THE SALT II TREATY
HEARINGS
BBFORB THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
EX. Y, 96-1
THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PRO-
TOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT
II TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18,
1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS
SEPTEMBER 6, 7, 10, 11, AND 12, 1979
PART 4
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
THE SALT II TREATY
HEARINGS
before: thb
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SIXTH CONGKESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
EX. Y, 96-1
THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THB
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PRO-
TOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT
II TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18,
1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS
SEPTEMBER 6, 7, 10, 11, AND 12, 1979
PART 4
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
y4'f 76/z:^f2/shlf
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
<8-260O WASHINGTON ; 1979
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Stock No. 052-070-05135-3
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho. Chairman
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GEORGE McGOVERN, South Dakota
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN GLENN, Ohio
RICHARD (DICK) STONE, Florida
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
S. I. HAYAKAWA, California
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
WiLUAM B. Bader, Staff Director
Albert A. Lakeland, Jr., Minority Staff Director
(U)
CONTENTS
Hearing days: ^^^
September 6, 1979 1
September 7, 1979 149
September 10, 1979 275
September 11, 1979 397
September 12, 1979 435
Statement of:
Baugher, Peter Vincent, past chairman and present member, national
governing board, Ripon Society, Washington, D.C 166
Brennan, Donald, director, national security studies, Hudson Institute 363
Carey, John, past national commander. The American Legion, Washington,
D.C 157
Corterier, Peter, Grermany, Rapporteur, Political Committee, North Atlan-
tic Assembly 312
de Vries, Klaas G., Netherlands, Rapporteur, Military Committee, North
Atlantic Assembly 318
Earle, Hon. Ralph, II, Chairman of the U.S. SALT delegation 435
Hoffmann, Prof. Stanley, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass 277
Karber, Phillip A., vice president, BDM Corp 253
King, Mrs. Coretta Scott, member, Americans for SALT 87
Kirkland, Lane, secretary-treasurer, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C 191
Krol, John Cardinal, Archdiocese of Philadelphia, on behalf of the U.S.
Catholic Conference, Washington, D.C 116
Lodal, Jan, executive vice president, American Management Systems 398
May, Michael, associate director, Lawrence-Livermore Laboratory, Liver-
more, Calif 406
Mclntyre, Hon. Thomas J., Jr., president, Americans for SALT 84
Moorer, Adm. Thomas (retired), cochairman. Coalition for Peace Through
Strength, Washington, D.C 39
Nitze, Hon. Paul, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and former Secre-
tary of the Navy 402
Panofsky, Dr. Wolfgang, director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center 351
Perry, Hon. William J., Under Secretary for Research and Engineering,
Department of Defense 438
Randall, Dr. Claire, general secretary. National Council of Churches 131
Rostow, Eugene, chairman, executive committee. Committee on the Pres-
ent Danger, Washington, D.C 1
Schlafly, Phyllis, American Conservative Union 202
Schmidt, Robert D., president, American Committee on East-West Accord,
Washington, D.C 149
Scoville, Herbert J., Jr., member, governing board. New Directions, Wash-
ington, D.C 176
Teller, Dr. Edward, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace 231
Thyness, Paul, Norway, president. North Atlantic Assembly 298
Vorspan, Albert, vice president. Union of American Hebrew Congrega-
tions 139
Wall, Patrick, United Kingdom, Chairman, Military Committee, North
Atlantic Assembly 307
Warnke, Hon. Paul, former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and former Chief, SALT negotiations 345
Winn, Brig. Gen. David W. (retired), policy board. Institute of American
Relations, Washington, D.C 79
Yost, Ambassador Charles W., cochairman of Americans for SALT 90
(ffl)
IV
Insertions for the record: ^^^
Letter from Professor Rostow to Senator Church, dated September 27, 1979,
in regards to amendments, reservations and understandings 15
Foreign Relations Committee staff memorandum of June 25, 1979 on SALT
II legal and procedural issues 18
Prepared statement of Prof. Eugene V. Rostow 31
Prepared statement of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Retired 60
Prepared statement of Hon. Thomas J. Mclntyre, Jr 86
Prepared statement of Ambassador Charles W. Yost 92
Prepared statement of John Cardinal Krol 127
Prepared statement of Dr. Claire Randall 136
Prepared statement of Albert Vorspan 143
Prepared statement of Robert D. Schmidt 153
Prepared statement of John Carey 160
Prepared statement of Peter V. Baugher 170
Prepared statement of Herbert J. Scoville, Jr 178
Prepared statement of the AFL-CIO executive council 193
Prepared statement of Phyllis Schlafly 219
Prepared statement of Charles L. Teevan 228
Prepared statement of Dr. Edward Teller 239
Prepared statement of Phillip A. Karber 264
Prepared statement of Prof. George F. Kennan 276
Prepared statement of Prof. Stanley Hoffmann 289
Prepared statement of Paul Thyness 302
Prepared statement of Patrick Wall 309
Prepared statement of Peter Corterier 314
Prepared statement of Klaas G. de Vries 321
Prepared statement of Ambassador Paul C. Warnke 349
Prepared statement of Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky 357
Prepared statement of Donald Brennan 369
Passage from General Rowny's prepared statement of July 12, 1979,
supplied by Donald Brennan 380
Ambassador Warnke 's responses to additional questions submitted for the
record • 385
Dr. Panofsky's responses to additional questions submitted for the
record 387
Mr. Brennan's answers to additional questions submitted for the record ... 393
Prepared statement of Hon. Paul H. Nitze 403
Prepared statement of Michael M. May 411
Letter from Senator Church to Secretary Vance, dated July 16, 1979,
regarding Soviet views concerning multiple protective structure basing
for M-X missile, and his response thereto 433
Production rate of ALCM's, supplied by DOD 454
Protocol limitations on GLCM's and ALCM's, supplied by DOD 455
Prepared statement of Hon. William J. Perry 474
Ambassador Earle's and Dr. Perry's responses to additional questions
submitted for the record 480
Appendix:
Comparison of the Russian and English texts of the SALT II Treaty 487
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson's responses to additional questions for the
record of July 16, 1979, part 2 491
Additional comments submitted for the record by General Rowny 492
Additional statements received for the record:
Statements of Dr. Wes Schwemmer Cady, Katherine Eaton, and Dr. J.
David Edwards, on behalf of the American Association of University
Women, Washington, D.C 494
Statement of Raymond Nathan, director, American Ethical Union, Wash-
ington, D.C 497
Statement of Walter Hoffmann, chairman, Campaign for U.N. Reform,
Wayne, N.J 497
Statement of Glenn E. Watts, president. Communications Workers of
America, Washington, D.C 502
Statement of Edward F. Snyder, executive secretary of the Friends Com-
mittee on National Legislation, Washington, D.C 503
Statement of Stephen E. Seadler, president. Ideological Defense Center,
New York, N.Y 504
Statement of Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton, president. Pax Christi USA,
Chicago, 111 509
Page
Statement of Dr. Alan Geyer, representing the Council of Bishops and the
Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church, Washing-
ton, D.C 512
Statement of Col. Phelps Jones, U.S.A. (retired), director, National Security
and Foreign Affairs, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States,
Washington, D.C 516
Statement of The Woman's National Democratic Club, Political Action
Committee, Washington, D.C 520
Statement of Lester H. Ahlswede, representing Citizen-Taxpayers, Silver
Spring, Md 520
Statement of Benjamin M. Becker, Highland Park, 111 523
Statement of Roger A. Singerling, Hackettstown, N.J 525
Statement of Joseph E. Tracey, Jr., Wheaton, Md 526
SALT II TREATY
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1979
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, at 10:03 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Biden, Stone, Zorinsky, Javits, and
Hayakawa.
Also present: Senator Cranston.
Senator Biden. The hearing will come to order, please.
opening statement
This morning the Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins its
final series of hearings on the SALT II Treaty. Today and tomor-
row spokesmen for public groups will be testifying on this agree-
ment. Unfortunately, we will not be able to hear from all such
groups who have requested an opportunity to testify, but we have
asked for written statements from those not scheduled to appear
before this committee.
This morning we will hear from three groups critical of the
SALT II agreement, the Committee on the Present Danger, the
Coalition for Peace Through Strength, and the Institute of Ameri-
can Relations.
First, we will hear from Eugene Rostow, speaking as chairman of
the executive committee of the Committee on the Present Danger.
After questioning from the committee, we will hear from Adm.
Thomas Moorer on behalf of the Coalition for Peace Through
Strength. I understand that accompanying Admiral Moorer to re-
spond to questions is Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, former head of the
Defense Intelligence Agency.
Finally, we will hear from retired Gen. David W. Winn and Dr.
Victor Fediay, who will speak on behalf of the Institute of Ameri-
can Relations.
Professor Rostow, would you please proceed?
STATEMENT OF EUGENE ROSTOW, CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER, WASH-
INGTON, D.C
Mr. Rostow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to express my own thanks and that of the Commit-
tee on the Present Danger for your invitation to appear today to
testify on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. I am appearing on
' See page 31 for Mr. Rostow's prepared statement.
(1)
behalf of the Committee on the Present Danger, as you said. You
have the two formal statements we have issued, as well as related
materials, and the statement prepared for these hearings.
The conclusions in our July 19 statement prepared for the hear-
ing before your subcommittee. Senator Biden, states: We believe, a
positive and affirmative program for putting SALT II and the
SALT negotiating process into the context of our foreign and de-
fense policy as a whole. I emphasize that these conclusions are the
basis for our approach, and we have repeated them in the begin-
ning of the statement prepared for my submission this morning.
I thought that my brief opening remarks today would be most
useful to you if I supplemented our earlier work on this subject by
commenting on some of the key issues which have emerged in the
hearings so far.
The strongest argument for SALT II which has thus far been put
forward by the administration was summed up by a distinguished
Senator in these terms, "To reject SALT II would be to go over the
abyss." The variations on this theme are infinite. Some years ago I
counted a couple of hundred remarks of this tenor and then gave
up counting. President Carter has said that those who oppose the
treaty as it stands are warmongers and opponents of detente. Sec-
retary of State Vance is reported by the press to have said that he
would resign rather than preside over the end of detente and the
revival of the cold war. ,
The notion that the cold war is over, the notion that Soviet-
American relations have improved in recent years is, in our opin-
ion, a dangerous symptom of autointoxication. The cold war is
worse today than it has ever been, featured by Soviet threats and
thrusts far more sophisticated in character and on a far greater
scale than those of the simple days of the Berlin airlift and the
attack on Greece. But, as things get worse, many Americans tell
each other that they are getting better. o * t m tt
SALT II is a case in point. If ratified in its present form, SALT II
would be an act of submission on our part, legitimizing Soviet
superiority and military superiority in all spheres. It would be a
great Soviet victory in the cold war and would be so perceived
everywhere in the world. But we keep repeating to ourselves that
SALT II would be a step toward stability, detente, and peace.
This statement is made so often that we accept it as self-evident.
But it is not self-evident. The SALT I package was ratified in 1972
on the basis of the same litany of arguments which have been
offered to the Senate and the American people this year, offered
under very different political and military circumstances, but of-
fered nonetheless.
The period since 1972 has been the worst period of the cold war.
It has been the period in which the agreements made for peace in
Indochina were openly violated. The promises made to President
Nixon in May 1972, with respect to peace in the Middle East were
openly violated. It has been the period of the Soviet campaign in
Africa and Asia and even of Soviet attempts to penetrate the
Caribbean, as we have noticed suddenly in the last few days.
In view of the betrayal of every promise and every expectation
on the basis of which SALT I was ratified, how can these argu-
ments be put forward and how can they retain their plausibility?
The fact that they do recalls President Kennedy's celebrated quip
that if you are cheated once, it is their fault, but if you are cheated
a second time, it is your own.
Many of those who believe that rejecting SALT II, as it stands,
would be "going over the abyss" attribute nearly magic influence
to arms limitation agreements. Nothing in the history of such
agreements gives the slightest encouragement for such beliefs.
The Treaty of Versailles was the most important of modern arms
limitation agreements. It set limits on German armaments and it
prescribed the demilitarization of the Rhineland, which was also
guaranteed by the Locarno Treaty. If Britain had been willing to
join France in enforcing that treaty, World War II would never
have taken place. But when the treaty was violated — secretly at
first, then openly when Hitler introduced conscription in 1935 and
marched into the Rhineland in 1936 — Great Britain and France did
nothing but wring their hands and try to persuade Hitler to sign
new treaties limiting arms.
The second most important arms limitation agreement of modern
times was the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and its successors
of the early 1930's. Our experience under that treaty, too, was
hardly more inspiring than the record of Versailles.
I could mention other instances, even more depressing: the agree-
ments for demilitarized zones in Korea and Vietnam, for example;
the Laos accord of 1962, or the arrangement to keep the PLO out of
southern Lebanon.
The argument that to reject SALT would be to go over the abyss
has another dimension, the notion that such action on our part
would make the Soviet Union more aggressive than it is. The claim
betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of the Soviet Union and
of the serious and devoted men who govern it. They are already
behaving as badly from our point of view as they dare. They take
every opportunity to expand, and they manufacture several. There
is no use getting excited about it. That is the nature of their policy.
As a distinguished professor at Princeton has said, they are still in
the mood of imperialism of the eighteenth century which we in the
west have long since given up.
There is only one argument which can deter Soviet expansion
and that is the calm confrontation of unacceptable risks. This
factor prevailed in a dozen crises since 1945, from the Berlin block-
ade to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. It is the visible erosion of
that conviction since 1972 or so which has invited a series of Soviet
thrusts on every continent and every ocean. In recent years, the
pace of Soviet expansion has increased as a result of the shock of
Vietnam and Watergate to American public opinion and the per-
ception in the Soviet Union of President Carter as a weak Presi-
dent.
The claim that it would cost us more money to refuse ratification
of SALT at the present time or to ratify it only on the conditions
that we have outlined here is equally specious. Administration
spokesmen have taken many different positions on this question.
Paul Warnke has said that it would cost more money if we ratified
SALT, but that the increase could not be ratified. Secretary of
Defense Brown has testified that it would cost perhaps between $1
billion and $2 billion a year for 4 or 5 years. Now he offers higher
estimates. Mr. Gelb has recently written that saving money is the
main argument for ratifying SALT. The fact is that in an area of
complex and rapidly changing technology, none of these estimates
is of much consequence.
Ambassador Harriman has offered a variant of the abyss argu-
ment. Not to accept SALT, he said, would lead to the election of a
hardliner to succeed Mr. Brezhnev. The notion that Mr. Brezhnev
is a moderate in any sense that we can recognize is denied by
anything he has said and done since he became a public figure. He
is the author of the Brezhnev doctrine. He claims the right to
intervene in any country at any time in behalf either of a socialist
government or of a progressive movement, that is to say, a move-
ment he regards as progressive. He is the author of the attacks on
°the Middle East in 1967 and 1973, and of the attack on Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968. To call Brezhnev a moderate is an abuse of the
English language.
Of course, there are differences within the Kremlm, and there
probably are groups and sects within the Kremlin, but according to
any information we have or have seen, they do not concern Soviet-
American relations, nor is there any evidence that any Soviet
leader accepts our definition of detente. Of course they all want to
see SALT II ratified. They made enormous progress under SALT I,
and they expect to make even more under SALT II. Furthermore,
if we ever do wake up and decide to restore the military balance,
they would surely lose as a consequence, because their economy is
so much smaller and weaker than our own. But these are hardly
reasons to take the treaty as it stands.
The second best argument offered by the administration for the
treaty is that it would not do much harm and should therefore be
ratified to demonstrate to our friends and our adversaries that we
really do have a government. It is an argument which appeals very
strongly to all Americans. For the best of reasons, we tend to rally
to the flag when it is under fire, and President Carter is surely
under fire.
The fatal flaw in this argument, however, is that the treaty is
not harmless. It would do a great deal of harm. It would lock us
into a position of strategic inferiority which would also be unstable
and unverifiable, the perfect recipe for Soviet nuclear blackmail
during the period of our greatest relative weakness in the early
and middle 1980's.
Moreover, it would prevent us from redressing the military bal-
ance during that period. No spokesman for the administration has
as yet seriously addressed the principal issues raised in this con-
nection by its critics. All studies of the problem agree that if
present trends continue just a few years longer, the Soviet Union
will have significant nuclear superiority in the early 1980's, the
capacity, that is, to make a pre-emptive first strike by destroying
our ICBM's, our planes on the ground, and our submarines in port
with a fraction of their nuclear force, holding enough accurate
missiles in reserve to neutralize the whole of our own nuclear
This possibility has been on everybody's mind as a nightmare for
years. The prospect that these risks will materialize has become
very much worse because President Carter has canceled, postponed.
or stretched out the programs initiated by his predecessors to deal
with them. The answer of the administration to this analysis is
that we could use our submarines in response to any such threat
and we could therefore deter it.
Some have even come so far £is to argue — Secretary Vance did
so — that we might launch our ICBM's on warning within a few
moments of receiving a radar signal that such an attack was on its
way. Then, finally they say that when the M-X missile becomes
available in significant quantities in 1989, it will provide an answer
to the vulnerability of our ICBM force. But what are we supposed
to do in the meantime, between now and 1989, or between the
period in the early 1980's when this possibility becomes a somber
prospect?
The administration answers this question by ignoring it.
Under these circumstances, we should be vulnerable to nuclear
war or nuclear blackmail. We should face a condition of diplomatic
impotence and be totally unable to use our conventional forces.
That is the linkage between the nuclear balance and the whole of
the rest of our foreign policy, which can never be escaped.
What would we do if there were a Macedonian uprising in
Greece, for example, supported from Bulgaria? If Iceland or
Norway were pushed somehow out of NATO? If we were told by
the Soviet Union to get our fleet and our forces out of the Mediter-
ranean? Under such circumstances, would either the Soviet Union
or our allies believe in the possibility of reprisal from submarines
which in turn would be suicidal for us? That was the argument,
you will recall, that General DeGaulle made some years ago about
the credibility of our nuclear weapons, and it is an argument which
is becoming more and more visible in the minds of our allies as
well as in the minds of the Soviets.
The only answer thus far from President Carter and his aides
has been a reiteration of their blind faith in the doctrine of mutual
assured destruction, the McNamara doctrine, by which we have
lived for more than a decade. It is the heart and nearly the whole
of the administration case for SALT II.
As former Secretary of State Kissinger emphasized in Brussels
last Saturday, that argument is losing its intellectual and political
plausibility. We simply must move and move rapidly to counter-
force strategies.
But the treaty would prevent us from undertaking the most
feasible and perhaps the only credible and practical counterforce
program that could preserve our second strike capability during
the early and middle 1980's: to reopen the Minuteman III produc-
tion lines which the President has recently closed, to make a great
many Minuteman Ill's; and to deploy them in multiple vertical
protected shelters, the so-called shell game.
The Soviets take the view that any such approach on our part is
prohibited by article IV of the treaty and by the provisions of the
treaty banning deliberate concealment. They say that each shelter
would be considered a fixed launcher, whether or not it contained a
missile, and in any event it would be a form of concealment in
their view which the treaty prohibits.
On either theory it would be banned. It may be an impracticable
approach for another reason under the treaty, because the number
required would be too great for the quotas of the treaty. That is,
Minuteman III is much smaller than many of the Soviet weapons,
and it carries only three warheads.
The administration has not, to my knowledge or to the knowl-
edge of any of my colleagues who have followed these things close-
ly, addressed the issue of a possible quick fix approach. Indeed, the
administration seems to assume that any program for protecting
our fixed ICBM's and other ground-based launchers in the early
eighties is impossible.
There are many other features of this treaty which are far from
harmless. The provisions with respect to heavy missiles, for exam-
ple; or the Backfire bomber; or the common understanding in
paragraph 8 of article IV which deals with the relationship of the
SS-16 intercontinental missile, and the SS-20 missile; or the cruise
missile problem, too, which has been much discussed.
Here we find the answer offered by the administration in these
hearings to be either nonexistent, or unresponsive and unsatisfac-
tory. This is true as well of what the administration has said on
verification. The administration has concentrated on the possibili-
ties of verifying the testing of new weapons, but has not answered
the questions which we and others have raised about the possibility
of counting missiles in warehouses and the absence of any re-
straints or any possible monitoring of restraints on the manufac-
ture of missiles rather than the deployment of launchers.
Our committee has recommended that the Senate should not
give its consent to the ratification of SALT II unless the most
important deficiencies of the treaty are modified by amendment
and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a
specific program that would achieve and maintain essential equiv-
alt^nce and adequate deterrence. Among the deficiencies of the
treaty requiring amendment I should list first our right to deploy
ICBM's in modes and in numbers we deem necessary to insure the
survival against surprise attack; the equal right of the two sides to
use heavy missiles; the inclusion of the Soviet Backfire and the SS-
20 within the numerical limits of the treaty; and provision for the
adoption of programs which would reverse the present ominous
situation of Soviet strategic superiority in Europe, including
change in the provisions regarding the range of land- and sea-based
cruise missiles and a clarification of the transfer of technology
issue causing so much concern to our allies.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me stress that the responsibility of
the Senate in voting on SALT II is unique in our history. Every
American shares the goal of achieving true detente with the Soviet
Union, which can only be defined, in my opinion, as a policy of
scrupulous and reciprocal respect for the rules of the charter of the
United Nations regarding the international use of force. True de-
tente in this sense is a central objective of the Committee on the
Present Danger and, I am sure, of the American people. Every
President and Congress since 1945 have gone to great lengths to
reach that goal, but President Carter's quest for detente with the
Soviet Union has been based on the misconception that acts of
unilateral disarmament on our part and other unilateral conces-
sions will induce the Soviet Union to follow suit.
As a result, President Carter has sacrificed our defenses and
weakened our alliances and abdicated his responsibility for the
security of the Nation. Under our Constitution, that responsibility
therefore falls on the Senate with respect to this treaty and ulti-
mately on the whole Congress and the people. We have not faced
decisions of such moment since the Presidency of James Buchanan.
President Carter likes to compare the debate over SALT II with
the controversy over the League of Nations in 1919, but the anal-
ogy is misleading. If you go back and look at it, the League vote
was not the result of the blind opposition of a small group of
willfuU men who prevented the ratification of the treaty. It was
President Wilson himself who urged the Democrats who followed
his lead on this matter, and there were 23 of them, to vote against
the treaty, with the reservations which had been negotiated by
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts as the leader. If only
seven more Democrats had refused to follow the President's lead
and had voted their convictions, the course of history might well
have been very different.
In the second place. President Wilson was proposing full and
responsible American participation in world politics. The position
today is just the opposite. President Carter is conducting a policy of
retreat to isolationism, and unless that policy is promptly reversed,
it will soon be beyond our power to do so.
The coming decade will be as difficult and as dangerous as any
we have faced in our past. We have a very short time in which to
protect our future through allied diplomacy and deterrence rather
than through war. A two-ocean navy cannot be restored in a day or
a year, nor can the other programs we require to achieve effective
deterrence at every relevant level. It will be a ticklish time, calling
for cool nerves and a firm grasp of the problem.
The Soviet Union will not view an American awakening with
equanimity. It can be expected to take full advantage of positions
of relative superiority and the presence in office of a President
whom it perceives as weak.
The time to begin is now, and the place to begin is here. Normal-
ly, we look to our President to take the lead in decisions of this
order. It is now clear that President Carter is firmly committed to
another view. What is at stake, Mr. Chairman, is not the balance
of power alone, but the future of liberty. Democracy cannot survive
in the world unless America plays its full part in assuring its
future.
Forty years ago, as the doubts and vacillations of the thirties
were being swept away by events, a speaker rose to his feet in the
House of Commons to address the great issue of the looming war.
Leopold Amery, one of Churchill's companions in the political wil-
derness, shouted a remark from his seat before the speaker began:
"Speak for England," he said. In that spirit, I say to you, speak and
vote for America.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Professor, I am not sure where to begin.
First of all, I think your characterizations of President Carter
retreating to isolationism and abdicating his responsibility are a
little bit, to say the least, exaggerated. If we are in all the trouble
8
we are in, is because of the President, it is amazing to think he was
deft enough to do it all within 2 ¥2 years.
It reminds me a little bit of Henry Kissinger's testimony. He
came up here and told us all about what was wrong. Somehow I
just had the impression that he had been around when all this was
taking place.
ARMS UMITATION NOT A WISE WAY TO PROCEED
It seems as though you have made a very strong case for the
position that arms limitation treaties, regardless of the form, are
essentially useless documents. Isn't it really your position and the
position of the committee that arms limitation under any circum-
stances is not a wise way to go?
You give us the Treaty of Locarno. You go back and talk about
naval agreements. You offer through a historical analysis of how
every treaty related to arms limitation really was a useless docu-
ment. Isn't that what you are saying?
Mr. RosTOw. No. The Committee has said that it is m favor of
fair and verifiable and balanced arms limitation agreements.
Senator Biden. But do you really mean that?
Mr. RosTOW. Yes, we really mean it. I have pointed out that
there was one very famous arms limitation agreement, which has
worked very well, that is the agreement with Great Britain about
the demilitarization of the Great Lakes, which was made back at
the time of the War of 1812, just after that war. It has lasted for a
long time. t i • 1 t
Senator Biden. I think I am getting the picture. I think I am
beginning to understand.
Mr. RosTOW. The point is, if you have arms limitation treaty
arrangements between people who fundamentally agree with each
other, they can be very useful, or if you have arms limitation
agreements between people who do not at all agree with each
other, or who agree with each other about the meaning of the
terms, they could be useful.
Senator Biden, you suggested that I couldn't possibly mean what
I said, that I was attacking the President unfairly. I should like to
respond to that if I may for a moment.
Senator Biden. Please try to do it as briefly as I did, because I
have other questions.
Mr. RosTOW. I had only 15 minutes in which to open this morn-
ing.
Senator Biden. Right, I only have 10 minutes.
Mr. RosTOW. I wanted to focus on the issues that have emerged
in this debate over the ratification of the treaty. In a great many
other statements over the years, I have severely criticized the
administrations of President Nixon and President Ford with great
impartiality for various things which they did and did not do. I
think the responsibility, for example, for initiating the notion that
detente had replaced the cold war goes to President Nixon, who
claimed much too much for his policy of rapprochement in negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union. But remember. Senator Biden, my
primary responsibility in life is that of a professor, and our respon-
sibility, I believe profoundly, is to call the shots as we see them.
I do think that the President's foreign policy, and particularly
his action in canceling and postponing the B-1 bomber and the
neutron enhanced radiation warhead, his treatment of the M-X
Minuteman III, the Trident, and all the rest of that sad story is
very costly and has been a very damaging series of moves.
REOPEN MINUTEMAN III PRODUCTION UNES
Senator Biden. Professor, you stated that the United States
should reopen the Minuteman III production line and deploy the
Minuteman in multiple vertical shelters, but the Defense Depart-
ment says if the Minuteman III were modified and made mobile, it
would be ready only a year ahead of the M-X. It would also have
considerably less capability than the M-X, because it would not be
capable of handling 10 MIRVed vehicles. So it really would not
change our strategic position in the early 1980's.
Do you agree with that or not?
Mr. RosTOw. Certainly if the M-X could be produced earlier I
would not be in the slightest bit interested in reopening the Min-
uteman production lines. I am trying to fill this gap with the
Minuteman, but my understanding was that it would not take so
long to resume the production of Minuteman III as it would take
now to perfect the M-X, which has been delayed for so long, but
the fundamental point is whether under a forced draft we could
move ahead quickly either with the M-X or the Minuteman III.
I should, of course, be in favor of the one the experts thought
was most effective.
Senator Biden. The experts tell us that is the M-X.
Mr. RosTOW. The basic point is, the treaty would prevent either
solution.
Senator Biden. How can you say that? Why would the treaty
prevent either solution? I just came back after 6 days in Moscow.
We raised the M-X question with the Soviets. We told them we
would be going forward with the M-X. They are fully aware of its
going forward. Nobody in the whole world has any real doubt about
what the intentions are. There was no indication that there was, as
you have indicated, a firm position taken that that would absolute-
ly violate the SALT agreement. I don't know where you get your
information. I have not been able to find any of that information. I
have not been able to find any information that any of our allies —
any of our allies, any of them, including the military people with
whom I met, from General Rogers to the German Command —
doubt that we are going ahead.
I don't know where you get your information. I don't know
where it comes from. You make these bald assertions. Quite frank-
ly, I find no s)mipathy for them. Please tell me what we can't do. I
have asked you this question before. What can we not do that you
feel needs to be done if this SALT Treaty goes forward and is
ratified?
Mr. RosTOW. Well, I just testified, and I put into my prepared
statement. Senator Biden, that the Russian view of the matter is,
and I have in front of me a State Department paper prepared for
Senator Stennis and the Armed Services Committee confirming
that
Senator Biden. Please read it to me. It would be helpful.
10
Mr. RosTOW. Yes.
MPS System in Relation to The Treaty Discussion. This issue was raised by the
Soviet delegation in Geneva in July 1978, referring to newspaper accounts concern-
ing the multiple aim point system using vertical shelters. The Soviets stated that it
appeared such a deployment would violate both the ban on construction of new
fixed ICBM silo launchers and the ban on deliberate concealment measures.
The United States delegation replied that no decision had been made regarding a
basing mode, but that whatever mode the United States adopted would be one that
violated neither of the provisions cited by the Soviets.
They further stated that:
A draft agreement expressly provided for the deployment after protocol expiration
of an ICBM system in which missiles and their launchers are moved from point to
point. The subject matter was not addressed again by the delegations.
Senator Biden. Right. That was 1978, a year ago. Since then we
have signed a treaty. Didn't you say that was July 1978?
Mr. RosTOW. Yes; that is what it says.
Senator Biden. All right. That was 1 year ago. In the meantime
there was a great deal of negotiation and the treaty was signed.
Mr. RosTOW. It says this issue was never raised again.
Senator Biden. But it was raised by us publicly. It was raised by
us throughout the world. We made what we are going to do clear.
There has been no response to it, indicating the Soviets objection.
Mr. RosTOW. Do you think that constitutes Soviet acceptance?
Senator Biden. I don't think the Soviets have to accept it. We go
forward with what we tell the world we are going to do, and what
we tell them we are going to do prior to the treaty's ratification.
Mr. RosTOW. Then they will say we violated the treaty,
Senator Biden. If they then say we have violated the treaty and
they want to pull out, then they can pull out. We have stated our
position. If in fact they respond by not saying anything and do not
physically or verbally respond to it, and we are able to go forward,
then they have acquiesced.
Mr. RosTOW. But Senator Biden, how do you reconcile these fixed
shelters with the definition of the launcher in article IV?
Senator Biden. Actually the way I reconcile it is that our De-
fense Department tells us we should not go the way you suggest
anyway. We should go the M-X route.
Mr. RosTOW. Well, very well, but on the M-X route, which mode
of deployment has the administration adopted as of August 1?
Senator Biden. They have not adopted one.
Mr. RosTOW. That is right.
Senator Biden. But the point is, we will adopt whatever our
military indicates to us is the best mode to adopt.
Mr. RosTOw. Within the limitations of the treaty.
Senator Biden. And all of them are within the limitations of the
treaty.
Mr. RosTOW. Well, Senator, I am sorry, but I cant agree with
you. I think that the Soviet analysis of the treaty is correct. To get
into a position under a treaty before it is ratified in which you
have a dispute with the Soviet Union as to its meaning on an
absolutely fundamental point is in my opinion a most unwise pro-
cedure. It may be, as you say, that this would put the onus of
abrogating the treaty on the other fellow, but that is not the object
of going into a treaty.
11
The object of going into a treaty of arms limitation is to clarify
things as much as possible and to help build mutual good faith and
trust.
Senator Biden. Precisely. We would clarify that.
My time is up. I will come back to that if there is time.
Senator Javits?
Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
RIGHT TO DEPLOY ICBM's IN NUMBERS WE DEEM NECESSARY
Professor Rostow, I notice in your statement you say something
which I would like to read into the record. You give your conclu-
sions, and the second conclusion reads:
That the Senate withhold its consent to the ratification of the treaty the Presi-
dent has submitted unless and until it is modified to meet its demonstrated deficien-
cies and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program
that will achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence.
I then look further in your statement in which you say that:
The Senate should not give its consent to the ratification of SALT II unless the
most important deficiencies of the treaty are modified by amendment: "Among the
deficiencies of the treaty requiring amendment, I should list first our right to deploy
ICBM's in modes and numbers we deem necessary to ensure survival against sur-
prise attack."
Now, isn't it a fact that if we ask for that, the Russians will too?
This is not a one-party game. In other words, they will ask for the
right to deploy whatever ICBM basing mode and numbers they
please. Mr. Rostow, is that a treaty, or are you engaging in a
charade with us?
You know very well, as well as I do, that there is no treaty the
minute they deploy as many as they want and we deploy as many
as we want. What are we talking about?
Mr. Rostow. I am not talking about a charade. I am not very
good at charades. Senator Javits. I am talking about a negotiation
to adjust the modes and numbers provided for in the treaty so that
we can deal with the problem of the vulnerability of the ICBM's
which has been so much discussed. I want to solve that problem
through agreement with the Russians. You ask whether the Soviets
won't ask for equal priviledges, of course. But they are already
deploying variable range mobile SS-20 missiles which are MIRVed,
and can reach the United States, but are not covered by the treaty.
The Soviet Union now has the capacity through its SS-20's in
Europe to reach the United States by a simple device, well, by two
simple devices, either by adding an extra booster to the SS-20 and
making it into an SS-16, or by substituting a single warhead on the
SS-20.
Now, we raise the question here as well in paragraph 3, to clarify
those points, of including the Soviet Backfire and the SS-20 within
the numerical limits of the treaty for that reason. We are trying
simply to point out consequences of this treaty as we analyze it
which would make it a much fairer, more equal, more balanced,
and more livable treaty. This is not a charade at all. This is dealing
with the most vital subject of our national security, the question of
whether the strategic balance on which the possibility of diplomat-
ic influence and the use of conventional force depends is going to
be tipped adversely to our interests.
1+8-260 0-79 Pt.4 - 2
12
Senator Javits. Professor, I asked you directly this: if we want to
build all the ICBM's that we choose to build under a treaty, don't
you expect the Russians to get the same right? Would you say yes
or no to that?
Mr. RosTOw. Senator Javits, I cannot say yes or no to that
because that is not what I said. I didn't say that we want to deploy
all the ICBM's we want. We want to deploy ICBM's in modes and
numbers we deem necessary to insure their survival, and we are
talking about negotiating an agreement with the Russians on that
point.
Senator Javits. And that is not equivalent to all we want as you
define it?
Mr. RosTOw. No, I am talking about negotiation. There is no
limit on ICBM production in the treaty. We are talking about using
them and being very direct with the Soviet Union. I am talking
about amendments, not unilateral declarations.
SIMPLY AGAINST THE TREATY
Senator Javits. My dear friend, you are talking about no treaty.
What I am trying to get you to say, because that is what you do
say, whether you are trying to avoid it or not, is, you are simply
against the treaty. You want no treaty. Why do you give us this
nonsense about renegotiation of a treaty with amendments when
you know that you are taking the whole heart out of the treaty
when there is no limit on us and no limit on them? We are just
playing with words.
Mr. RosTOW. Well, I haven't characterized the administration in
that way, but yes, I think it is a fair characterization.
Senator Javits. I am not saying it is the administration. I am
saying it is you, not the administration.
Mr. RosTOW. Well, there can be two opinions about that. I am
talking here, or was trying to talk here. Senator Javits, about
renegotiating this treaty. The treaty is not the essential point. The
essential point, as we tried to make clear in our statement is to
have a foreign policy and a defense policy that would secure the
interests of the Nation.
A fair and balanced and verifiable treaty might do that, but we
do not think that this treaty is fair, balanced, and verifiable, and
we think it would be a profound mistake for the Senate to approve
its ratification, to consent to its ratification in its present form.
Now, you can characterize that position as anything you like, of
course, but we have tried to make it clear in a succession of
statements going back to 1976 exactly what we are saying and why.
ARMAMENTS TREATY BETWEEN NATIONS THAT AGREE
Senator Javits. I have already given my view as to what you are
trying to do to this treaty. I wish that your organization, like other
organizations, would simply be frank about it and say you are
against it, and you believe that the only eventuality is for us to
make the maximum degree of preparation as rapidly as we can.
You gave your own analogy, and please correct me if I am wrong,
the only treaty that you believe can be an effective treaty to limit
13
armaments is between people who essentially agree with each
other. That excludes all treaties with the Russians.
So, should we just forget it and arm to the teeth and expect the
atomic war which is sure to come, as all of history has shown since
man began?
Mr. RosTOW. Senator Javits, in my reading of history war comes
when people feel they are losing control of the situation and when
one side becomes very much stronger than the other. Then they
strike out in desperation. The point was never better put than by
Thucydides about the causes of the Peloponnesian War, which
destroyed Greek civilization. He said, there were all sorts of epi-
sodes preceding that war, but the real cause of the war was the rise
in the power of Athens and the fear which this caused in Sparta.
Now, it is that fear which we are trying to overcome by urging
preparations for deterrent strength that would prevent war. The
Romans used to say, if you want peace, prepare for war, and we
say that in dealing with the Russians, there is no use getting
excited about it. The only way to deter them is to present, very
calmly, unacceptable risks. That is what we did in the Cuban
missile crisis in 1962. That is what we did in Berlin in 1948, and in
Greece, and in Turkey, and in a dozen other crises of the period.
We stood firm. We used conventional forces, and in the end, we
prevailed.
Now, the risk of war in my opinion is just the reverse of what
you say. I don't think that a SALT II Treaty would advance the
cause of peace any more than the SALT I Interim Agreement did.
The SALT I Interim Agreement was signed, and I think it was very
reasonable to sign it under the expectations of that period. I sup-
ported it. I support it now. But we have to recognize that all the
expectations on the basis of which we signed that treaty have been
betrayed.
That is to say, we were promised peace in Indochina and peace in
the Middle East, instead of which we got the reverse.
Senator Javits. All right. I see that my time is up. We can get
back to this.
Senator Biden. I will yield to you my time to keep up this line of
questioning.
Senator Javits. Thank you.
LEGAUTY OF ATTACKING RESERVATIONS
I am not yet myself committed to this treaty, but the administra-
tion, I think, has put it to us on the basis that we do not lose the
opportunity to go forward, but we put a cap at least on where we
both are. I don't see that you have answered that at all, and 1 will
tell you why, if I may.
I do not think that we are defining terms in the same way. Let
me give you a practical example. I notice in your testimony which
you made when you appeared before us in July, you were asked by
Senator Biden, "The vertical shelter game can be done, assuming
that we pass a reservation interpreting the verification provision so
as to allow the vertical shelter game." At that point you interrupt-
ed: "Mr. RosTOW. Mr. Chairman, a reservation has the same legal
effect as a letter from my mother."
Now, do you still maintain that position?
14
Mr. RosTOW. Yes.
Senator Javits. Why?
Mr. RosTOW. In the context of this kind of a treaty; that is, as
compared with a tax treaty or a multilateral treaty, a reservation
would have the most ambiguous and uncertain effect on the other
side. The Russians have said very openly that they would regard
such a reservation as a unilateral, domestic matter and would not
treat it as significant.
Senator Javits. Let me interrupt you. I would like to give you an
historical analogy. When the Russians signed the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, they announced publicly that they would not consider a
unified Europe to be a nuclear power even though France and
Britain were both nuclear powers and would be part of it. We
announced exactly the contrary at exactly the same time. That did
not invalidate the Non-Proliferation Treaty, did it? We both are
going to wait for the eventuality, and if either of us wanted to pull
out, we could.
Mr. RosTOW. My clear recollection is that we told the Russians
that if they said that a united Europe could not become a nuclear
power by virtue of the doctrine of succession in international law,
that the treaty was abrogated. That is the background of the
unilateral interpretations controversy over the 1972 agreement.
Now, it is not my recollection that the Russians ever made any
public announcement. I may be wrong — indeed, I often am — but
my recollection is that the Russians kept quiet on the issue after
both Rusk and Rogers testified.
Senator Javits. Well, there is no use in our arguing that, be-
cause that will just have to be corrected from the record, but my
recollection is exactly the contrary.
Mr. RosTOW. Very well.
INSISTENCE ON AMENDMENT TERMINOLOGY
Senator Javits. Now, the reservation proposition is a declaration
which is put into the instrument of ratification so that when we
ratify, we ratify with that reservation, and when they ratify they
ratify with that reservation in it. I don't understand why you want
the amendment business, except that you know as well as I do that
now the Russians have to face the proposition on amendments.
Brezhnev and Gromyko have said: "If you call it an amendment,
forget it, we can't take it, there is no treaty," so we are going to
call it a reservation. What is the difference? Do you just want to
call it an amendment to torpedo the treaty? Is that why you insist
on it?
Mr. RosTOW. After my exchange with Senator Biden, which you
just quoted, I checked with my colleagues, with professors of inter-
national law at the Yale Law School. They agree with me that a
reservation under these circumstances would not be binding on the
other party unless it were accepted, that silence would not be
acceptance, and therefore the reservation could not be regarded as
more than a unilateral statement for this kind of treaty.
There is no possibility that these issues would go to the courts. In
one of the leading American cases on the distinction between reser-
vations and amendments, the Court of Appeals for the Second
15
Circuit in New York threw out a reservation for a treaty on the
ground that it was not germane to the subject matter.
CIRCUMSTANCES MAKING RESERVATION INOPERATIVE
Senator Javits. Well, I think you are qualifying it. Now I am a
lawyer, too, and I don't know what circumstances you are talking
about. What are they? What are the particular circumstances that
make a reservation inoperative under this matter?
General Winn. Mind you, they have been included in the resolu-
tion of ratification which the President must do. He has no choice,
and therefore they will be part of the ratification papers of both
parties. I just do not understand that particular effort to attack
this matter.
UNILATERAL MATTER NOT BINDING SOVIETS
Mr. RosTOW. The Russians have already said that this is a uni-
lateral matter and it would not bind them.
Senator Javits. Professor Rostow, if this treaty is ended because
we don't agree on an interpretation, doesn't that suit you fine? You
wouldn't be complaining about it. You would love it. You are
against the treaty. Why are you debating with us as to what we
want to put in if we are for it? You are against it. So if it blows up,
you are delighted. You think it is good for the country.
Mr. RosTOW. Senator Javits, first of all, I have spent a large part
of my life trying to make agreements with the Russians. I was the
lend lease desk officer in the State Department during the war,
and developed the plan for the first reconstruction loans to the
Russians. Second, as you know very well, I am a professor. I cannot
resist the lure of an issue.
Senator Javits. Right, and I don't think you can resist the lure
of your own thinking either, whatever may be the realities of the
situation.
Mr. RosTOW. Well, that is a sin from which we all suffer. Sena-
tor. [General laughter.]
Senator Javits. Would you be good enough to submit a memo-
randum to us, a legal memorandum by you and your associates as
to why you believe that a reservation in this treaty has the same
legal effect as a letter from my mother?
Mr. RosTOW. All right, I shall be glad to do that. I shall be happy
to submit a legal memorandum to you. Senator.
[The following information was subsequently received for the
record:]
Yale Universit\-, Law School,
New Haven, Conn., September 27, 1979.
Senator Frank Church,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On September 6th, I was asked by Senator Biden, the
Acting Chairman, and by Senator Javits to comment on the staff analysis of the
comparative legal status of "amendments", "reservations", and "understandings"
with which the Senate might decide to qualify its consent to the ratification of
SALT n. The staff analysis appears in two memoranda sent to me by Frederick S.
Tipson, Esq., on September 14th. Mr. Tipson's letter and its enclosures arrived here
on September 24th. Mr. Tipson also called my attention to the Administration
position on these questions contained in an exchange between you and Secretary
16
Vance at p. 182 of Part 1 of your Hearings on the SALT II Treaty, and in answers to
questions on the subject at pp. 606-607 of the same volume.
I have consulted my colleagues Professors Myres S. McDougal, Robert H. Bork,
Joseph W. Bishop, Leon Lipson, and W. Michael Reisman on this issue, and I am
authorized to say that they join me in this letter.
Both our own usage and international practice have employed a number of words
to identify conditions imposed on the ratification of treaties, as the undated memo-
randum of Mssrs. Glennon and Tipson points out: amendments, reservations, unilat-
eral or common understandings, declarations, explanations, clarifications and so on.
Some may deal only with domestic legal or political problems, or indeed with
problems not germane to the subject matter of the treaty. For example, if the
Senate should condition its consent to the ratification of SALT II on an increase in
our own defense budget of 3%, 5%, or 10%, that condition— however it is labelled—
would not concern the Soviet Union, and obviously would not require its agreement.
On the other hand, the issues listed in my testimony on September 6th as
problems which should be clarified by the Senate before ratification do concern the
substance of the Treaty. They are matters on which the utmost precision is desir-
able in the interest of the great national objectives sought through the negotiation
of SALT IL ^ ^.
The heart of our disagreement with those who would deal with questions of this
order through "reservations" or "understandings" rather than "amendments" ap-
pears on p. 8 of the Glennon-Tipson memorandum, where the authors say that if
"reservations" or "understandings" adopted by the Senate as conditions to its con-
sent to ratification are included in the instrument of ratification, and if the Soviet
Union "proceeds with the exchange of instruments of ratification, its silence consti-
tutes assent to the treaties as modified by the United States." We believe it is
impossible to state the idea as a universal rule in this absolute form. Neither
international law nor political prudence justify placing so heavy a burden on the
interpretation of Soviet silence.
The supposed rule of assent through silence urged in the Glennon-Tipson memo-
randum does not correspond to the rule stated in Sections 124 and 126 of the
American Law Institute Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States and in many other authoritative comments on International law. There is no
assurance that the construction favored by your advisers is widely accepted for the
modification of bilateral treaties. Even more important, there is every indication
that the Soviet Union does not accept such a rule, but continues to rely on -more
formal distinctions among amendments, reservations, and other forms of treaty
modification. . ,,
Soviet spokesmen say repeatedly that they do not care what reservations we
adopt, since "reservations" are entirely internal in their effect. SALT II concerns
matters of the highest possible importance to the security of the United States and
of many other nations. International law on this subject, never clear cut, is now in
flux, in large part because of the influence of certain obscure, potentially inconsist-
ent, and controversial provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
To assume that the future of SALT II would be governed by so simplistic a rule as
that stated in the Glennon-Tipson memorandum would be risky at best, and, on
matters essential to the security of the United States, foolhardy.
Traditionally, both international law and our own practice used different words to
identify somewhat different procedures for altering a Treaty during the ratification
process. "Amendment" was the least ambiguous word customarily used. When the
Senate consented to ratification with an amendment, it was understood that the
President would submit the proposed change in the text of the Treaty to the other
party or parties, and obtain his or their consent to the amendment prior to ratifica-
tion. "Reservation", on the other hand, was a more ambiguous word used in a
variety of contexts. Section 124 of the Restatement defines the word "reservation"
as "a formal declaration made by a signatory before it becomes bound by an
international agreement that the agreement will not be binding upon it except upon
terms that it regards as changing the effect of the agreement under international
law." International and American usage is, however, less strict than the Restate-
ment definition. Often, the word "reservation" denotes unconditional consent by the
Senate to ratification, subject to a proviso which could have different consequences
in different settings. It is most often used in connection with multilateral treaties.
"Understanding" and "interpretation" have been used in even more fluid ways.
Since the Glennon-Tipson memorandum seems to rely heavily on a paragraph of
Article 20 of the Vienna Convention, it should be noted that in this regard the
Convention is having a regressive effect on international law. It seems to lump all
forms of treaty emendation and alteration together as "Reservations". Thus it
multiplies doubts and ambiguities, and reduces clarity. Some experts believe that
17
the provisions of the convention on reservations apply only to multilateral treaties.
Others believe the purpose of the Convention is to deal with the problem universal-
ly. But all must concede that the purport and scope of the provisions are uncertain.
(The text of Articles 19 and 20 of the Vienna Convention appears in an Appendix
to this letter.)
In their language and range of reference, Sections 2-4 of Article 20 seem to refer
only to multilateral treaties. And the Commentary of the International Law Com-
mission on the Draft which became the Vienna Convention is clearly of the view
that the Convention would apply only to multilateral treaties, on the ground that "a
reservation to a bilateral treaty presents no problem, because it amounts to a new
proposal reopening the negotiations between the two states concerning the terms of
the treaty. If they arrive at an agreement whether adopting or rejecting the reser-
vation— the treaty will be concluded. If not, it will fall to the ground."
If however, these provisions of the Vienna Convention should be interpreted to
apply to bilateral treaties like SALT II, would Section 2 govern? Section 5? If they
do not apply, under what circumstances should agreement to a reservation be
inferred from silence during the ratification process, even after twelve months?
Customary international law is full of episodes of controversy, doubt and confusion.
In view of the unsettled character of international law on the subject at this time,
we believe that if the Senate wishes to condition its consent to the ratification of
SALT II on certain modifications, clarifications, or interpretations of the text before
it, it should proceed only upon the express condition that the Soviet Union formally
and explicitly agree to each of our proposals for change in its instrument of
ratification.
It is, however, clear both in Secretary Vance's comments to you at p. 182 of the
Hearings and from the State Department's statements on pp. 606-607 that the
Administration is rel3ring heavily on Soviet "silence" as an important part of the
cement of this Treaty, and on our capacity to denounce the Treaty as the sanction
behind our views. But where is the evidence that the Soviet Union accepts "silence"
as a modality for binding itself to solemn international agreements? Whatever
evidence we have seen goes the other way.
The melancholy history of the "unilateral interpretations" of the Interim Agree-
ment on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms put forward by Administration
spokesman in 1972 is enough to warn against reliance on such a procedure. In that
case the Soviet Union remained silent while we expounded our interpretations of
the Agreement. They then violated the agreement as we interpreted it. Despite our
repeated statements to the contrary, we did not denounce the Agreement. Too much
was deemed to be at stake to make such a course advisable. Furthermore, our
capacity to denounce such a Treaty at will was thought to be at least doubtful, in
the absence of a violation of an unambiguous and major term of the Treaty by the
other party. Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. CI. 340 (1886).
It is clear from the debate that many people prefer to label Senate conditions to
its consent as "reservations" rather than "amendments", despite the uncertainties
such a course would generate, because they are afraid that the Soviet Union would
simply refuse to negotiate any further in order to resolve questions which might be
raised by the Senate. It is almost inconceivable that the United States Senate would
adopt such a posture after mature reflection. As President Kennedy once said, "the
United States should never negotiate out of fear, and should never be afraid to
negotiate." Surely we should never knuckle under to a position of "Take it or leave
it", or any other form of ultimatum.
"The Senate should reach its conclusions about SALT II in terms of its analysis of
the Treaty's impact on our foreign and defense policies as a whole. If it finds there
are certain issues on which it would be desirable to alter the text, or to obtain
clarification from the Soviet Union, it should proceed to state those points in a form
that would require the unequivocal and explicit concurrence of the Soviet Union.
The notion that we should hesitate to raise fundamental questions for further
discussion with any nation out of fear is repugnant to our nature and to our history.
If the Soviet Union were as arbitrary and unreasonable as some spokesmen for the
Administration seem to think, no agreement with it would be worth having.
Yours sincerely,
Eugene V. Rostow.
The signatories to this letter, all members of the Yale Law School faculty, are:
Myres S. McDougal.
Robert H. Bork.
Joseph W. Bishop.
Leon Lipson.
William M. Reisman.
Eugene V. Rostow.
18
Appendix— Vienna CkJNVENTiON on the Law of Treaties
ARTICLE 19 — formulation OF RESERVATIONS
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) The treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include
the reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) In cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
ARTICLE 20 — ACCEPTANCE OF AND OBJECTION TO RESERVATIONS
1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent
acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides.
2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the
object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety
between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be
bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and
unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent
organ of that organization.
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty
otherwise provides:
(a) Acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the
reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when
the treaty is in force for those States;
(b) An objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not pre-
clude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving
States unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State;
(c) An act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and contain-
ing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has
accepted the reservation.
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty otherwise
provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall
have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months
after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its
consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.
Foreign Relations Committee Staff Memorandum of June 25, 1979 Referred
TO IN Mr. Rostow's Letter
Memorandum to: Members, Committee on Foreign Relations.
From: Michael J. Glennon and Frederick S. Tipson.
Subject: SALT II— Legal and Procedural Issues.
This is a preliminary summary of legal and procedural issues relating to the
SALT II Treaty. It attempts to clarify certain basic questions regarding Senate
consideration of the treaty and identifies other issues for more detailed considera-
tion in subsequent memoranda. Still other issues will undoubtedly arise in the
course of the debate and we will respond to particular inquiries as quickly as
possible.
The following subjects are addressed:
1. The Treaty and Associated Documents.
2. Consideration by the Senate.
3. Presidential Alternatives after Senate Action.
4. Soviet Ratification and Modification.
I. THE treaty and RELATED DOCUMENTS: LEGAL STATUS AND ANALYSIS
President Carter signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna on June 18. As a signatory,
the United States is not legally bound to the terms of the treaty, but under
international law it is generally accepted that a treaty signatory undertakes in good
faith a) to proceed with the process of ratification in accordance with its own
constitutional law, and b) to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty during a reasonable interim period.
The President has asked for Senate advice and consent only to the Treaty and
Protocol, presented as a single document. The Protocol is regarded as an "integral
part" of the treaty itself and is distinguished by its earlier expiration date: 1981
rather than 1985. (The 1972 SALT Interim Agreement contained a Protocol on
19
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the 1972 ABM Treaty was amended with
a Protocol in 1974.)
The President's formal letter of transmittal contains, in addition to the Secretary
of State's report on the purpose and provisions of the agreement, the following
documents:
1. Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, relating to particular articles
in both the Treaty and the Protocol;
2. A Memorandum of Understanding by the two sides certifying the figures on
their present numbers of strategic offensive systems, in accordance with article 17(3)
of the Treaty;
3. A Joint Statement of Principles agreed upon by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev
representing their general objectives with respect to further SALT negotiations;
4. A memorandum from the Secretary of State communicating the exchange of
statements on the Soviet "Backfire" bomber which took place at the Vienna summit
meeting in June.
These four documents, according to the President's letter of transmittal, have
been transmitted "for the information of the Senate," not for its advice and consent.
Under Senate precedent, such instruments are not susceptible of amendment in the
strict sense.' However, the Senate could "reach" such documents by conditioning its
advice and consent in one of several ways. First, it could amend the Treaty to
incorporate the terms of a collateral agreement (or an amended version thereof^
within the text of the Treaty itself — as it did in the case of the Carter-Torrijos
"Joint Statement" regarding the Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty. Second, it could
insist in a reservation that the terms of a collateral agreement be modified in
accordance with its instructions prior to ratification. Third, it could announce in a
reservation or understanding that it regards the provisions of a collateral agree-
ment or assurance as equal in status to the Treaty itself and consents to ratification
subject to that understanding. All such conditions, of course, would have to be
accepted by the Soviet Union prior to the exchange of the instruments of ratifica-
tion.
In the absence of explicit conditions attached by the Senate, the status and effect
of collateral or derivative agreements would be governed by international legal
principles of treaty interpretation. Thus, the Treaty would be interpreted in light of
the negotiating context including those agreements made or assurances offered in
connection with its conclusion. Subsequent agreements between the parties regard-
ing the interpretation or application of treaty provisions would also be taken into
account.
1. The Agreed Statements and Common Understandings comprise, in effect, a set
of supplementary agreements designed to elaborate the meaning of particular arti-
cles in both the Treaty and the Protocol. Earlier in the negotiations, "Agreed
Statements" were considered to have a somewhat higher standing than "Common
Understandings," but the Administration no longer suggests that there is any legal
or political basis for distinguishing between them. Similar terms were used in
connection with the SALT I agreements, but unlike SALT I, there are no "unilater-
al statements" by either side and all Agreed Statements and Common Understand-
ings have been signed by both sides.
2. The Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Data Base on
the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms relates to Article 17(3) of the Treaty. By
the terms of that article, the Parties agree to maintain such a data base on an
ongoing basis through the Standing Consultative Commission. The "M.O.U." itself
contains figures on strategic arms as of November 1, 1978. In accordance with an
earlier understanding, these figures were updated as of the date of treaty signature
(June 18, 1979), and these updated figures are contained in accompanying submis-
sions of each side.
3. The Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotia-
tions on the Limitation of Strategic Arms, though agreed to by both sides, is not by
its nature a binding legal agreement. It represents a set of general common objec-
tives rather than specific undertakings. A comparable joint statement of principles
' The chair noted on March 24, 1922, during the consideration of a treaty with the British
Empire, France and Japan concerning their insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean, that a
declaration of the signatories as to their understanding and intent made at the time the treaty
was signed was not a part of the treaty and not subject to amendment. Cong. Rec, March 24,
1922 at p. 4496. Similarly, the chair (Vice President Mondale, presiding), in response to a
parliamentary inquiry by Sen. Allen at the outset of the debate on the Panama Canal Treaties,
stated that only "the body of the treaty, including all of the articles, annexes thereto, protocols
to it, et cetera, is before the Senate for consideration and therefore amendable." Cong. Rec, Feb.
8, 1978 at p. SiSOO. "Other documents," the chair stated, "would not be subject to amendments."
Id.
20
for the SALT II negotiations was issued at the Washington summit meeting of June
21, 1973.
4. The section of the President's submission to the Senate headed "Soviet Backfire
Statement" comprises, in effect, a memorandum of the Secretary of State certifying
the exchange of statements (written and oral) regarding Soviet production and
deployment of the Backfire (TU-22M) bomber which took place at the summit
meeting in June. The form of the exchange apparently was negotiated in advance,
with the U.S. signature of the Treaty conditioned upon Soviet acceptance of the
restrictions contained in their written statement on the Backfire. The nature of this
agreement raises a number of legal questions. Because of the special role of the
Secretary of State in negotiating and communicating this exchange, it will be
important to clarify his own expectations regarding the Backfire statements.
Unilateral written or oral declarations can provide the basis for binding commit-
ments under international law and diplomatic practice, especially if the State
making them expects another State to rely upon them. In this case, U.S. reliance
upon the Soviet assurances is made explicit. However, it is not clear whether the
Soviets would regard the violation of this understanding as equivalent to a violation
of the Treaty itself. It is also not clear whether the Soviet undertakings are limited
to the period of the Treaty only— i.e., whether their effective date and termination
date are identical to those of the Treaty.
Finally, the Secretary of State's Report to the President refers to President
Carter's affirmation "that the United States has the right to an aircraft comparable
to Backfire" (p. 35), but this affirmation does not appear in the Secretary's memo-
randum recording the exchange of statements in Vienna (p. 73). In view of the
careful orchestration of these statements, it is not evident why it was not included.
Therefore, it is not apparent whether U.S. development and deployment of a compa-
rable bomber would be subject to the same restrictions on capability and production
rate as the Backfire.
II. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE TREATY
Upon transmittal to the Senate, the Treaty will be routinely referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations, which has exclusive jurisdiction over all treaties
under Rule 25. Ij of the Standing Rules of the Senate. While another Committee
may hold hearings on certain aspects of the agreement, treaties are never referred,
jointly or sequentially, to any Committee other than Foreign Relations.
A. Consideration by the committee
Committee rules make no special provision for the handling of treaties. Thus,
unless the Committee determines otherwise, the same procedure followed during the
consideration of other measures will be followed in considering the SALT II Treaty.
The Committee will have before it two items: the text of the Treaty (including the
Protocol and perhaps other documents considered part of the Treaty), and the
Resolution of Ratification. The latter can be introduced beforehand or reported as
an original resolution; the procedural difference is described in part B below.
The Senate may grant its advice and consent conditionally, and if the Committee
wishes to recommend that it do so, two kinds of conditions are available. The first is
an amendment to the text of the Treaty itself. The second is an amendment to the
Resolution of Ratification. Amendments to the Resolution are typically designated
reservations, understandings, interpretations, declarations, and statements. These
are also discussed in more detail below. If it approves the Treaty, the Committee
will thus report two instruments to the Senate: (1) the Treaty itself, with or without
amendments; and (2) the Resolution of Ratification, with or without amendments-^
Treaties are placed on the executive calendar of the Senate in the order reported
and are taken up in that order. A motion to proceed to the consideration of
executive business is in order at any time and is not debatable unless any other
treaty is already on the executive calendar, in which case a motion to proceed to
consideration of the SALT Treaty would be debatable.
^ During consideration of the Panama Canal Treaties, the Carter-Tornjos Joint Statement was
incorporated in the Neutrality Treaty in the form of two "leadership amendments. The
Committee had declined to adopt these amendments formally so as to allow other Senators the
opportunity to join in their co-sponsorship; instead, it voted to recommend to the Senate that it
incorporate the amendments. The procedural effect was minimal; the amendments were as a
result noor amendments, rather than Committee amendments. Thus, they were not moved by
the Floor Manager and did not have priority over other amendments (see part B below).
21
B. Senate floor action
I. Types of conditions
As discussed above, two types of conditions may be imposed by the Senate upon
its consent: amendments to the text of the Treaty itself, and amendments to the
Resolution of Ratification.
a. Textual amendments. — An amendment to the text of a treaty is in one sense
similar to an amendment to a bill — it may strike out certain language in the treaty
and insert other language in lieu thereof; it may do the same with respect to
numbers appearing in the treaty; or, it may add new articles or sections, or delete
entire articles or sections. On the other hand, unlike a bill a treaty is not directly
modified by the Senate; rather, the Senate gives its consent upon the condition that
an amendment be made, and the treaty is actually amended by the President, who
does so upon bringing the treaty into force.
b. Amendments to the Resolution of Ratification. — Amendments to the Resolution
of Ratification may be designated as follows:
i. "Reservation". — A reservation modifies or limits the substantive effect of one or
more of the treaty provisions. It in effect adds something of substance to the treaty
or takes something of substance from it, and gives notice that the United States will
not, in that respect, give effect to the treaty except in accordance with the reserva-
tion.
The text of a treaty thus need not be amended explicitly in order to effect a
change in its substance. An implicit but equally effective amendment may be
achieved through a reservation or even an understanding (see below). The Senate
may provide by reservation, for example, that a certain provision will be without
force and effect; such a reservation would be the functional legal equivalent of an
amendment to the text of the treaty which strikes out the provision line by line.
ii. "Understanding". — An understanding is a statement which is not intended to
modify or limit any of the provisions of the treaty. Rather, it is intended to clarify
or explain a treaty provision or to deal with some other matter incidental to the
operation of the treaty in a manner other than in a substantive reservation. Some-
times an understanding is no more than a statement of policies or principles or an
indication of general procedures for carrying out provisions of the treaty. An under-
standing may relate to the rights and obligations of either party; like a reservation,
it need not be limited to the rights and obligations of the party entering the
understanding. Understandings are also on occasion called "interpretations". As
noted above, however, their practical effect may be the same as a reservation.
iii. "Declarations" and other statements. These are used most often when it is
considered essential or desirable to give notice of certain matters of policy or
principle, without an intention of derogating from the substantive rights or obliga-
tions stipulated in the treaty. "Explanations", "clarifications", and "recommenda-
tions" are other designations which occasionally have been used.
2. Procedure
Rule 37 of the Standing Rules of the Senate (attached) governs the consideration
of treaties. The procedure to be followed in the Senate, and options available to it if
it wishes the Treaty modified, are as follows:
The Senate will first consider the Treaty as in "Committee of the Whole." (The
Committee of the Whole procedure may be avoided only by unanimous consent or
by suspension of the rules.) At this stage, the Senate will go through the Treaty
article by article, at which time amendments to each article may be offered; there is
no vote on each article as such. Amendments recommended by the Committee on
Foreign Relations will be considered first, after which other amendments may be
offered. The Treaty is amendable in two degrees (i.e., amendments to amendments)
and all votes are by a majority of those present.
Only actual amendments to the text of the Treaty will be in order during the
Committee of the Whole proceeding. Amendments to the Resolution of Ratifica-
tion— i.e., reservations, understandings, etc. — are therefore not in order at this
stage. Articles of the Treaty are considered in numerical order, with consideration
of the Protocol following considering of the Treaty. Amendments may not be offered
to Articles that have not yet been taken up, but may be offered to Articles previous-
ly considered once the entire treaty has been considered in the Committee of the
Whole proceeding.
After the Senate has considered each article of the Treaty for possible amend-
ment, it will, in effect, "dissolve itself from the Committee of the Whole and then
vote a second time on each of the amendments (if any) passed earlier. (The Senate
may accept all the amendments by a single vote only with unanimous consent.)
Entirely new amendments may also be offered at this stage.
22
Following a wait of one day, the Resolution of Ratification is taken up, which will
automatically incorporate any amendments to the text of the Treaty. At that point,
amendments to the Resolution of Ratification itself are in order. Amendments to
the Resolution must be approved by a simple majority. Like amendments to the text
of the Treaty, they are amendable in only one degree. The vote on advice and
consent, which requires the approval of two-thirds of those present and voting,
occurs after the Senate has concluded consideration of the Resolution of Ratifica-
tion. All votes on amendments, reservations, understandings, etc., require only a
majority vote for approval.
Several additional procedural matters should be noted at this point.
Cloture.— The cloture and germaneness provisions of Senate Rule 22 (attached)
apply to the consideration of treaties. Thus, in the absence of cloture, an amend-
ment to a Treaty article need not be germane to that article. Cloture, if invoked,
would pertain to all aspects of the process: the Committee of the Whole and action
on both the Treaty and the Resolution of Ratification. The rule of germaneness
would then apply. .. . , , j .
Closed sessions.— A motion to consider the Treaty in secret ( with closed doors )
may be made at any time by any Senator and requires only a second. In accordance
with Senate rule 35 (attached), no vote is taken on such a motion; in contrast, a
motion to return to open session, while non-debatable, requires a majority vote.
Recommittal.— The concept of "recommittal" has been used, somewhat loosely, in
reference to two quite different procedural steps: returning the Treaty to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations for reconsideration (possibly with instructions), and
returning it to the President for renegotiation with the Soviets. The former repre-
sents a simple "motion to recommit" and is in order at any time prior to the final
vote on the Resolution of Ratification. The latter is more complex: a treaty may be
returned to the President only through the adoption of an order by unanimous
consent, or a resolution by simple majority. However, such a resolution would
normally be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
III. PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVES AFTER SENATE ACTION
Senate action on the SALT II Treaty could take any one of a number of courses,
each of which presents the President with various alternatives.
A. Senate consent without conditions
The Senate may grant its consent without imposing any conditions, as is done
with the great majority of treaties. If so, the President may then proceed immedi-
ately to ratify the Treaty. Contrary to popular impression, the Senate does not
"ratify" treaties as such— it gives its "consent" to ratification by the President.
Senate consent constitutes authorization, rather than a directive, to bring the treaty
into force. The President may, moreover, withdraw a treaty for which he has
requested Senate consent at any time prior to the final vote on advice and consent.
Ratification occurs upon the exchange of "instruments of ratification' with the
other signatory; these are documents indicating each state's intent to be bound and
containing any conditions either state may impose. In the case of bilateral treaties.
United States practice has been to execute a "Protocol of Exchange" as well, which
is a document signed by both states indicating that each has examined the instru-
ments of a ratification tendered by the other and that each accepts the conditions, if
any, imposed by the other.
B. Senate consent with conditions
In the event that the Senate conditions its advice and consent upon the accept-
ance of certain amendments, reservations, or understandings, the President has
several options: ,,,. .. .c 4.u rr +
1. Consider the conditions unacceptable and decline to ratify the Ireaty;
2. Reopen negotiations with the Soviet Union and seek their acceptance of the
conditions;
3. Submit a new Treaty to the Senate; or
4. Resubmit the original Treaty.
Several additional issues arise in connection with the various conditions which
the Senate may impose upon its consent: xu o i *•
Presidential objection to the resolution.— Frior to the final vote on the Resolution
of Ratification, the President may decide that amendments or other conditions
already attached to the Resolution make it unacceptable to him. He may then
request those siding with him to vote against the Resolution, rather than to risk
Senate advice and consent with unacceptable conditions. (This situation occurred
when the Versailles Treaty failed to receive a two-thirds vote because of President
Wilson's opposition to Senate approval with the so-called "Lodge Reservations. )
23
Requirement of Presidential transmittal. — With the possible exceptions of a condi-
tion relating solely to a matter of domestic concern (e.g., that a given treaty will be
non-self-executing) and a statement not germane to the treaty, the President is
required to include each Senate-added condition in the instrument of ratification
given the other signatory. "That such conditions must be so included," the Commit-
tee said in its report on the Panama Canal Treaties, "is as much a part of custom-
ary constitutional law in this country as the right of the Senate to grant conditional
consent." Ex. Kept. No. 95-12, Feb. 3, 1978 at p. 11.
Acceptance of United States conditions by the Soviet Union. — Instruments of ratifi-
cation are not exchanged until the views of the other government concerning
United States conditions have been obtained. If the Soviet Union proceeds with the
exchange of instruments of ratification, its silence constitutes assent to the treaties
as modified by the United States. If the Soviet Union objects to any such condition,
however, the treaty may not, in accordance with traditional United States practice,
be brought into force by the President. The United States practice of executing a
"Protocol of Exchange" incorporating any conditions attached prior to final ratifica-
tion makes certain that Soviet acceptance or rejection of Senate conditions will be
clear.
Right of rejection by the Soviet Union. — Any condition imposed by the United
States upon its consent to a treaty gives rise to a right of rejection by the Soviet
Union which has agreed tentatively only to the version it signed. A condition is thus
analogous to a counteroffer in the law of contracts. It may, if the "offeree" so
chooses, require that negotiations be reopened, be rejected outright, or, if the offeree
accepts it, bring a legally different agreement into effect.
Significance of the label. — From a strictly legal standpoint the particular label
attached to a condition is not determinative. Whether called an "amendment,"
"reservation," "understanding," "declaration," or something else, any condition im-
posed by the United States upon its consent to be bound may be rejected by the
Soviet Union as incompatible with the original agreement. Alternatively, once
accepted, every condition becomes binding along with the provisions of the treaty
itself. The significance of a label, as distinguished from the substance of the condi-
tion, is therefore more "political" than legal. While a condition designated an
"understanding" or an "interpretation" would be no less effective legally in condi-
tioning United States ratification than the same condition labeled a "reservation,"
or even one cast in terms of an amendment to the Treaty text, it might be regarded
by the Soviets as less offensive politically and thus be more easily accepted by them.
Practically speaking, therefore, it is the Soviet leadership which will judge the
acceptability of any condition attached to the Treaty, which may be influenced by
its designation (see part IV below.)
C. Senate inaction
The Senate may simply decline to act on the Treaty, as it has in the case of a
number of other treaties. In such event, a treaty simply remains on the Senate's
Executive Calendar unless and until withdrawn by the President or returned to him
by the Senate.
D. Senate rejection
The Senate may decline to approve the Treaty by failing to accord it the requisite
two-thirds vote of approval. This has occurred only 11 times in our history, the most
recent occasion being in 1960.^ Where a final vote on the resolution of ratification
fails to achieve the requisite two-thirds, the Senate customarily adopts a resolution
returning the treaty to the President.
The Treaty may, of course, be resubmitted thereafter by the President. Two
additional options have lately received some attention in the press. One would be to
resubmit the SALT agreement for approval by joint resolution — i.e., as a so-called
Congressional-Executive agreement. The SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive
weapons was handled this way from the outset and might be cited as a precedent.
However, the Senate may take a dim view of this approach.
The other option occasionally mentioned would be for the President to issue a
unilateral statement announcing the intention of the United States to adhere to the
provisions of the defeated Treaty. Prior to the October 1977 expiration of the SALT
I Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the United States and the Soviet Union
each declared its intent to observe the limitations of the agreement as long as the
other did so. While the Administration did not claim that such parallel declarations
constituted commitments "binding" the United States, and some Senators defended
the President's action as within his Constitutional power, others criticized the
' The Dispute Settlement Protocol to the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea.
24
approach as a circumvention of appropriate constitutional procedures, and a viola-
tion of section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.^
Concern about such an approach to SALT II has centered not only on Presidential
declarations following rejection of the treaty, but also on any attempt by the
Administration to extend the limitations of the Protocol beyond its expiration date
at the end of 1981. The Administration has conceded on several occasions (most
recently during testimony before the Committee on the treaty termination issue)
that treaties and treaty provisions may not be formally extended or amended by
executive agreement or parallel declarations.' This issue will be considered in a
later memorandum.
IV. SOVIET TREATY RATIFICATION AND MODIFICATION
It is not clear whether the Soviets will proceed to ratify the SALT II Treaty in
advance of Senate consideration. Treaties are ratified for the Soviet Union by the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the country's parliament. While this procedure is
generally deemed to be merely a formality, it is probably the stage at which the
Soviets would attach conditions of their own in response to conditions that might be
imposed by the Senate. In the case of the SALT I Agreements, the Presidium did
not act until the Senate (on the ABM Treaty) and the Senate and House (on the
Interim Agreement) had approved them.
With the possible exception of a matter of purely domestic concern or a statement
not germane to the treaty, if the Soviet Union ratifies the SALT II Treaty subject to
a condition, the text of the condition must be communicated to the President of the
Senate to obtain Senate approval for the acceptance thereof (if the President wishes
to accept the reservation or amendment). If, prior to receipt of notification concern-
ing the condition, the Senate has already given its consent to ratification of the
SALT II Treaty, the express consent of the Senate to acceptance of the condition
must be obtained before proceeding to exchange the instruments of ratification. If
the Senate still has the Treaty under consideration at the time the notification is
given, the Senate's consent to acceptance of the reservation may be either express
or implied; that is, if the Senate, with knowledge of the reservation, advises and
consents to United States ratification without reference to a Soviet reservation of
which it is aware, Senate approval may be inferred. (See page 23 for discussion of
the procedure for Soviet acceptance of Senate conditions.)
Senator Biden. After Senator Stone asks his questions, I will
read you our legal memorandum relating to reservations.
Senator Stone?
Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
USE OF MPS FOR EXISTING LAND-BASED MISSILES
Professor Rostow, regardless of the niceties of the form in which
a modification of this SALT II Treaty ought to take and which we
will explore, the substantive issue here is, should we modify the
treaty to specifically permit the use of multiple protective shelters
for our existing land-based missiles? Is it correct that your position
is that we need to do that because of the vulnerability of our land-
based missiles to first strike by the Soviet Union during the life of
this treaty?
Mr. RosTOW. Yes, sir.
DETERRENCE OF SOVIET FIRST STRIKE
Senator Stone. People say, why should we spend all of this
money to protect these existing missiles. Really, don't we have
* Section 33 provides that "no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will
obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of
the United States, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the
Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the
United States."
= See, e.g., the testimony of the Justice Department spokesman on page 220 of the Committee's
"Treaty Termination" hearings.
25
enough other missiles apart from those that could be destroyed in a
first strike to deter the Soviets from even contemplating a first
strike? What is your answer to that?
Mr. RoSTOW. My answer to that is this: It is a question of
numbers. The threat to blow up Soviet cities and population had a
certain credibility during the period of our nuclear monopoly, and
then of our very great nuclear superiority, but as former Secretary
Kissinger has emphasized, both in his statement here and in his
statement in Brussels last week, as Soviet nuclear parity was ap-
proached, and then as Soviet nuclear superiority is threatened,
that possibility of retaliation in that way steadily loses its credibil-
ity.
I have never been much impressed with the possibility that an
American President would actually do it, but I think he certainly
would not do it, and no one would believe that he would do it,
knowing that the Soviet Union had enough accurate missiles in
reserve to blow up our own cities. That would be suicidal and
irrational and no one would believe it would be done. The threat to
do it would have no deterrent effect, and if we ever allowed such a
situation to develop, we should be impotent.
REASON FOR DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE MISSILES
Senator Stone. Is that the reason why the administration is
proposing to build and deploy mobile missiles, the M-X missile?
Mr. RosTOW. Yes.
Senator Stone. Precisely what you just said?
Mr. RosTOw. That is exactly right.
Senator Stone. And is what you are saying that that same
doctrine must be extended to the period of our vulnerability in the
early and mid-1980's?
Mr. RosTow. That is correct.
PROVOKE SOVIETS TO GO FOR MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERS
Senator Stone. Suppose we did it. Suppose we did take for our-
selves the legal right to deploy our existing land-based missiles in
multiple protective shelters or in a multiple mode during the eight-
ies? It is then said by opponents of this option that we would
provoke the Soviets into doing likewise and more so, and that that
would lessen our security and increase our risk. What is your
answer to that?
In other words, they will go for the multiple protective shelter.
They will hide even more effectively in their closed society than we
will hide, and we will therefore be more at risk than before. What
about that?
Mr. RosTOW. As I brought out in my colloquy with Senator
Javits, the Soviets are now deploying mobile MIRVed SS-20's
which are causing great alarm in Europe and which can readily be
converted into missiles that can reach the United States as well.
Mobile missiles are very difficult for us to target and very difficult
for us to knock out. When you add this capacity to the Soviet
stockpile of extra missiles stored in unknown sites, in effect, they
are already doing the equivalent of what we are proposing.
26
Now, it may be, as many people have contended, that the devel-
opment of technology, nuclear technology, has made security
through verifiable arms control methods nearly impossible, and
that soon, hopefully as soon as possible, the Soviet Union the
United States, and other nations which have become nuclear
powers will recognize the folly of the entire development and go
back to the ideas of the Baruch plan which we proposed immediate-
ly after the war, a very wise proposal of which I am very proud.
We, while holding a nuclear monopoly, proposed to international-
ize nuclear weapons and nuclear science. They are becoming very
complicated. They are becoming very dangerous, and they are pro-
liferating all over the place. I have always favored and will always
favor such an approach as soon as the Soviet Union is ready to
accept it.
Senator Stone. Professor Rostow, may I say that I completely
agree with protecting our land-based missiles with multiple protec-
tive shelters of one kind or another during the period of our
vulnerability. I agree with that, but I want to address these argu-
ments that have been raised so that whatever form it takes, the
committee, the Senate, and the country will feel, as you do and as I
do, that we ought to do this.
CHANGE FROM MAD STRATEGY TO COUNTERFORCE
You are saying that we should convert our strategy from a
mutual assured destruction strategy in which our missiles kill
people and their missiles kill people to where, since their missiles
can now in the next year or two destroy our missiles, then our
missiles should be able to destroy their missiles as opposed to
people. That is counterforce strategy, right?
Mr. RosTOW. Right.
Senator Stone. So I return to this issue which I just raised with
you. If they can go mobile more effectively than we can, how can
they by putting in the MPS have a good counterforce? Will it be
sufficiently a counterforce if we protect our current land-based
missiles to give us a credible counterforce at all, or have we gotten
so far behind that we don't even get that with the multiple protec-
tive shelter?
Mr. Rostow. I am not now, nor have I ever been an expert on
arms, and I do not pretend to be, but my experience has been on
this side of the river in the State Department, and I am concerned
with the political effect of these weapons, but the people I know
best who are experts on arms tell me that they believe that for this
transition period this is the most feasible and quickest way to
assure our ICBM's against the possibility of destruction, which
could be the basis of nuclear coercion and nuclear threat.
Their arguments seem to be reasonable, as a practical matter.
EQUAL CREDIBILITY IN OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE
Senator Stone. Professor, is what you are arguing for equal
credibility in our strategic posture as compared to the Soviets'
credibility as to their strategic posture? You are not arguing for
firing any of these things?
Mr. Rostow. No, I am arguing for a stalemate.
27
Senator Stone. You are arguing for a proper stalemate or for
what they call these days a rough equivalency, but in this case a
rough equivalency of counterforce credibility.
Mr. RosTOW. That is absolutely correct. We are arguing for a
stalemate, for the nonuse of these weapons, to guarantee against
their either being used or being brandished.
Senator Stone. During the life of this treaty?
Mr. RosTOW. During the life of this treaty, and above all during
the period of the early 1980's when, as a result of a series of
decisions made by President Carter we face what everyone seems
to agree are very grave risks. How do we deal with those risks in
this period, and how do we deal with these risks in the long run?
BASIC FIREPOWER WOULD BE CREDIBLE DETERRENT
Senator Stone. Doesn't that also provide somewhat of an answer
to the question I raised about the capability of the Soviets to deploy
mobile missiles during the period, and that is that during this
period, the basic firepower would be a credible deterrent because of
the number of mobile missiles that the Soviets could deploy during
the period, during the treaty period?
Mr. RosTOW. Absolutely.
Senator Stone. Thank you. I see that my time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Professor, I have several questions. First, I have a
question from Senator Percy, who cannot be here this morning. He
would like me to ask it of you and of Admiral Moorer when he
testifies.
television coverage of the salt DEBATE
His question is whether or not the groups which you gentlemen
represent, in this case the Committee on the Present Danger, favor
television coverage of the SALT debate. That is the question. Does
your group favor television coverage of the SALT debate on the
floor of the Senate?
Mr. RosTOW. The group has taken no position on the question,
and therefore I cannot speak for the executive committee of the
Committee on the Present Danger, but personally I do favor such
coverage.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
BINDING EFFECT OF SENATE RESERVATIONS ON U.S.S.R
Now, with regard to the binding effect of Senate reservations on
the U.S.S.R., let me read to you from a memorandum, and then we
can exchange memoranda.
Mr. RosTOW. I shall be grateful for a copy of it.
Senator Biden. It says:
Under U.S. treaty practice, all reservations which the Senate attaches to a resolu-
tion of ratification are included in instruments of ratification which are exchanged
with the Soviet Union and are signed by the Soviet Union. It is this exchange under
article XIV of the treaty which brings the treaty into force. The protocol of ex-
change itself reads that the treaty will be carried out by both parties in accordance
with the reservation or other conditions contained therein.
Therefore, in agreeing to go forward with the exchange, the Soviets must accept
the conditions contained in the protocol of exchange. They can, of course, refuse to
H8-260 0-79 Pt.U - 3
28
go forward with the exchange, if they do not like one or more of the conditions
contained in the instrument, but if they do go forward, they are clearly bound and
clearly bound in law.
Now, I would be anxious to hear what your friends at Yale will
say.
Mr. RosTOW. I shall be very grateful for a copy of this document.
Senator Biden. We will give you a copy.
Mr. RosTOW. I can say now with great respect that that is a good
recitation of black letter law on the subject, but it does not meet a
very important qualification which has developed in a good many
cases, which is that the courts have sometimes said that the reser-
vation is incompatible with the treaty and outside the power of the
treaty-making process, and therefore can be disregarded.
That kind of control would not be available, of course, in this
sort of treaty.
SOVIET CONVERTING OF SS-20 TO SS-16
Senator Biden. I will not debate with you now, sir. You are
concerned that the SS-20 will be converted in effect to an SS-16
and be able with a single warhead to strike the United States. The
Soviets have approximately 100 SS-20's deployed. One thing I do
agree with you about, after extensive discussions over the last 6
months with European political and military leaders, is that they
are concerned about the SS-20. But I don't understand why in the
world the Soviets would ever consider converting the SS-20, either
through adding the extra stage or lightening the payload by substi-
tuting one warhead for three when to do so would give them only a
relatively few extra ICBM warheads, while denuding their theater
capability.
It seems that you double-count that SS-20 argument. You use it
in the theater to whip that one up, and then you also use it as it
relates to central systems, the same with the Backfire bomber.
Mr. RosTOW. Isn't that true of Backfire?
Senator Biden. Yes, as I said, as you do with Backfire.
Mr. RosTOW. I can't help it that the wretched things have multi-
ple purposes.
Senator Biden. Yes, but you can only use them one way. You
can't use the same missile two ways. Once it is used it is used.
Mr. RosTOW. I agree with you completely you can't shoot them
twice.
Senator Biden. Right. I am glad we have agreed on something.
Mr. RosTOW. We have agreed on many things. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I want the record to show we agree on very little.
Mr. RosTOW. All right. .
Senator Biden. That is important to me, as it probably is to you.
[General laughter.]
PROGRAMS united STATES NEEDS THAT TREATY PROHIBITS
Senator Biden. You mentioned one possible basing mode of the
M-X being inconsistent with the treaty.
Is there anything else that the United States must do in your
opinion to insure its security but cannot do because of the treaty?
You have mentioned the M-X. Is there anything else?
29
Mr. RosTOW. Well, I mentioned the multiple basing mode. It is
the verification problem under this treaty which presents a very,
very difficult problem for me, rather than the question of what we
should do to rebuild our strength.
Senator Biden. But on that one point, before we get to verifica-
tion, is there anything that we can't do if this treaty is passed
which your Committee has recommended?
Mr. RosTOW. Well, I would say certainly the rapid deployment of
an alternate basing mode is the first item we have mentioned. I
have mentioned also the range on cruise missiles which is mattter
of great importance.
Senator Biden. The range on ground-launched, on sea-launched
cruise missiles, but is that range affected after the expiration of
the protocol? Once the protocol expires on December 31, 1981, is
there anything we cannot do with regard to cruise missiles that
you would like done?
Mr. RosTOW. Well, about the protocol, we had a very unfortunate
experience with the expiration of the Interim Agreement which the
President has perpetuated by Executive agreement. Now, therefore,
the expiration of the protocol date and the effectiveness of that
against the possibility of similar action on the part of the President
of that period is a matter of some concern.
Senator Biden. You would agree, though, that the U.S. Senate
can bind this President or any future President of the United
States on that issue, wouldn't you?
Mr. RosTOW. Well, the whole U.S. Congress did in the ACDA
statute. In section 33, it said that no limitation on our arms shall
be effective unless accomplished by treaty or statute. The President
has perpetuated the Interim Agreement by Executive agreement.
Senator Biden. Don't you agree that if the U.S. Senate passes a
resolution specifying that under no circumstances can the Presi-
dent of the United States continue the protocol beyond December
31, 1981, that he would be bound by that?
Mr. RosTOW. Yes; but I think he is equally bound by section 33 of
the ACDA statute, and it has not proved effective.
ABIUTY TO deploy GLCM AND SLCM AFTER EXPIRATION OF
PROTOCOL
Senator Biden. Do you have any doubt about the ability to
deploy ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles after the
expiration of the protocol? Is there anything in the treaty that
would prevent us from deploying the type of ground- or sea-
launched cruise missiles that we would need, in your opinion?
Mr. RosTOW. Well, not for ourselves, I suppose. I am not quite
certain, but the transfer of technology point might affect the use of
such instruments by our allies.
Senator Biden. I specifically went to Moscow with six of my
colleagues for that very purpose, and met with their military com-
mand, with the members of the Supreme Soviet, and with Mr.
Kosygin for 3 hours, and made it very clear that certain things
were going to be done by the Senate. I will read from my prepared
text and tell you what their response was:
In my view and on the basis of my work as Chairman of the European Affairs
Subcommittee, there must be a clarification of Article XII of the treaty,
30
the one to which you referred, non-transfer.
This provision concerns the issue of non-circumvention. Here I want all concerned
to be put on notice, our allies, the American people, you in the Soviet Union, that
nothing, absolutely nothing in that treaty or protocol can or will inhibit existmg
patterns of collaboration between the United States and its allies.
I then went on to specify that with regard to the protocol:
Finally, I know you will see a condition of the treaty that makes clear that the
protocol means what it says, that is, that it ends in 1981, period, and that there is no
possibility of continuing that protocol beyond that date, and at that time the
ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missile will be deployed.
I can tell you that the Soviet reaction at all levels was that this
was our right under the treaty, that there is nothing that prevents
that. They did say they hoped we would continue to discuss that
with them but they understood full well that was our right. It
seems to me you raise an awful lot of red herrings.
Mr. RosTOW. But, Senator, with great respect, I don't think you
have answered my question. Of course, you are under no obligation
to do so, as I am, but still, you have not answered my question
about what happened to section 33 of ACDA.
Senator Biden. There was no formal extension.
Mr. RosTOW. Oh, please, sir. The United States and the Soviet
Union made simultaneous and identical announcements that they
were unilaterally extending the agreement. Are you suggesting
that there was no prior agreement to do that?
Senator Biden. I am suggesting that if the U.S. Senate specifical-
ly tells this President or whomever will be President in the year
1981 that he cannot, absent affirmative action by U.S. Senate,
extend, then he cannot extend the protocol.
Now, obviously, any President at any time can refuse to take
action.
A President can engage in inaction.
Mr. RosTOW. But with regard to section 33, it was not a question
of inaction. It was a question of action.
Senator Biden. What I am saying is that can be specifically
handled by a specific reservation by the U.S. Senate on that specif-
ic issue.
Mr. RosTOW. But doesn't section 33 of the ACDA statute do so
already?
Senator Biden. The answer is, I don't know.
Mr. RosTOW. All right.
Senator Biden. My time is up once again. If there are no further
questions, we thank you very much, Professor. We appreciate your
testimony.
Senator Zorinsky, do you have any questions of this witness.''
Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have one
question.
BETRAYAL OF PROMISES AND EXPECTATION IN SALT I
Mr. Rostow, in your testimony you allege the Soviet betrayal of
every promise and expectation on the basis of which the SALT I
package was approved. Would you enumerate what these promises
and expectations were and who made them?
Mr. Rostow. Yes. In the agreement of May 1972, between Presi-
dent Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, cooperation was assured to put out
31
fires all around the world, to work together specifically in the
Middle East to assure agreement in conformity with Security Coun-
cil Resolution 242, to cooperate in ending the war in Indochina on
favorable terms, and to give warning when certain kinds of events
occurred or were threatened. Instead of cooperating to end the
conflict in the Middle East, the Soviet Union had agreed with
President Sadat the month before President Nixon came to Moscow
in May 1972, that is, in April 1972, to cooperate with President
Sadat in launching a war in 1973 and to send all the necessary
equipment, experts, and so forth for that purpose.
So far as Indochina is concerned, of course, the Soviets cooperat-
ed in obtaining the agreements of January and of March 1973,
which from our point of view were satisfactory and reaffirmed the
Laos Agreement of 1962, but they cooperated with the North Viet-
namese in breaking those agreements and every aspect of those
agreements, and in denying their essential purpose.
Those are the two chief items I recall, and I think they are
sufficient to indicate that the agreements were not made in all
sincerity and were not carried out.
Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Rostow.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Professor.
Mr. Rostow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. Rostow's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Professor Eugene V. Rostow
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your invitation to testify on the ratification of the
SALT II Treaty. I am here in behalf of the Committee on the Present Danger, a
nonprofit, nonpartisan citizens' committee which began to function on 11 November
1976. Our position on SALT II has been stated on two occasions. In July, 1977, our
Executive Committee issued a pamphlet called "Where We Stand on Salt," which
was later approved by the Board of Directors. And in July of this year, the Execu-
tive Committee adopted a statement which was submitted to your Subcommittee on
Europe on 19 July 1979. Both those documents, together with related materials, are
before you. They are the basis of what I shall say.
Our conclusions on the Treaty as it stands are summed up on pp. 2-3 of our 19
July statement. They constitute, we believe, a positive and affirmative seven-point
program for action, which puts the SALT Treaty and the SALT negotiating process
into the context of our foreign and defense policy as a whole.
Permit me to recall those conclusions for ready reference:
"In view of the gravity of the issues raised by the Treaty now before you, and all
that has happened since the SALT I package was approved in 1972, we recommend:
(1) That the Senate advise the President and the nation of the need to seek a more
positive, forward looking, and effective foreign and defense policy, and state the
goals and principles on which that policy should be based; and (2) that the Senate
withhold its consent to the ratification of the Treaty the President has submitted
unless and until it is modified to meet its demonstrated deficiencies, and the
President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program that will
achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence.
"The Committee on the Present Danger is the first to recognize that withholding
the Senate's consent for the SALT II Treaty now before you is not in itself a foreign
and defense policy. We have concluded, however, that the action I have just outlined
is a necessary condition for developing a sound and prudent policy. And it is the
only available way to convince the President that the SALT II Treaty he signed in
Vienna fails both as a means for protecting our national security, and as an arms
limitation measure.
"It is our conviction that what the country needs above all else is to turn a sharp
corner in our foreign and defense policy. To recall the language of President
Carter's speech of July 15th, we believe the nation should start on a new course,
based on a clear recognition of the truth. Such a course, in our view, should include
these elements: (1) To shake off our post-Vietnam depression about foreign affairs
and the yearning for isolation which is implicit in it; (2) to reach a bipartisan
32
consensus on what our national interests in this turbulent world really are; (3) to
rebuild conventional and nuclear force deterrence so that we can protect those
interests by political means or by the use of conventional forces if we have to; (4) to
cooperate closely and continuously with our allies and other nations whose interests
in a peaceful and stable world political order and economic system are parallel to
our own; and (5) on that basis to continue negotiating with the Soviet Union about
the limitation of nuclear arms, including both intercontinental and intermediate
range nuclear weapons like those threatening Europe and other areas of great
importance to us.
There is still time for that great task to be accomplished in peace. As a group,
the NATO allies, Japan, China and other like-minded nations have more than
enough power and potential power to contain the Soviet drive for domination. But
that power is dispersed and inchoate. It is not being mobilized ir/o forms which can
become political power— naval squadrons and armored divisions; planes, reserves
and research formations. The potential power of the nations which favor a peaceful
world order cannot be brought to bear on world politics unless the energy, optimism
and intelligence of the American people are liberated and harnessed once again in
considered programs designed to restore the peace and prosperity of the nation. In
the bipolar world of nuclear weapons and nuclear blackmail, no coalition to guard
the peace can act without the protection of the American nuclear umbrella and
confidence that our nation is willing and able to meet its commitments."
II
I thought I could be most useful to you today if this opening statement supple-
mented our earlier statements by commenting on some of the key issues which have
emerged in the SALT hearings so far. President Carter's case for SALT rests on
something more than complacency about our ovm strength and an underestimation
of Soviet power and Soviet intentions.
The strongest argument for SALT II thus far put forward by the Carter Admmis-
tration is an argument of political myth. It was summed up by a distinguished
Senator in these terms: "To reject SALT II would be to go over the abyss."
The variations on this theme are infinite. One hears it said everywhere that to
reject SALT, or to ratify it with amendments or on conditions, would be to "end"
detente and revive the "Cold War." The President has said that those who oppose
the Treaty as it stands are war-mongers and opponents of "detente." The Secretary
of State is reported to have said that he would resign rather than preside over the
end of "detente" and the revival of the "Cold War." Some years ago, I counted a
couple of hundred remarks of this tenor, and then stopped counting.
The notion that Soviet-American relations have improved in recent years, that
the Cold War is over, and that negotiation has been substituted for confrontation is
a dangerous symptom of auto-intoxication. The Cold War is not over. On the
contrary, it is worse than ever, featured by Soviet threats and thrusts on a far
greater scale than those of the simple days of the Berlin airlift and the crisis in
Greece. But as things get worse, many Americans insist on telling each other that
they are getting better. SALT II is a case in point. If ratified in its present form, it
would be an act of submission on our part, legitimizing Soviet superiority— a great
Soviet victory in the Cold War, and so perceived everywhere in the world. But this
Administration keeps repeating that SALT II would be a step towards stability,
detente, and peace. . j ^ n.
This Delphic assertion is made so often that we tend to accept it as self-evident. It
implies that the Russians would behave even worse than they are behaving now if
SALT II is not ratified in its present form; that it would cost us more to keep up
with them in such an event; and that the process of negotiating with the Soviet
Union about nuclear weapons somehow contributes to peace and stability. In 1972,
the SALT I package was ratified under different geo-political circumstances, but on
the basis of this same litany of arguments. The period since 1972 has been the worst
and most disastrous period of the Cold War, featured by Soviet deception of the
United States in Indochina and the Middle East; the Soviet campaign in Africa and
Southern Asia; and an extraordinary Soviet military buildup, far greater than that
of the United States and its Allies. In view of the betrayal of every promise and
expectation on the basis of which the SALT I package was approved, it is difficult to
understand why these arguments are still so popular. But they are. As President
Kennedy once remarked, "If you are cheated once, it is their fault. But if you are
cheated a second time, it is your own."
The contention that the failure to ratify SALT II in its present form would be
"going over the abyss" is not really an argument, but an appeal to fear which
attributes nearly magic influence to arms limitation agreements. Those who are
swayed by this appeal are hypnotized by the SALT negotiating process as MacDon-
33
aid, Baldwin, and Chamberlain were hypnotized by the chimera of disarmament
forty-five years ago.
Nothing in the history of arms limitation agreements gives the slightest encour-
agement for such beliefs. The Treaty of Versailles was the most important of
modern arms limitation agreements. It prescribed strict limits on German arma-
ments and the demilitarization of the Rhineland. If Britain had been willing to join
France in enforcing that Treaty, the Second World War could never have taken
place. But when the Versailles limits on arms were violated, secretly at first, and
then openly; when Hitler introduced conscription in 1935 and marched into the
Rhineland in 1936, Britain and France did nothing except wring their hands and try
to persuade Hitler to sign new treaties limiting armaments. We can see parallels to
this behavior nearly every week in our reaction to Soviet behavior raising serious
questions about whether they are violating the Test Ban Treaty, the SALT I
agreements, or the agreement of 1962 about the Soviet presence in Cuba.
The second most important arms limitation agreement of modern times was the
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. Our exp)erience under that agreement and its
successors is hardly more inspiring than the record of Versailles. Lulled by the
delusive security of the Treaty, we, the British, and the French persistently kept
our navies relatively low, while Japan and later Germany built to the limits of the
Treaty and beyond.
There is another aspect of the Administration's argument that to reject SALT II
would be "to go over the abyss": the notion that such action on our part would
make Soviet policy even more aggressive than it is. The claim betrays a misunder-
standing of the nature of the Soviet Union and of the serious and devoted men who
govern it. The Soviet Union is already behaving as badly as it dares. It is moving as
rapidly as it deems prudent toward the strategic and political goals of its policy. It
takes advantage of every opportunity to expand its sphere of influence. There is no
use getting excited about this fact. It is simply a fact. As Professor Bernard Lewis
has remarked, the Soviet leaders are still in the imperial mood of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, which the West has long since abandoned with relief. In
the interests of our own survival, we have to persuade the Soviet Union that this
ruthless and cynical process must stop before it results inevitably in war.
There is only one argument that can deter expansion — the conviction on their
part that a given action would expose them to unacceptable risk. That is the factor
which made our diplomacy persuasive and effective in a dozen crises since 1945,
from the Berlin Blockade to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It is the visible erosion
of that conviction since 1972 which has invited a series of Soviet thrusts on every
continent. In recent years, the Soviet Union has increased the pace of its expansion
because of the impact of Vietnam and Watergate on American policy, and now
because it perceives President Carter as weak. As a result, the Soviet Union is
moving forward with incredible boldness in several areas of the world, including
even the Caribbean.
Some who accept this view of Soviet policy argue for SALT II nonetheless on the
ground that under SALT II it would be easier for us to verify Soviet behavior, and
confine the Soviet impulse to expand. I shall comment later on the verification
controversy as such. Suffice it to remark at this point that there is no reason to
suppose that we should have any more confidence in our knowledge of Soviet
activities under SALT II than we have had under SALT I. Since our intelligence
estimators have recently confessed to being in error by a factor of 100 percent, that
is not a comforting thought.
The claim that the ratification of SALT II would save us money is equally
specious. Short of general mobilization, it is hardly feasible for the Soviet Union to
spend more on military hardware than it has been spending for the last fifteen
years or so. I have heard General Jones say that the task of restoring the military
balance between the United States and the Soviet Union will cost the same with or
without SALT II — an estimate which may be erroneous in a perverse way, because
some programs — M-X, for example — may cost a good deal more than otherwise if
SALT should be ratified, in order to meet its verification standards. Administration
spokesmen have offered a variety of opinions on the cost consequences of not
ratifying SALT. Paul Warnke has said that the rejection of SALT would be costly,
but that its cost could not be quantified. Leslie Gelb has written recently that
saving money is the chief reason for ratifying SALT. Others have said quite differ-
ent things on the subject. The fact is that in an area of complex and rapidly
changing technology, none of these estimates are of much consequence.
Averell Harriman and George W. Ball have offered a variant of the "abyss"
argument which brings out its basic weakness. Not to accept SALT II, they have
told you, would help lead to the election of a "hard-liner" to succeed Brezhnev. The
notion that Brezhnev is a "moderate" in any sense we can recognize, or that he
34
believes in our concept of detente, is denied by everj^hing he has said and done in
all the years of his high office. Brezhnev was the architect of the attack on Czecho-
slovakia in 1968, and on our whole Middle East position in 1967 and 1973. He is the
man who broke his solemn agreements with us about Indo-China and the Middle
East. In the name of the Brezhnev Doctrine, he claims the right to use force
internationally in order to protect or promote regimes or revolutions he regards as
socialist or progressive. To call him a "moderate" is an abuse of the English
language.
There are of course differences within the Kremlin and no doubt there are
groupings among its members. But there is no serious evidence that any of these
differences concern Soviet-American relations. Of course all the Soviet leaders want
SALT II ratified. They have never made so much progress as they did under SALT
I, and they expect SALT II to be at least as productive for them. And they know
that if the United States ever does wake up, and decide to restore the military
balance, both in strategic and in conventional forces, they would lose ignominiously.
Their economy is only half as large as ours. But these are hardly reasons for us to
take the Treaty as it is.
There is thus nothing in the contention that to reject SALT would be "to go over
the abyss." The leaders of the Soviet Union are patient realists. They will negotiate
with us so long as it is in their interest to do so. And it will be in our mutual
interest to negotiate about strategic weapons only when we have fully restored
essential equivalence and adequate deterrence at every level relevant to our inter-
ests.
Ill
President Carter's second best argument for his Treaty is that it wouldn't do
much harm, would not prevent us from restoring the military balance, and should
therefore be ratified to demonstrate to our friends and adversaries that we really do
have a government. This argument appeals strongly to all Americans. For the best
of reasons, we tend to rally to the flag when it is under fire. Foreigners have their
own view of our government, based on their daily experience on a dozen issues. In
my talks with the leaders of friendly foreign governments in recent years, it became
clear that what they want from us is a policy of vigorous and imaginative resistance
to the process of Soviet expansion. I am confident that the program our Commiteee
has outlined would be well received by friendly nations, and fully respected by our
adversaries abroad.
There is, however, a fatal flaw in the argument which would wrap SALT II in the
flag of patriotism. The SALT II Treaty is not harmless; it would do a great deal of
harm; it would make it far more difficult for us to redress the military balance; and
no spokesman for the Administration has as yet seriously addressed the principal
issues raised in this connection by its critics.
All studies of the nuclear balance agree that if present trends continue just a few
years longer, the Soviet Union will have significant nuclear superiority in the early
1980's authorized by the SALT II Treaty — the capacity, that is, to make a preemp-
tive first strike by destroying our ICBM's, our planes on the ground, and our
submarines in port with a fraction of their nuclear force, leaving enough accurate
missiles in reserve to neutralize our own nuclear arsenal. If we should ever allow
such a position to develop, the military doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction on
which we have relied since Secretary McNamara's time would become obsolete, and
our submarines and other less accurate missile launchers would be ineffective.
Facing such threats, we should be unable to use conventional forces, and our
diplomacy would be without influence.
Slowly and reluctantly, the Administration has conceded that at a given point
fairly soon our ICBM's and other ground based-launchers will become vulnerable to
a Soviet first-strike attack. Some Administration spokesmen say that such a devel-
opment would not mean the end of the world, because we could always strike back
from our submarines, or, in an argument of desperation, even launch our ICBM's on
warning. It is hard to believe, but Secretary of State Vance himself has expressed
this bizarre view. Others say that our allies must realize that there are limits to our
nuclear umbrella: that is, in plain words, that the American nuclear guarantee
would be worthless. The official Administration doctrine is that the concerns of
SALT critics about our vulnerability to a preemptive first strike are valid, but that
they will be cured by the M-X missile, long delayed by President Carter. A decision
on its mode of deplojTnent was supposed to have been made by August 1, but has
not yet been announced.
But the M-X missile cannot be ready, the Administration says, before 1989 at the
earliest, even if President Carter finally solves the problem of reconciling its mode
of deployment with the SALT II Treaty.
35
What are we supposed to do in the meantime — that is, during the period of the
1980's when everybody agrees we shall be in a position of maximum exposure to
nuclear war or nuclear blackmail? If the Soviet Union gains sufficient superiority in
the early 1980's to threaten our land-based missile launchers with one-third or one-
fifth of their force, would it be rational or even conceivable for an American
President to use our submarine-launched missiles to destroy Soviet cities, knowing
that the Soviets had enough missiles in reserve to blow up a very large fraction of
our population in reprisal? Calculations of these gruesome scenarios are affected of
course by Soviet active and passive air defense programs and absence of such
programs on our part. Such calculations are currently most unfavorable to the
United States. In effect, they would reverse the position of the two nations at the
time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Under those circumstances, would the Soviet
government believe in the possibility of American retaliation to a first strike, and
be deterred by it? Such retaliation would be suicidal for us. No one could believe in
so irrational a policy.
This is the key question to consider in evaluating the nuclear balance and its
bearing on the political influence of both the Soviet Union and the United States. I
have been unable to find an answer on the part of any proponent of the Treaty
beyond a blind reiteration of faith in the continued vitality of the McNamara
Doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. This is indeed the heart and nearly the
whole of President Carter's case for SALT II. As former Secretary Kissinger empha-
sized in Brussels last Saturday, this position will soon be intellectually and political-
ly untenable. We simply must move to counterforce strategies or abandon the
notion of nuclear deterrence altogether.
But the Treaty would prevent us from undertaking the most feasible, perhaps the
only credible counterforce program that could preserve our second-strike capability
during the early and middle 1980's: to reopen the Minuteman III production lines,
which President Carter has recently closed, and deploy Minuteman Ills in multiple
vertical protected shelters. Such shelters would be considered "fixed launchers"
under Article IV of the Treaty, and would be prohibited. And the number of
Minuteman Ills required for such a program would exceed the quotas established by
the Treaty, since Minuteman III carries only three warheads. Here again, the
Administration has simply not addressed the issue. It is still struggling with its
attempt to reconcile the M-X missile with the provisions of the Treaty — a problem
that doesn't seem to worry the Soviet Union, which continues to develop and deploy
large numbers of mobile intermediate range missile launchers that can be converted
into intercontinental missiles by the addition of an extra stage.
There are many other aspects of SALT II which are far from harmless — aspects
which have been repeatedly called to the attention of the Administration, and
ignored or evaded in these hearings. The strange provision of the Treaty allowing
the Soviet Union more than 300 heavy missiles, while we can have none, has been
much discussed, but it has not been explained. These heavy missiles of enormous
throw weight are designed primarily as first-strike weapons against hardened tar-
gets. The essence of the Soviet Union's capacity for a credible first strike is the fact
that if present trends continue they will be able to destroy a large part of our land-
based missile force with one-third or one-fifth of their missiles. It is quite true that
another combination of weapons might also threaten our land-based missiles and
submarines in port. But there is all the difference in the world between a strike
which would require one-fifth of the Soviet force and one requiring four-fifths of
that force. In the strange calculus of nuclear terror, the difference is decisive. It is
what is left after the first strike that counts both politically and militarily.
Similarly, the provisions of the Treaty regarding the Soviet Backfire bomber have
been vehemently discussed, but the Administration's answer is totally unconvincing.
There is no doubt now that the Backfire is capable of reaching targets throughout
the United States from the Soviet Union, and that it can be refuelled in the air and
land in Cuba. Why is it not counted among the launchers covered by the Treaty,
like our B-52's or B-l's? We have to count even mothballed B-52's, cannibalized for
spare parts. The Administration does not answer the question, but asks us to be
content with Mr. Brezhnev's assurance that the Soviet Union will make no more
than 30 Backfires a year. Why 30 a year is to be considered de minimis in a Treaty
which purports to limit launchers to some 2,000 on each side isn't immediately
apparent, even if there were any way we could monitor these limits. How much
damage could 30, 60, or 90 Backfires do from Cuban bases?
Further, the restrictions of the Treaty and its protocol on the development of
cruise missiles, especially of land- and sea-based cruise missiles, and the ambiquities
of the Treaty about our capacity to transfer cruise missile technology to our Allies,
are both dangerous to our security and without any justification. Here again, the
testimony offered by the Administration is both unresponsive and unconvincing.
36
As for the verification provisions of the Treaty, I can find no answer in the
testimony thus far available to the facts pointed out on pp. 17-18 of our July 19
statement. My distinguished colleague Paul H. Nitze testified on this aspect of the
problem on July 30 before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. I
have included a copy of his Prepared Statement in my submission, and call it
particularly to your attention.
IV
The Executive Committee of the Committee on the Present Danger has recom-
mended that the Senate should not give its consent to the ratification of SALT II
unless the most important deficiencies of the Treaty are modified by amendment,
and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program that
would achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence. Among
the deficiencies of the Treaty requiring amendment, I should list first our right to
deploy ICBM's in modes and numbers we deem necessary to ensure their survival
against surprise attack; (2) the equal right of the two sides to use heavy missiles; (3)
the inclusion of the Soviet Backfire and the SS-20 within the numerical limits of
the Treaty; (4) provision for the adoption of programs which would reverse the
present ominous situation of Soviet strategic superiority in Europe, including
changes in the provisions regarding the range of land- and sea-based cruise missiles
and the transfer-of-technology which is causing so much concern to our Allies.
There are other deficiencies and ambiguities noted in our earlier statements, and
in the studies of my distinguished colleagues who have written, spoken, and testified
on these matters during the last few years. And there are many which have come to
the surface in your hearings and those of other committees of the Senate. These too
should be given serious consideration before the Treaty is ratified.
In closing, permit me to stress the extraordinary responsibility of the Senate in
voting in SALT II. The arguments put forward for the SALT I package were the
same as those advanced for SALT II today. Under the political and military circum-
stances of 1972, they were plausible arguments. But there is no rational way to
accept them as the basis for policy in 1979. It is simply too late to entertain such
views. Too much has happened to contradict them.
Therefore, the burden of responsibility on the Senate with respect to the Treaty is
unique in our history.
Every American shares the goal of achieving true detente with the Soviet iJnion,
which can only be defined, in my opinion, as a policy of scrupulous and recipr':'cal
respect for the rules of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the internation-
al use of force. True detente is a central objective of the Committee on the Present
Danger, and, I am sure, of the American people. Every President and Congress since
1945 have gone to great lengths to reach that goal. But President Carter's quest for
detente with the Soviet Union has been based on the misconception that acts of
unilateral disarmament on our part, and other unilateral concessions, will induce
the Soviet Union to follow suit. As a result, President Carter has sacrificed our
defenses and our alliances, and abdicated his responsibility for the security of the
nation. Under our Constitution, that responsibility therefore falls on the Senate
with respect to this Treaty, and ultimately on the whole Congress and the people.
We have not faced decisions of such moment since the Presidency of James Bu-
chanan.
President Carter sometimes compares the controversy over the ratification of
SALT II to the battle over our entry into the League of Nations after the First
World War. The analogy is misleading.
In the first place, despite the pervasiveness of the political legend, it cannot be
said that "a small group of willful men" blocked the ratification either of the
Covenant of the League or of the Security Treaty with France which had been
promised to France in order to induce its acceptance of the League, and was
therefore brigaded with the League Covenant. President Wilson gave up and indeed
strongly opposed the Treaties when he realized that he would have to compromise
with the Senate to obtain ratification. In the end, and at President Wilson's urgent
request, twenty-three loyal Democratic Senators voted against ratifying the League
Covenant with the reservations negotiated by Senator Lodge. History might well
have been different if seven members of the Senate had voted then for their
convictions. The Treaty with France never came to a vote. President Wilson was
always the kind of man who refused half or two-thirds of a loaf when he couldn't
get the whole thing. And at the time of the fight in 1919, he was seriously ill as
well.
37
Secondly, President Wilson was proposing full and responsible American partici-
pation in world politics, which some members of the Senate were resisting. The
position today is just the opposite. For nearly three years. President Carter has been
conducting a retreat to weakness and isolation. Unless that policy is promptly
reversed, it will soon be beyond our power to do so. We should then be squeezed into
a position of passive dependence on the Soviet Union. The program the Committee
on the Present Danger is recommending to you today, on the contrary, is one
through which we could remain what we have been and are, the bastion of democra-
cy, and a responsible member of the society of nations, capable with our allies and
associates of maintaining the balance of world power on which the future of human
freedom depends.
It is therefore not hyperbole to say that the state of the union for the next decade
at least, and perhaps for much longer, will be determined by the outcome of your
vote on the Treaty.
Your vote on SALT is important because the Treaty is important, and in our
judgment dangerous to the security of the nation. It would lock us into a position of
strategic inferiority which would also be unstable and unverifiable — a perfect recipe
for Soviet nuclear blackmail during the period of our greatest relative weakness in
the early and middle 1980's. President Carter found that possibility staring him in
the face when he took office in 1977. He made the situation worse by cancelling or
postponing the programs which his predecessors had initiated to prevent the prob-
lem from arising: B-1, the enhanced radiation warhead, M-X, and the rest of the
sad story.
Your vote on SALT II is important for another reason. It is the only chance you
are likely to have to pass judgment on President Carter's foreign and defense policy
as a system: his abandonment of the United Nations Charter as the lodestar of our
policy, and many other contradictions, paradoxes, and retreats.
These aspects of President Carter's foreign policy are not extrinsic to the merits
of the SALT Treaty. They are what the Treaty is all about. SALT II is not
concerned with a remote and upleasant subject of interest only to experts. It is not
limited to assuring the immunity of the United States from nuclear attack. The
United States has vital security interests beyond Fortress America. There is no
escaping the "linkage" between SALT II and the rest of our foreign and defense
policy. The state of the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United
States is the fulcrum on which the entire process of world politics is poised. The
visible and unquestioned availability of usable force has always been the key to
effective diplomacy. This maxim has never been more obviously true. Unless we
restore and maintain our clear second strike strategic nuclear capability, and our
naval and other conventional forces, the American nuclear umbrella will lose all
credibility, our political influence will continue to decline, and we shall be unable to
use either conventional or nuclear forces anywhere in the world if such action on
our part should be required. The pattern of our diplomatic impotence during the
last few years will become our normal condition, until it is succeeded by something
infinitely worse.
Many have compared the policies of the Carter Administration revealed in its
defense of SALT II to the posture of the ostrich taken by Great Britain and to a
lesser extent by France during the Thirties, when they failed to act together in time
to prevent the Second World War. The comparison is fair. In the Thirties, British
policy was determined by wishful thinking and a nearly suicidal paralysis of will.
Thus far, these two attitudes have dominated the foreign policy of the Carter
Administration. But there is one fundamental difference between the dilemma faced
by the United States today and that of Britain and France a generation ago. Even
in the darkest days of the Second World War, Britain and France could always hope
that the United States and the Soviet Union would somehow be drawn into the fray,
so that victory would become possible. There are no great powers in that position
now, no nations in the wings who might help to turn the tide if we persist in our
folly as Britain and France did during the Thirties, until it was too late to do
anything but fight. If we allow the Soviet rush for dominance to continue un-
checked; if we allow Europe to be enveloped and reduced, through the Middle East
or the Northern seas or both, Japan, China, and many other countries would fall
under Soviet control. We should then be truly isolated, living in a state of siege, and
confronting the pressures of a hostile Soviet foreign policy backed by an overwhelm-
ing array of force. Under such circumstances, if history is a guide, an episode trivial
in itself^the murder of an Archduke or the sinking of another Lusitania — would
prove again to the flash point of war. This is the nightmare probability at stake in
your vote on SALT II.
Some will say that I am too gloomy about the way things are going. The Russians
are not ten feet tall, we are frequently reminded. But for decades now the Soviet
38
Union has been keeping the living standard of its people low in order to support an
arms buildup and a foreign policy geared to indefinite expansion. This has hardly
been done in a fit of absent-mindedness. You have only to compare the map today
with the map in 1945 or 1972 to realize what extraordinary gains the Soviet Union
has made in its quest for geopolitical mastery. One after another, the old naval
bases of the nineteenth century imperial system are being taken over by the Soviet
Union. This process has to be faced and evaluated, not denied or ignored.
Let me appeal directly to those among you who believe that the Soviet Union is a
conservative, peaceful power, that the Cold War is over, and that active military
and political efforts on our part are not needed to preserve the world balance of
power and restore the vitality of the United Nations Charter. In Cromwell's famous
words, "Consider that ye may be wrong." If our analysis is correct, isn't it better
and more prudent to take precautions now than to be sorry later? If President
Carter is wrong, we shall face, over and over again, the choice of surrender or war
against bitter odds, alone and unprepared.
President Carter's case for SALT II is the same mixture of incompatible themes,
myths, and moods one finds in reviewing the history of the years before the Second
World War. The finest study of Pearl Harbor, that of Roberta Wohlstetter, com-
ments that in going over the record one is faced time and time again on the
American side "by the paradox of pessimistic realism coupled with loose optimism
in practice." If you read what President Carter has said on these problems, you can
see exactly what Mrs. Wohlstetter meant. On several occasions, President Carter
has described the Soviet arms buildup as offensive in character, and incompatible
with any theory of defense. But he has also characterized the Soviet position as
defensive in nature, based on exaggerated anxieties about the risks the Soviet
Union faces. Clearly, both the President's policies and his actions are based on the
second hypothesis, that of an essentially harmless, conservative, and defensive
Soviet Union. How he reconciles this view with his daily diplomatic and intelligence
reports is a mystery beyond my understanding. It is true that the President is prone
to boast that our military power is greater than that of any other nation, despite
the statistics, and what Secretary of Defense Brown says. We are left with the
disquieting thought that President Carter's defense budgets and policies are based
on jejime complacency and on the assumption that the Soviets have feet of clay.
The coming decade will be as difficult and dangerous as any we have faced in the
past. We have a very short time in which to protect our future through allied
di ilomacy and deterrence rather than through war. A two-ocean Navy cannot be
restored in a day or a year. Nor can the other programs we require to achieve
effective deterrence at every level. It will be a ticklish time, calling for cool nerves
and a firm grasp of the problem. The Soviet Union will not view an American
awakening with equanimity. It can be expected to take full advantage of positions of
relative superiority, and the presence in office of a President whom it perceives as
weak.
The time to begin is now. And the place to begin is here. Normally, we look to our
President to take the lead in decisions of this order. It is now clear that President
Carter is firmly committed to another view.
What is at stake, Mr. Chairman, is not the balance of power alone, but the future
of liberty. Democracy cannot survive unless America plays its full part in assuring
its future.
The tide has been running against us now for nearly a decade. The leaders of the
Soviet Union are pursuing a program of break-neck expansion, and treating our
interests everywhere with open contempt.
Forty years ago, as the doubts and vacillations of the Thirties were being swept
away by events, a speaker rose to his feet in the House of Commons to address the
great issue of the looming War. Leopold Amery, one of Churchill's companions in
the political wilderness, shouted a remark from his seat before the speaker began.
"Speak for England," he said. In that spirit, I say to you, "Speak and vote for
America."
Senator Biden. Our next witness is Adm. Thomas Moorer, co-
chairman of the CoaUtion for Peace Through Strength. Admiral
Moorer is accompanied by Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, cochairman of
the Coalition for Peace Through Strength.
Gentlemen, thank you for coming. Admiral, please proceed in
any way that is most comfortable.
39
STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS MOORER (RETIRED), COCHAIR-
MAN, COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH, WASH-
INGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. DANIEL GRAHAM
(RETIRED), COCHAIRMAN, COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH
STRENGTH »
Admiral Moorer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to
have the opportunity to testify again before this committee on the
SALT II Treaty. Today I am testifying as chairman of the executive
committee of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength.
The Coalition for Peace Through Strength is a bipartisan alli-
ance of 105 national organizations, 204 Members of Congress and
other pro defense leaders across America. The American Security
Council, which I serve as a member of the board of directors, is the
program secretariat for the coalition.
The purpose of the coalition is to work for the adoption of a
national strategy of peace through strength. The perception of
weakness on our part in 1941 prompted the Japanese to attack
Pearl Harbor. Mr. Chairman, at the end of World War II, I was a
member of the strategic bombing survey sent to Japan to investi-
gate the Japanese decisionmaking process that led to the attack on
Pearl Harbor, as well as other matters.
Since I was at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked, I was
charged with investigating this particular question. Why did the
Japanese attack Pearl Harbor? I discussed this matter with the
Prime Minister, with all the military leaders, the seniors in the
Japanese Government, and all without exception said the same
thing. They said that the Congress had refused to pass the draft
initially, and then they passed it only by one vote. They had
refused to fortify Wake and Guam Islands, and that the U.S. Army
was in Louisiana training with wooden guns, all of which was a
fact, and consequently they did not think that we had the military
capability or the will or determination to oppose them.
So, they decided to attack Pearl Harbor.
My point is, if the relative balance as perceived by the potential
enemy gets to a point where they think they can attack and
succeed, then the country is in danger.
Senator Biden. Do you think it has reached that point. Admiral?
Admiral Moorer. I think we are just at that point, yes, sir.
It is our belief that if the U.S. Senate consents to the SALT II
Treaty, as now configured, it would make the adoption of such a
strategy most unlikely.
We did prepare a detailed study entitled "An Analysis of SALT
II." Copies are available to you, and I urge every member of the
committee to study the report. However, since this is a 78-page
document and thus too long for me to cover in the time alloted
today, I will ask permission at this time simply to read a 3-page
joint statement signed by 1,678 general and flag officers from all of
the armed services. A list of the names of these officers is being
provided to the members of the committee. I have the list right
here, sir.
Senator Biden. Are they all retired, Admiral?
' See page 60 for Admiral Moorer's prepared statement.
40
Admiral Moorer. Yes, they are all retired. As you know, active
duty military leaders are not permitted to flatly oppose SALT II.
This is why we at the Coalition for Peace Through Strength have
sought out the views of retired military leaders who are now free
to speak out.
From my conversations with active and retired military leaders,
I believe that the overwhelming majority oppose SALT II as writ-
ten. This has been confirmed by the fact that only four of the
retired officers contacted so far have declined to join in the state-
ment because they support SALT II as written. Another 33 de-
clined for such reasons as that they were undecided, ill, or thought
that the statement should be written differently.
We are continuing to circulate the statement and will later give
each Senator a copy of the statement with a list of all the signers
at that time.
With your permission, sir, I will now read the letter that we
have written to the chairman of this committee:
Hon. Frank Church,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Dear Senator Church: We, the undersigned retired and reserve general and flag
officers of all U.S. Military Services respectfully request you to oppose ratification of
SALT II.
We are in full agreement with most of our fellow Ar^ericans in preferring inter-
national cooperation and equitable arms limitation agreements to hostility and
competition. But we cannot agree that we can wish this congenial state of affairs
into being by blinding ourselves Lo the stark realities of our strategic situation and
our closely related conventional situation. In our view, SALT II as now written
epitomizes the refusal of some Americans to face the facts. The facts which must be
faced are these:
Ten years of U.S. restraint in the strategic nuclf ar field rooted in our faith in the
SALT process has not been reciprocated by the Soviet Union. Rather, the Soviets
have pursued an unprecedented buildup of nuclear offensive and defensive capabili-
ty which, as^ Secretary of Defense Brown points out, is aimed at a war-winning
capability. In this pursuit, the Soviets have stretched to the limit or broken when
they felt it desirable solemn agreements such as weapons test restraints aimed at
slowing down nuclear expansion. This leaves them now with a technical base that
we cannot match.
The concept of mutual assured destruction which has shaped U.S. policy since the
1960's was never accepted by the Soviets and has been completely negated by their
massive strategic defensive effort, including civil defense. The aggressiveness of
Soviet behavior throughout the world has increased ominously as the military
balance has tilted in favor of the U.S.S.R. This behavior is part of an overall grand
design of which SALT negotiations are an integral part.
Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Iran, and now combat troops and
fighter pilots in our own back yard, Cuba, are examples of what I am talking about.
Certainly I commend the chairman of this committee. Chairman Church, for taking
a strong position in opposition to this action by the Soviets here on our side of the
globe. U.S. intelligence capabilities to verify Soviet compliance with arms control
agreements have been seriously eroded through compromise of satellite reconnais-
sance systems and loss of key monitoring facilities.
It seems to us, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, that there is little
disagreement inside or outside government that these are the facts, yet the Senate
has been asked to ratify a treaty which apparently ignores these facts. We are told
by defenders of SALT II that while this treaty does little to slow down the Soviet
military surge, it is necessary to ratify it to preserve the process.
The proponents insist that SALT III and SALT IV will cure the inequities of
SALT I and SALT II, and in my view this ignores Soviet behavior since SALT I. The
Soviets have become harder, not easier to deal with, and as they gain confidence
from obvious superioiity, I predict they will become even harder. The proponents of
SALT II insist that we will improve our security through ratification because the
situations would be worse without SALT II. We find it hard to believe (hat the
Soviets could significantly accelerate their current arms buildup in light of the fact
that they are already spending 15 percent of their gross national product on arms,
41
and we find it even harder to believe that ratification of SALT II would be followed
by vigorous U.S. efforts to close the widening gap between U.S. and Soviet military
capabilities.
It is almost certain that Senate ratification of this treaty would commit the
United States to another seven years of pursuing peace through trust of the Soviets
and adherence to the obviously bankrupt doctrine of mutual assured destruction.
This means further decline of our capability to declare war or to defend ourselves.
We respectfully submit that the arms control process has become dominated by
persistent U.S. refusal to face the reality of a failure of the twin policies of detente
and disarmament.
SALT II doesn't even limit arms. SALT II is only a set of rules for building arms
and some of these rules are nonenforceable. The image of limitation is provided by
alleged equal numbers of launchers and aircraft, not to the real destructive ele-
ments of nuclear force — missiles and explosive power — where the Soviets have been
allowed a heavy advantage. To make matters worse, the "equal" numbers are
contrived by failing to count Soviet delivery systems such as the Backfire, the most
advanced strategic bomber in the operational inventory of either side, or the SS-20.
We also find the treaty as written unverifiable and attempts to finesse this issue
by redefining terms most disturbing. SALT II is much more complex than SALT I
and covers qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of nuclear armaments enor-
mously more difficult to monitor. Given the compromise of our key verification
satellite systems and the loss of vital monitoring stations in Iran, we cannot ensure
against Soviet circumvention of the treaty provisions.
State Department documents describing SALT II now redefine verification. Where
adequate verification once required an assurance from U.S. intelligence that at-
tempts by the Soviets to circumvent would be detected, it now requires only that we
can detect cheating on such a large scale that it alters the strategic balance in time
to assure an appropriate U.S. response.
This new definition completely finesses the problem of adequacy of our intelli-
gence capability since it is totally dependent upon one's view of what constitutes a
strategic balance and an appropriate response. For those who find the actual bal-
ance of strategic capabilities irrelevant and believe that a single U.S. Poseidon
submarine is an adequate deterrent, regardless of the size of the Soviet forces, SALT
II can be considered adequately verifiable with no U.S. intelligence capability at all.
We agree with the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Brown, that the Soviets are building
forces capable of fighting and winning a nuclear war with the United States and its
allies, but we strongly disagree with his view that this aim can be thwarted by
ratifying SALT II. Soviet participation in SALT, or any other arms control treaties,
is primarily designed to further this goal and to elicit U.S. acquiescence and even
cooperation in creating the necessary imbalance of power required by that goal.
I should point out at this time, Mr. Chairman, that like you, I also have been
traveling. I spent the last weekend in Brussels at the NATO meeting commemorat-
ing the 30th anniversary of NATO. This meeting was attended by very influential
legislative leaders in Europe as well as Senators Roth, Morgan, and Garn, and
Representatives Zablocki, Beard, and others. I can say that you and I obviously do
not talk to the same people, because the facts are that whereas the leaders in
NATO have supported SALT II, there is considerable concern within the rank and
file of the leadership of NATO, and I can tell you why.
They see this imbalance that has developed with our strategic forces. No longer
do they believe that the United States in case NATO is attacked by Russia will be
willing to generate or initiate a major nuclear exchange between the United States
and Russia because Europe was attacked by the Russians.
Consequently, I think this makes the restraints of the protocol very important,
because the NATO nations at this time should begin immediately acquiring a
capability to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack on NATO by an attack from Europe
on Russia.
I talked to Lord Chalfonte, who is the publisher of the London
Times, and in fact he mentioned this. He noted that Pravda had
recently said words to the effect that the Americans have the
rather forlorn idea that the protocol will cease in 1981, but they
say it is not the case, it will be extended. This is the Russians
talking in Pravda.
I think that this point was discussed by you and by the previous
witness here with respect to what happened with the SALT I
interim agreement. It was extended. Now, I am not a lawyer and
42
cannot debate with you about what it means for Senate passage
and resolution, but I am just saying that there are many people
who fear that the protocol will be extended.
Mr. Chairman, in sum, we urge the Senate of the United States to consider the
grave consequences of ratifying a treaty which will commit this country to the
continuation of disarmament policies and philosophy which, however promising
when adopted, have imperiled the security of the United States and its allies and
encourage ever more aggressive Soviet behavior. The SALT process is not so sacro-
sanct that we must accept a lopsided and unverifiable agreement simply to show
progress. We who know war cherish peace. We are not warmongers, as all who
oppose SALT II have been dubbed by some.
As military professiuiials, and with all due resp)ect for our more circumscribed
colleagues still bound by their active service, we strongly urge you to reject SALT II
as currently written as being injurious to the security interests of the United States
and its allies.
That is signed by me with grave concern.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Admiral.
CONCERN OF NATO ALLIES ON PROTOCOL EXTENSION AND
NONCIRCUMVENTION
I would like to proceed with two lines of questioning, one con-
cerns the attitude of our NATO allies. I am not quite sure that we
disagree. You say that our allies express grave concern, and then
you point out what that concern is. The concern really relates to
the extension of the protocol and the noncircumvention provision,
doesn't it?
Admiral Moorer. Yes.
Senator Biden. Did anyone suggest to you that the central ele-
ments of the treaty concerned them, and that the United States
should not ratify the treaty?
Admiral Moorer. They did that by inference, in the sense that
they feel that the treaty as now constructed further enhances their
insecurity. They have what I would call a crisis of confidence.
Senator Biden. Sure. Doesn't that crisis of confidence relate to
the theater nuclear force relationship between NATO and the
Soviet Union and not to the central systems? You have already
said to us that you believe it was amplified in what they said that
they do not believe that the United States would engage its central
systems?
Admiral Moorer. So say them.
Senator Biden. Yes. If that is the case, isn't really their concern
the theater?
Admiral Moorer. Of course, and I think that the protocol inhib-
its, in my view, the development in the theater of the kind of
capability that they have.
Senator Biden. How did it do that. Admiral? How does it inhibit?
Admiral Moorer. Well, as I see it, it restricts the range.
Senator Biden. It restricts the deployment.
Admiral Moorer. Yes. In other words, the protocol as I read it
restricts the United States and has no impact on the Soviets.
DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILE AFTER DECEMBER 1981
Senator Biden. Isn't it true that we can continue research and
development, we can do all we are capable of doing short of deploy-
ing, and we are not capable of deploying until December 1981
43
anyway. Isn't that true? I mean, even if we wanted to deploy the
ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missile tomorrow, we
don't have that capability, do we, to deploy?
Admiral Moorer. Well, I think it depends entirely on what we
feel is urgent. As a matter of fact, when we built the Polaris
submarines under a posture of urgency, we turned them out at one
a minute. If this becomes an overriding objective, if you view what
happened in World War II, certainly we can deploy the missiles
before 1981.
Senator Biden. I see, and is it your firm belief that a significant
portion of our NATO allies wish us to reject the treaty?
Admiral Moorer. I think they certainly wish it to be significant-
ly modified.
CHANGES NATO WANTS AMENDED OR CHANGED
Senator Biden. Is there anjrthing beyond those two provisions
that they believe has to be amended or changed? Do you hear
anybody suggest that unless we include the Backfire bomber, we
should reject the treaty? Have you heard anybody say that?
Admiral Moorer. Yes.
Senator Biden. You did?
Admiral Moorer. Yes. They feel that the Backfire bomber and
SS-20 should be part of the overall package and is not counted.
Senator Biden. They think they should be counted as part of the
central systems?
Admiral Moorer. Yes; because this in effect, withdrawing them
from the Soviet numbers, changes the relative balance between the
weapons systems, the central system.
Senator Biden. How does it do that?
Admiral Moorer. It degrades the U.S. willingness as part of this
crisis of confidence that you and I just mentioned.
including backfire in central systems
Senator Biden. I see. I thought their concern was that they be
able to move forward with TNF modernization, introduce the long-
range Pershing, have access to cruise technology, and deploy their
ground-launched or sea-launched cruise, and that that was the only
prospect that would have any impact in countering the Soviet
theater systems, the theater systems being the Backfire bomber
and the SS-20.
Now, I am at a loss to understand the argument you have just
put forward, that by including them in the central systems, we
would in any way alleviate their concern. I don't understand that.
They are still sitting there. They are still there directed toward the
theater, not toward the United States.
By the way, I spoke to military people in NATO, and they know
what the Backfire bomber is for. Not a military man in Europe
whom I have run across doesn't know what the Backfire bomber is
intended for.
It is not intended for intercontinental use. It is intended for
them, and they know it, so they are very worried. How does includ-
ing it in the central systems affect that at all?
48-260 0-79 Pt . 4
44
Admiral Moorer. Well, Senator Biden, I don't know how much
experience you have had in military planning, but when you begin
to plan any kind of military strategy on the basis of predicting
what the intentions of the other sides are, you are in deep trouble.
You have to look at the capabilities of the other side and not the
intentions.
Senator Biden. Precisely. The capability of those aircraft and
what they are designed for. I don't know of any military men in
Europe who believe the primary capability and design purpose of
these aircraft is for anything but the theater; do you?
Admiral Moorer. Instead of the word "primary" I think it is
probably true that they are primarily devoted to European targets,
but they have an easy capability for reaching the United States,
and we have no air defense worthy of the name, as you well know.
Senator Biden. You know, we can do all kinds of things with any
kind of weapon, but it seems to me that you have to look at the
purpose, the primary purpose for which they are constructed. Obvi-
ously, you can do anything with almost any weapon. I have not run
across anybody in Europe, any military people who have any doubt
about the Backfire bomber being a theater weapon.
I see that the General is shaking his head no. General, do you
know of any military men in Europe who say that is not the
purpose?
General Graham. I know a lot of military men in Europe who
would say: "Good for you. United States," sarcastically. You don't
count the Backfire bomber because you hope they are going to use
them on us. I don't think that causes much confidence, and when
you come around to say what it was built for, the Backfire bomber
is the best bomber the Soviets have ever built for attack on the
United States. We are counting 50- to 60-year-old prop jobs in the
SALT Treaty, and the Soviets are going to have 400 of these new
jobs, and we are not counting them because some believe, and
apparently you believe, that they were not built for attack on the
United States.
I don't know how you possibly can come to that conclusion.
PRIMARY purpose OF BACKFIRE BOMBER
Senator Biden. General, let me ask you the question again, if I
could. Are there military people in Europe that you know who
believe that the primary purpose for which the Backfire bomber is
being built is for use against the United States, or do they believe
that the primary purpose of the bomber is for use in the theater?
General Graham. Military men both on this side of the Atlantic
and on the other side of the Atlantic look at weapons systems in
terms, as the Admiral said, of their capability. They know that it is
capable both of attacking peripherally and attacking the United
States. Every bomber in anybody's inventory is better for attacking
closer targets than farther targets.
Senator Biden. Now you are begging the question, sir. Let me
ask it in another way. What do the military men in Europe whom
you know believe is the mission for which the Backfire is presently
tasked? What do you think?
General Graham. I don't know of anybody who says they know
what the mission of the Backfire is on this side of the water or over
45
there. It is, of course, a bigger threat to anything to which it is
closer, and that is Europe, Japan, and China. It is a lesser threat if
it has a distance to go, but so are the Soviet bombers that we are
counting in SALT, and this is a better bomber than any of them.
Senator Biden. So the SS-18, because it has less distance to go to
get to Bonn, is also more of a threat to Europe than here.
General Graham. No, sir. There is a difference between aircraft
and missiles.
Senator Biden. Well, tell me the difference in terms of the ra-
tionale that you just put forward. You said any target ^hat is closer
is obviously more vulnerable. Isn't Bonn therefore more vulnerable
to the SS-18 than we are?
General Graham. Yes, sir; but you can get to Bonn without
refueling the Backfire, and you have to refuel the Backfire to go to
some farther distant target, so there is a great deal of difference
how you look at a missile and how you look at an aircraft.
Senator Biden. My time is up. Ihank you, gentlemen.
Senator Javits?
Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, two questions occur to me, and I would like to ask
them of you. I apologize for having to run over to the floor of the
Senate while you were reading your statement, but I gather you
read the letter of your organization into the record. Is that correct?
Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir. It is in the record.
SALT I effect on U.S. ARMAMENT BUILDUP
Senator Javits. I notice you make the point which is probably
summed up in these words: "The Soviets have become harder not
easier to deal with after SALT I." Would you say that there was
anything in the SALT I Treaty which prevented us from taking the
same steps forward in armaments that the Soviets did during that
time?
Admiral Moorer. No, sir, Senator Javits, and as I have said
many times, as you recall I am sure, when I as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the content of the SALT I Interim
Agreement on offensive systems, I had telephone calls between
Washington and Moscow on this matter as they were coming down
to the fine wire to sign the treaty. We came up with what we
called conditions, if you will, or assurances that we felt were neces-
sary in order to make SALT I viable.
The administration, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
fense, if you read the testimony, strongly supported the assurances
that were requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is a mattter
of record, but subsequent to that time, the B-1 bomber has been
canceled, and many other of the actions with respect to the cruise
missile, for instance — now, we have agreed to place a restraint on
the cruise missile range for land-based and sea-based missiles, and
overall the general thrust of what we have been talking about has
been slowed down.
I agree with you that we were not restricted from doing any of
those things, but I believe you will agree that SALT I created a
kinc! of euphoria in the Congress and in the eye of the public, and
consequently people more or less kind of sat back in their chairs
46
and the progressive buildup of the Soviets continued while ours
went down.
DIFFERENCE IN TIME PERIODS FOLLOWING SALT I AND SALT II
Senator Javits. I think that is a very fair statement, Admiral.
Let me refer to another sentence in the letter which reads as
follows:
And we find it even harder to believe that ratification of SALT II would be
followed by vigorous U.S. efforts to close the widening gaps betwen U.S. and Soviet
military capabilities.
I ask you this question. Is there any difference between this
period which will follow a SALT II ratification if we do ratify and
the period which followed SALT I? In other words, will we still be
in the same position where we could, if we wanted, build up to the
Soviets or get way ahead of them? What is there in this treaty, in
your judgment, aside from the euphoria which you feel will contin-
ue, which will block us from taking the action we should have
taken, assuming your argument after SALT I? What is there in
this treaty that will prevent us from moving forward if we wish to
with the same vigor and the same strength that you prescribed
after SALT I?
Admiral Moorer. You are really asking me two questions. First,
what is different about the time today and the time back in 1972? I
think there is a radical difference. I think that the rapid buildup
by the Soviets in all phases of military equipment, missiles, and
conventional forces, and so on, has put them in a far stronger
position. That is the first point. I think in 1972 they would not
have dared to put troops and fighter pilots in Cuba. I think they
are just thumbing their nose at us.
I think they know that they can move ahead and we are not
going to do anything about it, so there is a major difference be-
tween 1972 and 1979.
Now, so far as the specific treaty is concerned, what can't we do?
I have already mentioned what I think are the unnecessary re-
straints imposed on the United States by the protocol which im-
posed no restraints on the Soviets, and in my view will slow down a
buildup of the NATO countries which is mandatory.
Second, you have such things in the treaty as article IX, I believe
it is that article, which restricts us from putting ballistic missiles
on ships. Now, if we are a maritime power and the Soviets are a
land power, why did we agree to accept a disadvantage which I do
not think is necessary? The Soviets were the ones who suggested
this. Obviously, they have IVz times the land area that we do. I
think there is another aspect of this about which people do not talk
very much, Senator Javits, but if you will look at a map, you will
see that our ballistic missiles are west of the population centers of
the United States, namely, the Chicago-Boston-Washington trian-
gle, and if the Soviets would undertake a counterforce attack on
our land-based missiles, the fallout would come right across the
most densely populated area of our country.
Conversely, the Soviet missiles are on the east side of Soviet
Russia, and if we were to attack them, as we well know, the fallout
would go over Japan and China.
47
So, I think that we should not just agree to remove an option
which could possibly remove the target from the center of the
United States.
FEASIBILITY OF BALLISTIC MISSILES ON SHIPS
Senator Javits. Have ballistic missiles on ships ever been consid-
ered by you as the Chief of Naval Operations as a feasible proposi-
tion?
Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir, many times. This was at a time, of
course, when we were beginning to get seriously concerned about
the accelerated Soviet buildup that was taking place subsequent to
the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. This was looked on very seriously
in the Pentagon as an alternative means of rapidly increasing our
missile capability.
Senator Javits. We will inquire into that. Admiral. So far as I
know, it is the first time this has been raised. We will inquire into
it.
Admiral Moorer. But the treaty does prohibit this.
Senator Javits. Yes, I see that. We will include article IX in the
record at this point, and we will investigate it.
[The information referred to follows:]
Article IX — Special Prohibitions on Weapon Systems
This Article prohibits or restricts certain types of weapon systems.
Subparagraph 1(a) prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers for installation on water-
borne vehicle other than submarines, and of launchers of such missiles. This provi-
sion prohibits the development of a long-range ballistic missile system for surface
ships. The United States has no plans for such a system. An Associated Common
Understanding declares that this prohibition does not affect current practices for
transporting ballistic missiles, such as would be used in supplying missiles to
operating bases.
Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of Article IX prohibits the development, testing,
and deployment of fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the
seabed or on the beds of internal waters, or mobile launchers of such missiles which
move only in contact with the beds of such waters, as well as missiles for such
launchers. The effect of this provision is: (a) to extend the prohibitions of the Seabed
Arms Control Treaty ' to the entire territorial waters and internal waters of the
Parties; and (b) to extend its obligations to include development and testing in
addition to deployment. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty essentially prohibits Par-
ties from emplacing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction as well
as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for
storing, testing or using such weapons, on the seabed and the ocean floor (or its
subsoil) beyond a 12-mile coEistal "seabed zone" measured from the baseline of the
territorial sea. An associated Agreed Statement makes clear that the obligation
contained in this subparagraph applies, inter alia, to all areas covered by the
Seabed Arms Control Treaty.
The prohibition on mobile launchers which can move only in contact with the
seabed does not include launchers on submarines, as submarines need not be in
contact with the seabed in order to move.
Subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX prohibits the development, testing and deploy-
ment of systems for placing into earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of
weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles. This subpara-
graph expands the obligations of the Outer Space Treaty,^ in that the Outer Space
' The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons
of Mass Destruction • the Seabed and the Ocean Floor a. id in the Subsoil Thereof, signed at
Washington, London ani. Moscow Feb. 11, 1971, 23 UST 701, TIAS 7337. The United States and
Soviet Union are both Parties to this Treaty.
^ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed at Washington, London and
Moscow Jan. 27, 1967, 18 UST 2410, TIAS 6347. The United States and Soviet Union are both
Parties to this Treaty.
48
Treaty prohibits only the actual placement in space of weapons of mass destruction,
and does not cover fractional orbital missiles.
An associated Common Understanding states that the prohibition on fractional
orbital missiles does not require dismantling or destruction of existing launchers of
either Party. However, under the Second Common Understanding to paragraph 2 of
Article VII the Soviets have agreed to dismantle or destroy twelve SS-9 launchers
at the Tyura-Tam test range which have been used to test a fractional orbital
bombardment system (FOBS) several times in the past. Moreover, any fractional
orbit missiles in existence must be dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the obliga-
tion of paragraph 4 of Article XI, and such missiles cannot be developed in the
future.
Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 prohibits the development, testing, and deploy-
ment of mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs. This obligation complements what is in
effect a ban on additional fixed launchers of modern heavy ICBMs contained in
Article IV. Heavy ICBMs are defined in paragraph 7 of Article II.
Subparagraphs (e) and (f) prohibit heavy SLBMs and their launchers and heavy
ASBMs. These subparagraphs in effect define heavy SLBMs and heavy ASBMs in
language parallel to that for the definition of heavy ICBMs in paragraph 7 of
Article II. A heavy SLBM or ASBM is one with a launch-weight or throw-weight
heavier than that of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM. The First and Second Agreed State-
ments defining launch-weight and throw-weight and the Common Understanding
concerning "other appropriate devices" for SLBMs and ASBMs also parallel those
under paragraph 7 of Article II. The mutual understanding of the Parties on the
terminology related to the definition of throw-weight set forth in the plenary
statements by both Parties on October 29, 1976 (stated above), applies here as well.
The second paragraph of this Article prohibits the flight-testmg and deployment
on heavy bombers of long-range cruise missiles equipped with multiple independent-
ly targetable warheads. An Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 defines "independent-
ly targetable" warheads of cruise missiles. This definition is similar to that of
MIRVs, which are defined under paragraph 5 of Article II. This definition does not
include cruise missiles equipped with "cluster warheads"; nor does it include a
recoverable, single-warhead cruise missile which can attack independent targets on
separate flights.
Admiral Moorer. I am just saying that we should not voluntar-
ily accept the restraint that the Soviets are not going to use
an3rway. * i • i
Senator Javits. Well, I know, but it takes two to tango. Admiral.
We are not going to have everything our way, if we have a treaty.
If we are not going to have a treaty, we and they will each go our
own way. That was my argument with Professor Rostow, and that,
of course, is another very different matter.
Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir, but I think you can carry that only so
far, or you will wind up as the low man on the totem pole.
EFFECT ON NO ARMAMENTS PROGRAM OF SALT IS DEFEATED
Senator Javits. But that depends on the will of the United
States. That is what I am trying to get from you. I am asking you
this question. Suppose we do not enter into this treaty and we are
still in a state of euphoria. Are we then worse off or better off. In
other words, we remain in the same state of euphoria then, but do
not make the treaty. You gentlemen will have been successful in
defeating the treaty, but if you are not successful in an armament
program, then what?
Admiral Moorer. Well, in the first place, I think I emphasize
two or three times that we are not opposed to arms limitations. I
have never known a military man who was. Second, what we are
opposing is the contents of this particular document. We are not
opposing disarmament. .
Senator Javits. If I may have just 2 more minutes. Admiral, let
me say that we are now in a very particular situation. You have no
49
guarantee whatever, believe me, that if we reject this treaty the
Congress is going to vote all the things you want or that you think
we ought to have. I should not say "things you want;" you are not
capricious. You are one of our military leaders.
Admiral Moorer. I am a retired man.
Senator Javits. That is all right, but I have known you for years,
and I still honor you. I would not take away one whit from you.
You cannot assure us of that at all. If we reject the treaty and are
still euphoric, aren't we then much worse off?
Admiral Moorer. Senator Javits, I think that the treaty can be
put in such a form that it would be a far more balanced and
equitable treaty, and we have discussed some of the points here.
Senator Javits. Well, Admiral, then you are superimposing your
judgment on that of the President, the negotiators, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and saying that we can negotiate a better deal if we
turn this down. Now, that is a big question, a very big one. You
can't guarantee that.
Admiral Moorer. Of course not, but I feel it would be better to
try than to accept this treaty verbatim as written.
Senator Javits. By turning it down, whatever may be the conse-
quences?
Admiral Moorer. I think it should be negotiated further.
Senator Javits. I know, but that is turning it down. Sir, great
nations cannot bluff. The Senate is going to vote on this treaty, and
it is going to turn it down if you win. Then where does that leave
us? In my opinion, it threatens to leave us with the same euphoria,
with no treaty, with an exacerbated situation in the world, and
with far more scared European powers than they are today.
Admiral Moorer. Sir, I think you also have to ask the question
of where does it leave us if we sign it. That is what concerns me.
You can say that it is a matter of opinion, but I think the facts
speak for themselves. I think the Soviets have reached a point now
that they really do not care what we think. Otherwise, thej'
wouldn't be down in Cuba today.
Senator Javits. Well, we will see about Cuba, sir. You are too
much of a professional to jump at first assumptions. I do not know
what Cuba amounts to, but believe me, we will dig into it carefully.
There is indirect linkage for me between Cuba and SALT, and I
believe there is for everybody else. There is no use in kidding
ourselves about that. However, we are not at the bottom of that
story yet.
AGREEMENT TO SALT I TIED TO ADMINISTRATION PRESSURE
You say at the end of your letter. Admiral: "As military profes-
sionals, and with all due respect for our more circumscribed col-
leagues still bound by their active service." Admiral, did you agree
to SALT I because the administration wanted you to or because
you were convinced it was the right thing to do? In other words,
are you attributing a standard to the present Joint Chiefs of Staff
which is lower than yours?
Admiral Moorer. No, sir, certainly not, but I can tell you this.
Based on years and years of experience in our system of govern-
ment, we are the only nation to my knowledge that requires a man
in uniform to testify before the legislative branch of the Govern-
50
ment. I do know from my experience that it makes no difference,
and I am not getting political on this at all, it makes no difference
whether it is a Republican or a Democratic administration. There
are pressures brought to bear on the military people which I think
are probably proper in an executive pyramid, but they do not have
an opportunity to speak as I am speaking to you today.
This is an absolute fact in our system. Now, I do not oppose that.
I think in an executive branch, whether it is in the executive
branch of the U.S. Government or in the structure of General
Motors, that the chairman of the board, or the President, or who-
ever happens to be the chief executive officer, in all honesty and
fairness should ask his assistants, his vice presidents, or his joint
chiefs of staff what they think about this issue.
Then, he might say, I hear you but I am going to do it another
way. I have done that many times myself with my own staff. I am
sure you have, too. Senator Javits, but once the chief executive
makes the decision, then the staff is obligated to do everything it
can to support that decision. These people have two options, to
either support or to resign. That is the way the system works. I do
not think it should be changed or that it can be changed.
RELIABILITY OF JCS TESTIMONY
Senator Javits. Admiral, you would have us believe, and perhaps
this is the most portentious part of your testimony, that in order to
get the truth out of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we have to wait until
they retire, and they are then no longer Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Admiral Moorer. No; I did not say that at all, and I hope you
are not suggesting that I am accusing the Joint Chiefs of Staff of
lying.
Senator Javits. No; I did not mean to do that at all. You are
absolutely right to object, and I apologize, but in order to get what
they really think, you tell us we will have to wait until they resign
and they are no longer Joint Chiefs of Staff; therefore we cannot
rely upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is probably the most
serious thing that has been evidenced in this whole hearing.
Senator Biden. Or the political leadership you pointed out of the
Western World. n c^ rr i.
Senator Javits. Let's talk about the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
professionals, and you were one of them. Did you want us to rely
on you when you were Chairman?
Admiral Moorer. Certainly.
Senator Javits. You did? Well, why do you not want us to rely
on the present Joint Chiefs?
Admiral Moorer. I did not say that. I said you must take the
lead of the Chief Executive, and all the people who work for him
are required to support him. That is what I said. That is what they
all do. . u . T
Senator Javits. Well, sir, this is where you are an expert, but 1
must say in my opinion you leave our country in an extremely
exposed and vulnerable position to tell us that we can't really
know what they think. They will somehow rationalize or conform
to the Chief Executive when they are the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You
have to face that. Admiral. There is no way of ducking it. That is
what you are telling us, in my opinion.
51
Admiral Moorer. Senator Javits, let me say that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff sent several memoranda to the Secretary of Defense
on SALT II and they expressed essentially the same concerns that I
have expressed today. As a matter of fact, I think some members of
this committee remarked at the time the Joint Chiefs were sitting
right here that what you are doing is damning the treaty with
fai!.t praise. If you are fair about it, if you read what they said, I
don't think that they just can't wait until this treaty is signed.
Senator Javits. Sir, I am sorry. They are men of authority and
decision. I am not a professional, but I have served, too. I know
that military people know how to decide and how to give an order,
whatever may be their reservations, and they have stated them.
They have been given an order. They have said, we are for this, so
ratify it. I will say that you worry me very much about many,
many things, and not just this particular treaty, but major deci-
sions which involve the very existence of our country,
QUESTION OF VERIFICATION
Senator Biden. Let me follow on that one point. You mentioned
the question of verification, General, and Admiral. I sit on the
Intelligence Committee. I have for a year now heard the testimony
of the very men who are the experts both in the military and
outside of the military. I have heard Admiral Inman, who is an
incredibly qualified fellow. I have heard the heads of our intelli-
gence community come before us and say that we can verify this
treaty. I have only one source for classified information. I cannot
even go to you any longer. You don't have the access.
The very eminent retired generals and admirals whom you have
listed do not have the access to up-to-date information which the
people who are now charged by our Government with our security
have. They have said to us that this treaty is verifiable. Barry
Goldwater says this treaty is verifiable, after listening to them. We
all must rely at some point on experts. We are not talking about
political questions in terms of verification. We are asking them,
can you see X, Y, and Z, and the experts say, yes, we can. You are
telling us in your statement, and all of these retired people appar-
ently agree, that it is not verifiable. You go on to tell us that the
rank and file of the military in Europe have much deeper reserva-
tions about the treaty than the present military leadership. You go
on to say that the political leadership is strongly for SALT, but
underneath there is really no support.
It seems to me that you have made the most damning indictment
of political and military leadership and expertise not only in this
country but in the entire alliance that I have ever heard. You are
right that I don't have the experience with strategic planning that
you do. I am a 36-year-old U.S. Senator, not a retired Admiral with
a very distinguished career. But because of what I am, I look to the
people who supposedly know, the leadership in the military, the
leadership in the intelligence community, the leadership in the
alliance, and uniformly they tell me, with reservations that have
been expressed, that we should ratify this treaty. And you are
sajdng to us that retired people know better, that we should listen
to them, and you, and not to this leadership. And you imply that
they are really not telling us what they think.
52
If that is true, you don't leave us much to rely on, not just in this
treaty, but in anything relating to our military establishment.
Admiral Moorer. Senator Biden, I don't wish to leave it in those
terms. It is true, as I said before, that we do have a different
system which was established by the Congress in the Defense Reor-
ganization Act of 1958 as well as the National Security Act of 1927,
I believe. You might want to take a look at that. But when you get
to technical matters, in terms of the capability of the intelligence
system or the capability of our own equipment, of course, you get
the greatest detail in this, but when you get into a flat question of,
do you approve of the Vietnam conflict, which I did not, and I said
so many times, nevertheless, we also talk all the time about civil-
ian control. I'll bet I have heard that term a thousand times, the
term "civilian control." We do have civilian control in this country.
I have never known a military man who does not support the
Constitution, but I think there are pressures put on military people
to go along with the administration's policy, and that is just a fact.
I think if you were President, you would do the same thing.
Senator Biden. Sure, there is pressure, and I would attempt to do
the same thing if I believed it were right, but honorable military
men are faced with the same choice that honorable men in politics
are, and that is that they can't go along with it if they really
believe the security of the country is being jeopardized. Then they
would have an obligation to resign. That is a real obligation, not a
fictitious one.
You are implying that this treaty truly jeopardizes the security
of the United States, and that the military men who are telling us
otherwise know that. Now, it seems to me for them to continue in
office if they believe that means they would be dishonorable men,
regardless of the pressure. If I in fact totally disagree with a
position my party takes, my State takes, or my constituency takes,
i don't have an obligation to go along. I have an obligation to
follow my conscience, and I should resign if I can't go along with it.
These men, you are saying to us, know that this treaty jeopar-
dizes the security of the United States of America but because of
political pressure they are not coming forward.
Admiral Moorer. No, sir; I didn't say that. I said that what they
told you, I am sure, was their opinion, but I think that this treaty,
as I say in my statement, is ill-advised in its present form. I am not
like you in the sense that I do not have access to the intelligence
reports that you have. General Graham was director of the intelli-
gence agency, and so far as the verification capabilities are con-
cerned, he is an expert.
Senator Biden. I know that. I am not suggesting that General
Graham cannot disagree with Admiral Inman.
General Graham. I don't think I do, as a matter of fact. One of
the problems I think for a Senator getting briefed on verification
is, you may not know what questions to ask because you don't
know enough about it. Have you questioned this part of the treaty
that says the Soviets will not produce an SS-16 missile, will not
produce the third stage of it, will not produce the warhead? I don't
know of an honest intelligence man, Bobby Inman included, who
will say, yes, I can verify that they are not producing the warhead
for an SS-16. He knows they can't do that.
53
I'll bet you if you ask him bluntly, can you tell me, Bobby, can
you verify whether or not the Soviets are producing a warhead for
an SS-16, he will tell you he doesn't know. I will bet you Admiral
Turner, who knows a lot less about it than Bobby does because he
hasn't been in it as much, will also tell you no, and General Tighe
will tell you know if you ask the right question.
Senator Biden. You are a very interesting fellow. General, to
imply that after a Senator spends a full year, involving several
hundred hours of reading and briefings, that he is not able even to
ask the right questions. You guys make such an incredible indict-
ment of the system that I just find it absolutely difficult to believe
you are saying it.
Senator Stone. Don't go away mad, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Oh, no, I won't do that.
INTRODUCTION OF COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA
Senator Stone. Admiral Moorer, on July 17, you and Admiral
Zumwalt testified before this committee and for the first time the
issue of Soviet military buildups was raised by me in questioning
you. I asked you was it not the case that Soviet Golf II submarines
carry nuclear misssiles, and that if servicing such a submarine
took place in Cuba, it would be a violation, and you said it would ' I
asked you both this question: I would like to ask either or both of
you whether you think a direct or indirect effort to establish a
military base would be established by the introduction of a large
number of combat troops of the Soviet Union into Cuba.
Admiral Zumwalt said there is no question in his mind. You,
Admiral Moorer, said absolutely, yes, sir. I then asked, would you
say that if other than advisers, the Soviet Union attempted to
introduce as much as a brigade of combat troops into Cuba, that
that would constitute a direct or indirect effort to establish a base.
Well, since that time, within a day, the administration witnesses
denied that the Golf II submarine does or did carry nuclear mis-
siles, but within a week admitted it, and it is in the record. Within
3 or 4 weeks after that, they have now conceded and now they
assert that there is a Soviet brigade of combat troops in Cuba.
My final question to you was this: "I have already inquired about
the Soviet submarine visits. I have already inquired about the Mig-
23 and Mig-25 presence in Cuba. If in addition to that there were a
major introduction of Soviet combat troops into Cuba, could there
be any further doubt that we just do not care about protecting our
hemisphere against Soviet military bases in this hemisphere?"
At that time you said, Admiral Moorer: "None whatsoever, none
whatever, and I think it would be the height of folly for the United
Stated to permit that to happen, sir."
It has now happened. What is your suggestion to our policy-
makers at this juncture? And I would like the opinion of you.
Admiral Moorer, and also General Graham, of you.
Adi.Jral Moorer. In my opinion this is directly linked, as I
pointed out, this action by the Soviets — as a matter of fact, I
predicted this was going to happen when I testified on the Panama
Canal issue. I stated that there was a Torrijos-Moscow-Castro axis,
■ See the SALT II Treaty hearings, part 2, pp. 178-180.
54
and that the Senate should not be surprised if we did not find an
expansion of Soviet activity in Cuba in very short order.
I was sitting right here in this very room, I believe.
In the first place, I believe this is part of the overall effort of the
Soviets to gain major influence worldwide. I think there is no way
that you can unlink this from the SALT discussion. As I said this
morning, I think it is all part of an overall grand design on their
part.
In the first place, I think the SALT discussions should be halted
until the Soviets reconcile this point. If they refuse to do that, then
I think there are several courses of action open to us. Of course, I
am not in a position to decide on these.
Certainly I think we should make it crystal clear to the Soviets
and to the world at large that we are not going to tolerate this
gradual creeping injection of Soviet forces all around the world. I
mentioned Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Yemen, and other areas.
Obviously, we will give the perception to the world at large that we
are engaged in a massive program of worldwide retrenchment.
Senator Stone. Thank you, Admiral.
General Graham?
General Graham. When I heard about the brigades. Senator
Stone, the chill that went through me was related to the fact that I
was one of the key analysts at the time of the 1962 missile crisis,
which is the last time that the Soviets had a brigade in Cuba.
We were thinking about deploying our troops. As a matter of
fact, we did deploy our troops down in Florida to go in. The
question put to the intelligence people was, what are those Soviet
troops going to do? Why are they there? Some of the theses were,
well, maybe they put them there to try to deter us from attacking
Cuba, but we said one brigade will not deter us from moving
against Cuba.
Then maybe they are there to help make sure Castro stays in
power as sort of a palace guard. That was rejected. The final
analysis from all knowledgeable Sovietologists is that they were
there to guard nuclear weapons because the Soviets have never
allowed nuclear weapons to get in the hands of even their most
trusted satellites. This is a consideration that should be taken very
much to heart by the Senate of the United States, because it does
have to do with strategy. This business about saying, well, don't
worry about them, they are not going to invade Florida, no, they
are not going to invade Florida, but the last time a group like that
was there, the Government of the United States decided, and the
intelligence organs of the United States decided they were there to
guard nuclear weapons.
INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT INTO CUBA
As you brought out, and much to your credit. Senator, you did
raise your voice when the Soviets introduced new nuclear capable
aircraft into Cuba that were better nuclear delivery systems than
the ones that Jack Kennedy said they had to take out at the time
they took out their missiles. They had some old IL-28's in there,
much poorer aircraft than what they put in there now that are
nuclear capable, and then there was a chat about, well, this is not
the right model, and we don't know whether they are wired and so
55
forth, but I will tell you, every one of those aircraft that is de-
ployed opposite NATO is counted by the NATO people as a nuclear
threat to NATO.
Senator Stone. Are you speaking of the Mig-23's?
General Graham. Yes, the Mig-23's, the floggers. So, this is an
extremely serious business, and it should not be handled simply
through an expression of concern. I believe something must be
done about checking what may be just the tip of the iceberg. This
is what we see now in Cuba. What else is in Cuba? Once again, we
are getting the kind of reports that one of your colleagues. Senator
Keating, was getting before the Cuban missile crisis. They said,
watch out, something very sinister is going on down there in Cuba.
We could say, well, this is just Cuban exiles having their say again,
but now we had better pay some attention to them, as we did not
pay attention to them in those days until we took pictures and
found out what was going on.
There is one other aspect of this, and here I agree with Henry
Kissinger, and sometimes Henry Kissinger and I have not agreed
on things. Dr. Kissinger always insisted that we continue to fly
reconnaissance flights over Cuba while some of my colleagues even
in the Pentagon said that for cost purposes we are getting enough
pictures with satellites, so why send aircraft? He said, t^e day you
stop sending the aircraft over Cuba, you are going to py:2 a signal
to the Soviet Union that it is now open season for Hem to do
anything they want in Cuba.
When this administration came into power, I regret to say those
reconnaissance flights were stopped. I think that makes Henry
Kisssinger something of a prophet on this particular occasion.
Senator Stone. Mr. Chairman, may I have an additional 2 or 3
minutes?
Senator Biden. Yes, sir.
Admiral Moorer. Senator Stone, please permit me to make an
additional comment. I have been extremely concerned about the
Soviet pilots in Cuba because I feel that in the short term they are
more destabilizing than the troops were, because should they inter-
cept an American plane in the vicinity of Cuba, a situation would
be generated which can bring about a confrontation. For them to
have their pilots in Cuba, I think, is another matter that should be
taken up with the Soviets by the strongest means available.
Senator Stone. Thank you. Admiral.
General, I have another question on this point. How recently did
you retire as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency? In what
year was that?
General Graham. It was January 1, 1976.
SECRETARY VANCE's ASSERTION — BRIGADE IN CUBA SINCE 1975
Senator Stone. 1976. As of that time, could you comment on the
Secretary of State's assertion of yesterday that the brigade prob-
ably was there in 1975 or even earlier?
General Graham. If that is so, then there was absolutely no
evidence of that when I was Chief of Military Intelligence.
Senator Stone. And you were conducting the aerial reconnais-
sance then?
56
General Graham. That's right. In those days we were looking a
lot better than we have been in the last V-k years.
Senator Stone. Well, in the last V-k weeks we did conduct the
appropriate reconnaissance, the administration says. That is what
a lot of them do, piece the jigsaw puzzle together. What you are
saying is that that same or equivalent surveillance, up until Janu-
ary 1, 1976, had not produced that kind of evidence or anything
like that kind of evidence?
General Graham. That is correct. The most that we could find in
those days of evidence of Soviet presence was that they had con-
structed some facilities for Soviet sailors coming into Cienfuegos.
We could see the recreation facilities and some barracks there.
They put up some kind of sports fields that— I forget which it
was — Cubans don't play, so we know it was Soviets.
Senator Stone. Gentlemen, I am saying, as I have said repeated-
ly in the last weeks, that what you saw then in Cienfuegos as a few
recreational facilities is considerably, substantially, and in a major
way more than what is seen now in Cienfuegos. Isn't that a fair
comment, from what you know?
General Graham. Yes, sir, that is right. I was amazed to see in
the newspapers where somebody said, well, those troops have been
there for 5 or 6 years. If they were, we sure missed them, and we
were covering Cuba very well. I believe that these troops are part
of the pattern that you have begun to see with Mig-23 aircraft
arrriving, with the Soviet pilots in their flying combat missions in
allegedly Cuban forces, and now this brigade. We are only seeing
that which is hard to hide, and we had better take this extremely
seriously.
Senator Stone. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Admiral, I particularly want to thank you for assisting with the
disclosure and discovery of what General Graham calls the tip of
the iceberg, but which had to come out, and which is now out.
General Graham, I thank you for clarifying this question of
when this test substantially began. Thank you.
Senator Biden. Thank you. Senator Stone.
Senator Hayakawa?
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
soviet successful first strike possible by 1982-83
There seems to be general agreement that regardless of whether
or not we ratify SALT II, by about 1982 or 1983, the Soviets will be
able to make a successful first strike.
General Graham. Yes, sir.
Admiral Moorer. Yes.
Senator Hayakawa. Now, the M-X will not be fully deployed
before 1988. Is that right?
General Graham. I believe it is 1986, sir. If everything stays on
track, you will get some of them in 1986.
57
WHAT UNITED STATES SHOULD DO TO COUNTER SOVIET STRATEGIC
SUPERIORITY
Senator Hayakawa. What could or should the United States do
now, promptly, in order to counter the danger of Soviet strategic
superiority by 1982 or 1983?
What are the things we should be doing?
Admiral Moorer. Well, Senator Hayakawa, I have always felt
that you cannot uncouple the conventional capabilities from the
strategic capabilities, so in my view, in answer to your question, we
should start now to redress this imbalance in both the conventional
and the strategic areas. Now, some people will say that we can't do
an5^hing about that until the treatj' expires, so what is the use?
However, firm action that is clearly perceived by the world at large
that this is what we are doing in itself would have, in my view, a
deterrent effect. Had we done this a year ago, I don't think the
Soviets would have put troops in Cuba or built them up as they
have.
separation of strategic AND CONVENTIONAL PREPARATION
Senator Hayakawa. Admiral, possibly to ask another question,
you say that strategic preparations and conventional ones cannot
be separated from each other. Is that so?
Admiral Moorer. That's right.
Senator Hayakawa. Are we not being asked in considering the
SALT 11 Treaty to consider the strategic elements only and to
ignore ever3d;hing else that is going on in conventional weaponry
and conventional warfare?
Admiral Moorer. That is correct. I have felt from the outset and
have said that SALT 11 should be a national security debate and
not just a SALT debate. SALT should be merely a part of the
debate.
General Graham. May I add to that, Senator?
Senator Hayakawa. Please do.
NEED TO ERADICATE CLASH OF STRATEGIC PHILOSOPHY
General Graham. The fundamental problem is to get rid of this
crazy notion that we have been pursuing for 15 years called mutual
assured destruction [MAD]. You in the Senate, in your hearings,
have produced some evidence of a profound clash of doctrine in the
Pentagon. On July 9, Secretary of Defense Brown said that mutual
assured destruction was the bedrock of our strategic doctrines. On
July 16, when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was asked,
what do you think of mutual assured destruction, he said, it is an
extremely dangerous idea, and we in the military, no matter how
much our civilian masters think that is a good idea, have not
followed it.
So, until that clash of philosophy or clash of strategy is removed,
it seems to me that we are not going to make the kind of military
moves that we must in order to defend this country. There are
things that are never mentioned. Why don't we go ahead and
defend the American people? Under the MAD concept, we have
gotten rid of all our defense. We have encouraged the Soviets to
58
come up with a Backfire bomber by getting rid of all of our de-
fenses against bombers.
Civil defense is not a long leadtime item, and that in itself would
help greatly to rectify the gross imbalance in power, but if we only
stare at that little piece of the military problem which is called
intercontinental delivery, nuclear systems, and then insist on ex-
cluding some of them because they get in the way of making an
agreement, we aren't even looking at the U.S. military problem.
We are not even looking at our strategic problem. We are certainly
not looking at the total complex of economic, political and military
matters that should be a national strategy.
Instead, we are picking this tiny thing and arguing about cruise
missiles, accuracies, and so forth. While we stare at that little piece
of the picture, we find the whole Western position crumbling away
at an ever increasing rate.
DEGREE OF SCHIZOPHRENIA NEEDED TO DISCARD LINKAGE THEORY
Senator Hayakawa. General, I am grateful to you for confirming
my worst suspicions. The insistence on the part of both the Soviets
and our own administration that we consider the SALT agreement
in isolation with no linkage between that and Soviet adventurism
in Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, and so on, we are not supposed to
think about at all, they say, but that seems to require of us a
degree of schizophrenia of which I am not quite capable.
General Graham. I think there is a gross illogic in that position,
too. I am on the road all the time with the administration SALT
sellers to try to offset them. When they talk to the people, they
say, look, there is no linkage between Soviet past and present
behavior and SALT. SALT is in an area all by itself. Then the next
speaker gets up and says, we have to have SALT because the
Soviets will behave better with it and worse without it, so in the
future there is linkage, but in the present and past there is no
linkage. These people have no logic to their positions whatsoever.
SUSPENSION OF SALT DISCUSSIONS UNTIL CUBAN PROBLEM IS
RESOLVED
Senator Hayakawa. General, didn't I understand you to say that
our response to the presence of that Cuban brigade should be to
suspend the discussion of the ratification of SALT II?
Admiral Mooorer. That is what I said. In my opinion, we should
suspend it until this issue is settled. If this is a manifestation of
what the Soviets are planning overall in conjunction with the
revolutionaries in Cuba, this is only the beginning. We have seen
Nicaragua go down the drain, and I think certainly effort is now
going to be focused on all of Latin America and South America too,
here, right in our own backyard, where the Panama Canal is one of
the maritime gateways of the world, it connects the U.S. Western
States with the east coast, but the whole objective, in my view, of
the Soviets from the outset has been to control the approaches to
that Panama Canal for the same reason they are working on the
Suez Canal. Now that they have gone into Cam Ranh Bay, which is
the best naval base in all of the Pacific they have the Malacca
Straits in Singapore staring down their throat.
59
So, they are working hard all the time to control maritime traffic
from one ocean of the world to the other.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you very much, Admiral. I think you
will be happy to learn that at a press conference in response to
press inquiries yesterday as to what I thought ought to be done
about the presence of Cuban troops, I said we should call off the
SALT negotiations altogether.
Admiral Moorer. Senator, I think you are absolutely right.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you.
Senator Stone [presiding]. Thank you. Senator Hayakawa.
Admiral, General, thank you very much.
[Admiral Moorer's and General Graham's prepared statements
follow:]
48-260 0-79 Pt . U - 5
60
Prepared Statement of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Retired
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
I am honored to have the opportunity to testify again before
this Committee on the SALT II treaty.
Today, I am testifying as Chairman of the Executive Committee of
the Coalition for Peace Through Strength.
The Coalition for Peace Through Strength is a bipartisan
alliance of 105 national organizations, 204 Members of Congress and
other pro-defense leaders across America. The American Security
Council, which I serve as a member of the Board of Directors, is the
program secretariat for the Coalition.
The purpose of the Coalition is to work for the adoption of a
national strategy of Peace Through Strength.
It is our belief that if the United States Senate consents to
the SALT II Treaty, it would make the adoption of such a strategy
most unlikely.
We did prepare a detailed study called AN ANALYSIS OF SALT II.
However, this is a 78-page document and thus too long for me to
cover in the time allotted to us today.
Instead, I ask permission to read a three-page joint statement
signed by 1678 retired general and flag officers from all the armed
services.
As you know, active duty military leaders are not permitted to
flatly oppose SALT II. This is why we at the Coalition for Peace
Through Strength have sought out the views of retired military
leaders who are now free to speak out.
From my conversations with active and retired military leaders,
I believe that the overwhelming majority oppose SALT II as written.
This has been confirmed by the fact that only four of the retired
officers contacted so far have declined to join in the statement
because they support SALT II as written. Another thirty-three
declined for such reasons as that they were undecided, ill, or
thought that the statement should be written differently.
We are continuing to circulate the statement and will later give
each Senator a copy of the statement with a list of all the signers
at that time.
61
COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH
Program Secretariat: American Security Council
Educational Secretariat: American Security Council Education Foundation
September 6, 1979
The Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations
Dear Senator Church:
We, the undersigned retired and reserve general and flag officers
of all U.S. Military Services respectfully request you to oppose
ratification of SALT II.
We are in agreement with most of our fellow Americans in pre-
ferring international cooperation and equitable arms-limitation agree-
ments to hostility and competition. But we cannot agree that we can
wish this congenial state of affairs into being by blinding ourselves
to the stark realities of our strategic situation. In our view, SALT
II as now written epitomizes the refusal of some Americans to face the
facts. The facts which must be faced are these:
Ten years of U.S. restraint in the strategic nuclear field
rooted in our faith in the SALT process has not been recipro-
cated by the Soviet Union; rather, the Soviets have pursued an
unprecedented buildup of nuclear offensive and defensive
capability which, as Secretary of Defense Brown points out, is
aimed at a war-winning capability.
The concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) which has
shaped U.S. policy since the 1960 's was never accepted by the
Soviets and has been completely negated by their massive stra-
tegic defensive effort including civil defense.
The aggressiveness of Soviet behavior throughout the world has
increased ominously as the military balance has tilted in favor
of the USSR.
U.S. intelligence capabilities to verify Soviet compliance with
arms-control agreements have been seriously eroded through com-
promise of satellite reconnaissance systems and loss of key
monitoring facilities.
Washington Office: 499 South Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003
Washington Communications Center: Boston, Virginia 22713
62
It seems to us that there is little disagreement inside or outside
government that these are the facts, yet the Senate has been asked to
ratify a treaty which apparently ignores those facts. We are told by
defenders of SALT II that while this treaty does little to slow down
the Soviet military surge, it is necessary to ratify it to preserve the
"process." They insist that SALT III and SALT IV will cure the
inequities of SALT I and SALT II. This ignores Soviet behavior since
SALT I. The Soviets have become harder, not easier, to deal with.
The proponents of SALT II insist that we will improve our security
through ratification because the situation would be worse without
SALT II.
We find it hard to believe that the Soviets could significantly
accelerate their current arms buildup in light of the fact that they
are already spending 15 percent of their gross national product on
arms. And we find it even harder to believe that ratification of
SALT II would be followed by vigorous U.S. efforts to close the
widening gaps between U.S. and Soviet military capabilities. It is
almost certain that Senate ratification of this treaty would commit the
United States to another seven years of pursuing peace through trust of
the Soviets and adherence to the obviously bankrupt doctrine of Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD) . This means further decline of our capa-
bility to deter war or to defend ourselves.
We respectfully submit that the arms-control process has become
dominated by a persistent U.S. refusal to face the reality of a failure
of the twin policies of detente and disarmament.
SALT II doesn't even limit arms. The image of limitation is pro-
vided by alleged equal numbers of launchers and aircraft, not to the
real destructive elements of nuclear force — missiles and explosive
power — where the Soviets have been allowed a heavy advantage. To make
matters worse, the "equal" numbers are contrived by failing to count
Soviet delivery systems such as the Backfire, the most advanced stra-
tegic bomber in the operational inventory of either side.
We also find the treaty as written unverifiable and attempts to
finesse this issue by redefining terms most disturbing. SALT II is
much more complex than SALT I and covers qualitative as well as quan-
titative aspects of nuclear armaments enormously more difficult to
monitor. Given the compromise of our key verification satellite
systems and the loss of vital monitoring stations in Iran, we cannot
insure against Soviet circumvention of the treaty provisions. State
Department documents describing SALT II redefine verification. Where
adequate verification once required an assurance from U.S. intelligence
that attempts by the Soviets to circumvent would be detected, it now
requires only that we can detect cheating on such a large scale that it
alters the strategic balance in time to assure an appropriate U.S. re-
sponse. This new definition completely finesses the problem of
63
adequacy of our intelligence capability since it is totally dependent
on one's view of what constitutes a "strategic balance" and an "appro-
priate response." For those who find the actual balance of strategic
capabilities irrelevant, and believe that a single U.S. Poseidon sub-
marine is an adequate deterrent regardless of the size of the Soviet
forces, SALT II can be considered "adequately verifiable" with no D.S.
intelligence capability at all.
We agree with the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Brown, that the
Soviets are building forces capable of fighting and winning a nuclear
war with the United States and its allies but we strongly disagree with
his view that this aim can be thwarted by ratifying SALT II. Soviet
participation in SALT, or any other arms control treaties, is primarily
designed to further this goal and to elicit U.S. accjuiescence and even
cooperation in creating the necessary Imbalcince of power required by
that goal.
In sum, we urge the Senate of the United States to consider the
grave consequences of ratifying a treaty which will commit this country
to continuation of disarmsunent policies which, however promising when
adopted, have imperilled the security of the United States and its
allies and encourage ever more aggressive Soviet behavior. The SALT
process is not so sacrosanct that we must accept a lopsided and unveri-
flable agreement simply to show "progress."
We who know war cherish peace. We are not warmongers,
oppose SALT II have been dubbed by some.
as all who
As military professionals, and with all due respect for our more
circumscribed colleagues still bound by their active service, we
strongly urge you to reject SALT II as injurious to the security
interests of the United States and its allies.
With Grave Concern,
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, OSN, Ret.
On behalf of the following retired
generals and flag officers
Rear
Adm.
Rear
Adm,
Rear
Adm.
Brig
. Gen
Rear
Adm.
Brig
. Gen
Rear
Adm.
Rear
Adm.
Rear
Adm.
Elmer P. Abernethy, USN, Ret
Raymond B. Ackerman
Charles Adair, USN, Ret
. Charles J. Adams, USAF, Ret
Frank Akers, USN, Ret
. Frank Albanese, USA, Ret
John W. Albrittain, USN, Ret
Clarence E. Aldrich, OSN, Ret
Leroy J. Alexanderson, USNR, Ret
Maj.
Gen.
Rear
Adm.
Brig,
, Gen
Brig,
, Gen
Maj.
Gen.
Brig,
. Gen
Brig,
. Gen
Brig,
, Gen
Rear
Adm.
Jesse M. Allen, USAF, Ret
John M. Alford, OSN, Ret.
. Lawrence H. Allen
. Richard C. Allgood
John R. Allison
. Conrad S. Allman, USAF, Ret
. Walter F. Alt
. Kenneth G. Althaus, OSA, Ret.
Richard G. Altmann, USNR, Ret.
64
Rear Adm. Stephen H. Aitibruster, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John G. Ames, III, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Glenn C. Ames, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles C. Anderson, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Earl O. Anderson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herbert H. Anderson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roy G. Anderson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Vernon L. Anderson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Winston P. Anderson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. John D. Andrew, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. R. S. Andrews, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John G. Appel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jack J. Appleby, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard H. Arbury, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert J. Archer, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wilbur W. Aring, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Theodore A. Arndt, USA, Ret.
Admiral Jackson D. Arnold, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kelly Arnold, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Walter E. Arnold, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Arnott
Rear Adm. G. W. Ashford, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Milton H. Ashkins, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. James H. Ashley, Jr., USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Frederick L. Ashworth, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Raymond Astumian
Vice Adm. Bernard L. Austin, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward Austin, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Kenneth A. Ayers, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leo A. Bachman, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Backes
Brig. Gen. Van. N. Backman, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald G. Baer , USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George H. Bahm, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James A. Bailey, 'Jf-AF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William B. Bailey, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William S. Bailey, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lee E. Bains, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Duncan S. Baker, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Felix L. Baker, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harold D. Baker, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Felix P. Ballenger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richaird R. Ballinger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph R. Barbaro, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Eugene A. Bar ham
Rear Adm. Christopher S. Barker, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roland J. Barnick, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles H. Barnwell, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles D. Barrett
Brig. Gen. Paul L. Barton, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Baska, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas E. Bass, III, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond H. Bass, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Bastion, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold Bater, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bauer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Rudolph C. Bauer, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George W. Bauernschmidt, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard M. Baughn, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Baumer , USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward Bautz, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth H. Bayer, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles Beach
Rear Adm. Charles B. Beasley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles Becker, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick J. Becton, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Theodore C. Bedwell, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Aaron W. Beeman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles S. Beightler, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John K. Beling, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. David B. Bell, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frederick Bell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Bell, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Russell J. Bellerby, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Herbert G. Bench, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Russell A. Berg, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William W. Berg, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Bergquist, USAF, Ret.
Admiral Russell S. Berkey, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ferdinand V. Berley, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph L. Bernier, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert Bernstein, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul D. Berrigan, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Walter B. Bess, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wendell L. Bevan, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Irwin F. Beyerly, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William W. Beverley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Horace V. Bird, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John F. Bird, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Birdsong, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Max K. Bitts, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Paul P. Blackburn, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald F. Blake, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Blakefield, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Blaker
Brig. Gen. R. M. Blanchard, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John R. Blandford
Maj. Gen. Jonas L. Blank, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Albert M. Bledsoe, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frederick B. Blessee, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Elliott Bloxom, USN, Ret.
General Philip T. Boerger, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Calvin M. Bolster, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jones E. Bolt, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles R. Bond, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas Bonner, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Milton O. Boone, USA, Ret.
Admiral Walter F. Boone, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John L. Boros
65
Rear Adm. John T. Bottoms, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Aubrey J. Bourgeois, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clarence M Bowley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George M. Bowman, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. A. L. Bowser
Brig. Gen. John H. Boyes, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George S. Boylan, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Boyson, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Russell Boyt, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Anthony A. Braccia, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William T. Bradley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank A. Braisted, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Brandenburg, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank A. Brandley, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Brandon, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur F. Brandstatter , USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. L. Render Braswell, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Robert A. Breitweiser, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. James T. Brewer, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James R. Bright, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Russell C. Brinker, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James Brittingham, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John C. Brogan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Douglas B. Brokenshire, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Allison C. Brooks, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Grady S. Brooks, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thad A. Broom, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles R. Broshous, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles P. Brown, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jay G. Brown, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Brown, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William D. Brown, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Browning, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick J. Brush, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert S. Brussel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henry C. Bruton, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William E. Bryan, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Carleton F. Bryanc, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Buckner, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl E. Bull, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ross P. Bullard,
Brig. Gen. Cady R. Bullock, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Howard G. Bunker, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William O. Burch, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harvey P. Burden, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Allen M. Burdett, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond W. Burk, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Burke, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John W. Burkhart, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John C. Burney, Jr., USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John R. Burns
Maj. Gen. Merrill D. Burnside, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert C. Burrows, USN, Ret.
brig. Gen. Ernest H. Burt, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles R. Bushong, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Chester J. Butcher, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Benjamin J. Butler, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ogbourne D. Butler
Maj. Gen. Robert G. Butler, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Butt, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John L. Butts, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Victor A. Byrnes
Rear Adm. Jose M. Cabanillas, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Malcolm W. Cagle, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William R. Calhoun, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John U. Calkins, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. William M. Callaghan, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph W. Callahan, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas S. Cameron, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John M. Campbell, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert L. Campbell, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Roland A. Campbell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William B. Campbell, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. C. Craig Cannon, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert H. Canterbury, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Daniel Carlson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Martin D. Carmody, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edwin H. Cams, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Stephen W. Carpenter, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bruce L. Carr, USN, Ret.
General W. Reynolds Carr
Brig. Gen. Richard C. Carrera
Lt. Gen. Charles W. Carson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry R. Carson, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph M. Carson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert S. Carter, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jesse H. Carter, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benjamin B. Cassiday, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. George W. Casslercnr, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Gordon L. Caswell. USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard C. Catledge, USAF, Ret.
Gen. Jack J. Catton, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Cecil T. Caufield, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Caughey, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert W. Cavenagh, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William S. Chairsell, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Alvin D. Chandler, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Curtis W. Chapman, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harry M. Chapman, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James W. Chapman, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Steve A. Chappuis, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. P. N. Char bonnet, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Chardon
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Chase, USA, Ret.
General Max M. Cherry
Brig. Gen. William H. Cheeseraan, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Chiles, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Keith L. Christensen, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James G. Christiansen, USA, Ret.
66
Rear Adm. John S. Christiansen
Vice Adm. Ralph W. Christie, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Gordon P. Chunghoon, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Bradford G. Chynoweth, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert H. Clancy, USN, Ret.
General Albert P. Clark
Brig. Gen. Allen F. Clark, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adra. David H. Clark, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jeane R. Clark, USN, Ret.
Admiral John E. Clark, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John M. Clark, USAF, Ret.
General Bruce C. Clarke
Admiral Ralph S. Clarke, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Winton R. Close, USAF, Ret.
Brig, Gen. John B. Coates, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph G. Coburn, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lor is R. Cochran, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Samuel G. Cockerhara, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Benjamin Coe, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. James E. Cohn, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Philip P. Cole, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William C. Cole, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lewis E. Coley, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. R. W. Colglazier
Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. Collins, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John L. Collis, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. John B. Colwell, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter V. Combs, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. J. Richard Compton
Brig. Gen. Ross R. Condit, Jr., USA, Ret.
Admiral Ray R. Conner, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Raymond C. Conroy, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Louis J. Conti
Rear Adm. Albert B. Cook, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph E. Cook, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William R. Cooke, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Damon W. Cooper, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joshua W. Cooper, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Marcus F. Cooper, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Paul T. Cooper, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Cooper, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard H. Cooper, USAR
Rear Adm. Bennett S. Copping, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Corbin, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Charles A. Corcoran, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederic W. Corle, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Peter Corradi, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ted H. Corry, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward J. Costello, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Cox, USA, Ret.
Rear Adra. William R. Cox, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John S. Coye, Jr., USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jarred V. Crabb, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Kenneth Craig, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Craig, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Wyatt Craig, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard S. Craighill, USN, Ret.
General Reginald M. Cram
Brig. Gen. William J. Crandall, USAFR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Albert B. Crawford, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. B. Hayden Crawford
Rear Adm. George C. Crawford, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward I. Creed, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles H. Crichton, USN. Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard G. Cross, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Crouch, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert B. Crowther, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harry Crutcher, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adra. Robert R. Crutchfield, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Allman T. Culbertson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles R. Cundiff, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Currier, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. R. D. Curtin, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert H. Curtin, USAF, Ret.
General Donald Curtis
Maj. Gen. Gilbert Curtis, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Raymond W. Curtis, USA, Ret.
Vice Adra. Walter L. Curtis, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ben Scott Custer, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles S. D'Orsa, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. John A. Dabney, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Leo P. Dahl, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Theodore 0. Dahl, USN, Ret.
Rear Adra. Carl M. Dalton, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. 0. T. Dalton
Rear Adm. Winfred P. Dana, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Maurice W. Daniel, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Darcy, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Carlton S. Dargusch, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Carl Darnell, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Don O. Darrov?, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Anthony F. Daskevich, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frederick J. Dau, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lester A. Daughter ty, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Buddy R. Daughtrey, USAF, Ret.
General Harry J. Davidson, Sr.
Brig. Gen. Joseph H. Davidson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles L. Davis, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. George M. Davis, Jr., USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Glenn B. Davis, USN, Ret.
General Raymond G. Davis
Maj. Gen. Woodard E. Davis, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thurlow W. Davison, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Donald S. Dawson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Willard H. Day, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James K. DeArmond, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur R. DeBolt, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Chester B. DeGavre, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Merlin L. DeGuire, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Dean, Jr., USA, Ret.
67
Maj. Gen. Elbert Decoursey, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Russell Defauver, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clinton G. Defoney, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert L. Delashaw, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Leon Delighter
Maj. Gen. Marvin C. Demler, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth C. Dempster, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Francis C. Denebrink, USN, Ret.
Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clyde R. Denniston, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John A. Des Fortes, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harold T. Deutermann, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. J. P. S. Devereux
Maj. Gen. Lawrence R. Dewey, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. E. B. Dexter, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William J. Deyo, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John S. B. Dick, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. William W. Dick, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George W. Dickinson, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Dietrich, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Dissinger, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John S. B. Divk, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ernest W. Dobie, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Dobson, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen Nevin W. Dodd, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Sydney B. Dodds, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roy T. Dodge, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph E. Dodson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl R. Doerf linger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John W. Dolan, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William A. Dolan, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John M. Donalson, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jack N. Donohew, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Philip J. Donovan
Lt. Gen. Stanley J. Donovan, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas A. Donovan, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward M. Dooley, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles R. Doran, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul P. Douglas, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Williain R. Douglas, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Wallace R. Dowd, Jr., USN, Ret.
Admiral James H. Doyle, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William C. Doyle, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Abraham J. Dreiseszun, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donn R. Driver, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond F. DuBois, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas H. Dubois, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis R. Duborg, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. James R. Dudley, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John H. Dudley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clifford H. Duerfeldt, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Irving T. Duke, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert W. Duke, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Leo J. Dulacki
Admiral Charles K. Duncan, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald Dunford, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William D. Dunham, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank Dunkley, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles G. Dunn, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard T. Dunn, USA, Ret.
Admiral Lewis W. Dunton, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James K. Durham
Rear Adm. Willijun H. Duvall, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. R. T. Dwyer
Brig. Gen. John R. Dyas, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Victor A. Dybdal, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. E. R. Eastwold, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert E. L. Eaton, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Seimuel K. Eaton, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harvey W. Eddy, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Alan C. Edmunds, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. James V. Edmundson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Morris 0. Edwards, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Parmer W. Edwards, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clarence T. Edwinson, UAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward S. Ehlen, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Milton Ehrlich
Brig. Gen. Charles V. Elia, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ernest M. Eller, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frank W. Elliott, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard V. Elliott, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John C. B. Elliott, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. William E. Ellis, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ernest B. Ellsworth, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Hugh M. Elwood
Lt. Gen. William J. Ely, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Henry E. Emerson
Lt. Gen. Jean E. Engler, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. William P. Ennis, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Horace H. Epes, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. B. Erwin, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Graydon C. Essman, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William E. Eubank, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harry L. Evans, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Evans, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Gordon S. Everett, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry G. Ewart, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur E. Gxon, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis L. Fabrizio, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. D. S. Fahrney, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Fairbrother, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ivan L. Farman
Rear Adm. Eugene H. Farrell, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph E. Faucett, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James B. Faulconer, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Albert J. Fay, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward L. Feightner, USN, Ret.
General James Ferguson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William E. Ferrall, USfi, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Angelo L. Ferranti
68
Rear Adm. Harold F. Pick, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard D. Field, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph E. Fielding, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Russell R. Finn, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alvan Fisher, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ralph E. Fisher, OSAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard E. Fisher, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John A. Fitzgerald, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Phillip H. Fitzgerald, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. W. F. Fitzgerald, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Fitzgerald, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Michael P. D. Flaherty, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Edward M. Flanangan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis E. Fleck, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Lawrence J. Fleming, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Morton K. Fleming, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William B. Fletcher, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William O. Floyd, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George C. Fogle, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis D. Foley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry J. P. Foley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph F. Foley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Winston P. Folk, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. J. E. Fondahl
Brig. Gen. Paul P. Foran, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Bernard B. Forbes, USN, Ret.
General G. Foreman
Rear Adm. James E. Forrest, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward C. Forsyth, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George I. Forsythe, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Newton P. Foss, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm., Walter M. Foster, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. C. Lyn Fox, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Claud M. Fraleigh, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Francis
Rear Adm. Nickolas J. F. Frank, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John F. Franklin, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joe N. Frazar, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Dewitt L. Freeman, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Mason Freeman, USN, Ret.
General Paul L. Freeman, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leonard F. Freiburghouse, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leonard Frisco, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William J. Fry, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas Fuller, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Samuel G. Fuqua, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles M. Fur low, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick R. Furth, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Walter D. Gaddis, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank L. Gailer, USAF, Ret.
George R. Gallagher
Rear Adm. W. Earl Gallaher, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William 0. Gallery, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clarence J. Galligan, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Walter T. Galligan, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jack K. Gcimble, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Wayne N. Garnet, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert G. Card, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George W. Gardes, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. E. Blair Garland, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis L. Garrett, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Malcolm E. Garrison, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph S. Garrison, USNK, Ret.
Rear Adm. Norman F. Gar ton, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene W. Gauch, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. John D. Gavan, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald Gay, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. J. Edwin Gay, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur A. Gentry
Brig. Gen. William F. Georgi, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry E. Gerhard, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John H. Germeraad, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William K. Ghormley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederic Gibbs, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Elmer J. Gibson, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold B. Gibson, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth H. Gibson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. W. M. Gibson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Gilbert, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas E. Gillespie, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Gingles, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard P. Glass, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James Glore, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William R. Goade, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George W. Goddard, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Guy H. Goddard, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George A. Godding, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Godson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Melvin A. Goers, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert R. Goetzman
Rear Adm. William B. Goggins, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Morton J. Gold, USAF, Ret.
General William B. Gold, Jr.
Admiral Henry W. Goodall, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John C. Gordon, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Gordon T. Gould, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. C. L. Grabenhorst, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James E. Graham
Maj. Gen. Donald W. Graham, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Gordon M. Graham, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Arthur R. Gralla, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John G. Gramzow, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Etheridge Grant, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Elonzo B. Grantham, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alfred M. Granum, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Guy J. Gravlee
69
Rear Adm. Oscar Gray, Jr., USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Philip H. Greasley, USAF, Ret.
General William O. Green
Brig. Gen. Jaraes W. Green, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George B. Greene, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. A. Greene, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John F. Greenslade, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Elton W. Grenfell
Admiral Charles D. Griffin, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James A. Grimsley, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Francis H. Griswold, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Sidney Gritz, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. August H. Groeschel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Rowland H. Groff, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John V. Grombach
Rear Adm. Royce L. Gross, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald G. Grothaus, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Groverman, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bradford E. Grow, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard A. Grussendorf, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William S. Guest, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. Gullett, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick A. Gunn, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Karl W. Gustafson, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kermit L. Guthrie, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank S. Haak, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Chester E. Haberlin
Maj. Gen. Herbert R. Hackbarth, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Louis J. Hackett, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jaraes F. Hackler, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ira F. Haddock, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Theodore G. Haff, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hamilton Hains, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Peter C. Hains, III, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Dudley D. Hale, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Stewart L. Hall, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. William E. Hall, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kay Halsell, II
Maj. Gen. Milton B. Halsey, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lyle E. Halstead, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Archelaus L. Hamblen, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward J. Hamilton
Rear Adm. Thomas J. Hamilton, USN, Ret.
Gen. Barksdale Hamlett
Rear Adm. Wellington A. Hammond, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George F. Hamner , USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William L. Hamrick, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jack L. Hancock, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Walter J. Hanna, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clifford P. Hannum, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry J. Hansen, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Norris B. Harbold, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eads G. Hardaway, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Hardaway, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold F. Harding, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Donald L. Hardy, USAF, Ret.
General Robert B. Harkness, Jr.
Vice Adm. F. J. Harlfinger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John Harllee, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Harper, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Robert W. Harper, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Talbot E. Harper, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Brooks J. Harral, USN, Ret.
General Ben Harrell
Maj. Gen. William S. Harrell, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alfred R. Harris, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benjamin T. Harris, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Roy M. Harris, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Bertram C. Harrison, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene L. Harrison, USA, Ret,
Rear Adm. Lloyd Harrison, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Harrison, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Gerald A. Hart
Brig. Gen. Frederick O. Hartel, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Hartford, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles C. Hartman, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Hartt, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harry L. Harty, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Valery Harvard, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert A. Harvey
Brig. Gen. David C. Hastings, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. W. G. Hathaway
Maj. Gen. John J. Hayes, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hugh C. Haynsworth
Maj. Gen. Stuart G. Haynsworth, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. John T. Hayward, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Raymond F. Hebrank
Vice Adm. Truman J. Hedding, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Earl C. Hedlund, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin C. Hef felf inger , USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William T. Hef ley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles A. Heira, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roger C. Heimer
Rear Adm. Paul R. Heineman, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. John A, Heintges
Lt. Gen. Rolland V. Heiser
Rear Adm. Frank V. Heimer
Brig. Gen. Jack W. Hemingway, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Henderson
Maj. Gen. Raleigh R. Hendrix, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Augustus M. Hendry, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John P. Henebry
Maj. Gen. William H. Hennig, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John B. Henry, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Karl G. Hensel, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph L. Herlihy, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Vincent Hernandez, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Herring, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Daniel W. Hickey, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George L. Hicks, USNR, Ret.
70
Maj. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, USA, Ret.
Rear Adin. Paul L. High, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John M. Hightower, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jim D. Hill
Maj. Gen. Roderic L. Hill, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harry L. Hillyard, USA, Ret.
Vice Adra. William 0. Hiltabidle, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. John H. Hinrichs, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. B. J. Leon Hirshorn, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard M. Hobson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. Hoefer, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John A. Hoefling, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herbert L. Hoerner, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bartholanew H. Hogan, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. R. Wesley Hogan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold R. Holcomb, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Holcombe, USA, Ret.
Rear Adra. Richard Holden, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, USA, Ret.
Admiral William R. Hollingsworth, USN, Ret.
General Bruce K. Holloway, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harland E. Holman, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ernest V. Holmes, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl O. Holmquist, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Everett W. Holstrom, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Holt, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. J. Stanley Holtoner, USAF, Ret.
Admiral Ernest C. Holtzworth, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Edwin B. Hooper, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John E. Hoover, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lewis A. Hopkins, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles F. Home, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard C. Home, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles T. Homer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John S. Horner, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John B. Horton, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herschel A. House, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin B. Howard, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James H. Howard, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hamilton W. Howe, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hugh H. Howell
Rear Adm. C. C. Howerton, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lester E. Hubbell, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward M. Hudgins
Brig. Gen. Oscar Conrad Hudson
Brig. Gen. Ronald S. Huey
Brig. Gen. Harry J. Huff
Brig. Gen. Robert B. Hughes, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert L. Hughes, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. H. E. Humfeld, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ladd F. Hunt
Rear Adm. Louis H. Hunte, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert E. Hunter, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George P. Hunter, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond P. Hunter, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert N. Hunter, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Benjamin Hunton, USAR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jack E. Hurff, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard M. Hurst, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Samuel H. Hurt, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Eugene L. Husdon, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Vincent G. Huston, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles R. Hutchison, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph C. Hutchison, USA, Ret.
Admiral John J. Hyland, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John P. Ingle, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter D. Innis, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald G. Irvine, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roy M. Isaman, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Ives, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Jack, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. David H. Jackson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ivan E. Jackson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Milton C. Jackson, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. P. W. Jackson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adra. Robert W. Jackson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Oscar J. Jahnsen, USA, Ret.
Rear Adra. Williara J. James, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick E. Janney, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Carl H. Jark, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Irby B. Jarvis, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Hal B. Jennings
Rear Adra. M. J. Jensen
Rear Adm. John R. Johannesen, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ernest F. John, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles E. Johnson, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. E. Gillis Johnson
Maj. Gen. Earl L. Johnson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Johnson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henry C. Johnson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John B. Johnson, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth L. Johnson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph C. Johnson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard H. Johnson, USA, Ret.
Admiral Roy L. Johnson, USN, Ret.
General Warren R. Johnson
Admiral Means Johnston, Jr.
Rear Adm. Don A. Jones
Brig. Gen. Bruce B. Jones, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carlton B. Jones, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George M. Jones, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Stanley W. Jones, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William C. Jonson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Allen R. Joyce, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Jung, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Carl S. Junkermann, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Williara L. Kabler , USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph I. Kane, USN, Ret.
Rear Adra. Constantine A. Karaberis, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Draper L. Kauffman, USN, Ret.
71
Rear Adm. John H. Kaufman, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Louis Kaufman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul Kaufman, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert Kaye, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edgar S. Keats, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George Keegan, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Gerald F. Keeling, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Naiff H. Kelel
Brig. Gen. Harold K. Kelley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur W. Kellond, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Maurice w. Kendall, USAF, Ret.
Maj- Gen. Richard C. Kendall, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John M. Kenderdine, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. Kennedy, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Kennedy, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard A. Kern, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Redmond F. Kernan
Brig. Gen. H. E. Kessinger, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wayne 0. Kester , USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Dixwell Ketcham, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Gerald L. Ketchum, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Ingolf N. Kiland, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benjamin H. King, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James I. King, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Jerome H. King, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John J. King, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Philip V. King, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas H. King, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leon S. Kintberger, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John M. Kinzer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Louis J. Kirn, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Bernard J. Kitt, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Julius Klein
Lt. Gen. Richard P. Klocko, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard A. Knobloch, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank J. Kobes, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herman J; Kossler, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm, William J. Kotsch, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edgar P. Kranzf elder , USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frederick C. Krause
Brig. Gen. Martin R. Krausz, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Philip F. Kromer , USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Clifford J. Kronauer
Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak
Rear Adm. Howard F. Kuehl, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Chester A. Kunz, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William B. Kunzig, USA, Ret.
General Laurence S. Kuter , USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul L. Lacy, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John J. Laffan, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James A. Lake, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kir by Lamar, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Valdemar G. Lambert, USN, Ret.
General F. H. Lamson-Scribner
Maj. Gen. James E. Landrum, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert B. Landry, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard Lane, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Clarence J. Lang, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Cyrille P. Laporte, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Louis R. Laporte, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William W. Lapsley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Wharton E. Larned, USNR, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harold O. Larson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harold V. Larson, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William B. Latta, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert E. Laub, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John T. Lawler
Brig. Gen. John D. Lawlor, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Baskin R. Lawrence, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Sidney J. Lawrence, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. William S. Lawton, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Osmund A. Leahy, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Leahy, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John E. Leary, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John E. Lee, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lamar Lee, Jr., USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Leek
Rear Adm. James E. Leeper , USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William C. Lemly
Rear Adm. Frederick W. Lemly, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kelley B. Lemmon, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles F. Leonard, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William N. Leonard, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Cecil P. Lessig, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph W. Leverton
Maj. Gen. William P. Levine, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. B. E. Lewellen, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. John T. Lewis, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Oliver W. Lewis, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Porter Lewis, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Vernon B. Lewis, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William D. Lewis, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. R. E. Libby, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. David I. Liebman, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Lawrence S. Lightner, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter E. Linaweaver, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Lawrence J. Lincoln
Gen. Rush B. Lincoln, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Lingle
Brig. Gen. Andy A. Lipscomb, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John J. Liset, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Elmer L. Littell, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Olin A. Lively
Brig. Gen. B. C. Lockwood, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas A. Long, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Victor D. Long, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Longley, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Michael Lorenzo, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Walter E. Lotz, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles E. Loucks, USA, Ret.
72
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Kenneth Loveland, USN, Ret.
Jess up D. Lowe, OSAF, Ret.
Sumter L. Lowrv, USA, Ret.
. Bernard R. Luczak, tJSA, Ret.
. Garland A. Ludv, USA, Ret.
Robert P. Lukeman, USAF, Ret.
William S. Lundberg, USA, Ret.
. Reginald P. Lyman, USA, Ret.
George E. Lvnch, OSA, Ret.
. George P. Lvnch, USA, Ret.
John J. Lynch, USN, Ret.
Ralph C. Lynch, USN, Ret.
Nelson M. Lynde, USA, Ret.
. Donald J. Lynn
. Archibald W. Lyon, USA, Ret.
Harvey E. Lyon, USN, Ret.
Hylan B. Lyon, USN, Ret.
Raymond R. Lyons, USN, Ret.
Clinton S. Lvter, USA, Ret.
Donald J. MacDonald, USN, Ret.
Duncan C. MacMillan, USN, Ret.
John J. Maginnis
John B. Macgregor, USN, Ret.
Robert A. Macpherson, USN, Ret.
. Robert S. Macrum, USAF, Ret.
Dashiell L. Madeira, USN, Ret.
Frank M. Madsen, USAF, Ret.
. W. S. Magalhaes
Thomas B. Magath, USNR, Ret.
. J. Maglione, USAF, Ret.
Charles J. Maguire, USN, Ret.
Harrv P. Mahin, USN, Ret.
, Thaddeus F. Malanowski, USA, Ret.
Ralph W. Ma lone, USN, Ret.
Robert W. Maloy, USAF, Ret.
, Ben J. Mangina
Daniel J. Manning
Joseph I. Manning, USN, Ret.
, Alexander Marble, USA, Ret.
, Theodore H. Marshall, USA, Ret.
William J. Marshall, USN, Ret.
Clarence A. Martin, USA, Ret.
, Edward 0. Martin, USAF, Ret.
Sherman F. Martin, USAF, Ret.
David L. Martineau, USN, Ret.
Harrv C. Mason, USN, Ret.
Stanhope B. Mason, USA, Ret.
Theo. C. Ma taxis, USA, Ret.
Paul L. Mather, USN, Ret.
Salve H. Matheson, USA, Ret.
Bob O. Mathews, USN, Ret.
John H. Maurer, USN, Ret.
Azro J. Maxham
William S. Maxwell, USN, Ret.
Walter S. Maver , USN, Ret.
Brig.
Brig.
Mai.
Maj.
Brig. Gen.
Rear Adm.
Maj.
Rear
Gen.
Adm,
Brig. Gen. Richard W. Mavo, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. McAuliffe, USNR, Ret.
Gen. Madison M. McBrayer, USAF, Ret.
Gen. George H. McBride, USA, Ret.
Gen. William D. McCain
Gen. Chester E. McCarty, USAF, Ret.
Admiral J. W. McCauley, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur J. McChrystal, USA, Ret.
Clyde F. McClain, USAF, Ret.
John G. McClaughry, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. McCloy, USNR, Ret.
Charles M. McCorkle, USAF, Ret.
James R. McCormick, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Victor B. McCrea, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth A. McCrimmon, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leo B. McCuddin, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert H. McCutcheon, USAF, Ret.
Admiral David L. McDonald, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Everett A. McDonald, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ellsworth D. McEathron, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John A. McEwan, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Thomas K. McGehee, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Francis M. McGoldrick, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. McGuire, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Godfrey T. McHugh, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. D. E. McKay, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George H. McKee, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Logan McKee, USN, Ret.
General Seth J. McKee, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William A. McKee, USA, Ret.
Gen. C. M. McKeen, USA, Ret.
Henrv R. McKenzie, USA, Ret.
Eugene B. McKinney, USN, Ret.
William R. McKinney, USN, Ret.
John R. McKnight, USN, Ret.
John H. McLain, USAF, Ret.
Richard E. McLaughlin
Ephraim R. McLean, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. G. A. McLean, USN, Ret.
Gordon McLintock
Robert McMath
Gen. Henry W. McMillan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George J. McMillin, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin E. McMorries, USN, Ret.
James A, McNally
Raymond F. McNelly, USA, Ret.
Melvin F. McNickle, USAF, Ret.
Richard R. McNulty, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Claude M. McQuarrie, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles J. McWhinnie, USNR, Ret.
Gen. John C. McWhorter, USA, Ret.
Gen. Keith E. McWilliams
Rear Adm. States M. Mead, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Fillmore K. Mearns, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward P. Mechling, USAF, Ret.
Maj.
Maj.
Rear
Rea r Adm
Rear Adm
Brig
Gen.
Adm.
Gen.
Major Gen.
Vice Adm.
Vice Adm.
Brig. Gen.
Maj.
Rear
Maj.
Maj.
Adm.
Gen.
Gen.
Rear Adm.
Maj.
Brig.
73
Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, USA, Ret.
General Vernon E. Megee
Rear Adm. Roqer W. Mehle, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John L. Melqaard. tJSN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert E. Mellinq, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert L. Melton, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Corwin Mendenhall, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Chauncey D. Merrill, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles H. Mester, Jr.
Briq. Gen. Frank Meszar, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph M. Metcalf, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alfred B. Metsger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward F. Metzer, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard J. Meyer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter C. Michaels, USNR, Ret.
Briq. Gen. Howard E. Michelet, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bill A. Miles, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin S. Miller, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George H. Miller, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold B. Miller, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Junior F. Miller, USA, Ret.
Briq. Gen. Robert B. Miller, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ward S. Miller, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene J. Mincks
Maj. Gen. Charles F. Minter, Sr., USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Augustus M. Minton, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clinton A. Misson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Burt L. Mitchell, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Cleo N. Mitchell, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William L. Mitchell, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. S. Edward Mittler, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Chester J. Moeglein, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert L. Moeller, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert E. Moffet, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William A. Moffett, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lloyd W. Moffit, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edmund W. Montgomery
Lt. Gen. Richard M. Montgomery, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harley F. Moonev, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Benjamin E. Moore, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. French R. Moore, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harlev L. Moore, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John B. Moore
Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Moore
Brig. Gen. Leon A. Moore, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Moore Moore, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert L. Moore, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William T. Moore, USNR, Ret.
Vice Adm. William J. Moran, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James L. Moreland, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henrv S. Morgan, Jr.
Maj. Gen. Martin J. Morin, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William F. Morr, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. Morrill, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert R. Morris, USA, Ret.
Briq. Gen. John H. Morrison, USA Ret.
Briq. Gen. Manlev G. Morrison, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard I. Morton, USA, Ret.
Briq. Gen. Alvin J. Moser
Rear Adm. Charles W. Moses, USN, Ret.
Admiral William C. Mott, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Horace D. Moulton, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles F. Mudgett, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Dolf E. Muehleisen, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. E. L. Mueller, USA, Ret.
General Richard Mulberrv, Jr.
Maj. Gen. Hal L. Muldrow, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Henry J. Muller, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George W. Mundy, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George P. Munson, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John D. Murphy, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John W. Murphy, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert F. Murphy, USA, Ret.
General S. A. Murphy
Maj. Gen. James L. Murrav
Brig. Gen. Joseph Murrav, Jr., USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Llovd M. Must in
Brig. Gen. Philip D. Myers, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Warren E. Mvers
Rear Adm. Charles D. Nace, USN, Ret.
General Gus G. Nagv
Brig. Gen. Ezekiel W. Napier, USAF, Ret.
Gen. Joseph J. Nazzaro, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Ray C. Needham, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Spurgeon H. Neel, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard C. Neeley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Carson R. Neifert, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Douglas T. Nelson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roy W. Nelson, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William T. Nelson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. J. H. Nevins, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James P. Newberry, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Langdon C. Newman, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Henry C. Newton, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Franklin A. Nichols, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard E. Nichols, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles A. Nicholson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wallace H. Nickell, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Herman Nickerson Jr.
Rear Adm. Hugh R. Nieman, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Samuel Nixdorff, USN, Ret.
Admiral A. G. Noble, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul R. Norby, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert H. Northwood, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William P. Nuckois
Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Nurre, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard O'Connor
Rear Adm. Michael G. O'Connor, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. James W. O'Grady, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles S. O'Mallev, USA, Ret.
74
Rear Adm. John F. Oakley, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Arthur W. Oberbeck, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Odell, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. T. C. Odora, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Russell G. Ogan, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Milton L. Ogden, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William U. Ogletree, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Nils 0. Ohman, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clay Olbon, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard M. Oliver, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. Oiler, OSN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alfred C. Olney, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl B. Olson
Brig. Gen. Gustaf P. Olson, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Howard E. Orem, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Organ, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. David P. Osborne, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frank A. Osmanski
General J. A. Ostroph
Rear Adm. William W. Outerbridge, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin B. Owen, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hinton A. Owens, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Norris W. Potter, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roger W. Paine, Jr., USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ralph A. Palladino, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles J. Palmer, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George G. Palmer, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George A. Pappas, Jr.
Rear Adm. Charles W. Parker, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Edward N. Parker, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Parker, USAF, Ret.
Admiral George A. Parkinson, USNR, Ret.
General Harlan C. Parks, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joel D. Parks, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank J. Parrish
Brig. Gen. Benton K. Partin
Maj. Gen. William A. Patch, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Goldsborough S. Patrick, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Stanley F. Patten, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alex M. Patterson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard 0. Patterson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. H. C. Pattison, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Leonard E. Pauley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert G. Paulsen
Admiral Charles N. Payne, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. D. J. Peacher
Rear Adm. Rufus J. Pearson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Theodore E. Pearson, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gejj Willard Pearson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin R. Peck, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Oscar Pederson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Byron E. Peebles, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Howard W. Penney, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald G. Penterman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Louis W. Perkins
Brig. Gen. Howard P. Persons, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roy W. Peters, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George E. Peterson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard W. Peterson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank I. Pethick, Jr., USAR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert L. Petit, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roger E. Phelan, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Tobias R. Philbin, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Chester G. Phillips, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene Phillips
Lt. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adro. Ben B. Pickett, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Pieklik, USA, Ret.
General Arthur J. Pierce, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Russell K. Pierce, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Gladwyn E. Pinkston, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ernest A. Pinson, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Robert B. Pirie, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eli P. Plaskow
Rear Adm. William G. Pogue, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Boleslaw H. Pokigo, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. David P. Polatty, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Douglas C. Polhamus, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Jack P. Pollock, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph G. Poneroy, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Mackenzie E. Porter, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert L. Porter, USN, Ret.
General Robert W. Porter, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Alton G. Post, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William S. Post, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Powell, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth R. Powell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George T. Powers, III, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard R. Pratt, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Arthur W. Price, Jr., USN, Ret.
Admiral Frank H. Price, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Oran 0. Price, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Fay B. Prickett, USA, Ret.
Admiral Alfred M. Pride, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George S. Prugh, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. Pugh, II, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold F. Pullen, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George S. Purple
Rear Adm. Ira D. Putnam, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank E. Raab, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Rafferty, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Lawson P. Ramage, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Paul H. Ramsey, USN, Ret.
Admiral John E. M. Ranneft
Maj. Gen. Henry A. Rasmussen, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William T. Rassieur, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clemens V. Rault, USN, Ret.
General Edwin W. Rawlings, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph W. Rawson, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clarence C. Ray, USN, Ret.
75
Rear Adm.
Brig. Gen.
Vice Adm.
Maj. Gen.
Maj. Gen.
Brig. Gen.
Rear Adm.
Rear Adm.
Brig. Gen
Maj.
Brig
Herman L. Ray, USN, Ret.
Joseph G. Rebman, USA, Ret.
E. F. Rectanus, USN, Ret.
William H. Reddell, USAF, Ret.
William N. Redling, USA, Ret.
Albert Redman, Jr., USA, Ret.
Allan L. Reed, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Michael J. Reichel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leslie L. Reid, USNR, Ret.
George H. Reifenstein, USNR, Ret.
Stewart E. Reimel, USA, Ret.
Richard D. Reinhold, USAF, Ret.
Henry J. Reis-El Bara
Reiter, Jr., USN, Ret.
Reitz
Edward E. Renfro, USN, Ret.
Thomas F. Rew, USAF, Ret.
Vorley M. Rexroad, USAF, Ret.
Reynolds, USA, Ret.
Reynolds, USAF, Ret.
Z. Reynolds, USN, Ret.
E. Reynolds, USA, Ret.
Rice, USN, Ret.
Rice, USN, Ret.
Rice, USN, Ret.
Rich, USAF, Ret.
Richards, USA, Ret.
Richardson, USN, Ret.
Gen.
Gen
Rear Adra. Harry L
Brig. Gen. Ivan A
Rear Adm.
Gen.
Gen
Gen
Gen
Maj.
Brig
Brig
Brig
Emmett R.
George E.
James R.
, William
Lester K.
Joseph E.
Robert H.
Clyde K.
George J.
Alvin F.
Rear Adm.
Rear Adm.
Rear
Rear
Adm.
Adm.
Rear Adm.
Brig. Gen
Rear Adm.
Rear Adm.
Vice Adm.
Brig. Gen
Maj. Gen.
Rear Adir..
Rear Adm. Clifford G. Richardson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Hugh A. Richeson, USA, Ret.
James B. Ricketts, USN, Ret.
Herman P. Riebe, USN, Ret.
Charles E. Rieben, USNR, Ret.
Robert E. Riera, USN, Ret.
Cecil D. Riggs, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Whitaker F. Riggs, USN, Ret.
General D. E. Riley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard A. Risden, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. James P. P.iseley
Brig. Gen. Robinson Risner, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Osmond J. Ritland, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. B. A. Robbins
Lt. Gen. Jay T. Robbins, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joe A. Robbins, USN Ret.
Levi J. Roberts, USNR, Ret.
Armand J. Robertson, USN, Ret.
Pearl H. Robey, USAF, Ret.
Ray A. Robinson, USAF, Ret.
Allan B. Roby, USN, Ret.
Harry J. Rockafeller, USAR, Ret.
Walter F. Rodee, USN, Ret.
Jermain F. Rodenhauser , USAF, Ret.
Rafael Rodr iguez-Ema, USA, Ret.
Frederick C. Roecker , USA, Ret.
Andrew W. Rogers, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm.
Rear
Adm.
Rear
Adm.
Maj.
Gen.
Maj.
Gen.
Rear
Adm.
Maj.
Gen.
Rear
Adm.
Maj.
Gen.
Brig
. Gen
Brig
. Gen
Brig
. Gen
Brig. Gen. Jack A. Rogers, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenwood B. Rohrer
Maj. Gen. Andrew P. Rollins, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Michael R. Roman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William K. Rcmioser , USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. David L. Roscoe, Jr., USN, Ret.
Drig. Gen. John M. Rose, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Philip H. Ross, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard M. Ross
Rear Adra. Henry J. Rotridge, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John A. Rouse, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles H. Royce, US.^, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward A. Ruckner, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adra. Thomas J. Rudden, USN, Ret.
Vice Adra. Theodore D. Ruddock, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Paul E. Ruestow, USAF, Ret.
Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George Ruhlen, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Louis J. Rumaggi, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard G. Rumney, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adra. Joseph W. Russel, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Michael P. Russillo, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clifford G. Ryan
Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward A. Sahli
Maj. Gen. Charles E. Saltzman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James G. Sampson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Crawford F. Sams, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth O. Sanborn, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. E. R. Sanders, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harry Sanders, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Homer L. Sanders, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ira T. Sanders, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Leo A. Santini, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward W. Sawyer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Valentine H. Schaeffer, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George E. Schafer
Brig. Gen. Evan W. Schear, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harold G. Scheie, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Otto A. Scherini, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward C. D. Scherrer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John J. Schieffelin, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter F. Schlech, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Howard F. Schlitz, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John W. Schmidt, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond J. Schneider, USN, Ret.
Vice Adra. William A. Schoech, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herbert E. Schonland, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert A. Schow, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ned Schramm, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Floyd B. Schultz, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Carl F. Schupp, II
Brig. Gen. Francis F. Schweinler, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert B. Scoles, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Tom W. Scctt, USAF, Ret.
48-260 0
7 9 Pt.U
76
Rear Adm. Eugene T. Seaward, OSN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wiltz P. Segura
Rear Adm. F. Gordon Selby, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Moise B. Seligman
Vice Adm. Benedict J. Semmes, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John W. Sessums, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul E. Seufer, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. W. T. Sexton, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John N. Shaffer, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leland G. Shaffer, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Louis D. Sharp, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond N. Sharp, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William J. Sharrow
Rear Adm. Charles W. Shattuck, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Shaw
Brig. Gen. William L. Shaw
William H. Shawcross
Rear Adm. Maurice W. Shea, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William F. Sheehan, USA, Ret.
General Ralph A. Sheldrick
General Lemuel C. Shepherd
Brig. Gen. Paul D. Sherman
Lt. Gen. James C. Sherrill, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Stephen Sherwood, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Ralph L. Shifley, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Clarence B. Shimer, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John G. Shinkle, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Allen M. Shinn, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. James M. Shoemaker
Lt. Gen. Raymond L. Shoemaker
Vice Adm. Wallace B. Short, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Anthony T. Shtogren, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roland P. Shugg, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William R. Shuler, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Shull, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Burton H. Shupper , USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas N. Sibley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William B. Sieglaff, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Norman D. Sillin, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Rupert M. Simmerli, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert H. Simmert, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Cecil L. Simmons, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Henry Simon, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Maurice E. Simpson, USN, Ret.
General William H. Simpson
Maj. Gen. John F. Sims
Brig. Gen. Turner A. Sims, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William K. Skaer, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert B. Skinner, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lecount H. Slocum, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Morris Smellow, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Curtis S. Smiley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Allen Smith, Jr, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bertram D. Smith, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. C. Coburn Smith, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles H. Smith, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Donald J. Smith
General Frederic H. Smith, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George F. Smith, USAF, Ret.
Admiral Harold P. Smith, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hugh R. Smith
Brig. Gen. James M. Smith
Brig. Gen. L. W. Smith
Brig. Gen. Lynn D. Smith, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul E. Smith, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Spencer R. Smith, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Stuart H. Smith, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wilbur A. Smith, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William T. Smith, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Willard W. Smith, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ralph A. Snavely, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William O. Snead, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Edwin K. Snyder
Maj. Gen. Oscar P. Snyder, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Maxwell C. Snyder, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albin R. Sodergren, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Leo E. Soucek, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard B. Spear
Brig. Gen. Max H. Specht, USA, Ret.
General John F. Speer
Brig. Gen. William Spence, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald 0. Spoon, USA, Ret.
General R. I. Stack
Brig. Gen. John E. Stannard, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George R. Stanley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Conrad L. Stansberry, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Allen T. Stanwix-Hay, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James B. Stapleton, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Merlin H. Staring, USN, Ret.
General Albert B. Starr
Maj. Gen. Maxwell W. Steel, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. George P. Steele, II, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Wycliffe E. Steele, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Floyd W. Stewart, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James L. Stewart, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. LeRoy J. Stewart, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth Stiles, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Alden E. Stilson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James J. Stilwell, USN, Ret.
General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lewis W. Stocking
Vice Adm. Thomas M. Stokes, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Jack W. Stone, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank B. Stone, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leslie 0. Stone, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Martin R. Stone, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Aaron P. Storrs, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles L. Strain, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Leland S. Stranathan, USAF, Ret.
77
Rear Adm. William W. Strange, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Elliott B. Strauss, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene L. Strickland, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert W. Strong, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William A. Stuart, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Coulter R. Sublet t, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henry Suerstedt, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Henry R. Sullivan, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John B. Sullivan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William A. Sullivan, USN, Ret.
William F. Suraraerell
Rear Adm. Paul E. Summers, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Alexander D. Surles, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frederick J. Sutterline, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank C. Sutton, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Daniel J. Sweeney, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Willieim E. Sweeney, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Douglas M. Swift, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles A. Symroski, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Alden P. Taber, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Avelin P. Tacon, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. C. M. Talbott, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benjamin B. Talley, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. George C. Talley, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Lawrence F. Tanberg, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Tarbox, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond D. Tarbuck, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Tarpley, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. August F. Taute, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin A. Taylor, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edwin B. Taylor
Rear Adm. Ford N. Taylor, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph I. Taylor, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Leonard B. Taylor, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert Taylor, III, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Temple, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph N. Tenhet, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frederick R. Terrell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Roy M. Terry, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold C. Teubner , USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Herbert B. Thatcher, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thoralf T. Thielen
Maj. Gen. Arthur Thomas, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lloyd H. Thomas, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles S. Thompson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James H. Thompson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Mark R. Thompson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roy E. Thompson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter G. Thomson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wallace 0. Thompson
Rear Adm. William Thompson, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John F. Thorlin, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harrison R. Thyng, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul W. Tibbets, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Murray J. Tichenor, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Eramett H. Tidd, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl Tiedeman, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Timberraan, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James B. Tipton, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benton C. Tolley
Rear Adm. Kemp Tolley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Rutledge B. Tompkins, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William A. Tope, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold W. Torgerson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John D. Torrey, Jr., USA, Ret.
General Salvador Torros
Vice Adm. George C. Towner, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles 0. Triebel, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas K. Tripp, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George W. Trousdale, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herman J. Trum, III, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard B. Tuggle, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Benjamin O. Turnage, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Carl C. Turner, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph W. Turner, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Hiram L. Tuttle
General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold H. Twitchell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Achilles L. Tynes, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Edward H. Underhill, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edgar H. Underwood, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. F. T. Unger , USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clarence Unnevehr , USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Fay R. Upthegrove, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lee N. Utz
Lloyd W. Van Antwerp
Rear Adm. Clyde J. Van Arsdall, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Lawrence E. Van Buskirk, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Willicim M. Van Harlingen, USA, Ret
Rear Adm. Blinn Van Mater, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thaddeus J. Van Metre, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harry Van Wyk, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James E. Van Zandt, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roland B. Vanasse, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Daniel Vance, Jr.
Rear Adm. George Vandeurs, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Walter M. Vann, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Frank W. Vannoy, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. K. L. Veth, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Fred W. Vetter, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Felix L. Vidal, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Warren C. Vincent, USNR, Ret.
Admiral Quentell Violett, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Norman H. Vissering, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward H. Vogel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ernest S. Von Kleeck, USN, Ret,
Rear Adm. Curtis F. Vossler, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John R. Wadleigh, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ruben E. Wagstaff, USN, Ret.
78
Rear Adm Charles L. Waite, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Alden H. Waitt, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George H. Wales, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward K. Walker, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Thomas J. Walker, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Henry T. Waller
Rear Adm. Harry N. Wallin, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harvey T. Walsh, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Louis A. Walsh, Jr., USA Ret.
Rear Adm. Wilfred A. Walter, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ernest K. Warburton, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Norvell G. Ward, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert W. Ward, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Herbert O. Wardell, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Wardrop, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas G. Warfield, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Aln D. Warnock, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Henry L. Warren, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hugh Warren, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jacob W. Waterhouse, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John R. Waterman,. USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Odale D. Waters, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William W. Watkin, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James H. Watkins, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Tarleton H. Watkins, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Albert Watson, II, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl E. Watson, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold E. Watson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul C. Watson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. George A. Weaver, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wilburn C. Weaver, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John H. Weber, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. David A. Webster, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George B. Webster, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles S. Weeks, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John F. Wegforth, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harold F. Weidner
Brig. Gen. Walter D. Weikel, AUS, Ret.
Major Gen. Frank D. Weir
Rear Adm. Robert O. Welander, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Seth L. Weld, Jr., USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Charles Wellborn, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph A. Wellings, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Benjamin 0. Wells, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. David J. Welsh, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Walton K. Weltraer
Maj. Gen. Donald L. Werbeck, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Holden C. West
Brig. Gen. Leslie J. Westberg, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward W. Westlake
Maj. Gen. James H. Weyhenmeyer , USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William J. Whelan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. David L. Whelchel, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Sherburne Whipple, Jr., USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard S. Whitcomb, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roger E. Whitcomb, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles F. White, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles H. White, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald M. White, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John W. White, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Marshall W. White, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Scott Whitehouse, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Otis M. Whitney, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard R. Whittaker, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carlos W. Wieber, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Geoffrey P. Wiedeman, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Charles W. Wilkins, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Wilkins, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Collin P. Williams
Maj. Gen. George V. Williams, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James W. Williams, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Macpherson B. Williams, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard C. Williams, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roy D. Williams, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Delbert F. Williamson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis T. Williamson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. Willis, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Delmar E. Wilson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin Mark Wilson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George H. Wilson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James A. Wilson
Maj. Gen. Thomas N. Wilson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William R. Wilson
Vice Adm. L. J. Wiltse, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Loren G. Windom, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter C. Winn, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Jowell C. Wise, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Narvin 0. Wittmann, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Thomas Wolfe
Brig. Gen. Frank P. Wood, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hunter Wood, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lester O. Wood, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert R. Wooding, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William R. Woodward, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward L. Woodyard, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Francis A. Woolfley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph M Worthington, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Stanley T. Wray, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edwin K. Wright, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas K. Wright, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henry J. Wuensch
Rear Adm. Don W. Wulzen, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ira T. Wyche, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Evan W. Yancey, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Earl P. Yates, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Yeager , USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George H. Yeager, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Emmett F. Yost, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles M. Young, Jr., USA, Ret.
Admiral Edwin J. S. Young, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George H. Young, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Mason J. Young, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Carl A. Youngdale
Brig. Gen. Ninian L. Yuille, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William T. Zink, Jr., OSN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth F. Zitzman, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Virgil L. Zoller, USAF, Ret.
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, Ret.
Briq. Gen. Edwin A. Zundel, USA, Ret.
79
The committee will stand in brief recess while the Senators go to
vote. When we come back, we will take our final witnesses. Again,
may I thank you both?
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]
Senator Biden [presiding]. The committee will please come to
order.
Our next two witnesses are retired Gen. David W. Winn and Dr.
Victor Fediay. They will be speaking on behalf of the Institute of
American Relations.
Dr. Fediay, would you please come up to the witness table?
General, thank you very much for your patience in sitting here
as long as you have. I assure you that the lack of attendance is not
due to a lack of interest in your statement but due to the confusion
of voting and other matters taking place on the floor of the Senate
right now. I am sure you know this is a very busy time. I am very
anxious to hear your statement. Please proceed in any way that
would be most comfortable to you.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. DAVID W. WINN (RETIRED),
POLICY BOARD, INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS,
WASHINGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY VICTOR FEDIAY,
PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS
General Winn. I had a chance to learn a little bit about patience,
so that was no problem, Mr. Senator.
The statement I am about to make reflects my own opinion. It
should not in any way be attributed to my former period with the
Air Force. It does not represent the Air Force.
Senator Biden. Are you speaking on behalf of the Institute of
American Relations?
General Winn. They have arranged for my presence here. To
that extent, yes, but as far as speaking for the Institute of Ameri-
can Relations officially, I do not do so.
I am very pleased to be here to contribute my opinions to this
discussion.
Senator Biden. We are anxious to hear from you.
General Winn. My last job was Commander of the North Ameri-
can Defense Command Combat Operations Center. This facility is
located in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex near Colorado Springs;
with all sources of intelligence available. They watch the Soviet
Union each day around the clock. Our responsibilities were to
provide the President and the National Command authorities
warning and evaluation of any threat to the North American conti-
nent. From that window, Soviet capability was impressive.
For example, they outshot us 5 to 1 in space launchers and 4 to 1
in missiles in 1977. We saw some events that exceeded our own
capabilities and our technological expectations. Sometimes it took
us too long to know what we were seeing, and sometimes we were
not sure at all what we were seeing. Our intelligence collection is
good, but in my opinion it does not support the conclusion that
adequate technical verification of Soviet capabilities is possible.
Yet my concern for the future does not stem from verification
limitations that I know exist. I am concerned about the basic
premise of our strategic arms limitation negotiations. The lopsided
conception of the SALT II Treaty implications worries me far more
80
than the prospect of ICBM's flying both ways over the Arctic. I got
out of the Air Force early because I could not find an arena where
positions, policies, or concepts could be debated.
For example, I tried to raise issues against the decision eliminat-
ing ADCOM [the Aerospace Defense Command]. That decision to
me did not make sense from a military or management point of
view. I objected to killing the only integrated homeland air defense
command we possessed. Nobody even answered the mail. All argu-
ments were totally ignored from start to finish, not just mine. The
ADCOM decision was steamrollered from the top.
Shredding out our only full-time, dedicated heartland defense
command contributes directly to the SALT II imbalance. The mis-
sion of a fully integrated command is now to be split four ways.
It was said that this would save $12 million a year. At the same
time, we were in the process of eliminating all but a handful of
ground radars with combat capability, turning our air sovereignty
over to the FAA with civilian radars and controllers.
I asked a senior officer privately, if the decision to kill ADCOM
were yours to make, would you do it, and he said yes. I turned
away, and he said, Dave, you just don't understand the pressures.
Well, he is right, I don't know the pressures, and I don't under-
stand the pressure for SALT II. Why do we insist on this treaty?
The bottom line of the SALT II advocates is that we are better off
with it than without it. I think the opposite is true. Take for
instance the Backfire bomber problem. B-52's are counted in SALT
II, despite their age and the high threat under which they might
have to fly. The Soviet Backfires are not counted, despite our near
total inability even to detect them, much less to destroy them.
Contrast that with the defense our aging B-52's and FB-lll's
would meet to reach a Soviet target. While we systematically re-
duced both our homeland defense interceptor aircraft and ground
control radars, Russia has built and built and built. The Soviets
took the lesson of the Cuban crisis of 1962 very seriously. This
lesson was simply that the power ratio at that time was wrong for
them. The United States could defend herself. In the early sixties,
it didn't matter where our interests were threatened. The numbers
were wrong for them. Now the numbers are different. You have to
conclude that we haven't paid the price to maintain our military
parity. The reason that Russia arms is to become a force against
which there is no defense. With SALT II, we see in action the belief
that there is a disconnect between raw military power and their
international behavior.
The SALT II issue is more than ballistic missiles, bombers, and
submarines. A lot of history and a few fundamentals are involved.
It has been over 6 years since I returned from Hanoi's Hoa Lo
Prison. During these 6 years, and especially during the last 30
months, a pattern in American dialog has developed that is famil-
iar to me, and that pattern goes back to Hanoi. When my para-
chute popped open over North Vietnam, there was little doubt that
my own freedom was over. The Hanoi prisoner had no choices.
Pressure was total. Control was complete. There was no end short
of yielding. For the prisoner, the inevitable result was inability to
continue resistance.
81
Now America is being challenged, and we have all been condi-
tioned in a sense much like that prisoner in Hanoi.
Freedom throughout the world is being squeezed left, and I
wonder how many of us are aware and anxious about it. The
prisoner in Hanoi was left with nothing to link him to tradition,
family, or country. The United States is not yet cut off from its
traditional, historical, and constitutional strength, but the same
inexorable pressures faced by the prisoner in solitary can be seen
ahead for the American people. America's solitary confinement is
our isolation from the premises on which SALT and other issues
are being faced, and the same temptation to cave in is working on
free people in the same way they did on the captive man in Hanoi.
We are being pushed, and pushed very hard.
The basic question, I think, of the SALT II Treaty debate is, do
we have a choice in this matter? SALT II is an agreement which
we will honor with those whose aim is the destruction of free
choice. Is the SALT II ratification process the final argument that
everything will come out OK if we simply trust those who say they
understand these things?
The American people just as the Soviet citizen may not under-
stand the technicalities of assured destruction, or even when it is
about to occur, but every person understands that life without
choice is the ultimate weakness.
This treaty lacks fundamental logic and ignores history. Its worst
feature is that it is being sold on a mother knows best basis, when
people ought to wonder whether mother knows what she is doing.
We don't have to do this, but the circle of decision gets smaller and
smaller. We risk having fewer choices in deciding when wisdom
needs the strength to say no in meeting its responsibilities.
In its recently published annual report, the International Insti-
tute of Strategic Studies in London warns the free world that the
Soviet Union leaves the United States and its allies far behind in
military force, both strategic and conventional. The new generation
of missiles developed and deployed by the Soviet Union is more
powerful than any of ours, which have not been significantly im-
proved since the sixties. The Institute estimates that the Soviet
Union is in the position of achieving a first strike capability
against the United States.
These conclusions of the prestigious London Institute, plainly
stated, put the ratification of SALT II into a very dubious category.
During the 10 years of SALT negotiations, the balance has clearly
changed in the overall security posture vis-a-vis that of the Soviet
Union. We still have a fundamental policy objective of essential
equivalence.
Defense Secretary Brown, speaking of the uncertainties of Soviet
response, said:
Basically they require us to insist on essential equivalence with the Soviet Union
in strategic nuclear forces.
He also said:
The issue is now to make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot gain any
military or political advantage from their strategic forces. Insistence on essential
equivalence guards against any danger that the Soviets might be seen as superior,
even if the perception is not technically justified.
82
By way of partial clarification of what is understood to be the
essential equivalence, Secretary Brown said:
By essential equivalence we mean the maintenance of conditions such that Soviet
strategic nuclear forces do not become usable instruments of political leverage
coverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage. Any advantage in force char-
acteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by U.S. advantages in other characteris-
tics, and the U.S. posture is not in fact and is not seen as, inferior in performance to
the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.
These conditions exist today, and our objective in the current SALT II negotia-
tions is to maintain them in the future.
The International Institute of Strategic Studies disagrees with
Secretary Brown. The conditions for essential equivalence of Febru-
ary 1978, obviously are not a reality in September 1979. According
to the London Institute, the Soviets are "seen as superior, and the
U.S. posture is in fact seen as inferior."
As if to prove that the strategic forces are usable instruments of
political leverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage, the
Soviet Union has special military troops to maneuver jointly with
Cubans on Cuban territory. Under the umbrella of strategic superi-
ority, the Soviets apparently feel free to use their forces in the
proximity of Nicaragua or any country which may become their
next target. The presence of 3,000 Soviet troops is not a direct
threat to the United States, but for wars in Central America it
could be decisive.
It is imperative that a SALT Treaty which the United States
ratifies does not force the United States to look the other way at
every geopolitical move the Soviet Union makes, even in the west-
ern hemisphere. If the U.S.S.R. should decide to test our will today
or tomorrow, how many warheads would be presumed to be aboard
the SS-18? As agreed in the treaty? If they chose to use their
superior navy to close the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean in
1980, where would the Backfire bombers be based? And what range
would Backfires reach, to what targets, just in case we tried to
respond?
Would SALT II have helped? Treaties do not deter. Negotiations
never reach the bottom line of deterrence.
Without any agreement at all, we halted the B-1 and enhanced
radiation weapons, and stretched out other programs into the
period we now seek to cover with SALT II.
Advocates of SALT II insist that it puts a cap on the number of
MIRV-type warheads the Soviets can install on the 308 heavy
missiles. It is a strange argument. The agreement prohibits the
United States from having any such missiles. By 1985, the Soviets
will probably have improved the accuracy and yield of increased
numbers of warheads. They could increase the MIRV's on each SS-
18 to 20 or even 30.
There is an argument that the M-X will re-establish the strate-
gic balance in our favor, but if the production of the M-X moves
forward as rapidly as possible, it would be ready for initial deploy-
ment only by 1986, and not fully available until 1989. By that time,
the SS-18's could be fully MIRVed with 30 accurate warheads per
missile. That could give the Soviet Union the capability of striking
all M-X and Minuteman missiles in one attack, forcing the United
States to launch on warning or face destruction without retali-
ation.
83
The SALT II numbers game is obviously not in our favor, but
that clearly is not the main reason why the treaty should not be
ratified in its present form. The conditions for negotiation of SALT
III will be even more restrictive for the United States than experi-
enced in SALT II if it is ratified as it stands. The vulnerability of
peace arrangements will be absolute if the conditions of SALT II
permit the maximization of Soviet advantage in space and in the
air while Soviet conventional forces continue to grow.
Simply by having so much to negotiate away, the Soviet Union
has sent us a message. The first line is, let's negotiate if it makes
you feel better. The last line is, let the results speak for them-
selves.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. General. Your testimony
is very straightforward, and it reiterates some of the points that
have been made earlier by your former colleagues and evidences
the same concern. Consequently, I only had a few questions, but in
light of the fact that I have only SV2 minutes to vote on the next
amendment that is up on the floor, I will not even attempt to ask
those questions. I thank you on behalf of the committee for your
statement. Thank you for your patience.
This hearing will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
[Whereupon, the committee recessed, to meet again at 2 p.m.
the same day.]
84
Afternoon Session
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of
the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Church, McGovern, Biden, Sarbanes, Muskie,
Javits, Percy, and Hayakawa.
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT
This afternoon we continue to hear from public witnesses on the
SALT II Treaty.
Appearing first will be Hon. Charles Yost, Senator Thomas Mcln-
tyre and Coretta Scott King, on behalf of Americans for SALT.
Next we will hear from three religious groups. Cardinal Krol will
testify for the U.S. Catholic Conference. Dr. Claire Randall will
appear for the National Council of Churches. Albert Vorspan will
testify on behalf of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations.
Ambassador Yost, we will ask you to begin, if you will.
Ambassador Yost. Senator Mclntyre will open for us if that is
agreeable to you, sir.
The Chairman. That is an appropriate way for us to commence
these hearings.
Tom, it does my heart good to see you again.
Senator McIntyre. Even with my bald head?
The Chairman. To see you looking so well. And I think that I
express the feeling of all of your colleagues and friends in the
Senate when I give you a warm welcome back.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS J. McINTYRE, JR., PRESIDENT,
AMERICANS FOR SALT>
Senator McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the Foreign Relations Committee. Today I offer my testimony on
the importance of SALT II on behalf of Americans for SALT, a
nationwide citizens' campaign of which I am president.
Americans for SALT is a coalition of individuals and major orga-
nizations in support of the ratification of the SALT II agreement.
The individuals include retired military officers, former Govern-
ment officials and other prominent Americans. The organizations
include religious groups, business associations, labor unions, scien-
tific and educational organizations, and public interest groups.
The working consensus of these many Americans is that the
ratification of SALT II is essential for the security of the American
people in several important ways.
First, SALT caps the Soviet strategic threat. The nuclear threat
we would likely face without SALT will be both quantitatively and
qualitatively more formidable than the threat under SALT.
It is precisely because many of us are concerned about an unre-
stricted Soviet strategic buildup that we wish to place SALT re-
strictions on the Soviets. The more one is concerned about the
formidable Soviet threat under SALT, the more one should seek to
avoid an even greater threat, one without SALT.
See page 86 for Senator Mclntyre's prepared statement.
85
Second, under this treaty we will be able to plan our defense
programs more effectively because we will be able to predict with
greater accuracy and greater confidence the size and shape of the
Soviet threat. The treaty requires them to fit their forces into a
well-defined grid of specific limits, sublimits, and qualitative re-
strictions.
Moreover, the treaty prohibits the Soviets from interfering with
our national technical means of monitoring their weapons develop-
ment and deployment. Under SALT, we will be able to focus our
R. & D. moneys much more effectively to counter the Soviet buildup
since that threat itself will be more predictable.
Third, SALT leaves us free to choose the strategic and theater
weapons we need to secure our common defense.
When I served as chairman of the Subcommittee on Military
Research and Development of the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee, my colleagues and I were especially vigilant on this point. So I
am particularly reassured that the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified
that the United States will be free to exploit its truly formidable
military technology to meet the Soviet challenge.
Fourth, I believe we have an opportunity to reunite our Nation
behind a prudent national defense program through the debate on
SALT. For too long, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
we have been divided about both our defense requirements and
SALT.
At the heart of this division is a fallacy, a fallacy that SALT and
national defense are mutually exclusive. The American people
want both a strong national defense and a SALT agreement. The
SALT debate gives us an opportunity to reconstruct a broad work-
ing American middle that will support both a strong defense pro-
gram and arms limitations as a means to that same end.
However, Mr. Chairman, if the treaty is rejected, I fear we will
return to a polarized politics which will make it difficult for us to
rally a stable base of public support behind defense programs. At a
time when we find a deep American desire to get together to
manage our affairs in so many troubling policy areas — inflation,
energy, taxes — we need to demonstrate again to ourselves and our
allies and our adversaries that we can find common ground to
manage the most dangerous of all problems, nuclear weapons.
This suggests my final point. Although it cannot be proved in
any systematic way, we somehow all know that this agreement
enhances our security because it represents the common interests
of both nuclear superpowers in avoiding the use of nuclear weap-
ons.
The treaty will not eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, but
it does, because of this unstated premise, make the use of these
weapons somehow less likely. SALT will not eliminate military
competition, but it will make it less dangerous and more orderly.
In sum, I believe the American people, and in fact people all over
the globe, know they will be more secure in a world in which the
two most powerful nations continue to work in our common inter-
est to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war within the framework of
this treaty.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Thomas J. Mclntyre follows:]
86
Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas J. McIntyre, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Today I offer
my testimony on the importance of SALT II on behalf of Americans for SALT, a
nationwide citizens' campaign of which I am President. Americans for SALT is a
coalition of individuals and major organizations in support of the ratification of the
SALT II Agreement. The individuals include retired military officers, former gov-
ernment officials and other prominent Americans. The organizations include reli-
gious groups, business associations, labor unions, scientific and educational organiza-
tions and public interest groups.
The working consensus of these many Americans is that the ratification of SALT
II is essential for the security of the American people. I believe SALT will enhance
our security in several important ways.
First, SALT caps the Soviet strategic threat. The nuclear threat we would likely
face without SALT will be both quantitatively and qualitatively more formidable
than the threat under SALT.
As Secretary Brown has testified:
The Soviet total strategic missile and bomber force will likely be 30 percent larger
without SALT than with it.
Their total strategic MIRVed ballistic missiles, both land and sea, will likely be 50
percent greater without SALT than under SALT.
Their MIRVed ICBM's could be up to 75 percent greater if unrestricted by SALT.
Their total strategic nuclear warheads and gravity bombs could easily be half
again as large a force if unrestricted by SALT.
The threat to our ICBM's from their silo killer warheads could double without
SALT restraints on MIRVed ICBM launchers and number of warheads permitted on
each.
Without SALT, the Backfire bomber production could grow unrestricted beyond
its current level. Without SALT, the Soviet SS-16, the only mobile ICBM fully
developed by either side, could be deployed. Without SALT, the Soviets could pro-
ceed to develop their fifth generation of ICBM's without any restrictions.
In sum, it's precisely because many of us are concerned about an unrestricted
Soviet strategic buildup that we wish to place SALT restrictions on the Soviets. The
more one is concerned about the formidable Soviet threat under SALT, the more
one should seek to avoid an even greater one without SALT.
There is a second way SALT will enhance our security. Under this treaty, we will
be able to plan our defense programs more effectively, because we will be able to
predict with greater accuracy and confidence the size and shape of the Soviet
threat. Under SALT, we will know the number and kinds of strategic weapons
developed and deployed by the Soviets, because the treaty requires them to fit their
forces into a well defined grid of specific limits, sublimits and qualitative restric-
tions. Moreover, the treaty prohibits the Soviets from interfering with our national
technical means of monitoring their weapons development and deployment. Since
our own military research and development programs must be designed to hedge
uncertainties about the Soviet threat, the greater the unknown, the more difficult
our own R. & D. task. In other words, under SALT, we will be able to focus our R. &
D. monies much more effectively to counter the Soviet buildup since that threat
itself will be more predictable.
Let me suggest an important way this is true. As we all know, current intelli-
gence projections suggest the Soviets will be able to mount a technical threat to our
ICBM's in the early to mid-1980's. Any of the basing schemes under consideration to
ensure our ICBM's would survive this threat is designed against a specific presup-
posed number of attacking silo-killer Soviet warheads. Under SALT II, we can
predict the maximum number our M-X basing design must be able to counter,
because the treaty will limit the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers and the
number of warheads permitted on each. Without SALT, that number will be much
higher and much more difficult to predict.
This is vividly true in the case of the threat to our ICBM's from the Soviet heavy
missiles. SALT restrict's the SS-18's to 308 with no more than 10 warheads on each.
Without SALT, they could keep their hot production line going and could relatively
cheaply build up to 500 SS-18's. They could also double the number of warheads on
each. So instead of having to design an MX basing scheme that would counter a
threat of 3,000 warheads from the SS-18's under SALT, we would have to design
one to counter 10,000 warheads from the SS-18's. So in this case as in others, SALT
will help us design an effective solution to a critical military problem we will face.
Third, SALT leaves us free to choose the strategic and theater weapons we need
to insure our common defense. With virtually no exceptions and certainly no impor-
tant exceptions, the United States will be free to exploit its formidable military
technology to meet the Soviet challenge. I am particularly reassured that the Joint
87
Chiefs of Staff testified this is the case. When I served as Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee on Military Research and Development of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, my colleagues and I were particularly vigilant on this point. Throughout our
hearings, we consistently inquired about the degree of technological freedom the
emerging agreement would leave us. We urged the Administration to avoid as much
as possible any such restrictions.
I realize that our success in ensuring this freedom is a source of some frustration
to some who wish that SALT would have resolved domestic debates about what
weapons systems we require. I never believed that this was a proper objective of
SALT negotiations. If, of course, we would have been required in the bargaining to
accept restrictions, we could judge that bargain in the aggregate. But I personally
reject the view that it should be an objective of SALT either to preclude or mandate
a particular U.S. weapons system. I always felt that was something we should
decide for ourselves in our councils.
There is a fourth way SALT can enhance our national security. I believe that we
have an opportunity to reunite our nation behind a prudent national defense
program through the debate on SALT. For too long, we have been divided about
both our defense requirements and SALT. At the heart of this division is a fallacy
that SALT and national defense are mutually exclusive. I believe SALT should be a
means to a more effective common defense for our nation rather than as an aspect
of detente or as an end in itself. Further, I believe, the American people want both
a strong national defense and a SALT agreement.
The SALT debate gives us an opportunity to reconstruct a broad working Ameri-
can middle that will support both a strong defense program and arms limitations as
a means to that same end. For the first time since Vietnam, we have an opportunity
to rebuild a working majority on this common ground.
However, if the treaty is rejected, I fear we will return to a polarized politics
which will make it difficult for us to rally a stable base of public support behind
defense programs. At a time when we find a deep American desire to get together to
manage our affairs in so many troubling policy areas — inflation, energy, taxes — we
need to demonstrate again to ourselves, our allies, and our adversaries that we can
find common ground to manage the most dangerous of all problems, nuclear weap-
ons.
This suggests my final point. Although it can't be proved in any systematic way,
we somehow all know that this agreement enhances our security because it repre-
sents the common efforts of both nuclear superpowers to avoid the use of nuclear
weapons. The treaty will not eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, but it does,
because of this unstated premise, make the use of these weapons somehow less
likely. SALT will not eliminate military competition, but it will make it less danger-
ous and more orderly.
In sum, I believe that the American people, in fact people all over the globe, know
that they will be more secure in a world in which the two most powerful nations
continue to work in our common interests to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war
within the framework of this treaty.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator, for an excellent
statement.
I believe that in the interest of time, we should hear from each
member of the panel. Then we will address questions to the panel.
I think that Mrs. King might testify next.
Mrs. King often speaks for the poor, and we would be interested
in knowing what there is in SALT for Americans who are con-
cerned about food, housing, and living standards for our own
people.
Mrs. King, I am very pleased to welcome you this afternoon.
STATEMENT OF MRS. CORETTA SCOTT KING, MEMBER,
AMERICANS FOR SALT
Mrs. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and your distinguished
colleagues on the committee.
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before this com-
mittee in support of ratification of the SALT II Treaty. I am doubly
honored to appear before you today, honored by the privilege of
88
speaking to this important committee on a subject of such grave
significance to the peace of the world.
I am honored to be the first woman, the only mother, and the
only representative of any American minority to have this privi-
lege. I am not unaware of the heavy responsibility that this places
on me, Mr. Chairman, because it is exactly the women, the moth-
ers, and the minorities of this country that are the real silent
majority, who pay the highest price for the continuance of the
world's arms race and would pay the highest price for any nuclear
or even nonnuclear war.
In the course of the past few weeks, the committee has heard
voluminous testimony on the merits and shortcomings of this
treaty by experts in the field of nuclear and strategic matters. I,
too, come to you as an expert because I am a citizen of this Nation;
and as a citizen, I know that the issues in this historic debate on
SALT are not confined to missile counts and throw-weight and base
modes.
As we all know, a more basic and fundamental issue tests us and
challenges us today, and it is this: Shall we, in the name of nation-
al security, commit ourselves to a course of confrontation and
potential nuclear annihilation by rejecting this treaty; or shall we
as a Nation seek a more lasting security through the peaceful
resolution of conflict in a way that allows us to free our spirits and
resources for the development of human potential in our society?
These are public policy choices which must be made by citizens,
for they are the true experts. They are the people whose lives are
to be risked, whose children's lives are to be mortgaged, and whose
parents' lives are to be wasted should we choose to pursue a course
of superiority and winability in an arms race that knows no win-
ners.
Yet, most Americans are overlooked and excluded from this
debate. Public polls showing citizen support for the SALT process
are ignored or glossed over because we are told citizens are not
experts.
My husband, Martin Luther King, Jr., knew these same frustra-
tions during another historical national debate. Though a recent
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, my husband was informed by
so-called specialists on the Vietnam war that he was not enough of
an expert to discuss this basic issue of war and peace, of violence
and nonviolence.
I fervently hope that we as a Nation, in contemplating the
wisdom of this treaty to limit nuclear weapons, will listen to those
whose lives are directly affected by the outcome of this debate: The
mother in Utah who gives her child milk knowing the dangers of
radiation from nuclear weapons testing— that mother is an expert
on SALT; the unemployed youth who cannot find a job and knows
that military spending creates less jobs than spending on human
need— that youth is an expert on SALT; the elderly American
holding his grandchild, who witnessed the massive loss of life in
past world wars — that American is an expert on SALT.
Indeed, no issue of public policy is more personal than this issue
of limiting nuclear weapons and ending this senseless arms race.
Let me give you an example from an area of personal concerns:
unemployment. Studies have shown that $1 billion of military
89
spending creates about 75,000 jobs. The same amount, if spent on
construction, creates 100,000; on health care, 139,000 jobs; on edu-
cation, 188,000 jobs.
Thus, the military budget swells in the name of national security
while our most precious resources stand idle. Our communities
may be ringed by missiles and our cities surrounded by silos, but
how secure are we if America's future, blighted by high unemploy-
ment, holds only the prospect of deterioration and decay.
The twiii perils of unemployment and inflation are not confined
to our shores. Today, the economically dislocating effects of the
arms race can be felt throughout the world. Children with distend-
ed bellies still suffer for want of adequate food; yet global military
expenditures now exceed $400 billion a year.
This vast expansion of destructive power at the expense of
human needs has served to decrease our global security and leaves
us ever more vulnerable to random annihilation through nuclear
exchange or accident. Yet we recognize these perils and have
shown the vision and moral leadership to engage in a process of
negotiated restraint.
As we in this country reexamine our commitment to the SALT
process, we must ask ourselves this question: What perception will
the world community have of our Nation should we fail, after 7
years of deliberation, to proceed with this historic agreement to
limit nuclear weaponry? Nothing less than our future is at stake.
Without SALT, any prospect of progress toward further arms
limitation is clouded. Without SALT, any hope of replenishing our
human resources is undermined. Without SALT, any dream of
peace for our children and their children is diminished; in its place,
a legacy of tension and fear.
Skeptics will say that the SALT process is untenable in today's
world, that mutual accommodation is unthinkable, and that har-
mony in international relations is impossible. They choose instead
to pursue a policy of confrontation and violence, despite the poten-
tial for human extinction.
I am accustomed to a great deal of skepticism and even outrage
at the thought that the principles of nonviolent social change are
relevant to world affairs. Yet, I firmly believe that the world's
people, though often divided by nationalism and racism, are united
in their instinctive will to live and their civilized will to do so in
peace.
I am reminded of my husband's words almost 15 years ago now,
and I quote: "I refuse to accept the cynical notion that nation after
nation must spiral down a militaristic stairway into the hell of
nuclear destruction. I believe that unarmed truth and an uncondi-
tional love will have the final word of reality."
Mr. Chairman, this treaty to limit strategic weapons is not a
perfect agreement. Indeed, it has been termed "a modest step."
How do you define "modest" when any progress toward bringing
nuclear weapons under some control means a better chance for a
peaceful future for everyone?
I am sure I will be well understood when I say I have learned the
virtue of patience, although patience can seem a terrible taskmas-
ter when every fiber of one's being longs for speed in setting right
what one knows to be wrong.
90
The important thing is to keep pressing forward, to take advan-
tage of every opportunity for making progress, even if it is only one
step at a time. This opportunity to limit nuclear weapons under
the SALT II Treaty, to reduce the probability of destroying civiliza-
tion itself, and to turn our labors toward improving the quality of
all our lives rather than the useless waste of our resources must
not be lost.
My experience, Mr. Chairman, is that the United States is most
respected in the rest of the world where our other virtues are most
recognized, the virtues of quiet rather than noise, of the power to
build rather than the power to destroy, and of the spiritual power
of being a mediator in disputes, a reconciler among nations rather
than a belligerent and demanding nation.
We as a people are by far the most powerful nation in the world,
Mr. Chairman, not only politically, economically, and militarily
but, I firmly believe, spiritually. We have the potential for world
leadership. What other nation could have sponsored a Camp David
peace conference? What other world leader but Jimmy Carter
could have brought together those two ancient enemies to a table
of dialog? What other nation could have sent an Andrew Young to
the United Nations for the healing of the nations and the opening
of conversation and dialog of all peoples until he gained the love
and respect of almost everyone in that most suspicious and conspir-
acy-ridden of all world institutions?
The United States, Mr. Chairman, is a great hope for peace if we
can but learn to use our power with more dignity and restraint.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, let us not delude ourselves out of the
challenge before us. It is not a technical nor a military one; it is a
moral one, a challenge of moral leadership. The whole world is
watching the United States, whether the United States will take
the high road of making the dramatic offer to continue this small
peace process that we already have started with SALT II.
My late husband found it necessary to remind his listeners that
once to every man and nation is given the moment to decide. That
this is an hour for courage and decision. The U.S. Senate can
decide to take one small step forward for dialog and peace with the
Soviet Union, which could be one giant step forward for the
women, the mothers, the children, and the poor, not only for this
country and the Soviet Union, but for the whole world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mrs. King, for a very
eloquent statement given with much feeling.
I would now like to ask Ambassador Charles Yost to present his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR CHARLES W. YOST,
COCHAIRMAN OF AMERICANS FOR SALT '
Mr. Yost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I testify before you today as a cochairman of Americans for
SALT and as a former foreign service officer with some 45 years of
experience in international affairs. That service included substan-
tial experience in negotiating with the Soviets at the Dumbarton
Oaks, San Francisco, and Potsdam Conferences, two assignments in
' See page 92 for Ambassador Yost's prepared statement.
91
Vienna under the Four Power occupation, director of the State
Department's Office of Eastern European Affairs, and at the
United Nations for 7 years, including those of the BerHn, Cuban,
and Congo crises.
I have, therefore, no illusions either about Soviet objectives or
about the need for great vigilance in doing business with them.
Senator Mclntyre has described the character and purpose of our
organization. I am submitting as an annex to my testimony a list of
the cochairmen, of the members of our advisory council and of
about 140 prominent persons who are publicly supporting our orga-
nization and our goals.
As you will note, many of those persons are officers or repre-
sentatives of other organizations with substantial nationwide mem-
berships, some of which assisted in the establishment of Americans
for SALT, and many of which have taken a public position in
support of ratification of the treaty.
With respect to the attitude of the American public toward the
treaty, you gentlemen are, of course, aware that a substantial
number of public opinion polls taken over the past year show that
about 70 percent of Americans polled consistently favored a strate-
gic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.
The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the senior officials of the administration in
their testimony to you before the recess have submitted convincing
evidence that this particular strategic arms control treaty before
you will, on balance, reinforce the security of the United States,
will not inhibit us from further strengthening our armed forces in
ways necessary to our defense, and will in several important re-
spects place the United States in a more advantageous military
position than if the treaty should be rejected or delayed.
Distinguished private citizens with long experience in negotiat-
ing with the Soviets, such as Averell Harriman and John McCloy,
have supported these views and have recommended ratification. So,
indeed, have the principal leaders of our European allies.
After studying the testimony offered to this committee and ex-
amining the provisions of the treaty thoroughly, Americans for
SALT is strengthened in its conviction that the treaty, if ratified,
will serve to reinforce both the security of the United States and
the prospects of world peace.
It therefore, in our view, clearly meets the objective which those
70 percent of Americans who in opinion polls supported an arms
control agreement with the Soviets had in mind. Reports from
public interest groups throughout the country which are alined
with us confirmed that this is the case.
Many of them, like many of you, would have preferred that the
treaty provide for more substantial reductions. However, part of a
loaf is decidedly better than no bread. If the SALT process is
continued and not interrupted, such larger reductions, to which
both parties to the treaty are pledged, can be promptly pursued in
the next stage of the negotiations.
On the other hand, as Mrs. King has just pointed out, rejection
or indefinite delay would seriously increase international tensions
and risks of world conflict. If the treaty is not approved, the Soviets
48-260 0-79 Pt.U
92
would gain specific substantial military advantages which the
treaty would deny them.
They would, instead of being obliged to reduce from 2,500 to
2,250 missile launchers, be able to increase by 1985 to as many as
3,000. Instead of being limited to 10 warheads on each of their 300
heavy missiles, they would be able to install as many as 30 on each,
a difference of 3,000 warheads.
They would be able to deploy three or four new strategic systems
rather than only the one permitted under the treaty. They would
be able to interfere significantly with our monitoring of their mili-
tary activities in ways that would be prohibited by the treaty.
All these options offered to 'die Soviets by rejection of the treaty
could constitute, together, a most serious threat to our national
security. I should like to recedl in this connection the public state-
ment Secretary- Kissinger made in January 1977, just before leav-
ing office, and I qvjote:
I believe that to achieve a usable <"jperiority in strategic n'jclear weapons is
extremely unlikely and relatively easy to prevent, and the obsession vdth it dis-
tracts us.
What I presume Mr. Kissinger meant was that as long as we
maintain a credible second strike capability and show a clear in-
tention to use it if necessary, any superiority the Soviet Union
might have in some weapons is not usable, either militarily or
politically, because their use would bring about almost total devas-
tation of their homeland.
We do certainly have that capability at present and are in the
process of reinforcing it with Trident submarines and missiles and
with air-launched cruise missiles. The SALT II Treaty places no
obstacles in the way of our maintaining that capability. As long^ as
we do maintain it, scenarios of our docilely succumbing to nuclear
blackmail are, in my view, wholly implausible.
The time available to me does not permit my dealing in any
further depth with the substance of the treaty. I should like, there-
fore, to submit for the record a statement of 10 points explaining
briefly why I personally support the Treaty and why the principal
arguments of its opponents seem to me unconvincing.
I trust that a sober assessment of the benefits of the SALT II
Treaty and of the quite predictable consequences of its being reject-
ed will commend themselves to you gentlemen and lead you to the
same conclusions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Charles W. Yost fol-
lows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Charles W. Yost
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I testify before you today as a Co-
Chair of Americans for SALT and as a former Foreign Service Officer with some 45
years of experience in international affairs. That service included substantial expe-
rience in negotiating with the Soviets— at the Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco and
Potsdam Conferences, two assignments in Vienna under Four Power occupation, as
Director of the State Department's Office of Eastern European Affairs, and at the
United Nations for seven years, including those of the Berlin, Cuban and Congo
crises. I have no illusions, therefore, either about Soviet objectives or about the need
for great vigilance in doing business with them.
"Americans For SALT" is a private organization established for the purpose of
mobilizing public support for the conclusion and ratification of the SALT II Treaty.
There is submitted as an annex to this testimony a list of the co-chairmen, of the
93
members of our Advisory Council and of about 140 prominent persons who are
publicly supporting our organization and our goals. As you will note, many of these
persons are officers or representatives of other organizations with substantial na-
tionwide memberships, some of which assisted in the establishment of "Americans
For SALT" and many of which have taken a public position in support of ratifica-
tion of the treaty.
With respect to the attitude of the American public toward the treaty, you
gentlemen are of course aware that a substantial number of public opinion polls
taken over the past year show that about 70 percent of Americans polled consistent-
ly favored a strategic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. The Secretar-
ies of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior
officials of the Administration in their testimony to you before the recess have
submitted convincing evidence that this particular strategic arms control treaty,
SALT n, will, on balance, reenforce the security of the United States, will not
inhibit us from further strenghthening our armed forces in ways necessary to our
defense, and will in several important respects place the United States in a more
advantageous military position than if the treaty should be rejected or delayed.
Distinguished private citizens with long experience in negotiating with the Soviets,
such as Averell Harriman, John J. McCloy, and, subject to some conditions, Henry
Kissinger, have supported these views and recommended ratification of the treaty.
After the study of testimony offered to this Committee and a careful examination
of the provisions of the treaty by its own experts, "Americans For SALT" is
strengthened in its conviction that the treaty, if ratified, will serve to reenforce both
the security of the United States and the prospects of world peace. It therefore
clearly meets the objective which those 70 percent of Americans who in opinion
polls supported an arms control agreement with the Soviets had in mind. Reports
from public interest groups throughout the country which are aligned with us
confirm that this is the case.
Many of them, like many of you, would have preferred that the treaty provide for
more substantial reductions. However, part of a loaf is decidedly better than no
bread. If the SALT process is continued and not interrupted, such larger reduction,
to which both parties to the treaty are pledged, can be promptly pursued in the next
stage of negotiations.
Returning for a moment to Mr. Kissinger, I should like to recall a public state-
ment he made in January 1977, just before leaving office: "I believe that to achieve
a usable superiority in strategic nuclear weapons is extremely unlikely and relative-
ly easy to prevent, and the obsession with it distracts us."
What Mr. Kissinger meant was that, as long as we maintain a credible second
strike capability, and show a clear intention to use it if necessary, any superiority
the Soviet Union might have in some weapons is not usable, either militarily or
politically, because its use would bring about almost total devastation of their
homeland. We do certainly have that capability at present and are in the process of
reenforcing it with Trident submarines and missiles and with air-launched cruise
missiles. The SALT II Treaty places no obstacles in the way of our maintaining that
capability. As long as we do maintain it, scenarios of our docilely succumbing to
nuclear blackmail are in my view wholly implausible.
The time available to me does not permit my dealing in any depth with the
substance of the treaty. I should like therefore to submit for the record a statement
of 10 points explaining briefly why I personally support the treaty and why the
principal arguments of its opponents seem to me unconvincing.
In conclusion I would recall that when the actor Maurice Chevalier was asked
how he felt about getting old, he replied that he was not particularly enthusiastic
about it but he preferred it to the alternative. I believe that a sober assessment of
the benefit of the SALT II Treaty, and of the quite predictable consequences of
rejecting it, should lead us to the same conclusion.
I have carefully followed the debate on the SALT II Treaty during the past year,
including testimony pro and con before this and other Senate committees. To
summarize my conclusions, there seem to me ten major points which emerge in
favor of ratification of the treaty. Several of these points seem to me to refute
convincingly the principal arguments put forward by opponents of the treaty.
1. The highest officials of our Government, including those responsible for our
national defense, have testified unequivocally that this treaty will, modestly but
usefully, strengthen the security of the United States. I see no reason to doubt
either their judgement or their sincerity.
2. The treaty does not prohibit the United States from taking a wide variety of
additional measures to strengthen its national defense, if the Administration and
the Congress deem it necessary to do so. Such permitted measures, several of which
are already under way, include Minuteman modernization, deployment of Trident
94
submarines and missiles, deployment of cruise missiles, deplojonent of the MX
missile, and an unlimited range of improvements in conventional forces.
3. If the treaty is not approved, the Soviets would gain specific substantial
military advantages which the treaty would deny them. They would, instead of
being obliged to reduce from 2,500 to 2,250 missile launchers, be able to increase by
1985 to as many as 3,000; instead of being limited to 10 warheads on each of their
300 heavy missiles they would be able to install as many as 30 on each (a difference
of 6,000 warheads, more than their total present number); they would be able to
deploy three or four new strategic systems, rather than only the one permitted
under the treaty; they would be able to interfere significantly with our monitoring
of their military activities in ways that would be prohibited by the treaty. All these
options offered gratuitously to the Soviets by rejection of the treaty could constitute
together a most serious threat to our national security.
4. One of the principal arguments by opponents of the treaty relates to an alleged
approaching vulnerability of our Minuteman missiles. If such a vulnerability were
to occur, it would occur either with or without the treaty. Personally I consider such
a supposed vulnerability to be purely theoretical. As long as we maintain other
invulnerable systems, such as our strategic submarines, the Soviets will not be fools .,
enough to risk destruction of most of their cities and industries by attacking us.
Moreover, they would not be able to achieve political advantages by threatening to
do so, since both we and they would know that such threats were bluff and would
not be carried out.
5. Our principal NATO allies have publicly urged ratification of the treaty and
several of their leaders have publicly emphasized the dismay they would feel if it
were rejected. In his testimony before this Committee July 31 Henry Kissinger said:
"There is no doubt that failure to ratify the treaty will shake European confidence
in an American government that for seven years assured them that it knew what it
was doing."
6. There can be little doubt that rejection of the treaty, afer seven years of
painstaking negotiation, would lead to a further escalation of the arms race, the
deployment of additional new systems on both sides, and very heavy expenditures
which would not be incurred if the treaty takes effect. There is no warrant for
believing that the Soviets have reached a ceiling of military expenditure. Experi-
ence clearly shows that they will spend whatever amounts they think are required
to keep even with us.
7. On the question of linkage with SALT of Soviet behavior in the Third World,
there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that the Soviets would behave better if
SALT is rejected than if it is ratified. On the contrary, a significant inhibition on
their objectionable behavior — their concern not to risk being too offensive to us —
would be diminished by the interruption of the SALT relationship.
8. There is no reason to believe that, if the treaty is rejected or if amendments are
added which would require renegotiation, such renegotiation could be either begun
or concluded quickly. The United States is about to enter an election year. More
important, the Soviet Union is already preparing for and about to undergo a change
in leadership. It is highly probable that the SALT process would remain in suspense
until that change, which as Mr. Harriman has pointed out could be adversely
affected by rejection of SALT, has been completed and assimilated. By that time any
one of a dozen contingencies could occur, as we have seen so often in the past 7
years, to cause further and indefinite delay.
9. If the treaty ever should be renegotiated, to accommodate amendments pro-
posed by the United States, we would of course, if we expected a new treaty to
result, have to be prepared to make concessions to the Soviets to balance those we
would be asking of them. What concessions would we be prepared to make? We
might in fact end up with no treaty at all or with one worse on balance than the
one we now have before us.
10. Finally, rejection of the treaty would delay indefinitely, perhaps for many
years, the process of negotiating the more substantial reductions which are stipulat-
ed in the Statement of Principles in the present text and which both proponents
and opponents of the treaty solemnly proclaim is their principal objective.
Americans for "SALT
President
Thomas Mclntyre, Former United States Senator.
Cochairs
Marjorie Benton, Delegate to the United Nations Special Session on Disarma-
ment.
Clark Clifford, Former Secretary of Defense.
95
The Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C, President, University of Notre
Dame.
Townsend Hoopes, Former Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Henry Cabot Lodge, Former United States Senator; Former Ambassador to the
United Nations, and to Vietnam.
Lloyd McBride, President, United Steelworkers of America.
Charles Yost, Former Ambassador to the United Nations.
Advisory council
Thomas Bradley, Mayor, City of Los Angeles.
Marjorie Bell Chambers, President, American Association of University Women.
Norman Cousins, President, World Federalists Association.
Milton S. Eisenhower, President Emeritus, The Johns Hopkins University.
Murray Finley, President, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union.
Douglas Eraser, President, United Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America.
Emil Mazey, United Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America.
Joyce D. Miller, President, Coalition of Labor Union Women.
Francis B. Sayre, Jr., Associate Director, The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institu-
tion.
Rabbi Arthur Schneier, Park East Synagogue.
Stuart Symington, Former United States Senator; Former Secretary of the Air
Force.
Foy Valentine, Executive Secretary, Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission.
Jerome B. Wiesner, President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
96
Hayward Alker, Pmlenor of Political Science.
Maisachus^-inlCwnite of Technology
Marion Anderson! Employment Research
Auociation
Les Aspin. Member. United States House of
Representatives
Richard Bamet. Senior Fellow. Institute for
Policy Studies
Dons Bato
Roben S. Benismm, Chairman of the Board of
Governors. United Natior.s Association
Meyer Berger. Chairman, Meyer Berger Company
Charles V. Bergstrom, Executive Director. Office
for Governmental Aflairr, Lutheran CoufKil in
the U S. A.
Hans Bethe. Professor of Nuclear Physics, Cornell
University
David Blumberg. Former President. B'nai B'rith
Philip W Bonsai, Form«r United States
Ambassador
Kenneth Bouldmg. Ptofettor of Economics,
University of Colorado
Thomas Bradley. Mayor. City of Los Angeles
Joel Brooke. Former President, Fund for Peace
Helen Caldicon. M.D.
Bob Carr, Member, United States House of
Representatives
Marjone Bell Chambers. President, American
Association of University Women
Charles N. Coilatos. Commissioner of Veteran's
Services, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Arthur Collins. Jr.. Lt General. US Army (Ret.)
Randloph P. Compion, Chairman of the Board,
Compton Foundation
Howard R. Conant. Chairman, Interstate Steel
Company
Sister Carol Coston, Executive Director, Network.
Norman Cousins. President, '.Vorld Federalists
Association
Anhur Macy Cox, Former Specialist in Soviet
Affairs. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Karl Deutsch, Stanfield Professor of tnternationai
Peace. Harvard University
James A. Donovan. Colonel, United States
Marine Corps (Ret.)
Paul Doty, Director. Program for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard University
Thomas Downey. Member, United States House
of Representatives
Sidney DreH. Deputy Director, Stanford Linear
Accelerator Center
TiUord E. Dudley, President, Property
Management and Maintenance
Charles Dyson, Chairman of the Board, Dyson
Kissner Corporation
Helen W Edey, M.D
Milton S. EiFenhower, President Emeritus, The
Johns Hopkins University
Abraham Femberg. Chairman Emeritus, The
Weinman Institute of Science
Bernard T- Feid, Professor of Physics.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Joseph Fiiner, President, Nobiemet International
Stanley Fine, Rear Admiral. United Stales Navy
(Ret }
Murray Finley. President, Amalgamated Clothing
and Textile Workers Union
David Fmn, Chairman of the Board. Ruder
& Finn
Douglas Fraser, President, United Auto,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America
John Kenneth Gaibranh, Profe*sor Emeritus,
Department of Economics, Harvard University
Edward Garvey. Executive Director, National
Football League Players Association
Robert W Gilmore. Vice Chairman, Narional
Committee on U.S. -China Relations
Ernest Gross. Attorney at Law
C. Jarrett Gray, President. Women's Division of
Global Ministries. United Methodist Church
Morton Halpenn. Director. Center for National
Security Studies
Armand Hammer, President, Occidental
Petroleum
T. Walter Hardy. Jr , Chaimian of the Board,
Hardy Salt Company
Tom Harkin, Member, United States House of
Representative*
SUPPORTERS*
James Herman. President, International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's U^ton
Beniamin L. Hooks. Executive Director. National
Association for the Advancement of Colored
People
Proctor W. Houghton. President, Houghton
Chemical Company
Most Reverend Raymond G- Honthausen,
Archbishop of Seattle
Henry George Jacobs, President. H.G. Jacobs
Foundation
Michael F Jacobson, Executive Director, Center
for Science in the Public Interest
Mildred Jeffrey, Former National Chair, National
Women's Political Caucus
Mark Kaplan, Attorney at Law
Donald M. Kendall, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, PepsiCo, Inc.
Henry Kendall, Founder, Union of Cor>cerned
Scientists
Isaac C. Kidd. Jr . Admiral, United States
Navy (Ret.)
George Kutiakowsky, Professor Ementus of
Chemistry. Harvard University; Former *
Presidential Science Advisor
Phihp M Klutznick. Senior Panner. Ktutrnick
Investments
Betty Goei? Lall. Associate Director, New Yorn
State School of Indusi'ia! and Labor Reiatic^s:
Oeltgate to United Nations Panel of Experts on
the Relationship between Disarmament and
International Security
Edward Lamb. Chairman of the Board, Lamb
Entc'orises. Inc.
Eugene Lang, Chairman, REFAC Technology
Development Corporation
John Marshall Lee, Vice Admira!. United States
Navy (Pet. I
C. Payne Lucas, Executive Director. Africare
Bishop James K. Maihewi. Washington D.C.
Area United Methodist Church
Robert Matteson. Former Director, Program
Planning Staff. United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency
Emil Mazey, Secretary-Treasurer, United Auto,
Ae'ospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America
Eugene J. McCarthy. Former United States
Senator
George C McGhee, Former Ambassador, Former
Under Sei.re'.dry of State for Political Affairs
Joyce D. Miller, President, Coalition of Labor
Union Women
Patsy Mink. President. Americans for Democratic
Action
Ins Mitgang. National Chair, National Women's
Political Caucus
Dsvid Mtxner. Mixner Scott Associates
L. Calvin Moore. Citizenship Legislative Director.
Oil, Chemital and Atomic Workers
Kenneth Montgomery, Attorney at Law
Edward P. Morgan. News Commentator
Hans J Morgenthau, Professor of Political
Science, New School of Social Research
Frank E. Moss, Former United Slates Senator
M, Stewart Mott, Ne« York, New York
Paul Newman Actor
Henry E, Niles. Chairman, Business Executives
Move for New National Priorities
Ara Ot^emal, Chairman SATRA Corporation
Wolfgang Panofsky, Director, Stanford Lmear
Accelerator Center
John Aristotle Phillips, Princeton Student who
designed his own bomb
Harvey Picker, Dean, School of International
Affairs. Columbia University
Rabbi Ely Pilchik. President. Central Conference
of American Rabbis
Jo Pomerance, Chairperson, Task Force for a
Nuclear Te^t Ban Treaty
Avery Post. President. United Church of Christ
Max Potash. President, Polyvinyl Chemical
Industries
Neal Potter. President, Montgomery County
Council (Maryland)
William Potter, Professor of Political Science
Tulane University
Bernard Rapoport, Chairman, American Income
Life Insurance Company
AMERICANS FOR SALT Gg>^^
Rudolph Rasin, President, The Rasin Corporation
Roger Raveile, Professor of Science and Public
Policy, University of Cahfornia, San Diego
Joseph Reber, President. The Reber Corporation
Charles Robinson, Chairman. Delaware Trust
Company
Robert V. Roosa. Former Under Secretary of
Treasury for Monetary Affairs
.James W. Rouse, Chairman of the Board, The
Rouse Company »
Ralph Rudd. Clark, Friends Committee on
National Legislation
Jack Rutna, Professor of Electrical Engineering.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Bruce Russeit. Professor of Political Science,
Yale University
John Ryor, Former President, National
Education Association
Stanley Salen. National Commission for Citizens
in Education
Francis B. Sayre, Jr., Associate Oirectoi, The
Wilson Center, Smithsonian inttilution
Rabbi Alexander Schindler, President, American
Hebrew Congregation
Lo'j'S Schneider, Executive Secretary, American
Friends Service Committee
Rabbi Arthur Schneier, Park East Synagogue
Patricia Schroeder, Member, Uniied States
House of Representatives
Herbert ScoviHe, Jr., Formei Deputy Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency
Peter Scott. Mixner Scott Associates
Glenn T. Seaborg, Former Chairman, Atomic
Energy Commisi.on
Jacob Sheinkman, Secretary-Treasurer,
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union
Sargent Shriver, Former Ambassador to France,
Former Director of the Peace Corps
J. David Singer, Mental Health Research Unit.
University of Michigan
C. Maxwell Stanley, Chairman of I'le Board,
Stanley Consultants, Inc.
Sol Stctin. Senior Executive Vice President,
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union
Philip Stewart, Professor of Political Science
Ohio State University
Robert Stuart. President, National Can
Corporation. Chairman of the Board, World
Federalists Association
Louis Susman. Attorney at Law
Stuart Symington, Former United States
Senator; Former Secretary of the Air Force
William Thompson, Stated C;erk of General
Assen-ibly, United f-reEbyte'ian Churches
Jarnes C. Thomson, Curator. Nieman Foundation
tor Journalism
John Toll. Chairman, Arms Reversal Program
John Topping. President, Ripon Society
Arnold E. True. Rear Admiral, United States
Navy (Ret.)
Kosta Tsipis. Research FeKow. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
Foy Valentine. Executive Secretary, Southern
Baptist Christian Life Commission
Nan Waterman. Chairperson, Common Cauae
Bernard S Weiss, Former Vice President.
Gimbel Brothers
Charles W. Whaien, Jr., Former Member, United
States House of Representatives
John H Whitaker. Senior Vice President,
Whitaker Cable Company
Jerome B. Wiesner, President, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; Former Presidential
Advisor
William Winpisinger. President, International
Association of Machinists
Emily Womach, Chair of the Board and
President, Women's National Bank
Jerry Wurf. President. American Federation of
Slate, County and Municipal Employees
William Wynn. President. Retail Clerks Iniernationat
Union
D. Robert Varnail, Jr . Chairman. Yarwey
Corporation
'Inclusion of the rwmet listed above does not necessarily indicate organizational endorsement.
'This is a paaial list.
97
DR. Kissinger's testimony on salt ii
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Yost, for a very clear
statement of your position. The 10 points to which you refer will be
incorporated in the record.
You refer to Mr. Kissinger and his statement of January 1977 in
which he said, I believe, that to achieve a usable superiority in
strategic nuclear weapons is extremely unlikely and relatively easy
to prevent, and the obsession with it distracts us. Have you read
Mr. Kissinger's more recent testimony on the SALT II Treaty?
Ambassador Yost. I have, indeed. And he referred, I noted, to a
statement somewhat similar to this which he had made in a press
conference, as he described it, in a moment of fatigue and exas-
peration. This particular statement, however, I don t believe was
made in any such context. It was made in a relaxed moment when
he was about to retire. And I have no reason to believe he would
have changed his mind in regard to the statement or that it is not
just as true now as it was then.
The Chairman. You believe that this statement has the candor
that we normally associate with a death statement; that is, he was
approaching the end of his tenure and could consider these matters
in a reflective and candid \yay? [Laughter.]
Ambassador Yost. I do think so. Senator. Actually, if one reads
the statements he made in the last month or two before he left
office, they were characterized by that frankness which I think
reflected exactly the state of mind you describe.
NUCLEAR superiority PROMOTES SOVIET ADVENTURISM
The Chairman. I found his argument unconvincing, that is the
argument that he made when he appeared before this committee
that nuclear superiority, whatever that may be, somehow creates
political advantages that can be used tactically in promoting Soviet
adventurism.
It seems to me that in the past, there is no evidence nor do I
recall that the Secretary was able to cite any evidence to support
that proposition. At times when we have had that nuclear superior-
ity, we have been faced with extreme Soviet adventurism, as in
Berlin and, indeed, in Cuba in 1962. And I hardly believe that the
Russians will withdraw from Angola, Ethiopia, or, indeed, from
Cuba where, we now know, they have deployed a combat brigade,
because of any belief that we will nuke them if they don't.
Ambassador Yost. I would quite agree. Senator. I think both
sides realize that the results of resorting to nuclear weapons would
rebound on them in such a devastating fashion that they are
extremely unlikely to use them. And since each side knows that
the other feels that way, nuclear blackmail is simply not convinc-
ing.
The Chairman. It is not convincing, and Secretary Kissinger did
not make it so in his testimony, at least not to me.
OVERKILL CAPACITY TO DESTROY
Would you agree that once the two countries have achieved that
degree of nuclear strength that both have overkill capacity to
destroy the other even after surviving an initial attack, that then
98
the further accumulation of these weapons becomes irrational,
wasteful and, indeed, can only increase the level of danger that
any nuclear war that might result from such gross miscalculation
or some tragic mistake would prove to be utterly devastating to
both civilizations?
Ambassador Yost. It certainly seems so to me. Nor do I think
that we can rely — if, for example, the treaty should not be ap-
proved— on the Soviets not continuing to match whatever we felt
we should spend on nuclear weapons. I noticed that one of the
witnesses this morning expressed the view that they would be
unlikely to do so, that they had reached the limit of their expendi-
tures.
Frankly, I think that is a rather naive point of view. I think they
have demonstrated over many years that at no matter what cost or
sacrifice, they will spend whatever they think is necessary to
match us.
MINORITY AWARENESS OF SALT II
The Chairman. Mrs. King, you spoke from the heart this after-
noon, and I have no question about your personal commitment to
the support of this treaty. What I would like to ask you is, to the
extent that you feel you can answer the question: Does the black
community in this country as a whole really care about SALT, or
does any other minority group, for that matter? Do you think that
there is an awareness of how SALT relates or could relate to these
other problems that you have mentioned, that is, the problems of
poverty, the problems of insufficient food, the problems of inad-
equate housing, that tend to plague so many of our black citizens?
Mrs. King. Yes, I think very definitely that the black community
is aware of this relationship. I think that that awareness was
created during the Vietnam war period when Martin Luther King,
Jr., tied that relationship between excessive spending on an ill-
fated, immoral war to the lack of resources for the disadvantaged
and deprived communities.
Also, the concern is that blacks have in the past been selected in
larger numbers to participate in combat when there was a war,
and we know what that means in terms of broken families and
lives that are destroyed and so on. So I think that the black
community is very much aware of what this could mean.
We are very concerned about the bread and butter issues. Most
black people feel that we can have both. There was a discussion
during the last Vietnam crisis, guns versus butter and so on. I
think black people want the Government to be prepared but they
do not feel that being prepared means neglecting those human
needs that are so vital to the survival of our culture and heritage
and our very being.
The Chairman. I wanted to make a comment on that particular
portion of your testimony because it seems to me a very poignant
example of how weak a given government can be despite the enor-
mity of the arms with which it surrounds itself. That is the recent
case of Iran.
There was certainly no insufficiency of weaponry to protect the
Shah and his regime; yet the lack of solidarity among his people,
the lack of support, rendered those forces impotent when the
99
people once took to the streets against him. And in the long run,
the strength of this country will depend in part upon its weapons
but far more fundamentally upon the cohesiveness of the American
people and their willingness to support the country in times of
danger and to fight for it.
That, in turn, as you have said, does not depend upon surround-
ing our cities with missiles if our cities are full of decadence and
decay and the needs of our people left unattended.
CONTRIBUTION SALT MAKES IN CONTROLLING NUCLEAR ARMS
Senator Mclntyre, I have just one question I would like to ad-
dress to you, and then I will turn to Senator Javits. I ask this
question because Senator McGovern is not here and he might not
return. It is a question I think he might want asked. He has often
brought up the point in the course of the hearings.
If this treaty depends on a cocommitment to a whole series of
new weapons systems such as the M-X missile, the cruise missile,
the Trident submarine, the others that have been urged upon us,
what contribution do you think the treaty makes to the ostensible
objective which it seeks to serve, namely, putting wraps on the
nuclear arms race?
We know that under the treaty, both sides can continue to add
thousands of nuclear warheads to their arsenals. And we are told
that we should ratify the treaty only if we also approve a very
expensive new commitment to the construction and deployment of
additional nuclear weapons systems not prohibited by the treaty.
So there are those, including Senator McGovern, who have asked
whether this is really an arms control treaty or an arms accelera-
tion treaty when viewed in that context.
Senator McIntyre. Mr. Chairman, I think it is regrettable, but it
is a matter of fact of life that the treaty is being subjected to all
forms of linkage. As I said in my statement, I believe the treaty
puts on a cap, some limitations on the Soviet threat. The treaty
continues the SALT process, which hopefully will begin to bring
the levels further down in SALT III and SALT IV.
We do have to recognize, what I know we saw in the R. & D.
subcommittee 6 or 7 years ago, what we considered to be quantum
leaps in the research and development that the Soviets were sup-
porting compared to which had previously been more or less incre-
mental.
So we have to turn our attention to the fact that our land-based
missiles may very well be in jeopardy by the mideighties.
Now, I don't suppose you recall, Mr. Chairman, but when the
M-X was first broached, it had a $20 to $50 billion price tag, and the
Air Force could not tell your Armed Services Committee how they
were going to do it. I believe I went to the floor and spoke against
the M-X system as being premature. As history shows, the Navy
was wrong to go too fast on the Trident.
But now I do think we are ready to move out with a solution. So
if an M-X system can be put together that will insure that the
land-based missiles will not be at risk in the mideighties, then I
would be for it.
So I regret, too, that this treaty did not do all we wanted it to do.
I regret that the turndown is not more significant. Yet, you want
100
to cite one thing, the Russians are bound to do something under
this treaty. It may be singular, to demolish and destroy some 250 of
their missile launchers.
Now, you can say they are obsolete launchers, but they are as
good as the ones we have on our Minuteman 11. We know the
Soviets are aggressive. They are adventuresome, and nothing will
change them.
If we do not pass this treaty, it is not going to make them worse
or better. If we pass the treaty, it is not going to make them any
different.
As a young man in World War II, I ended up in Czechoslovakia
in the Army of Occupation, in Strakonice, Czechoslovakia. I will
never forget it. We were along side the Russians, and the Russians
were as aggressive as any people I have ever met in my life.
Their soldiers thought nothing of trying to steal our Jeeps, and
the only Vvay you could get it through their head that they were
not to take the Jeep was to take your 45 and put it in their face.
We are dealing with a difficult people. But we must try to
understand them. We must realize that the SALT process is so
important, because, as Ccretta King has said, and I have heard
scenarios as you have of nuclear exchanges, it is just insanity.
So I say yes, we must continue to improve our nilitary system to
be sure to balance, to maintain the essential equivalence and to
continue to strive so that the SALT process will eventually turn
this arms race around.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Javits.
Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to join the Chair in welcoming the witnesses.
It is a great service you have produced for the committee today,
and I am very happy to see you going out and answering many of
the questions that many people in the communities ask. You have
great talent. It is a good thing.
We had this morning a very powerful aggregation of organiza-
tions on the other side. That is good, too. It puts us to our proof to
argue with them. But I am glad to see that there is an effective
committee on the pro side.
UNITED STATES SEIZED BY STATE OF EUPHORIA AFTER SALT I
I have one question to ask of you, Senator. We served together.
Retired admirals and generals testified this morning. They say that
in the 5 years after SALT I was ratified, the United States was
seized by a euphoria that disarmament was at hand.
We were sold on the idea of overkill without taking account of
the fact that in the meantime, counterforce had perhaps overtaken
that concept; that, therefore, we allowed the Soviet Union to race
way ahead of us until today we don't have superiority, and even
the doctrine of equivalence has now been, they think, seriously
jeopardized.
Now, from your own experience, would you be kind enough to
make any comment that you wish?
Senator McIntyre. Senator, I have great respect for our retired
military and great respect for the military people I had the oppor-
tunity to work with while in the Senate. I once decided that the
101
difficulty with the admirals of the ocean and sea when they
became Chief of Naval Operations is that they wanted every ship
they could get.
I thought it was our job to try to test their requests in the
Yankee sane way. So I believe that our retired military and other
distinguished people who may have testified this morning — and I
didn't hear their testimony — can recount all our past mistakes, but
when they tell you that the Russians are far superior, I disagree.
We have a new Trident submarine about to go in. We are putting
in F-14's to replace the F-4's that were so successful. We have
more things going for us. I have been constantly amazed with our
technology and with the creativity of our experts. So I don't say we
are second at all. I think we are in a period of essential equiv-
alence.
I deplore the tactics of the people who are against this treaty. It
is so easy to be against, picking away and trying to say that
mistakes have been made in the past when they probably contrib-
uted to those mistakes.
UNITED STATES AT MERCY OF SOVIET BLACKMAIL BY 1985
Senator Javits. The argument is also made by the same wit-
nesses that they believe that a euphoria could seize us again after
we sign SALT II and that we will slip even further behind, so that
by 1985, at the expiration of the treaty period, we will be complete-
ly at the mercy of whatever the Soviets want to do through nuclear
blackmail.
Senator McIntyre. Let me say here, and then I will quit on this,
the question of what we are going to construct and build for our
defense is one that should be taken by itself and not in conjunction
with this important treaty. We should be able to decide in our own
minds, and in your debates on the floor of the Senate and in the
committees, with the help of our military, whether there are gaps
we should close and whether there are weaknesses we should over-
come. These issues should stand by themselves, our Armed Forces
and our defense system. The treaty, which I believe is a step
toward what we all want, sanity and peace, should be judged on its
own.
Senator Javits. So you would not subscribe to Dr. Kissinger's
proposition either, would you, that when you sign this treaty, you
have to have a flat commitment of x dollars or x programs, or
whatever else you have to promise in order to guarantee in ad-
vance?
Senator McIntyre. No. I do not subscribe to the theory of tran-
quilizers. I think we can in our own House, Senate, and administra-
tion decide what we need to close any gap. We have the technology
to do it and more.
Senator Javits. And that this is a democratic country, Senator,
and that that is the way it is done, not by generals writing condi-
tions.
Senator McIntyre. Right.
Senator Javits. Now, I had the great privilege of serving with
Ambassador Yost in the United Nations in 1970. I have very high
regard for him. I have read your 10 points, by the way, and I
102
believe they are excellent. I wish you had read them to us. They
could very well be a syllabus for the debate on this treaty.
Ambassador Yost. Thank you, Senator.
UNITED STATES WILLPOWER TO USE TRIAD
Senator Javits. I would like to call one thing to your attention.
It is a very important point which I will be raising time and again.
We have a Triad. That is our defense. The Soviet Union, in effect,
has a unitary system, to wit, land-based missiles.
The rest of it is coming aboard, the Navy SLBM's, et cetera, but
they hardly pretend that it represents a major part of their offen-
sive nuclear capability.
Now, all the witnesses are arguing as if we had nothing but land-
based missiles, as if we had no SLBM's and no bombers. They are
just disregarding them, pushing it out of the window. And yet we
have spent billions on these programs.
The Secretary of Defense testified here that these legs of the
Triad are critical to us, that they are a significant part of our
counterforce capability certainly for the next 5 years until we get
the M-X missile.
Now, I notice that you say: "As long as we maintain other
invulnerable systems such as our strategic submarines, the Soviets
will not be fools enough to risk destruction of most of their cities
and industries by attacking us." Well, if you listen to Dr. Kissinger,
Ambassador Yost, you would not believe that.
He says no President of the United States will dare to use them
when the showdown comes.
Now, you have been our representative at the United Nations
and this is your paper. What do you say about that?
Ambassador Yost. Senator, I have heard that argument not only
from Dr. Kissinger but from many others, and it has never seemed
to me convincing. After all, why did we build a Triad if we didn't
intend to use it? The purpose, of course, is deterrence. And to
simply assume that if one element of the Triad is outmoded or for
any reason is unusable, that we are going to throw up our hands
and abandon the other two seems to me to run counter to the
entire purpose of our defense programs for the last 30 years.
So I would entirely agree with you that we do have other ele-
ments of our Triad, unlike the Soviets, who rely almost entirely on
their land-based missiles, and we are in the process of reinforcing
the sea-based missiles and we are about to go in for air-launched
cruise missiles.
So I would say that regardless of whether or not our land-based
missiles become vulnerable, that we are in a very safe, secure
situation.
Senator Javits. We should not duplicate everything the Russians
do man-for-man, tank-for-tank, plane-for-plane, missile-for-missile.
On the contrary. I am a tennis player. I know the surest way to
lose is to play the other fellow's game.
justification for advocacy of salt
Mrs. King, I have just one question of you. I am delighted that
you are with us.
103
This is a very rough game for poor people. A huge part of our
budget is going for defense with more in the mill. So much going
for military spending is pretty sad stuff, and more will go, I regret
to tell you. Under those circumstances, how do you justify, in the
interests of the poor, your advocacy of SALT?
It certainly maintains the level of roughly present expenditures
and may involve us in more. Can we explain to the poor — and you
are one of the most eloquent exponents — that without this treaty,
if we do turn it down, the desperate of our country could be very
much worse off than they are today?
Mrs. King. I think, as difficult as it is to explain to people who
are struggling with the necessities of life that the alternative is
Senator Javits. Worse.
Mrs. King. Total destruction, almost, we have to try to do that.
In some of my lecturing in talking to college students who are very
idealistic, I have had to try to answer some of these questions. And
I am a practical idealist, you know. I dream of a day when we
actually will have a disarmed world, you know.
I share the views that my husband had that we have to move
toward that time. But I realize that we are not nearly there and we
have a long, long way to go. And as long as there are the realities
of being destroyed by other nations, responsible people in govern-
ment must make preparation.
So I have said as far as I am concerned I do believe in disarma-
ment. I am a nonviolent person. I believe that ultimately we have
to disarm the whole world. But I can only say to people that I talk
to that it is very unrealistic to think, even to equate not spending a
certain amount for defense in the real world we live in, and to use
the argument that we must take away from the preparedness in
case there is a war, that we must take away from that and use that
money for the resources to feed the poor.
The poor must be fed. We must do that. But to use that as an
argument and say that, there are some people who feel that some-
how there is no justification for spending the enormous amount for
our military defense and spending so little for the human needs.
I subscribe to that, too, but I am realistic enough to know that
our Government is not going to do that at this time. Until we can
somehow sit down together and work these things out between the
Russians and ourselves, we have to somehow destroy the feeling of
fear, eliminate the feeling of fear within people.
As my colleague has said here, it is a process. We have to start
this process, and I think this is the beginning. We are a long way
from having the answer, but I feel it is important for me to be here
to say something in support of this treaty because without this, I
fear what the alternative will be for all of us.
Senator Javits. I can assure you, Mrs. King, without it there will
be no limit whatever on the stakes of the game.
Mrs. King. Yes.
Senator Javits. Therefore, any limit is better for the poor who
are bound to get the worst chewed up in a war.
Mrs. King. Right.
Senator Javits. So, the most we can do is limit the stakes and
cut down the possibilities.
Thank you.
104
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Javits.
When I asked Senator McGovern's question, I didn't know he
was going to return in time to ask it himself. So he will now ask
the questions I had intended to put to you. [Laughter.]
Senator McGovern. You probably did a better job with it than I
would have, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to observe that we have three unusually thoughtful
and qualified witnesses here today in Ambassador Yost, Mrs. King
and our colleague. Senator Mclntyre. I wanted to ask a couple of
general questions.
OVERALL STANCE OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
I would like to begin with you, Mr. Yost, if I may.
Last spring, Richard Barnett wrote an article in the Foreign
Affairs Quarterly in which he pleaded for a more comprehensive
approach to the Soviet Union. He makes this observation in the
opening paragraph of the article.
He observes that the strategic arms limitation negotiations in
Geneva and Moscow have been exhausting, and the arguments
over ratification in Washington promise to be embittering. The
process has not led to an improved international climate. Indeed, a
strong case can be made that in the last few years, the SALT
negotiations have exacerbated tensions between the two superpow-
ers.
Do you feel that through the whole SALT process — and this
article was written 4 or 5 months ago and we have now had the
experience for several weeks of the ratification process — we are
improving our overall stance and our relationships with the Soviet
Union, the relationship between the so-called superpowers, or are
they being exacerbated.
Ambassador Yost. No, Senator, I don't agree that without the
SALT negotiation, the SALT process over the past few years, our
relations with the Soviet Union would have been better. I think
they would have been decidedly worse. With all the other differ-
ences of opinion and conflicts that we have with the Soviets, at
least the SALT process, although in my opinion it moved much too
slowly, requiring 7 years, nevertheless was an anchor and it did
serve as one common objective that we were both agreed on pursu-
ing.
And while, of course, there was sharp argument about some
elements in it, on the whole it served to keep us from drifting
further apart. It is, after all, the knowledge of the two governments
that their peoples are hostage to each other, that either can de-
stroy the other, that provides some limits on the ambitions or
adventurism that might otherwise be shown.
And the fact that both are engaging and have been willing to
engage now for 10 years in this process of trying gradually to n.ove
toward some more stable situation is a positive factor that has
improved relations.
I am confident that had that process not existed, or if it should
now end, our relations would be infinitely worse and, as Senator
Javits has just said, both sides would be spending far more on
armaments than they have been.
105
Senator McGovern. Well, I am inclined to agree with what you
have said, that the effort has been worthwhile. However it has also
been frustrating. It is one process that will help remove some of
the ambiguity between the two superpowers. How much it will do
in the way of actual arms limitation, to say nothing of arms
reduction, I am not at all clear on. But I do think it helps remove
some of the elements of confusion and ambiguity between the great
powers and in that sense is important.
All three of you now have argued, I take it, that it is in the
interest of the United States that this agreement be ratified. Is
that correct?
[Mrs. King nods affirmatively.]
[Senator Mclntyre nods affirmatively.]
[Ambassador Yost nods affirmatively.]
LINKAGE TO OTHER ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
Senator McGovern. If that is true, it seems to me, then, that we
ought not surrender that interest. If it is in the U.S. interest to
ratify this treaty, we ought not surrender that because we are
peeved or concerned or alarmed by developments in some other
aspect of the Soviet-American relationship. Would you agree with
that?
Ambassador Yost. Yes, I would. It has been my experience over
the last 30 years that clashes between us and the Soviet Union in
many parts of the world are simply bound to occur. As regrettable
as they are, they are, I am afraid, unavoidable in the present
climate.
I feel that if we should, whenever there is a clash of this kind,
suspend the arms control process, it would aggravate rather than
improve the situation.
Senator McGovern. I don't think there is any doubt about the
judgment of some of the Senators who have said that the presence
of the Soviet forces in Cuba is going to make it harder to ratify this
treaty. On the other hand, in terms of logical thinking about what
is in the interest of the United States, it does seem peculiar that
we would punish ourselves by denying ourselves this treaty be-
cause we are unhappy about something else the Soviets do.
If the treaty is in our interest, how does it serve the U.S. interest
then to reject it because we are unhappy about something that has
taken place elsewhere in the world? That is to inflict punishment
on ourselves, is it not?
Ambassador Yost. I would feel so. Senator. I feel, for the reasons
I stated in those 10 points, that the treaty is very definitely in our
security interests and that it should stand on its own feet. The
Soviets are doing a great many things in many parts of the world
of which I strongly disapprove.
Nevertheless, I continue to think that it is in our interest to
make this particular agreement with them and ratify it.
Senator McGovern. I do think it is important for us to empha-
size that this treaty is not a reward for Soviet good behavior, and
rejecting the treaty is not a logical form of punishment for Soviet
misbehavior.
If you are going to accept the proposition that this treaty helps
the United States, it seems to me that the so-called linkage argu-
106
ment on how we are going to use our support or withdrawing our
support from the treaty to regulate the Soviets elsewhere around
the world does not carry much weight.
Ambassador Yost. I agree.
Senator McGovern. My time is just about up but I just want to
underscore again here what Mrs. King and Senator Mclntyre and
you have said, Ambassador Yost. I think there are sources of
American strength that are very important for us to use around
the world. But the one area where we do not have a clear advan-
tage over the Soviet Union is in the military field.
There are a good many other fields where we do: the field of
economics, the field of human rights, and in our ability to use
intelligent diplomacy. Those are the areas where I would hope
more of the competition would be directed rather than keeping so
much of it focused on the military struggle.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator McGovern.
Senator Hayakawa.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start by saying to you. Senator Mclntyre, it is a pleasure
to see you again. Let me also welcome Mrs. King and Ambassador
Yost.
I would like to ask Ambassador Yost something, to start with. He
just said the Soviets are doing many things in many parts of the
world of which you profoundly disapprove. Ambassador Yost.
Ambassador Yost. [Nods affirmatively.]
ANTICIPATED SOVIET BEHAVIOR AFTER SALT II
Senator Hayakawa. What bothers me is so many of the things of
which you disapprove — and I am sure you and I agree on what we
disapprove of, Soviet adventurism in Angola, Ethiopia, South
Yemen, weapons and military advisers to 40 or more African na-
tions, stirring things up in the Middle East, Latin America and so
on — so many of these things happened after the signing of SALT L
What is going to happen after the signing of SALT II?
It seems as if SALT I gave them the assurance that they could go
ahead with these things.
Ambassador Yost. Well, Senator, I would not be inclined to
associate those two elements so closely. I would think that we
should combat those particular examples of Soviet adventurism
which you have cited and that we should find appropriate means of
doing so. It differs in each case, of course. There is no across-the-
board solution.
I personally would like to see the United Nations used a good
deal more than it is in dealing with some of those problems you
mentioned. But I do not think that it would be either desirable or
effective to try to link all of them with the SALT Treaty or the
SALT process.
As I mentioned earlier, I am sure, since incidents of this kind are
bound to keep occurring, that would be the end of any arms control
negotiation because they will keep occurring.
If, for example, the treaty should be rejected or indefinitely
delayed, I don't think it would improve Soviet behavior one iota.
They would go right on doing, in Angola or wherever else, exactly
107
what they have been doing. In fact, they might behave a little
worse because this one element of restraint, their expectation and
desire to have an arms control agreement with us, would be elimi-
nated.
So, while I agree with what Senator McGovern has said, that
there is an obvious political connection which affects American
public opinion necessarily, I do think that we should try to sepa-
rate these issues to the extent that we can because in our view the
SALT Treaty is so much in our security interest that it would be
very foolish indeed to throw it away in the hope that it might
make the Soviets behave better in Angola, Cuba or wherever,
because I don't think that they would.
SALT I NOT TIED TO ADVENTURISM
Senator Hayakawa. Your reply essentially, then, is that the
signing of SALT I is not to be connected with the adventurism.
Ambassador Yost. I don't think it made any difference in their
behavior in the past.
SALT II MAY DIMINISH ADVENTURISM
Senator Hayakawa. Are you not also saying the signing of SALT
II may diminish that adventurism in the future?
Ambassador Yost. I think the whole SALT process, as long as it
goes on, not simply the fact that we have signed and ratified SALT
II but that we have immediately, as the statement of principles in
SALT II provides, started the negotiation of SALT III, will have
some moderating effect on their behavior. It certainly will not stop
all the behavior of which we disapprove, but it will, in my opinion,
be less serious, less troublesome than if there were no SALT proc-
ess.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
EFFECT OF CUBAN PROBLEM ON SALT POSITION
The next question I would like to ask, and I address it to all
three of you and any one of you is free to answer it in any way you
like, is: Does the revelation of the existence of a Soviet combat
brigade in Cuba influence in any way your position on SALT II?
That is, not only on the treaty itself but our approach to its
ratification.
Ambassador Yost. Should I say a few words and see if my
colleagues want to?
Senator Hayakawa. Go ahead.
Ambassador Yost. No, Senator, I think not, for the reasons I
have just cited. I think SALT II is in our interest; that we will be
more secure with it than without it; that their arms would be
restrained in ways they would not be without the treaty, and
therefore, we should go ahead and pin down that treaty while we
can.
I dislike seeing Soviet troops in Cuba. I hope we can find other
ways of dealing with that and eliminating that situation. I don't
think there is anything that we need to be panicky about. After all,
we are a considerable power, and 3,000 troops there, while unpleas-
ant, is obviously not going to undermine our national security.
1+8-260 0-79 Pt.4 -
108
That does not mean I think we should ignore it. I think we
should pursue with the Soviets through other means the elimina-
tion of that situation. But I don't think that we should throw away
the benefits I think the SALT Treaty would bring us.
Senator McIntyre. Well, Senator, I always wonder why we are
always surprised. There should be no surprise involved in this
matter. But I would say, and I must say this, too, that you gentle-
men have had the benefit now of yesterday's hearings from which
you have the up-to-the minute information. And I don't have this.
I would say, depending on the nature of those troops and the
amount of them and the possibility of bases being constructed, that
I would want them out of there. And I would also want SALT IL
You see, the reason I want SALT II is so that we can know what
they, our Russian adversaries, are up to.
Mr. Chairman, you must have known that there were Russians
in Cuba before it appeared the other day. I don't know what you
found out yesterday, but let's get them out of there. But let's also
get SALT II.
The Chairman. Senator, I knew there were Russian military
personnel in Cuba engaged in training activities and also certain
communications activities, but not until last week did I know that
there was a Russian combat unit there.
I wish we lived in a world of perfect logic. I have been saying
from the beginning that this treaty should be dealt with on its
merits. I continue to hope that it will be dealt with on its merits.
But I could not truthfully say that the development, the confirma-
tion of the existence of a combat brigade of Russian troops in Cuba
that were placed there secretly, does not have a chilling effect in
the Senate.
You know as a former Senator that it would have such an effect.
Senator McIntyre. As one who knows what that means on the
street corners of Boise
The Chairman. Yes, and throughout the country. I also think
that unless this matter is satisfactorily resolved, I would be mis-
leading you and misleading the country to say that I believe the
Senate would be prepared to ratify the treaty.
It is one thing for the Cubans to move into Angola and Ethiopia,
which has never exercised me very much because I think in the
end it is going to be for the Africans to solve; but it is another
thing to move a combat unit secretly to within 90 miles of our
shores. I think that the Senate is bound to view the two together.
That is just a simple statement of fact, the facts with which we
live.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.
The Chairman. We do have a vote, I might say. The Senators
might want to go vote and come back so that we don't have an
interruption.
Senator Biden. I apologize to the witnesses for not having heard
their testimony, but I have had an opportunity to read the testi-
mony.
109
SOVIETS NOT MILITARILY SUPERIOR TO UNITED STATES
I would like to say one thing which contradicts something that
seems to be gaining some credibility around here. I, for one, do not
believe the Soviets are militarily superior to the United States of
America. None of the witnesses have said that but we have been,
in effect, for the last several weeks talking as if that is true. It is
not true.
We have to look at military posture not just in terms of strategic
capability and conventional capability, but geographic location, po-
tential enemies, reliability of allies and a whole range of other
questions. I don't think there is a military man in this country who
would trade places with the Soviet Union given the entire range of
things they would have to trade if we were in a fighting situation.
But I want to say that for the record because it was mentioned
again here. I don't think George meant much beyond what he said.
He talked about Soviet equality in the military field and the need
to emphasize the other areas. I don't even concede that, if you take
the entire spectrum of military considerations, the Soviets are
superior.
I wonder what would happen. I wonder what Senator Hayakawa
and Senator Garn and others are going to say if, in fact, the
administration is able to, by whatever means would be employed,
force this brigade out of Cuba? If the administration forces the
brigade out of Cuba, does that say that we should have SALT? I
assume that that is what it means.
I assume it means that if they say they cannot have SALT with
the brigade in Cuba because it somehow shows how weak we are,
that if, in fact, the brigade is forced to leave, I assume they will be
prepared to point out how strong we are and why then it would be
useful to have SA.LT.
I am, as you might guess, prepared to make that argument if and
when the brigade leaves.
SALT DISCUSSED IN VACUUM
I would like to compliment you, Mrs. King, on bringing into
focus what often is not focused on here. We tend to become, as
Senator Church says, nuclear theologians when we discuss SALT.
And we discuss it not only in a vacuum in the military — that is, we
discuss strategic and not conventional — but we also discuss it
within a vacuum of what is happening in the rest of the world and
the rest of our economy.
And your point about inflation and unemployment being by-
products of the failure to have a SALT agreement is one which
should be reiterated time and again. It is not in and of itself reason
to vote for SALT if SALT were not a good agreement, if it injured
our security. But if it is at a minimum an even call, even if it is
close, those two factors play very heavily. I would like to compli-
ment you on bringing them out.
And Senator Mclntyre, as usual you have put your finger right
on the thrust of why we need SALT from a security standpoint.
You point out in your statement that there are several reasons but
two main reasons. One, failure to have SALT diminishes our capa-
bility of monitoring and controlling Soviet threat. And second, with
no
the SALT agreement it allows us to do the things we have to do
anyway if we decide we must do them and moves forward in
continuing the process.
But you again don't argue it, as I read your statement, from a
position of anything other than U.S. security. U.S. military security
is enhanced.
The reason why I am not asking any questions is I agree with
what you all say. And I would just like to compliment each of you
on the way in which you have approached it. You seem to have
covered all of the basics.
Ambassador Yost, you point out in your statement that there are
differences between us and the Soviets. They are always going to
be there and we should not reject something just because we have
differences in other areas. I guess I have no desire to be conten-
tious after the testimony I heard this morning from the anti-SALT
people, but I am going to have to go vote.
I would like to compliment you all once again for putting the
issue into what I believe is a proper perspective. I am very anxious
to see, if the administration is successful in moving the troops out
of Cuba, whether or not there will be the same rallying point,
whether or not we will refer to Carter's moving the troops out of
Cuba in the same way we refer to, throughout these hearings, the
Kennedy blockade of Cuba, that we could do it then because we
were strategically stronger and we can't do it now if it were to
occur again.
Well, the opponents of SALT have made it sound like it has
occurred again. It has not. They make it sound like it has. And I
would be very anxious to see what they have to say.
Senator Sarbanes would like to question you all. I imagine he is
on his way back. And I will be back also. I must leave now. Besides,
if I didn't come back, with the Cardinal about to testify, I wouldn't
be allowed back into Philadelphia anyway. So I will be back short-
Thank you very much.
If we could recess for 5 minutes to give Senator Sarbanes time to
come back. I apologize for having to do this.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Ambassador Yost. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. King had to leave. She
asked me to apologize to you.
The Chairman. All right. Thank you.
Our next member to question is Senator Muskie.
Senator Muskie. I apologize for not being here when you read
your opening statements, but I have read them all and I have
listened to my colleagues in their question period. It gives me a lot
of reading time as they all tend to use their 10 minutes, which I
think is very useful, and the questions have been good. I really
have nothing to add to them.
I particularly liked Senator Mclntyre's testimony in which he
emphasized two points which tend to get overlooked in the debate
over the details of the treaties and the details of asymmetrical
defense postures in the two countries.
The first is that the Soviets without the treaty would really be
less restrained with respect to future defense spending and arms
Ill
buildup than they would be with the treaty. That point, I think,
needs to be emphasized over and over again. The treaty itself is not
likely to be either the cause or the contributing factor to future
Soviet buildup except to the effect that it restrains their potential.
Without the treaty, their potential is enhanced.
NO UMITATIONS ON U.S. OPTIONS
On the other side of that coin, insofar as I know, based upon the
testimony I have heard, U.S. options for defense buildup, including
strategic nuclear weapons, are not limited in any way that we are
now considering. Am I correct in that. Senator Mclntyre?
Senator McIntyre. That is essentially correct, yes.
Senator Muskie. So the net effect of the treaty from that point of
view is that the Soviets are restrained with respect to options they
would clearly exercise. We are not restrained with respect to op-
tions we are considering with or without the treaty.
Senator McIntyre. The opponents would clearly say we are re-
straining ourselves on our GLCM's and our SLCM's, submarine-
launched cruise missiles and the ground-launched cruise missiles.
But the answer to that, of course, is that these provisions are in
the protocol and do not restrict us in any practical way. We cannot
deploy these systems before the protocol expires. Moreover, there
was no restraint there, really, on our development or testing.
Senator Muskie. And with respect to Ambassador Yost, I did find
your ten points very useful. I think they are an excellent basis on
which to rationalize for the average citizen the pros and cons from
the national interest point.
Ambassador Yost. Thank you, sir.
Senator Muskie. And I think that must be done.
Finally, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, it is very useful to
bring into these hearings, with the exception of Senator McIntyre
and Ambassador Yost, perhaps, the average citizen's perspective on
these treaties and to emphasize the values and concerns the aver-
age citizen ought to be raising as he or she evaluates the national
interest as represented by these treaties.
I think that is terribly important. The polls continue to point out
that citizens are for arms control. Yet we have witnesses day after
day, technicians, experts getting into the details of the treaty and
tending to overlook or to overshadow or to put into a dim light the
fundamental reasons why arms control is important.
Mrs. King's testim.ony highlighted that point. I remember dis-
cussing that particular point with Mr. Kosygin in Moscow in 1971,
and clearly, we both were influenced by that perspective, the fact
that the resources of this world were being drained away from the
human needs of this planet's occupants to fuel an arms race which
at that time, I think, cost about $200 billion a year. Now Mrs. King
uses the figure $400 billion.
The figure changes upward so rapidly it is difficult to stay on top
of the latest statistic. But that kind of spending on arms, $400
billion, obviously dilutes the capacity of the world's governments or
the will of the world's governments to deal with the problems of
the disadvantaged. And the problems of the disadvantaged underlie
most of the tensions and confrontations upon the face of this globe.
112
Were it not for the problems of the disadvantaged, those who
seek power would not find power so easily attainable as they now
find it. And I think it is those kinds of fundamental concerns that
ought to be highlighted as often as possible in these hearings and
in the public debate over these treaties. There are risks to moving
in the direction of peace. There are incomparably greater risks for
moving in the direction of war.
I know that oversimplifies the situation but I find some of the
experts oversimplifying, too, and occasionally their oversimplifying
ought to be set off against the oversimplification of human beings
interested in simply surviving, getting enough to eat and a decent
environment in which to raise families and to look forward to a
better future.
So I am delighted, Mr. Chairman, that this kind of testimony is
now entering the hearings, and I appreciate the testimony we
received.
I have no further questions. I think the appropriate questions
have been asked and, I think, well answered.
Senator McIntyre. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator McIntyre.
Senator McIntrye. May I request two charts, "Potential Soviet
Strategic Threat in 1985, With or Without SALT," and "U.S. Free-
dom to Develop Strategic Strength Under SALT II," be included in
the record.
The Chairman. Very well. The data will be included in the
record as you have requested.
[The information referred to follows:]
113
i/ai.i_J:REEDOM_TO DrvFLOP Strategic Strfnbth
Undfr salt II
(supplied by Senator Thomas Mclntyrel
SALT
Permits
n SALT
Prohibits
U.S.
Strategic
Forces
At Sea
Trident I Missile
@
Trident II Missile
$
Poseidon Missile Improvements
0
Trident Submarine
0
Advanced Small Strategic Submarine
1
Submarine Survivability — Quietness
§
SALT
Permits
n SALT
Prohibits
U.S.
Strategic
Forces
ON
Land
Air-Launched Cruise Missile —Range
•
Air-Launched Cruise Missile ~
PFNFTRATinN
f
Advanced Strategic Air-Launched
MrssTi F
- 1
•
B-52 Conversion to Cruise Missile
r.ARRTFR
•
Advanced Cruise Missile Carrier
•
B-1
•
Advanced Penetrating Bomber
1
Improved FB-111
•
B-52 Improvements
1
114
U.S. Freedom to Drvelop Strategic Strength
„SALT SALT
Permits Prohibits
U.S.
Strategic
Forces
ON
Land
H-X Missile
•
Minuteman III Missile — Improved
Yield
1
Minuteman UI Missile — Fractiona-
CV..j^ ^«*i^-^ ^ "71.-*// V.th TION
•
Minuteman II — Replacements
•
SuRvivABLE Basing — M-X
•
SuRvivABLE Basing —Minuteman
•
Missile Penetration Aids
•
SALT
Permits
n SALT
Prohibits
U.S.
Theatre
Nuclear
Forces
Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
•
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
•
Mobile Medium- range Ballistic
Missile
1
. determined at hearings of Senate Armed Services
Committee, Juiy /5, 1979.
115
POTENTIAL SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT IN 1985
— With and Without SALT ~
[supplied by Senator Thomas Mclntyrel
With SALT Without SALT
Soviet Strategic Missile & Bombers
2250*
3000**
Soviet MIRVed Strategic Missiles
1200*
1800**
Soviet MIRVed Land-based Strategic
Missiles
820*
1300***
Soviet Silo- killer Warheads
6000***
10,000-15.000*^
Soviet Total Strategic Warheads & Bombs
9500***
13.000-18.000*'
From Treaty
Secretary Brown's Statement to the Senate
Armed Services Committee. July 23. 19/9
Determined in Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing. July 2.). 1979. during questioning of
Secretary Brown and Undersecretary Perry
116
Senator Mclntyre and Ambassador Yost, thank you very much
for your testimony. The committee is in your debt.
John Cardinal Krol, the Archbishop of Philadelphia; the Cardi-
nal will appear on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference.
Cardinal Krol, we are grateful to you to come to appear as a
witness today, and I would invite you to proceed with your testimo-
ny as you see fit.
STATEMENT OF JOHN CARDINAL KROL, ARCHDIOCESE OF
PHILADELPHIA, ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. CATHOLIC CONFER-
ENCE, WASHINGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY THE REVEREND
J. BRYAN HEHIR AND EDWARD DOHERTY »
Cardinal Krol. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, as indicated, I am
John Cardinal Krol, Archbishop of Philadelphia. I speak on behalf
of the U.S. Catholic Conference [U.S.C.C] comprising over 350 bish-
ops in the United States, serving more than 50 million Catholics.
Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request that my full written testi-
mony be submitted for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, your prepared statement will
be inserted in the record at the appropriate point.
Cardinal Krol. I am accompanied by Father Bryan Hehir, the
one with the Roman collar on my right; Mr. Edward Doherty, on
my left, both from the U.S.C.C.
I will confine my remarks to a summary of the complete testimo-
ny. At the outset, I express the very sincere gratitude of the
Bishops of the U.S. Catholic Conference for the opportunity to
present their views on the moral dimensions of the nuclear arms
race. My testimony, the testimony which I submit, is divided into
three sections. The first section focuses your attention on the moral
and religious principles which are applicable. The second section
focuses these and applies these principles to certain aspects of the
current debate on the SALT II Treaty, and a third section directs
your attention to the future beyond SALT II.
Now, the first section, the moral principles underlying my testi-
mony have been enunciated in papal declarations and in the docu-
ments of the Second Vatican Council. In these statements, the
arms race is condemned as a plague on the human race, a radically
defective way of maintaining the peace, and an aggression against
the poor of this country and of the world.
The imperative of our age is that all must work to put an end to
the arms race and make a real beginning of disarmament, not
unilaterally, indeed, but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis
of agreements and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees.
These principles are the authentic position of the Catholic Church
and of faithful Catholics.
However, the application of these principles to a particular pro-
posal such as the SALT II Treaty admits of a divergence of views.
Accordingly, the position I present today, while based on generally
accepted principles, is not necessarily a unanimous position among
the bishops, nor does it represent all the Catholics in the United
States. It is, however, the official position of the U.S. Bishops
Conference as adopted by its administrative board. In offering this
' See page 127 for Cardinal Krol's prepared statement.
117
testimony, the bishops seek to fulfill a dual role of responsible
citizenship and religious leadership. That dual role requires that
we speak the truth plainly.
The Catholic bishops of this country believe that for too long we
Americans have been preoccupied with preparations for war. Too
long have we been guided by the false criterion of equivalence or
superiority of armaments. Too long have we allowed other nations
virtually to dictate, albeit obliquely and indirectly, how much we
should spend on stockpiling weapons of destruction.
Is it not time to give priority to steps towards peace, to move
toward it through gradual, bilateral, negotiated disarmament?
I am here, Mr. Chairman, to support ratification of the SALT II
Treaty as a partial and very limited step in the process of halting
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and moving toward real re-
ductions. The support for ratification is severely qualified because
of the moral principles which govern our view of arms control. The
massive complexity of the nuclear arms race is something which
diplomats and analysts grapple with daily. We respect that techni-
cal complexity. We have tried to study and to assimilate it in this
testimony.
For the church, however, the nuclear arms race is principally
defined, as Mrs. King had said, in religious and moral categories
since war in any form raises the question of human rights and
human life.
In a nuclear age, the moral imperative to prevent war has taken
on a qualitatively new character. From Pius XII to John Paul II,
the moral teaching is unequivocal: The nuclear arms race is unre-
servedly condemned, while the process of arms control and disarm-
ament is urgently commended.
The pursuit of peace is not based on a naive or Utopian view of
the world. The Christian tradition is eloquent about the vision of
peace. It is also realistic about the fact of war. Hence, the Second
Vatican Council declared that "governments cannot be denied the
right of legitimate self-defense once every means of peaceful settle-
ment has been exhausted."
The perspective of this testimony, therefore, recognizes that some
forms of war can be morally legitimate, but judges that nuclear
war involving the use of weapons of uncontrolled destructiveness
surpasses the boundaries of legitimate selfdefense.
The prohibition of use: It follows that the primary moral impera-
tive of the nuclear age is to prevent any use of nuclear weapons. It
is this prohibition which is reflected in the following judgment of
the Second Vatican Council:
Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of
extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself.
It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.
It should be noted, Mr. Chairman, that in the sixteen documents
of the Second Vatican Council, this was the onl}' formal condemna-
tion ^'^sued, there was none other. It reflects the gravity of the
moral problem before us in these hearings. The primary purpose of
the bishops' support of SALT II is to join in any reasonable effort
designed to make nuclear war in any form less likely. Our support
of the treaty remains qualified, however, because of the moral
paradox of the deterrence policy.
118
The moral dilemma of deterrence: The moral paradox of deter-
rence is that its purpose is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons,
but it does so by an expressed threat to attack the civilian popula-
tion of one's adversary. Such a threat runs directly counter to the
central moral affirmation of Christian teaching on war: that inno-
cent lives are not open to direct attack.
In their moral statement on strategic policy in 1976, the Ameri-
can Catholic Bishops argued that:
We must be aware that not only is it wrong to attack civilian populations, it is
also wrong to threaten to attack them as a part of a strategy of deterrence.
This moral judgment that the use of strategic nuclear weapons
and the declared intent to use them in our deterrence policy are
both wrong is a fundamental principle in the U.S.C.C. position. It
means that deterrence can be tolerated as a lesser evil than use, as
long as serious negotiations are pursued, aimed at phasing out
nuclear deterrence. If the pursuit of that goal is forsaken, the
moral attitude of the Catholic Church would almost certainly have
to shift to one of uncompromising condemnation of both use and
possession of nuclear weapons.
Based on these moral principles, we cannot regard the SALT II
Treaty as a major achievement in arms control. It certainly is not
an arms reduction treaty. It is more accurately characterized as a
measure which regulates the expansion of the arms race. Neverthe-
less, it does set some limits. Consequently, the Catholic Bishops of
the United States urge the Senate to ratify this treaty because of
the process of negotiation which produced it and the further negoti-
ations which it permits offer the promise of escape from the danger
of nuclear holocaust, and from the ethical dilemma of nuclear
deterrence.
The second part is the principles governing the current debate on
the SALT II Treaty.
The bishops have taken this position in support of SALT II
conscious of the objections of those who oppose SALT II. We have
serious reservations about the treaty because we know it is a
deceleration, not a reversal of the arms race. The analysis of this
testimony concludes that the quantitative and qualitative limits on
delivery systems and weapons achieved by SALT II are worthy of
support. We are sympathetic, however, to those critics, including
some of my fellow bishops, who cannot find in the SALT process
thus far evidence of real arms reduction. Unless there is movement
beyond SALT II toward more substantial measures of arms control,
our support of SALT II will be hard to sustain.
We are also aware of the far more numerous opponents of SALT
II who criticize the treaty as failing to protect U.S. security. Some
argue that the treaty will not prevent the U.S.S.R. from achieving
a first strike capability against our land-based missiles which they
will then use to change the strategic balance in various parts of the
world. Others argue that the perception of the U.S.S.R. having a
first strike potential will produce a shift in the global political
balance.
I am not a political or technical expert, but I must raise some
questions. To the first criticism: Would not the leaders of the
U.S.S.R. be insane to initiate a nuclear war, even in the possession
of a first strike capability against our ICBM's, when the basic
119
reality of the nuclear age remains deterrence based on the assured
destruction policy? Even those of us who oppose the present policy
of deterrence have to recognize its function.
To the second criticism: Can it be argued that an increase of
strategic power can so easily be translated by the Soviets into an
effective instrument of political influence? Is not the influence of
the strategic balance on a particular political situation most com-
plex and unpredictable precisely in those situations of the develop-
ing world where forces of nationalism and a plethora of ideological
positions are vying for control? Has not the cost of using nuclear
weapons on the part of those who employ them deprived these
weapons of much of their strategic utility and made their political
value equally problematic?
Mr. Chairman, you cited some examples, including Iran and
Soviet adventurism in the past, and I ask, has the military superi-
ority of the U.S.S.R. enabled it to achieve a decisive political ad-
vantage over its neighbor China? I raise these questions to mdicate
that while we have examined the objections of those who oppose
SALT with the arguments just stated, we have not found them
sufficient to deter our support for the treaty. There are risks in the
SALT II process, but we believe that they are worth taking to
solidify what has been achieved by the treaty and to move beyond
it to a more significant reduction.
The third section is beyond SALT II. It is our hope that the U.S.
agenda for future negotiations will be bold, I might say a bit bolder
than it has been, and imaginative, aimed at demonstrable reduc-
tions in both weapons and delivery systems.
We realize, Mr. Chairman, that it has been argued during these
hearings that ratification of the treaty should be linked to new and
massive programs for expanding and improving U.S. strategic nu-
clear and conventional forces. Several witnesses have said that
SALT II is acceptable precisely because it does not prevent the
United States from matching expanding Soviet capabilities. Strate-
gic equivalence has become the new name for the arms race.
At the time of SALT I, Dr. Kissinger was quoted as asking: What
good is strategic superiority at these levels of numbers? Are we not
justified in asking today whether strategic equivalence is an abso-
lute necessity? Why must we accept this criterion which ties our
defense spending to our adversary's decisions, when we now have
the potential of destroying every human being in the world four
times over?
I have come here today, Mr. Chairman, because we believe in
negotiated arms control. Because of that belief, we must question
the logic of an absolute adherence to the criterion of strategic
equivalence. It would radically distort our intention to have our
support of SALT II coupled with plans for new military expendi-
tures. The treaty should be ratified as an arms control measure,
not as a maneuver to increase the strategic budget.
The proposed new strategic systems will require a massive outlay
of funds at a time of increasing fiscal stringency. The Constitution
of the United States calls upon the executive and legislative
branches of government not only to provide for the common de-
fense, but also to establish justice, to promote the general welfare
and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.
120
Estimates for the M-X missile alone run from $30 billion upward
over the next decade. With the national debt today at over $800
billion, and pressure being exerted on legislative bodies at all levels
to reduce expenditures, the investment of $30 billion in one weap-
ons system inevitably will result in new limits on spending tor
essential human services here and abroad.
It is our recommendation that systems like the M-X, as well as
Trident II, should be considered negotiable in return for compara-
ble concessions by the U.S.S.R. in SALT III. We have been told that
the aim of SALT III will be deep cuts in the strategic arsenals of
both superpowers. We fervently hope, we fervently pray, that this
^ Mr ^Chairman, the attention of the whole world has been cap-
tured by the new Pope John Paul II. He has already taken note of
the significance of the SALT II Treaty for world peace. The treaty,
he said,
is not yet a reduction of weaponry or, as could be hoped, a provision for disarma-
ment But that does not mean that the foreseen measures are not a sign, which we
St to greet with pleasure, of the desire to pursue a dialogue without which every
hope of working effectively for peace could vanish.
The Pope asked for prayers "to bring progress to the great cause
of laying down weapons and pursuing honest, stable and effective
agreements" of peace and concord. It is in this spirit that the U^.
Catholic Conference submits this testimony to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. , ^ r j.i.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members of the com-
"^The^' Chairman. Thank you very much, Cardinal Krol, for an
extremely well reasoned, comprehensive statement on the position
of the U.S. Catholic Conference on this treaty ^ , , -.u ^
I have been informed that I need to go to the floor to deal with a
resolution that is presently being debated that would call for the
suspension of all further Senate consideration of SALT until writ-
ten assurances are received from the President that Soviet forces
in Cuba pose no threat to the United States nor to U.S. foreign
policy. I think this is an indication of the realities to which 1
^^ But beforfleaving-and I would then extend to Senator Muskie
the balance of my time-I want to say that I appreciate very much
the decision that has been made by the Catholic Church and by
other churches, Protestant and Jewish churches, to speak out on
Siportant political issues when they affect moral principles
Indeed, the core of this whole attempt to bring nuclear arms under
some restraint is essentially moral in nature, and I think your
statement underscores this very persuasively.
I sometimes think that the great moral blindness of the last
century was the institution of human slavery, but the most respect-
able of our leaders in that period, at least m the early part of the
century, were content to raise no questions concerning slavery
Even as the century advanced, it became the subject of a great
nItSnal debate in which the most respectable people found ways to
rationalize and to justify the continued existence of slavery It
Sme at TasHo the\errible tragedy of the Civil War before that
issue was resolved.
121
It may well be that the great moral blindness of our times is the
nuclear arms race, and most respectable, most powerful world lead-
ers and experts of every kind find ways to rationalize its continu-
ation and to justify it on one basis or another. I think that the
great contribution of your statement is to bring us back to the
basic moral questions and force us to confront them. I am grateful
to you for your statement. It is a very important contribution to
the commit iecj's consideration of this treaty.
Seiiator Muskie, please.
Senator Muskie. This is the first time at these hearings I have
had a chance to ask the first question, and I really don't have a
quastion so much as a reaffirmation of what Senator Church has
just said.
NEED ?0R MORAL IMPERATIVE TO BE EMPHASIZED
I was delighted in Augi!st to learn that you were interested in
coming to this hearing because at that point the hearings, by and
large, had emphasized the concerns of people who deal with arms
and arms diplomacy, on the impact upon national security, and
those who believe that national security was not so threatened that
we should ignore the moral imperative involved were concerned
that the moral imperative was not being sufficiently emphasized.
It is not that those who were testifying were unaware of the
moral imperative; it is just that they were so preoccupied and had
been for years in negotiating the means for moving toward a
reduction in arms that I am not sure they were as sensitive as they
ought to be to the fact that this treaty does not produce a reduction
in arms.
At what level a reduction would begin, no one would dare pre-
dict. I would not predict that a SALT III Treaty would result in a
reduction in arms, or even a leveling off of the arms race. And I
think it is important that we be reminded that those kinds of risks
lie ahead of us, and indeed, that they would be exacerbated if this
treaty is rejected.
So I feel I have been privileged this afternoon, Your Eminence,
to listen to your statement. I hesitate to ask questions because your
statement is so clearly, carefully structured, thoughtfully produced,
and based upon a rather careful study of the record, the issues, the
questions, the challenges that have been raised that I doubt that
the effect of your statement would be improved by interpretations
based upon ad hoc questions put to you by Senators on this side of
the table.
RESERVATIONS THAT TREATY DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH
There is just one question I would really like to ask, not that the
point would be left ambiguous, if it is ambiguous, in the record.
You were very careful at the outset to point out that this was the
official position of the National Council but that it did not neces-
sarily represent the views of every member or of every bishop.
Would it be accurate to characterize the views of those who have
reservations about the statement or about the SALT II Treaty to
say that their reservations are based upon a conviction that the
treaty does not go far enough in the direction of reducing arms.
122
rather than that it poses a nonacceptable risk to our national
security?
Cardinal Krol. The first part is correct. Their objection is that it
simply does not go far enough. We have expressed that reservation.
They expected that it should have moved in the direction of reduc-
tion, disarmament. And actually it doesn't do that at all. There is
no reversal. All it does is control or regulate the growth. And it is
precisely, I would say, for that reason that there is a divergence of
opinion among the fellow bishops.
It is, I would say, a small minority of bishops, but with great
conviction.
Senator Muskie. I remember. Cardinal Krol, enjoying your hospi-
tality in Philadelphia, and I remember that the bedroom which I
occupied was also occupied by the beautiful painting of the current
Pope whose eyes followed one wherever one moved in the room. I
have seen those kinds of paintings before, but I had never seen
such a dramatic one, or representing a personage whose influence
and authority was so overwhelming. I can't say that I slept the
sleep of the innocent totally that night under such surveillance,
but I would say that your testimony here this morning represents
that kind of surveillance from the enormously significant moral
position of the Catholic Church, and as a Catholic, I am delighted
that it has been used as you have used it here this afternoon.
Cardinal Krol. Thank you. Senator.
Senator Muskie. Senator Percy.
Senator Percy. Your Eminence, we all appreciate your presence
here and we respect the position that you have taken.
TELEVISED COVERAGE OF SALT FLOOR DEBATE
I think one of the most disappointing aspects of my consideration
of SALT II, which may be one of the most important votes that I
will cast in the U.S. Senate, has been the low level of interest
seemingly shown by our constituents. There is no comparison with
the high level of emotion and interest we saw on the issue of the
Panama Canal. Yet in SALT II we are dealing with the future of
the human race. We tried to grapple with one of the problems of
the nuclear age in the Non-Proliferation Act that we passed in the
Congress about 1 year ago, and we are trying to grapple with
another aspect of the problem here. I think broadcasting these
hearings is important. Your presence, speaking on behalf of such a
highly valued group of men and women, is important because it
promotes public understanding and helps focus public attention on
the importance of this issue.
In your opinion, would it be well for us to try to solve the
technical problems and open up the Senate of the United States to
television and radio coverage of the SALT debate so the people of
this country can share in the debate and grasp its significance as
you and the group that you represent have so ably expressed?
Cardinal Krol. Senator, I don't think I would be the best judge
of that. One of the problems that you would have in this is that
you are showing the perfection of refinement of debate on a matter
which is complex and involved. We have tried to apply the moral
principles. There are other principles of security and so on, and I
don't know whether you could convey that even by the intelligent
123
and reasonable debates that you have in the Senate. I don't know. I
don't think I am a good judge of that. The televising of these
hearings has provided some preparation beforehand, and there
could be some interest generated through the media if the debate is
to be televised. The problem is whether the coverage of the media
would be read and to what degree would it be understood. But it
would be very helpful to have the people interested and knowledge-
able.
There is also a question of priorities. If you want to talk about
energy, or inflation, or about the shortage of gasoline, that will
command the interest of people. But it seems the people are willing
to entrust their elected Representatives and Senators with the
SALT II decision. It is your responsibility with clear-minded knowl-
edge and perception and courage to make the decisions. I am here
only to help you by casting some light particularly on the moral
aspects. As Mrs. King said, this was basically and ultimately a
moral issue, which is the same theme that I developed in the first
section. But it is up to you gentlemen who have to be courageous —
and I appreciate fully the risks involved in the democratic process-
es of election. I think it was Churchill who said that democracy is
the worst form of government in the world but better than any
other kind. I realize what you have to face when you have elec-
tions. But there is an area where you have to be true to yourself, to
the truth, and vote with courage.
Senator Percy. Thank you.
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF NATIONS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES
I would like to clarify a point you made. You have pointed out
that we ought to move toward de-escalating the arms race and
bilaterally eliminate nuclear weapons, if at all possible, in their
totality. You said this is a moral issue.
Is it not also true, though, that it is a moral responsibility of the
Nation to adequately and properly defend its citizens? We have a
case in Lebanon where a nation saw fit not to provide adequate
defense for its own borders, its own people, and it has been torn
asunder for years now.
Isn't there a moral obligation to see that we adequately provide
for our defense so as to deter any aggression?
Cardinal Krol. Yes, I have emphasized that, that the right of
self-defense is a sound moral principle for individuals and for na-
tions. The right of self-defense is rooted in the law of nature, and of
nature's God. At the same time, there is a basic principle we study
in moral theology, "en inculpate tutelae," that is, you can only use
as much force as is necessary to repel the aggressor.
Now, when a little child comes at you with a toy baseball bat,
you don't run for a machine gun; and it is a crude comparison, but
that is the concept involved there, and when you have these nucle-
ar stockpilings on both sides, the basic moral issue is the unprotect-
ed civilian. If somebody comes at you with a gun, with arms, you
shoot at them, but when you have missiles and nuclear power that
wipe out, as were wiped out in Nagasaki, hundreds of thousands of
innocent people, unarmed, that is morally indefensible. And the
nuclear power inherently has that kind of a potential and for that
reason, the bishops oppose nuclear power as a viable weapon.
48-260 0-79 Pt . 4
124
REJECTION OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT
Senator Percy. You, as I see your statement, reject unilateral
disarmament. When you face an adversary of increasing strength
and apparently different moral persuasions than we do, there
would be no sense, I would think, in unilaterally disarming. That is
why this whole process of bilateral negotiation seems to be the
sensible way to go about it.
Do I surmise that you would concur with that conclusion?
Cardinal Krol. Positively, Senator. That was, in fact, Paul VI
speaking at the U.N. in 1965, when he made that statement "No
more war; war never again," and he insisted disarmament was the
first step toward peace. But he added a sentence which is not very
frequently quoted. It is on the first page of my testimony: "As long
as man remains that weak, changeable, and even wicked being he
often shows himself to be, defensive armaments will also be neces-
sary."
On the following page, the "Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World" says this, that: "Since peace must be born of
mutual trust between peoples instead of being forced on nations
through threat of arms, all must work to put an end to the arms
race and make a real beginning of disarmament, not unilaterally
indeed, but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis of agreements
and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees." That is exact-
ly the principle.
Senator Percy. Thank you, sir, very much indeed.
Cardinal Krol. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Muskie. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Your Eminence, Senator Muskie said that to ask questions in a
sense would detract from the statement and the manner in which
it was put together, but being the product of 13 years of Catholic
education, I can't resist the opportunity to ask a Cardinal a ques-
tion.
ADOPT defense POSTURE BASED ON COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY
Your Eminence, I am concerned that one of the paragraphs in
your statement might be taken out of context. One of the debates
that has been raging in this committee for the past 2 months has
been whether or not the United States should adopt a defense
posture based upon the concept of counterforce capability.
The argument has been made that the policy upon which our
nuclear deterrent for the past 20 years has been based, which is
mutual assured destruction, is not a good policy, not a workable
policy, not a moral policy because it means just what it says: that
the Soviets should know that if they were to strike the United
States or its allies with nuclear weapons, then, as they say in south
Philadelphia, school is out, it is all over.
Now, along come Dr. Kissinger and others and they say we need
the M-X missile, we need the enhanced radiation weapon, and we
need other things like GLCM's and SLCM's and ALCM's, because
we must counter the counterforce capability of the Soviet Union.
They, with their big missiles, can strike in the mid-1980's our
ground-based missiles and knock out those missiles, and only kill
125
10 to 20 million Americans, and it is suggested that if the United
States were to retaliate massively under that circumstance, then it
would be immoral, because the Soviets would retaliate in turn and
we would have created mutual suicide. In your statement you say:
"The moral paradox of deterrence is that its purpose is to prevent
the use of nuclear weapons, but it does so by an expressed threat to
attack the civilian population of one's adversary. Such a threat
runs directly counter to the central moral affirmation of the Chris-
tian teaching on war: that innocent lives are not open to direct
attack."
What I am leading to is that I don't see how nuclear weapons of
the size that either side has now can be employed in a surgical
way, and that a policy which is designed to deter the use of those
weapons on civilian populations by essentially saying that we have
no option open to us but to respond in kind seems to me to be one
of the only ways to preclude the prospect of it occurring. And I just
wonder whether or not you can help me as a U.S. Senator deal
with that dilemma a little further. Should we be designing weapons
that are designed to be surgically used? Is that what our Church is
saying?
Cardinal Krol. Senator, after 13 years of Catholic education, I
am sure you have heard the expression "the lesser of two evils."
There is a goal, there is an ideal. There is a practical reality. You
can never lose sight of your goal, but you have got to go through
the practical reality to achieve your goal. We do not recommend or
favor a counterforce capability. I have described the criterion of
strategic equivalence as a false criterion: strategic equivalence is
another name for the arms race. What I don't like about it and
what I think every thinking American shouldn't like about it is
that somebody else is dictating how much we are to spend. As I
mentioned in the testimony, we have enough power now to kill all
the people in the world four times over. Our development is more
than sufficient. Well, what are we going to do with the three other
striking forces, and why do we need five? I mean, that is why it is
a plague, it is an insanity.
Senator Biden. I agree.
Cardinal Krol. But in this question of the deterrence, I have
made it plain that we are opposed to the use, even to the threat.
But we will take deterrence in the process as the lesser of two
evils.
I think it was Senator Hayakawa that talked about the Soviets,
what they are doing. I think we have to look not only at their
actions, we must try to understand why they act as they do. I think
we have to look at the basic integrated philosophy of communism.
They refer to it as a dialectical materialism, a dialectic in which
we find theses and antitheses, constant tension, constant struggle,
all directed to the goal of world domination.
For a while we followed the isolation policy. We would not talk
to the Soviets. But that is not the way to pursue truth or get truth
to prevail. We are dealing with a people and we know what their
ideology and goals are. They have never denied that their ultimate
goal is world domination. They have never denied or modified their
goal of the extermination of religion. But we are dealing with them
not because we approve their ideology, not because we approve all
126
of their actions, but for the interests of the human race and the
human family, we have to try to have or at least acknowledge some
principles of truth and agree to some principles. And even when we
reach the agreement, we have to be aware of the fact that the
track record of performance on agreements by the Soviets is not
the best. We come back to another maxim which, as an attorney,
you would know, that the law serves the vigilant and not the
dormant. We must be alert and vigilant.
The SALT II Treaty, as I tried to point out, is not the world's
greatest achievement.
Senator Biden. I was hoping, quite frankly, you would answer
the question that way. My concern — both as a Senator who is a
proponent of SALT and as a practicing Catholic — is that some
might very well take that statement of yours out of context, not
having had the benefit of the scholastic education.
I felt certain that Your Eminence did not want to be even
indirectly associated with being a proponent of a counterforce
strategy.
I would like to make one further statement, and although it
sounds somewhat gratuitous, I really mean it. It is a sincere state-
ment. I think the Holy Father is going to do more for opening up
the East- West dialog and opening up the prospects for more free-
dom and tolerance in Eastern Europe, and eventually in the Soviet
Union, than all the arms control agreements and all the agree-
ments that the superpowers have signed so far. I cannot think of a
better choice that could have been made for a Pope. I just got back
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and even Communist
leaders within those countries were talking about the impact the
Pope has had, although some of them clearly were a little worried
about it. And in Western Europe, they are absolutely ecstatic about
the impact the Pope is having.
And he is doing it in such a forthright yet tactful way. He is not
choosing up sides, east and west and good and bad, but he is having
a tremendous impact on the tens of millions of people who had just
lost hope. I am really, really proud. It almost makes me want to be
Polish.
Cardinal Krol. That is a laudable desire. Senator.
Senator Biden. Seriously, I just wanted to tell Your Eminence
that from my perspective the Pope's personality and presence have
had extensive repercussions at the highest political levels through-
out the world. But I am sure Your Eminence already knows that.
Thank you very much for your time.
Senator Muskie. I have been trying for years to get Senator
Biden to make that kind of a statement about the Poles.
Senator Biden. My Irish mother had problems with that, but we
may be able to work it out.
Senator Muskie. Well, Your Eminence, clearly you made an
impression on the committee. I am sorry that other members were
not present because of preoccupation with similar duties elsewhere
on the floor, but I repeat that I am delighted that you could come,
that you made your statement. I think you have made an impor-
tant contribution, and I look forward, too, to the visit of the Pope,
We Poles have got to stick together.
Thank you very much.
127
[Cardinal Krol's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Cardinal Krol
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am Cardinal John Krol, Arch-
bishop of Philadelphia. I speak on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC)
comprising over 350 bishops of the United States, serving more than 50 million
Catholics.
I express the sincere gratitude of the USCC for the opportunity to present the
views of the Catholic Bishops of the United States on the moral aspects of the
nuclear arms race.
I. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE TESTIMONY
The moral principles underljdng my testimony have been enunciated clearly in
papal documents and speeches, and in Vatican Council II. Pius XII pleaded on the
eve of the World War II: "Nothing is lost by peace, everj^hing may be lost by war"
(Aug. 24, 1939). Paul VI speaking to the General Assembly of the U.N. said: "No
more war, war never again. Peace must guide the destinies of all peoples and of all
mankind. . . . Disarmament is the first step toward peace. ... As long as man
remains that weak, changeable and even wicked being he often shows himself to be,
defensive armaments will also be necessary" (Oct. 4, 1965).
Vatican Council II, in its "Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,"
declared: "The arms race is one of the most grievous plagues of the human race,
and it inflicts an intolerable injury upon the world" (para. 81); "The arms race is
not a secure way of maintaining true peace, and the resulting balance of power is
no sure and genuine path to achieving it" (para 80); "Since peace must be born of
mutual trust between peoples, instead of being forced on nations through dread of
arms, all must work to put an end to the arms race and make a real beginning of
disarmament, not unilaterally indeed, but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis
of agreements and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees" (para 82).
These principles reflect the authentic position of the Catholic Church and of all
faithful Catholics. The manner and degree to which these principles are reflected in
a particular proposal, such as the SALT II Treaty, admits a divergence of views. For
this reason, I recognize, and I want this Committee to know, that while the princi-
ples to which we subscribe are clear and generally accepted, the position I present
here today is the view of the majority of the Administrative Board of the Bishops
Conference; it is not a unanimous position within the Conference of Bishops, nor it
it the unanimous position of all Catholics in the United States. It is however the
official policy of the U.S. Catholic Conference, and in expressing it, we Bishops seek
to fulfill a role of responsible citizenship, as well as the religious leadership.
This role requires me to speak the truth plainly. The Catholic Bishops of this
country believe that too long have we Americans been preoccupied with prepara-
tions for war; too long have we been guided by the false criterion of equivalence or
superiority of armaments; too long have we allowed other nations to virtually
dictate how much we should spend on stockpiling weapons of destruction. Is it not
time that we concentrate our efforts on peace rather than war? Is it not time we
take that first step towards peace: gradual, bilateral, negotiated disarmament?
It is impossible to regard this Treaty as a spectacular achievement in the field of
arms control. But we support its ratification as a partial and imperfect step in the
direction of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as part of an ongoing
process, begun in 1972, to negotiate actual reductions in nuclear arms. Our support
is, however, heavily qualified precisely because of the moral principles which govern
our view of arms control.
No question of foreign affairs surpasses the arms race in terms of moral complex-
ity and moral content. Along with the correlative issue of world poverty, the arms
race forms the heart of the moral agenda of foreign policy.
The massive technical complexity of the arms race in its political and strategic
dimensions is something that people in our government grapple with daily. V'e
respect that technical complexity and have tried to assimilate it in this testimony.
At the same time, for the Church the arms race is principally a problem defined in
religious and moral categories. The specter of war, in any form, raises for Christian
ethics the central question of the taking of human life. Since the life of every single
human person bears the sacred dignity of the image of God, the question of the
religious and moral significance of warfare has received more sustained reflection in
Roman Catholic theology than almost any other moral problem. From St. Augus-
tine's masterful treatment of war in Chapter 19 of "The City of God" to the Vatican
Council II's injunction to the Church that it should "undertake a completely fresh
128
appraisal of war" there has been present in Catholic tradition an abiding determi-
nation to limit the impact of war on the human family.
In the nuclear age, the moral sanctions against war have taken on a qualitatively
new character. From Pius XII to John Paul II, the moral argument is clear: the
nuclear arms race is to be unreservedly condemned and the political process of arms
control and disarmament is to be supported by the Christian community. This
pursuit of peace is not based on a naive or Utopian view of the world. The Christian
tradition is eloquent about the vision of peace; it is also realistic about the fact of
war. Hence, Vatican Council II, recognizing the inadequate nature of the political
structure of the international community, stated that "governments cannot be
denied the right of legitimate self-defense once every means of peaceful settlement
has been exhausted". (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,
para. 79.)
The perspective which shapes this testimony, therefore, recognizes that some
forms of war can be morally legitimate, but judges that nuclear war surpasses the
boundaries of legitimate self-defense. The application of this basic moral principle to
our present situation requires that we distinguish two problems of the nuclear age:
the use of nuclear weapons and the strategy of deterrence. Both are pertinent to our
assessment of the SALT II Treaty.
The prohibition of use. — The primary moral imperative of the nuclear age is to
prevent any use of strategic nuclear weapons. This prohibition is expressed in the
following passage of Vatican Council II: ' Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at
the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a
crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating con-
demnation". (The Pastoral Constitution, para. 80.)
This was the only formal condemnation of the Council and indicates the serious-
ness with which the bishops of the world viewed the possible use of what they called
"modern scientific weapons". Our first purpose in supporting SALT II is to illus-
trate our support for any reasonable effort which is designed to make nuclear war
in any form less likely. I have said that our support of the Treaty is qualified; one
reason for this is the paradox of nuclear deterrence.
The moral dilemma of deterrence. — The moral paradox of deterrence is that its
purpose is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, but it does so by an expressed
threat to attack the civilian population of one's adversary. Such a threat runs
directly counter to the central moral affirmation of the Christian teaching on war:
that innocent lives are not open to direct attack. The complexity of the moral
dilemma is reflected in the statement on deterrence of the American Bishops in
1976: "With respect to nuclear weapons, at least those with massive destructive
capability, the first imperative is to prevent their use. As possessors of a vast
nuclear arsenal, we must also be aware that not only is it wrong to attack civilian
populations but it is also wrong to threaten to attack them as part of a strategy of
deterrence. We urge the continued development and implementation of policies
which seek to bring these weapons more securely under control, progressively
reduce their presence in the world, and ultimately remove them entirely' . (To live
in Christ Jesus: 1976.)
The moral judgment of this statement is that not only the use of strategic nuclear
weapons, but also the declared intent to use them involved in our deterrence policy,
are both wrong. This explains the Catholic dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence
and the urgency of the Catholic demand that the nuclear arms race be reversed. It
is of the utmost importance that negotiations proceed to meaningful and continuing
reductions in nuclear stockpiles, and eventually to the phasing out altogether of
nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutual-assured destruction.
As long as there is hope of this occurring. Catholic moral teaching is willing,
while negotiations proceed, to tolerate the possession of nuclear weapons for deter-
rence as the lesser of two evils. If that hope were to disappear the moral attitude of
the Catholic Church would almost certainly have to shift to one of uncompromising
condemnation of both use and possession of such weapons.
With this in mind, the Catholic Bishops of this country ask the Senate of the
United States to ratify this Treaty because the negotiations which produced it, and
the further round of negotiations which it permits, offer the promise of escape from
the danger of a nuclear holocaust and from the ethical dilemma of nuclear deter-
rence.
II. THE SALT II TREATY
Nevertheless, we have serious reservations about this Treaty. SALT I had created
a hope among people that SALT II would require real reductions on both sides. This
hope has not been fulfilled and there is no clear indication that SALT III can revive
129
that hope. That is why some of my fellow bishops and many more concerned
Catholics refuse to support SALT II.
The U.S. proposals of 1977 had significant reductions in view but these were
rejected by the U.S.S.R. The present Treaty limits strategic nuclear delivery systems
to 2,250 (after 1981) on both sides and this will require the dismantling of about 250
Soviet launchers. Such a reduction is not very significant considering the destruc-
tive power (3,550 megatons for the U.S., and 7,868 megatons for the U.S.S.R.) that
will remain and continue to increase on each side.
Secondly the Treaty does not preclude either side from proceeding to replace its
present land-based ICBMs wth a new system, or modif3ring existing systems within
limits, it is true, as to size and number of warheads but obviously embodjdng
significant improvements in accuracy. These systems will obviously be more destruc-
tive.
On the other hand it cannot be argued, as do some critics, that the Treaty does
not constrain Soviet strategic weapons expansion. Under the Treaty the U.S.S.R.
will not be permitted to deploy an already-tested mobile missile (SS-16); it must
count all SS-18 missiles as having multiple warheads though some may not; it must
stop its current program of deplojdng additional missiles with multiple warheads by
about 1982 and may not increase the number of warheadls in existing missiles.
SALT II is thus basically a deceleration, not a reversal of the nuclear arms race.
Wliile the weight of this testimony comes to the conclusion that the quantitative
and qualitative limits on delivery systems and weapons constitute an arms control
achievement worthy of support, that conclusion becomes harder to defend if one
assumes SALT II to be the end of the process. Much more remains to be done.
By far the most numerous opponents of ratification are those who reject the
Treaty as failing to protect U.S. security. In particular, there are those who argue
that this Treaty will permit the U.S.S.R. to achieve a first-strike capability against
our land-based ICBM s, and that they will use this threat to challenge and change
the strategic balance in various parts of the world. Can this really be reliably
predicted? With the U.S. in possession of a large nuclear arsenal and varied means
of delivery would not the leaders of the U.S.S.R. be insane to start, or threaten to
start, a nuclear war, even in possession of a first-strike capability vis-a-vis our land-
based ICBM's? Can we gainsay the tragic reality that deterrence is still based on the
posture and policy of mutual-assured destruction? Even if the U.S.S.R. were to
acquire the capability to neutralize the U.S. Minuteman force of ICBM's, is it not
clear that the other legs of the Triad will continue to deter a Soviet first-strike, if
indeed that were the Soviet intention?
Some critics of the Treaty, however, do not base their opposition mainly on the
premise that the U.S.S.R. would risk a first-strike. Rather they argue that the
perception in the world of the U.S.S.R. having first-strike capability will lead to an
adverse shift in the global political balance. I do not pose as a political or technical
expert, but I must ask whether, in the nuclear age, it can be argued that an
increment of strategic power can so easily be translated into an effective instrument
of political influence. This translation from the strategic balance to specific political
conflicts seems particularly complex precisely in those situations in the developing
world where forces of nationalism and a plethora of ideological positions are vjdng
for control. The cost of using nuclear weapons on the part of those who employ
them has deprived them of much of their strategic utility and has made their
political usefulness equally problematical. For example, the U.S.S.R. has not been
able to achieve a decisive political advantage vis-a-vis China, despite the former's
admitted military superiority.
On balance, we are satisfied that while the Treaty does not require a reduction in
nuclear weaponry on either side, at the same time it will not substantially endanger
U.S. security. Whatever risks may be involved are worth taking for the sake of
ensuring that the SALT II negotiations will be followed quickly by a third round
aimed at more significant reductions.
III. BEYOND SALT II
By itself SALT II is no more than a beginning. It creates a certain momentum
which should make possible more impressive arms control achievements. If not, our
confidence may have been misplaced. What are the prospects?
It is our hope that the U.S. agenda for future negotiations will be bold and
imaginative, and that the aim of the negotiators should be real, demonstrable
reductions in both weapons and delivery systems. Our negotiating posture should
not sacrifice long-term possibilities for real disarmament in the name of short-term
tactical advantages in the strategic competition.
It can hardly be a source of satisfaction or pride that the ratification of this
Treaty may be in doubt or that an arms control agreement can only be purchased in
130
conjunction with substantially increased expenditures for other arms. There is a
prevalent belief in this country that our national security can only be preserved by
the djTiamic of technlological development and investment in new and ever more
destructive weapon systems. One reads that the decision to deploy the MX missile is
a response to such perceptions but perhaps still not sufficient to reconcile opponents
of the Treaty.
We have already referred to the opportunities which the Treaty affords for
further escalation of nuclear weaponry by both sides. It has been argued during
these hearings that ratification of the Treaty should be linked to a new and massive
program for expanding and improving U.S. strategic nuclear as well as conventional
forces. If the (Congress accepts this advice, the hope which I referred to earlier for a
reversal of the nuclear arms race will grow even dimmer.
Many of us remember being told by the then Secretary of Defense McNamara in
the late sixties that U.S. security depended on U.S. strategic forces being main-
tained at a level 2 or 3 times greater than that of the U.S.S.R. in terms of
deliverable warheads. The United States now has 9,200 strategic nuclear weapons
(re-entry vehicles and aerial bombs) compared to 5,000 for the U.S.S.R.; yet we are
told we are no longer superior, in fact are facing strategic inferiority, and must
exert ourselves to maintain or recover "equivalence". Where McNamara once was
confident that neither side would be able to acquire a first-strike capability, we are
now told that the U.S.S.R. is acquiring a first-strike capability and that the United
States must hasten to do likewise. Witness after witness have told this Committee
that SALT II is acceptable precisely because it does not prevent the United States
from meeting this challenge. Strategic "equivalence" is the new name for the
nuclear arms race!
At the time of SALT I Dr. Kissinger was quoted as asking, "what good is strategic
superiority at these levels of numbers?". Are we not justified in asking today, is
strategic equivalence an absolute necessity? Is this doctrine not an infallible recipe
for continuing the strategic arms race? Are we not moving inexorably toward a
situation in which each side has a first-strike capability, a posture and a policy, not
of deterrence by mutual-assured destruction, but of readiness for and reliance on
the capability for fighting a nuclear war?
We, the Catholic Bishops, find ourselves under the obligation of questioning
fundamentally the logic of the pattern of events implied by determined pursuit of
strategic equivalence. Our purp)ose in coming before this distinguished Committee is
to speak on moral-religious grounds in support of arms control designed to be a step
toward real measures of disarmament. It would radically distort our intention and
purpose if our support of SALT II were in any way coupled with plans for new
military expenditures. The Treaty should be approved as an arms control measure,
not a maneuver to increase the strategic budget.
These proposed new strategic systems will require a massive outlay of funds at a
time of increasing fiscal stringency. The Constitution of the United States calls
upon the executive and legislative branches of our government not only to provide
for the common defense but also to establish justice, to promote the general welfare
of the nation and to secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.
Estimates for the M-X missile run from $30 billion upwards over the next decade;
with the existing national debt at $805 billion and pressure being exerted on
legislative bodies at all levels to reduce expenditures, the investment of $30 billion
in one weapons system inevitably will result in new limits on spending for essential
human services here and abroad.
This topic of the competition of arms for scarce resources has been an abiding
concern for me. Speaking at the Synod of Bishops in 1971 I argued then, and still
believe now, that: "The armaments race violates the rights of the world's poor in a
way that is fruitless and intolerable. The reason is that it is not the way to protect
human life or foster peace, but on the contrary the causes of war are thereby
aggravated little by little".
It is our recommendation that systems like the MX, as well as Trident II, should
be considered as negotiable in return for equivalent concessions by the U.S.S.R. in
SALT III. We have been told that the aim of SALT III will be "deep cuts" in the
strategic arsenals of both superpowers; we fervently hope this will be true. As we
consider the future of U.S. defense policy, including the deployment of the M-X, it
might be well to review one dimension of the SALT I negotiations. At that time, the
possibility existed of excluding the deployment of MIRVs; we did not take that
option. Now we find that one of the major objections of those opposing SALT II is
the threat posed by the Soviets to our land-based ICBM's. The Soviet MIRV capabili-
ty is a central element of the threat to our ICBM's, a threat which we might have
obviated by a different negotiating posture in SALT I. Our hope is that we will
carefully consider the M-X, and related decisions in the light of their impact on the
131
negotiating process of SALT III. Perhaps the most important single strategic arms
control step would be the elimination of MIRV's from the respective ICBM forces.
Unrealistic as it may seem to hardheaded defense planners, the question should be
raised now whether the United States could try immediately to negotiate a lower
MIRV level for ICBM's.
IV. SUMMARY
The foregoing testimony may be summarized in the following propositions:
1. Catholics reject means of waging or even deterring war which could result in
destruction beyond control and possibly a final holocaust of humanity.
2. In particular, strategic nuclear weapons of massive destructiveness and poison-
ous regional or global aftereffects must never be used.
3. Consequently, the reduction, through negotiated agreements, and eventually
the elimination of such weapons, must be the overriding aim of policy. Without it,
there can be only one alternative: the indefinite continuation and escalation of the
strategic competition. The doctrine of strategic equality, by itself, does not insure
against such competition; rather it almost guarantees it. Some risks must be taken
in the direction of control, both to avoid nuclear war and to rescue us from the
moral dilemma of nuclear deterrence.
4. SALT II, the result of seven years of negotiation, represents a limited but
acceptable agreement which constrains the nuclear forces of both the United States
and the U.S.S.R., does not jeopardize U.S. security, and can be the beginning of a
continuing and necessary process for obtaining meaningful and progressive reduc-
tions. The Treaty should be ratified by the Senate.
5. This process must not be sacrificed to a narrow and technologically oriented
insistence upon exploitation of new nuclear options, including counterforce options.
In particular, final decisions regarding deployment of the M-X and Trident II
should be deferred until the utility of those options for negotiation in SALT III can
be explored.
6. Failure by the United States to take full advantage of the possibilities for
further restraints and reductions will eventually rob U.S. foreign and defense policy
of moral legitimacy.
Mr. Chairman, the attention of the whole world has been captured by the new
Pope, John Paul II. He has already taken note of the significance of the SALT II
Treaty for World peace. The Pope's remarks came in his weekly Sunday talk before
leading the noon Angelus in St. Peter's Square. The SALT accord, he said, "is not
yet a reduction of weaponry or, as could be hoped, a provision for disarmament. But
that does not mean that the foreseen measures are not a sign, which we ought to
greet with pleasure, of the desire to pursue a dialogue, without which every hope of
working effectively for peace could vanish."
"Believers and men of goodwill who feel themselves so impelled by conscience to
pledge themselves as 'artisans of peace' cannot ignore the importance of anything
that favors a climate of alleviating tensions. This helps to encourage other indis-
pensable progress on the road to limitation and reduction of armaments".
The Pope asked for prayers "to bring progress to the great cause of la3dng down
weapons and pursuing honest, stable and effective agreements" of peace and con-
cord. It is with such sentiments that the U.S. Catholic Conference submits this
testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee.
Senator Muskie. Our next witness is Claire Randall, General
Secretary of the National Council of Churches.
STATEMENT OF DR. CLAIRE RANDALL, GENERAL SECRETARY,
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, ACCOMPANIED BY
ALLEN GUYERi
Dr. Randall. Mr. Chairperson, I am Claire Randall, the general
secretary of the National Council of Churches. I am accompanied
by Dr. Allen Guyer who is one of a very large number of persons
within the churches' ranks who have given serious and careful
thought to these issues and who are the ones who advise and guide
and help boards and agencies and executives as we try to deal with
these complex issues. Therefore we work not only from our moral
' See page 136 for Dr. Randall's prepared statement.
132
understandings but from some of the technical aid that we do
receive.
I would like also to say just briefly that 22 church bodies have
made statements, copies of which will be coming to all Senators
shortly, in support of SALT II, which we think is a very important
matter, and 27 such churches and others have come together in a
coalition, the Religious Committee on SALT II, which is working at
this very hard and is reaching out across the country in education
and information ways.
So it is that we are, as churches, working on this issue.
I might also just interject here as my friend Coretta King inter-
jected some other pieces that perhaps have not been presented
here, that there are many women in this country who not only as
mothers but in other ways are deeply concerned about the issues
that are before us in the SALT II discussion. And certainly the
churches feel that this is a life and death issue, and therefore it is
a theological and moral issue, as has been pointed out.
I would like to share briefly with you some of what the Council
of Churches would have me say in this case, and also to point out
that we are made up of 32 denominations in this country, which
includes the six large black Baptist and Methodist churches and
the eight or so orthodox churches, not just the mainstream Protes-
tant churches, which I think is important to know.
And the National Council of Churches has, since its formation 30
years ago, given leadership among the Protestant and Orthodox
churches to the struggle for peace and justice. The council came
into existence shortly after the world had witnessed the devastat-
ing effects of nuclear weapons, and its leadership and the members
of the churches ever since have been keenly aware of the danger to
all humanity posed by the threat of nuclear war, and in a sense,
the line that we have gone across as we have entered into a
nuclear age.
In the Old Testament, we are told to beat our swords into plow-
shares. In the New Testament we are asked not to return evil for
evil but to love our neighbors. These biblical injunctions, because
we believe these principles expressed in action, create the climate
which leads to just, peaceful relations between peoples and nations.
These biblical injunctions must be listened to in our opinion.
At its meeting in May of this year, the governing board of the
National Council of Churches voted unanimously, and I might say
enthusiastically, in favor of the ratification of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty. It is my purpose in this testimony to set forth
some of the reasons the National Council supports ratification. We
have based our testimony on the short phrases that are a part of
the introduction to the SALT II Treaty. I will not read those
phrases but simply comment at this point on them.
The United States already has in its nuclear arsenal, as you well
know, enough nuclear weapons to kill every man, woman, and
child in the world, not once, but several times. And once is too
much, and more is impossible, and thus an absurd idea. And even
limited use of this power would visit devastation on future genera-
tions as well as the present due to radiological contamination. The
devastation of every major Soviet city by U.S. nuclear weapons
might achieve what defense planners call a strategic objective. But
133
the winds that sweep round the globe would bring deadly radiation
to the United States even if no Soviet bombs explode in the United
States. And so there are devastating consequences for humankind.
In SALT II, the United States and the U.S.S.R. are mutually
agreeing to limit strategic offensive arms. Our country and the
Soviet Union have opposing ideological, political and economic sys-
tems, but unless all humanity is to be endangered, these two major
powers must find ways to improve relations. The treaty provisions
which limit arms are of vital significance, but we must not under-
estimate the symbolic importance of the two superpowers' ability
to reduce tension and danger by mutual agreement without resort
to war. The ratification of the treaty by these two nations with
such opposing views would give evidence to all the world that
differences between nations can be dealt with by peaceful means.
While the treaty is a symbol of mutual trust, it does not depend
for its success on mutual trust, and there have been those who
testified to help us come to that conclusion.
In 1968, under pressure from the United States and the Soviet
Union, many nations renounced nuclear weapons for themselves
and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article VI contains a
promise made by the superpowers to make progress in reducing
and eliminating their nuclear arsenals and to move quickly toward
completion of a ban on all nuclear testing.
In affirming a statement that was drawn up by leaders of the
National Council of Churches and representative leaders of Soviet
churches this spring, the governing board of the National Council
expressed profound concern about the danger of a precarious bal-
ancing of humanity on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. We
know that still more terrible weapons are being developed which
can only lead to far greater fear and suspicion, and thus to a still
more feverish arms race. Against this we say with one voice: No. In
the name of God, no.
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is ready to
accept a treaty which gives the other nation strategic offensive
superiority. The United States and the U.S.S.R. weapons systems
are not identical. Therefore, an element of judgment is involved in
determining parity. After long, careful negotiations, agreement has
been reached which most American military and intelligence lead-
ers have testified provides equality and equal security. We have
indicated some of those facts which we believe lead us to agree that
this is something which we can believe.
Without an agreement setting limits on the arms race there can
be no strategic stability. Each side will inevitably make huge in-
vestments to achieve what is perceived as superiority. The fear
that the other nation is achieving strategic superiority has fueled
the arms race already between the United States and the U.S.S.R.
SALT II does not reduce U.S. arms. It only sets a ceiling. With-
out such a mutually agreed upon ceiling, both countries would be
tempted to an arms race which would use scarce resources, divert
scientific research from avenues designed to benefit all human
kind, and in fact endanger rather than enhance the security of the
United States. Our Nation's security does not depend solely on its
military might. It depends as much on our economic stability and
134
fairness, our technical competence, and the faith of the people that
our Government is truly benefiting all its citizens.
The nations of the world, in 1978, spent more than a billion
dollars a day on armaments. We are informed that the World
Health Organization required a mere $83 million to eradicate
smallpox from this Earth. The United States now has an unaccept-
able rate of inflation, millions of its citizens are unemployed, and
perhaps more will be, almost 20 percent of the population is illiter-
ate. The true strength of a nation is the strength of its people. The
only rewards of an arms race with no limitations are widespread
moral devastation, cynicism, hopelessness, and possibly even the
end of civilization.
So surely limiting the arms race meets the interests of both
parties.
While pressing for the earliest possible approval of the SALT
accords, the National Council of Churches governing board af-
firmed that while we understand that SALT II does not provide for
more substantial arms reduction, it does provide a new and essen-
tial framework of parity for negotiating substantial and equal re-
ductions in SALT III, and further steps in the direction of general
and complete disarmament. It promises a new opportunity to con-
solidate institutions for halting the spread of nuclear weapons. The
success of SALT II would open the way to decisive progress on
other critical disarmament issues. It would enable our two govern-
ments, speaking of the U.S.S.R. and the United States, to share
more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic, techni-
cal, and cultural affairs. It would help to promote a new climate of
international relations in general.
Limiting the arms race by ratifying SALT II is an important
step, but it is only one step among many that must be taken. SALT
II limits the arms race. It does not reduce it. SALT II does not deal
with the vital matter of nuclear nonproliferation. It does not ban
chemical or radiological arms, but by limiting strategic arms, the
National Council believes SALT II helps to establish a climate in
which work in these vital areas can proceed.
The joint statement on subsequent negotiations, which is at-
tached to SALT II, established the framework for negotiating fur-
ther limitations and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms
and so on. Thus, the ratification of SALT II not only limits the
current strategic arms race but helps make possible negotiations
looking forward to an actual arms reduction.
And so the statement that the governing board of the National
Council affirmed expressed profound anxiety for the future of our
own and all peoples. It was encouraged by certain things that had
been taking place showing that the peoples of the world are calling
for disarmament.
Ratification of SALT II is not full disarmament or the establish-
ment of peace. But we believe it promises a new opportunity to
consolidate institutions for halting the spread of nuclear weapons,
opens the way to decisive progress on other critical disarmament
issues, and enables the governments of the United States and the
U.S.S.R. to share more fully in the constructive works of peace in
economic, technical and cultural affairs. Therefore, we urge ratifi-
cation of SALT II.
135
May I say that actions by this U.S. Senate can and do affect the
well being of all the world's peoples. We urge you to remember
that as you deal with this critical treaty I am sure you do, but we
would emphasize that for you.
And may I be bold enough to close with a challenge to you from
the book of Deuteronomy:
"I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse, said the
Lord. Therefore choose life, that you and your descendants may
live." This is the strongest feeling that we in the churches I think
have. It is embodied in that biblical quotation.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Randall, for an excel-
lent statement, I must say.
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES SPREADING WORD OF SALT
SUPPORT
I wonder what the National Council of Churches is doing to
spread the word. You clearly feel very strongly about the treaty
and the need for the Senate to ratify the treaty. But the Senate,
being a representative body, is influenced by the people who live in
each of the 50 States, and what is the National Council of Churches
of Christ doing to spread this message?
Dr. Randall. There are several things that we are doing. We
have staff and committees that work on these matters in trying to
get the materials and the educational information prepared. We
had this consultation in the spring for three days with church
leaders from the U.S.S.R. in which we were miraculously, I think,
able to make a statement together calling for this kind of under-
standing of the life and death matters that we are dealing with.
This statement has been widely used and is being widely dissemi-
nated, and I think has a strong religious appeal because of its very
basic religious tone.
In addition, I mentioned before you came back in that there are
22 church bodies that have made statements in support of SALT II,
copies of which are being sent to Senators.
We also are part of the coalition, the Religious Committee on
SALT II, which is one way we are attempting to consolidate our
efforts of education and information being sent out. And I have
been informed of the fact that this material and this kind of
education is beginning to spread around, and the interesting thing
is that when such education is made available to people, and the
opportunity to think along these lines, that there is a very real
appreciation and understanding and support for this direction, an
understanding of its limitations, but also of its necessity.
The Chairman. Well, I would expect so, but I am keenly aware
of the money that is being raised and the rather frenetic effort on
the part of certain organizations opposed to the treaty to saturate
the country with arguments and frightening charges with respect
to what the treaty would do. I don't think that advocates of the
treaty have done as much to try and get their message out.
The message you bring to us today is a splendid one, as I have
said, but I would urge you to do everything in your power to reach
your own membership with it.
136
Dr. Randall. We are urging, and have been urging the churches,
the individual churches to work through the many channels that
they have on this.
We are quite aware of the problem which you have expressed,
and we find that a difficult problem to deal with also since, as we
all know, the kinds of monetary resources which such groups have
are not available to the mainstream of the church in the same way.
But we have analyzed and are analyzing that situation, trying to
find those ways in which we can respond, go around or counterbal-
ance that very problem, and we shall continue to do more.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Dr. Randall. Thank you.
[Dr. Claire Randall's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Claire Randaul
My name is Claire Randall. I am general Secretary of the National Council of the
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.
The National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. is a cooperative agency
of thirty-two Protestant and Orthodox bodies in this country. I do not purport to
speak for all members of the communions which are constituent to the National
Council of Churches. I am speaking for the Governing Board, the policymaking body
which is composed of persons selected by member denominations in proportion to
their size. It is this group which determines the policy positions through which the
Council seeks to fulfill its expressed purpose "to study, and to speak and to act on
conditions and issues in the nation and the world which involve moral, ethical and
spiritual principles inherent in the Christian gospel."
The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has since its
formation 30 years ago given leadership in the Protestant and Orthodox churches to
the struggle for peace and justice. The Council came into existence shortly after the
world had witnessed the devastating effects of nuclear weapons, and its leadership
and the members of the churches ever since have been keenly aware of the danger
to all humanity posed by the threat of nuclear war.
In the Old Testament we are told to beat our swords into plowshares. In the New
Testament we are asked not to return evil for evil but to love our neighbors as
ourselves — and, in fact, to love our enemies. We seek peace, but only because of
these biblical injunctions, but because we believe these principles expressed in
action create the climate which leads to just, peaceful relations between peoples and
nations.
At its meeting in May, 1979, the Governing Board of the National Council of
Churches voted unanimously in favor of the ratification of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty. It is my purpose in this testimony to set forth some of the
reasons the National Council of Churches supports ratification. My remarks will be
related to the purpose of the Treaty as stated in its introduction: "Conscious that
nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind (Preamble, SALT
II Treaty, 1979), * * *."
The United States already has in its nuclear arsenal enough nuclear weapons to
kill every man, woman and child in the world, not once, but several times. Once is
too much. And even limited use of this power would visit devastation on future
generations as well as the present due to radiological contamination. The devasta-
tion of every major Soviet city by U.S. nuclear weapons might achieve what defense
planners call a strategic objective. But the winds that sweep 'round the globe would
bring deadly radiation to the U.S.A. even if no Soviet bombs explode in the U.S.A.
Such "devastating consequences for all mankind" must be prevented.
Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided
for in this treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between Parties,
help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen internationally
peace and security (Preamble), * * *.
In SALT II the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are mutually agreeing to limit strategic
offensive arms. Our country and the Soviet Union have opposing ideological, politi-
cal, and economic systems, but unless all humanity is to be endangered these two
major powers must find ways to improve relations. The Treaty provisions which
limit arms are of vital significance. But we must not underestimate the s5mibolic
importance of the two "super powers' " ability to reduce tension and danger by
mutual agreement— without resort to war. The ratification of the Treaty by two
137
nations with such opposing views give evidence to all the world that differences
between nations can be dealt with by peaceful means.
While the Treaty is a symbol of mutual trust it does not depend for its success on
mutual trust. Article XV provides for verification of compliance. The chief military
and intelligence officers of our nation have said the United States is capable of
verifying Soviet compliance. We believe the Treaty does, in fact, "help to reduce the
risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security."
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons (Preamble), * * *
In 1968 under pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union many
nations renounced nuclear weapons for themselves and joined the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Article VI contains a promise made by the super powers to make progress
in reducing and eliminating their nuclear arsenals and to move quickly toward
completion of a ban on all nuclear testing.
The Governing Board of the National Ck)uncil of Churches, in May, 1979, ex-
pressed profound concern about the danger of a precarious balancing of humanity
on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. We know that still more terrible weapons are
being developed which can only lead to greater fear and suspicion and thus to a still
more feverish arms race. Against this we say with one voice — No! In the name of
God— No!
Guided by the principle of equality and equal security (Preamble), * * *
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is ready to accept a treaty which
gives the other nation strategic offensive superiority. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.
weapons systems are not identical. Therefore, an element of judgment is involved in
determining parity. After long, careful negotiations, agreement has been reached
which most American military and intelligence leaders have testified provides
"equality and equal security." We note the United States now has almost twice as
many deliverable strategic nuclear warheads as the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. has
1,400 land based missiles versus 1,054 in the U.S.A. and 950 submarine launched
ballistic missiles to 656 in the U.S.A. Both nations in the Treaty have agreed to an
overall ceiling of 2,250 nuclear delivery vehicles by 1985, with equally important
sub-limits in various categories (U.S. Department of State, 1978). The agreed upon
verifiable limits, we believe, do provide "equality and equal security."
Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the
Parties and the interests of international security (Preamble), * * ♦
Without an agreement setting limits on the arms race there can be no strategic
stability. Each side will inevitably make huge investments to achieve what is
perceived as superiority. The fear that the other nation is achieving strategic
superiority has fueled the arms race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.
SALT II does not reduce U.S. arms. It only sets a ceiling. Without such a
mutually agreed upon ceiling both countries would be tempted to an arms race
which would use scarce resources, divert scientific research from avenues designed
to benefit all human kind and, in fact, endanger rather than enhance the security
of the United States. Our nation's security does not depend solely on its military
might. It depends as much on our economic stability and fairness, our technological
competence, and the faith of the people that our government is truly benefiting all
its citizens.
The nations of the world, in 1978, spent more than a billion dollars per day— 400
billion per year— on armaments. We are informed that the World Health Organiza-
tion required a mere 83 million dollars to eradicate smallpox from the face of the
earth. The United States now has an unacceptable rate of inflation, millions of its
citizens unemployed, almost 20 percent of the population illiterate. The true
strength of a nation is the strength of its people. The only rewards of an arms race
with no limitations are widespread moral devastation, cjTiicism, hopelessness, and
possibly even the end of civilization.
Surely limiting the arms race "meets the interests of the Parties and the interests
of international security."
Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the
further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general
and complete disarmament (Preamble), * * *
While pressing for "the earliest possible approval of the SALT II accords," the
National Council of Churches Governing Board affirmed: "While we understand
that SALT II does not provide for more substantial arms reduction, it does provide a
new and essential framework (of parity) for negotiating substantial and equal reduc-
tions in SALT III, and further steps in the direction of general and complete
disarmament. It promises a new opportunity to consolidate institutions for halting
the spread of nuclear weapons. The success of SALT II would open the way to
decisive progress on other critical disarmament issues. It would enable our two
138
governments to share more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic,
technical and cultural affairs. It would help to promote a new climate of interna-
tional relations in general."
Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to
limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms (Preamble), * * *.
Limiting the arms race by ratifying SALT II is an important step, but it is only
one step among many that must be taken. SALT II limits the arms race. It does not
reduce it. SALT II does not deal with the vital matter of nuclear nonproliferation. It
does not ban chemical or radiological arms. But by limiting strategic arms the NCC
believes SALT II helps to establish a climate in which work in these vital areas can
The joint statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotia-
tions on the Limitation of Strategic Arms which is attached to SALT II establishes
the framework for negotiating "further limitation and reduction in the numbers of
strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitations." Thus the ratifi-
cation of SALT II not only limits the current strategic arms race but helps make
possible negotiations looking forward to an actual arms reduction.
The NCC Governing Board's May 1979 statement expressed "profound anxiety for
the future of our own and all peoples." It was encouraged by the unprecedented
range of disarmament negotiations; by the strengthening of the more significant
measures taken by the United Nations for disarmament; by the renewed vitality of
nongovernmental organizations in the disarmament field; and by the indications
that the peoples of the world are calling for disarmament.
Ratification of SALT II is not full disarmament or the establishment of peace. But
we believe it promises a new opportunity to consolidate institutions for halting the
spread of nuclear weapons, opens the way to decisive progress on other critical
disarmament issues, and enables the governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to
share more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic, technical and
cultural affairs. Therefore, we urge ratification of SALT II.
Actions by this United States Senate can and do affect the well being of all the
world's peoples. We urge you to remember that as you deal with this critical Treatjs^.
Therefore, may I close with a challenge to you from the book of Deuteronomy: 'I
have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life, that
you and your descendants may live" (Deuteronomy 30:19).
NOTES
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation Df Strategic Offensive Arms, Vienna, Austria, June 18, 1979.
U.S. Department of State. SALT and American Security, November 1978.
Preamble to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union
OF Soviet Sociaust Repubucs on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
Vienna, Austria, June 18, 1979
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein-
after referred to as the Parties,
Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,
Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972,
Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and deter-
mined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972,
Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided
for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the
Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strenghten interna-
tional peace and security. . , ^ , XT T> 1 x-
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Prolitera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons,
Guided by the prinicple of equality and equal security.
Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the
Parties and the interests of international security.
Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the
further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general
and complete disarmament, r „lu i.
Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to
limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms.
139
The Chairman. Our last witness this afternoon is Albert Vor-
span, who represents the Union of American Hebrew Congrega-
tions here in Washington.
Mr. Vorspan, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee
this afternoon. I am sorry that you have had to wait so long. It is
now a little after 5 o'clock, so please proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ALBERT VORSPAN, VICE PRESIDENT, UNION
OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS,' ACCOMPANIED BY
RABBI DAVID SAPERSTEIN, DIRECTOR, RELIGIOUS ACTION
CENTER OF REFORM JUDAISM, AND COCHAIR, RELIGIOUS
COMMITTEE ON SALT
Mr. Vorspan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and despite
the lateness of the hour, I do want to thank you and the committee
for this opportunity. I am really grateful for this opportunity be-
cause I think what happened here this afternoon — I am grateful
that I had to sit through it, too — what I think happened this
afternoon is something which, to me, is indispensible to the SALT
debate — that this debate has been placed in a moral framework.
The issue of what is right, the issue of the future of the human
race has been voiced and echoed this afternoon not only from the
profound testimony of Roman Catholic and Protestant religious
leaders, but if I may say so, from that side of the podium as well.
And if I can say, I think we have all failed to some extent in
posing the issue in terms of these very fundamental dimensions. I
think most Americans, while they in general support the idea of
SALT, are intoxicated with and mystified by what they read about
this debate and these issues. And the reason I believe that the
discussion this afternoon was very important is that in my under-
standing of what SALT signifies, the testimony of the Cardinal, the
testimony of the distinguished Protestant leader, the testimony of
rabbis and other religious leaders are as relevant to the deepest
issues involved here as the testimony of a general or an admiral
presently serving or retired, and I am very grateful for the oppor-
tunity to have been part of that.
My name is Albert Vorspan. I am the vice president of the Union
of American Hebrew Congregations. This is the central body of
Reformed Judaism in the United States of America.
In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, being very conscious of
the weight of discussions here, including many repetitive discus-
sions, I am going to be very brief. I would like the opportunity to
submit a longer, more detailed statement for the record.
The Chairman. Of course.
Mr. Vorspan. But I will only spend a few minutes summarizing
in sharp telescope some of the things that seem to me to be very
important.
The organization that I represent includes 720 Reform syna-
gogues throughout the United States, roughly 1 million members.
Like the distinguished people who sat here earlier today, I do not
pretend for one moment that every member of every one of those
synagogues shares the view adopted by the board of the Union. But
I do say that it was very significant that after a study of an entire
year, with proponents and opponents of the SALT Treaty being
' See page 143 for Mr. Vorspan's prepared statement.
48-260 0-79 Pt.i+ - 10
140
brought before our group, in the end, the decision that was made
was a unanimous decision, I think an enthusiastic decision, and I
think, the onus is on us as it is on every other religious group to
bring that message to our people, to the people in this country, and
to oppose it in terms of the issues of choosing life.
With me today is Rabbi David Saperstein, who is the director of
the Religious Action Center of the Union of American Hebrew
Congregations here in Washington. I want to echo what has been
said, but I will do it very, very briefly. I think many Americans
have been led to believe that the choice faced by the Senate and
the American people is a choice between SALT II and some ideal
treaty. The choice, as I think we have heard it today, is that
however disappointed many of us are that SALT II does not go
nearly far enough, that SALT II is in some measures almost cos-
metic and atmospheric; despite that, what we are talking about is a
SALT II compared to what? And it seems to me that the "com-
pared to what" is the nightmare of chaos which can lead ultimate-
ly, inevitably only to profound tragedy for the human race.
I am one of those who shares the disappointment that this step is
too small, but I am also one of those who believes that this treaty
must be weighed against events happening in an onrushing way
every minute of the day. SALT II cannot be seen in a vacuum
because it seems to me that forces are converging on us, on all the
human beings on this planet which make it absolutely essential
someday, somehow, for the human race to get a handle on this
struggle. And those events include the following: The immense size
of the superpowers' arsenal; the fact that the nuclear club is ex-
pected to increase sevenfold by the year 1990, from 5 to 35 nations;
the massive resort by dozens of countries to nuclear technology as
an energy source following the energy crisis of 1973 and 1974; the
mounting prospects of the utilization by terrorist groups of stolen
fissionable material, or even tactical nuclear weapons; the rising
curves of hostility and violence in regions such as Southeast Asia,
the Korean Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa, and
Latin America, and the potential that these tensions can trigger or
escalate a nuclear conflict; the ongoing conventional and nuclear
arms race, reaching $400 billion in military expenditures this year
alone; the lack of firm or coherent policies of security and disarma-
ment at the highest levels of the Government of the United States
and U.S.S.R.
I share with the distinguished witnesses who sat here earlier
today the belief that mankind faces, as the Senate faces, a penulti-
mate choice, a moment of truth, the kind of choice which God set
out for us in the book of Deuteronomy: "I have set before you this
day the blessing and the curse, life and death, good and evil.
Therefore, choose life in order that you may live."
I speak also as a representative of a Jewish organization and
that Jewish organization has deep concerns about our fellow broth-
ers and sisters in all parts of the country, and one of the aspects of
this debate which resonates within the Jewish community is the
question: Does our support for SALT II relate to our concern for
Soviet Jewry and progress toward peace in the Middle East and
would it be good or bad for those issues? Proponents of linkage
argue that we should refuse to ratify SALT II unless the U.S.S.R.
141
improves its human rights performance and supports progress
toward peace in the Middle East. Deep as is our concern for Jews
in the Soviet Union and other people in the Soviet Union, deep as
is our commitment to peace in the Middle East, we believe that
SALT II must be examined and measured and judged on its own
merits. Our support for SALT II in no way signifies our approval of
Soviet domestic or international policies. The SALT Treaty is of
momentous intrinsic moral and strategic interest. It is deserving of
ratification on its own merits. If the world disappears into a nucle-
ar holocaust, our concerns for human rights and peace become
irrelevant. Human life is the ultimate civil and human right.
In fact, however, SALT II can only help to improve the situation
of Soviet Jewry and other dissidents, and others seeking to emi-
grate. Recently Senator Kennedy put this problem to Andrei Sak-
harov, one of the truly courageous fighters for human rights in the
Soviet Union. Senator Kennedy reported, and I quote.
When I met last year with Andrei Sakharov in Moscow he stressed that the
greatest threat to humanity and human rights is the threat of nuclear war. His plea
to us is to ratify SALT: not only to reduce the threat of nuclear war but also to
create the mutual confidence necessary to resolve the other important issues be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States. Let the advocates of linkage explain
how the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union will be served by Senate refusal
to ratify SALT.
I firmly believe that it is in the interest of Jews in the Soviet
Union, of persons of all religious faiths, seeking liberalization and
seeking the right to emigrate, if the stability that is involved in
SALT II can be formalized and extended.
I want to conclude, Mr. Chairman, by indicating that I believe
religious organizations in this country and the U.S. Senate share in
one sense a certain responsibility, and that responsibility is what
you, Mr. Chairman, spoke to, I believe with great eloquence, earlier
today.
One of the great moments in my life in dealing with public issues
in the United States was on that day when Protestant, Catholic
and Jewish religious bodies stood together in this Chamber, in this
Senate, to speak for civil rights at a time when that issue was in
danger of becoming embroiled in political considerations only. And
I think SALT is in a similar condition today.
And I want to pledge at least for my small group that we will do
all in our power to raise the moral issue, to educate our people, to
expose them to both sides and to deal with the fundamental reli-
gious and moral message which I believe SALT bears for the
human race. What this Senate can say can be a proclamation
heard throughout the world, a proclamation unlike that made by a
person named Isaiah centuries ago, that the joint benefits for both
sides outweigh even deep differences, that there are ways besides
bloodshed for nations to redress grievances and resolve disputes,
that nations need not be prisoners and hostages of a bitter, unre-
mitting past. We can be the shapers of a better world and a more
hopeful future, that humankind is not inexorably doomed to repeat
the disasters of history. What always was, need not always be.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Vorspan.
I have been reading from your statement parts that you were
unable to recite in order to save time. I must say that it is an
142
extremely moving and profound statement, and I would want it to
appear in the record in its entirety.
Mr. VoRSPAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You made an argument that is often overlooked
which is that the most fundamental human right of all is the right
to exist. The development of nuclear weapons has put the right of
existence in jeopardy, the existence of our people, our national
civilization, that of the Soviet Union, and indeed, who knows,
depending upon the scope and ferocity of the nuclear holocaust, a
full scale nuclear exchange, perhaps the survival of the human
race itself. And all other rights, however important they may be to
the condition of life, rest upon that base.
Mr. VoRSPAN. I made that argument not as a unilateral disarma-
ment advocate in any way, but I do believe that there is a kind of a
readiness, a kind of a weariness that prepares people for talking in
terms of 10 million, 20 million, 40 million, 60 million in ways in
which those figures lose all sense of meaning whatsoever. And then
somebody comes along and says well, we have miscalculated, there
is a way to survive this thing. It really is only 35 million. But there
is an obscenity involved in that, and I think it is the weary accept-
ance of the fundamental premise of the way we have been doing
business as a civilization, about which I am talking now. And
therefore I think that the reverence for life, the concern for the
preciousness of life, while it sounds like a cliche and a sermon that
we ask clergymen to come and deliver to us, is really the heart of
the matter that we are talking about.
So I am grateful to you for your question.
The Chairman. I think that the answer must be found in the
mutual recognition of the foolishness and futility of an unre-
strained nuclear arms race, and the need for both the United
States and the Soviet Union as the two so-called superpowers to
not only check the acceleration of nuclear arms, but to begin to
reverse the trend, reduce the danger, and ultimately, if a sufficient-
ly effective inspection and control system can be devised, to elimi-
nate nuclear weapons entirely from the face of the Earth.
When you consider the importance of that goal and how far we
are from it, SALT II becomes a very small step indeed, but it is
something, it moves in the right direction, and it keeps the journey
alive.
Mr. VoRSPAN. The alternative to it, if I may say so, may doom
forever the possibility of the kind of dream and the kind of vision
we have been talking about here.
The Chairman. There is that risk.
No one knows for sure but there is that risk.
Thank you very much for your statement.
Mr. VoRSPAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Javits.
Senator Javits. Thank you.
Thank you very much also, Mr. Vorspan. I join the chairman in
the observations which he has made and I assure you that it is a
matter of deep gratification to me that there is such a parallel
approach between a Jewish representative here as with the Catho-
lic and Protestant representatives. I was not here when the Cardi-
nal testified, but I read his statement and I had a verbatim report
143
of it; there is an extraordinary parallelism. That, I think, is ex-
tremely gratifying. Of course, Dr. Claire Randall who testified for
the Protestant denominations took exactly the same attitude.
So I can only tell you that all of us here on this committee,
whether we are for or against the treaty, have the same motiva-
tion, and I think for Senator Church and myself and many other
members, you can be sure that we know that in this matter we are
trying to do the Lord's work. Therefore, it deserves, more than
diligence, more than skill, more than dedication; it deserves pas-
sion, which I am trying to give it and so is the chairman. I am very
impressed by your testimony and it is extremely useful.
Mr. VoRSPAN. Thank you. Senator.
[Mr. Vorpan's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Albert Vorspan
Good afternoon. I am Albert Vorspan. With Rabbi David Saperstein, the Director
of the Religous Action Center of Reform Judaism and co-chair of the Religious
Committee on SALT, I am here today to share with you the position on SALT II of
the Union of American Hebrew Congregations which I serve as Vice-President. The
UAHC represents over one million American Reform Jews in 700 congregations
throughout the country. After a year of investigation and discussion, the Board of
Trustees of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations voted unanimously in
favor of ratification of the SALT II Treaty explaining, in part, that "in keeping with
our mandate to 'seek peace and pursue it,' we see in the SALT process the most
realistic chance for checking an insane, wasteful and potentially catastrophic nucle-
ar arms race."
A JEWISH imperative
This is not the first time that members of the Jewish community have testified
publicly on behalf of arms control and disarmament. "They shall beat their swords
into plowshares and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword
against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." These words of Isaiah,
echoing down through the centuries have been eloquent testimony of our commit-
ment to disarmament. To ignore those words now is to impreil humankind. Since
Hiroshima the prospect of warfare has been raised to a qualitatively different order
of risk. We have always had warfare — but never the capacity to destroy human life
and to make the world unliveable. Nuclear warfare requires a moral revolution, a
revolution in which human life and peace must take precedence over worshipping
the idols of production, technics, strategic superiorities and the military-industrial-
complex. Because we address the issue of SALT II in this context, we have joined
with 26 other national Catholic, Protestant and Jewish groups in the Religious
Committee on SALT.
We all share a sense of the urgency of the time. Religious values must be given a
chance. If not it may well be too late. Increasing numbers of experts maintain that
nuclear war is likely by the end of this centry. This contention is supported by a
number of political and military factors in the world today including:
1. The immense size of the superpowers arsenal — the equivalent of 3 tons of TNT
for every human being on Earth.
2. A nuclear club that is expected to increase seven-fold by the year 1990, from
five to thirty-five nations.
3. The massive resort by dozens of countries to nuclear technology as an energy
source following the energy crisis of 1973-74.
4. The faltering prospects for a strong and stable non-proliferation agreement to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.
5. The mounting prospects of the utilization by terrorist groups of stolen fission-
able materials or tactical nuclear weapons.
6. The rising curves of hostility and violence in regions such as Southeast Asia,
the Korean Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa and Latin America, and
the potential that the tensions in these areas can trigger or escalate to a nuclear
conflict.
7. The on-going conventional and nuclear arms race, reaching $400 billion in
military expenditures this year.
8. The fragility of United States-U.S.S.R. detente.
144
9. The commitment on both sides to a quahtative build-up of increasingly sophisti-
cated strategic weapons which go beyond the reach of verification and threaten to
destabilize arms control negotiations, and
10. The lack of firm or coherent policies of security and disarmament at the
highest levels of the governments of the United States and U.S.S.R.
Thus today, we are faced in fact with precisely the choice God set out for us in
The Book or Deuteronomy, "I have set before you this day, the blessing and the
curse, life and death, good and evil; therefore choose life in order that you may
live."
Through the millennia, the Jewish tradition heis psiinfully developed a set of
values limiting war which must serve as our guide in evaluating this treaty;
1. The use of force is permissible for self-defense. Thus SALT II must be evaluated
in terms of legitimate U.S. security needs.
2. The goal of humankind is shalom. Shalom is more than the cessation of war. It
is the opportunity for national and personal fulfillment and completeness.
3. Any use of force must guarantee absolute protection of non-combat and civilian
populations.
4. Any use of force must be guided by a concept of proportionality which insists
that no more damage should be inflicted than is necessary to pursue the limited
goal of defense.
The dilemma of our age is that the values and positions described above are now
faced with a stark reality of new and incomparable proportions — weapons of mass
destructions which threaten to erase distinctions between offense and defense;
which if used would be a massive violation of the protection of noncombatants and
proportionality; which would eliminate the possibility of shalom-indeed, threatens
the very possibility of all of God's creation. Since any use of nuclear weapons
threatens these values, the goal of the American people must be first, the limita-
tion; then, the reduction; and finally, as President Carter pledged in his inaugural
address, the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Thus, SALT must be regarded as a
process which transcends SALT II and in which lies our ultimate security.
THE QUESTION FOR THE SENATE: ARE WE MORE SECURE WITH SALT II OR WITHOUT
SALT II
Will we be further along the path to achieving the values discussed above with
SALT II or without SALT II? After careful and lengthy evaluation, the UAHC
concluded that in every way we will be more secure when this treaty is ratified.
If SALT II should be rejected by the Senate it will be a serious set-back for the
cause of arms limitation and control. The SALT process provides the best hope for
arms control. It has been accepted by the United States and U.S.S.R. Recently, it
has been accepted by China. It is accepted by the rest of our allies who are members
of the nuclear club. Indeed, the leaders of these and many other countries have
called for the ratification of the treaty. The General Assembly of the United
Nations voted 127-1 in favor of SALT. The likelihood of successful renegotiation
with the U.S.S.R. of any substantive change is very slim. For this reason, the UAHC
would like to see the treaty passed in its present form with no amendments or
actions which would result in the need for renegotiation. A failure to ratify the
treaty would result in a major crisis of confidence among our allies and friends. It
would be a major set-back for detente between the United States and U.S.S.R. Thus
the failure to ratify SALT II would adversely affect American security.
Without SALT II, United States and Soviet military spending will rise even more
rapidly than now planned. Each side will redouble its efforts to achieve illusory
superiority. Dangerous and provocative weaponry will be developed and deployed.
Trends toward "limited" nuclear wars, massive civil defense programs and a garri-
son state mentality will ensue.
The economic costs to the United States and the U.S.S.R. would be enormous.
Between $30 and $100 billion more would be spent on military expenditures, by
1985. Balanced budgets and inflation controls would be sacrificed. The ability of the
United States to increase its security by providing employment and educational
opportunities to its citizens; decent health care and housing; and welfare assistance
which provides a minimally decent living — all these would be sharply undercut. The
result would be the development of an underclass of Americans who are out of jobs
and out of hope — filled with frustration and despair. Intergroup tensions would be
greatly exacerbated. The spirit and soul of America would be drained by its inability
to maintain a fundamentally decent quality of life for its citizens. No country which
erodes its internal strength can long endure — no matter how large its military
budgets and how great its military forces might be.
Without SALT II, we will be hurt strategically, as all of the compromises and
concessions made by the Soviets in the negotiations of this treaty would be lost. In
145
the sometimes mean spirited and hawkish tone of the recent debate over SALT II,
we have constantly emphasized the concessions we made and ignored the conces-
sions which .he Soviets made. Without SALT II:
1. The Soviets will have 3-4,000 missile launchers rather than the 2,250 to which
they have agreed (a reduction of 250 launchers for them).
2. We would have no common data base as opposed to that to which the two
countries agreed under the treaty.
3. The United States and U.S.S.R. would have a number of new land-based
missiles as opposed to the one allowed by the treaty.
4. We would face 20 to 30 warheads on some Soviet missiles as opposed to the
limit of 10 to which they have agreed.
5. There will be no production limits on the Backfire bomber as promised the
United States in an agreement outside the treaty.
6. The Soviets might have thousands more new warheads than they would have
with the treaty.
7. Whatever qualms the United States might have on verification, can any sane
human being believe that we would be more secure and more capable of verifying
what the Soviets did, if they had not accepted our counting rules; if they had not
promised to continue their policy of non-interference with our national technical
means; if they had not restricted their encryption of missile tests?
In the abysmal ignorance which our inability to monitor the Soviets would create,
the military hardliners in both countries would be strengthened. An atmosphere of
intense fear and mistrust would blanket the world. Efforts to negotiate further
reductions through SALT III or any other arms control agreement would be severe-
ly restricted. Successful negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty would be
unimaginable. Negotiations aimed at checking proliferation of nuclear and conven-
tional weapons would likely break down.
Despite the accusations of some SALT critics, the U.S. negotiators struck a fair
bargain in SALT II. They did not undermine our security. The Soviets agreed not to
limit our forward-based missiles. They accepted no limitation on air-launched mis-
sile range. They gave up their demand for a non-transfer clause. They gave up their
demand for a limit on ground-launched or sea-launched cruise missile testing. They
permitted an average 28 cruise missiles per bomber. They accepted limitations on
the upgrading of the Backfire bomber. They accepted our definition of what consti-
tuted a "new ' missile. While, of course, as critics of SALT pointed out, the United
States has made numerous concessions to the Soviets — compromise is the essence of
a successful agreement. Our negotiators have successfully embodied the notion of
nuclear parity in SALT II. This offers a real hope for reduction in the future.
THE SALT DEBATE — SO FAR
Indeed, the debate so far seems to have ignored the basic reality that the SALT II
Treaty has balanced the needs of two fundamentally different and asymetrical
military forces. The rhetoric of the debate has implied that for each compromise the
United States made, the U.S.S.R. must have made a similar one. Such a provision
by provision comparison is not grounded in reality. We must rather measure the
total effect of the treaty. It is the position of the UAHC that when this standard is
applied, the two superpowers have reached an accord which limits arms growth in a
way which protects our security and the security of the U.S.S.R.
The debate has been particularly distressing in two other ways. First, the debate
has lost sight of the goal of arms reduction and elimination. Instead, SALT II has
been used as a political football by those who would seek greater growth of the U.S.
nuclear arsenal; a higher military budget or would seek to end the SALT process
altogether. Senators who only a few months earlier had voted reductions in military
spending now demand, in banner headlines, a sharp rise in the military budget. If
SALT II is a bad treaty then no amount of spending will make it a good one.
More importantly, new weapons systems and increased military spending ought to
be decided on their own merits. For Senators today to lock the country into new
systems, new weapons and higher budgets for years to come after a couple of
months of debate on the SALT Treaty, does not appear to be the most responsible
way of dealing with the real security and defense needs of our country. The series of
extravagent pay-offs which marked SALT I should not be permitted to plague SALT •
II. We must be most careful to avoid the technological trade-offs of SALT I. Because
we led in certain types of technology in the early seventies — MIRV technology,
cruise missiles and large submarines — we exempted limitations on such arms. As a
result, the Soviets felt compelled to undertake a major "catch-up" program. Today,
the Soviets now are MIRVing their missiles. The result is that our land-based
ICBM's may soon be theoretically vulnerable to destruction on the ground. Today,
because we lead in mobile missile technology, we seek to set time limits on the
146
controls of mobile missile deployment and thus risk escalating the arms race into a
new and dangerous stage. We will soon introduce the unverifiable, destabilizing
cruise missUes into the strategic picture. The decisions on the M-X missile and any
other new system ought to be carefully evaluated on their own merits with a full
public debate after the SALT Treaty has been ratified.
Perhaps even more threatening in the debate has been the virtually unchallenged
contentions of those who would provide the United States with the capacity to fight
a "limited" nuclear war. This "counterforce" theory has increased its attraction as
the Soviets develop the capacity to target U.S. land based missile silos. The ability
to destroy accurately military nuclear targets raises the theoretical spectre of a
nuclear war which would inflict "acceptable" damage to industri£il and human
targets. Various basing modes of the proposed mobile missiles seriously raise the
spectre of a counterforce capacity.
Increasingly, the rhetoric of counterforce theory has been infused into the SALT
n debate. While counterforce theory presumes solutions to strategic and technologi-
cal problems which may be unsoluble in this century, as a religious presence in this
country we are more concerned about the devastating moral implications of this
theory. The counterforce theory creates the dilemma that by seeking to give either
country various limited strategic options, it makes the use of nuclear weapons more
thinkable. Because the effects of the use of limited nuclear strikes appear to be
selective, discriminate and controllable, strategic planning and analysis would
accept them as real options. If counterforce becomes a part of the strategic relation-
ship, the likelihood of nuclear war would greatly increase.
Given the present state of the arms race, both technologically and politically, it
seems more prudent to accept only those weapons and strategic doctrines that seek
to prevent any use of nuclear weapons; that renders them "unthinkable" in political
£md moral terms. Only from this position is it possible to begin reduction of strate-
gic arms in a reasonable, balanced and prudent manner, bring them more surely
under control; and decrease their significance and legitimacy in world affairs. This
is the theory of SALT, and SALT II is essential to its process. We believe that the
whole issue of counterforce theory deserves far more analysis and attention than it
has been given so far.
PAST SALT II
Opponents of SALT II have attempted to discredit the notion and the rhetoric of
the SALT process. We categorically reject such aspersions. The pursuit of peace and
the elimination of nuclear weapons must be a constant and continuous effort by all
of us. The notion of a process is inherent in SALT and we must look past SALT II.
The UAHC is disappointed in the modest limitations of SALT II. We would have
wished that this had been a treaty embodying real arms control.
Arms control must be the essence of the next SALT agreement. This goal should
be reflected in understandings and reservations to SALT II which would not require
renegotiations. The SALT II limits must be regarded as ceilings not as targets which
must be reached. There should be an explicit rejection of the concept of "limited"
nuclear war as an element of U.S. foreign or strategic policy. We should clarify that
we are prepared to seek meaningful bilateral reductions even before the expiration
of SALT II.
The symbolism of the Soviet dismantling of missile launchers without replace-
ment, as required by SALT II, must not be lost in the debate. It should be empha-
sized as the tjrpe of action that will take on real meaning in SALT III. Just this
week Senator Biden, upon returning from a series of meetings with Soviet leaders,
indicated that they were prepared for real reductions in future arms agreements.
The initiative created by those meetings must be seized by the Senate. The United
States should clearly set out its intentions as to how these two countries will
achieve real reductions and work for that goal as quickly and effectively as possible.
The example which the superpowers sets in controlling nuclear arms will have a
significant impact on future efforts to control horizontal proliferation of nuclear
weapons. No dynamic in the 1980's so threatens to destabilize the world and lead to
nuclear war as the numerical growth of those countries which will soon possess a
nuclear capacity. The United States and U.S.S.R. have succeeded in making the
possession of nuclear weapons a "status" symbol of power and influence in the
world. We must act dramatically to change that. Ratification of SALT II is an
important step in that direction. On the eve of the Second Non-Proliferation Treaty
Conference, rejection of SALT II would inevitably undermine any hope to check the
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries.
147
ISRAEL AND SOVIET JEWRY
As Jews, we have a special concern for our brothers and sisters throughout the
world. Repeatedly we have been asked how does our support for SALT II relate to
our concern for Soviet Jewry and progress toward peace in the Middle East?
Proponents of linkage argue that we should refuse to ratify SALT II until the
U.S.S.R. improves its human rights performance and supports progress toward
peace in the Middle East. We reject that notion. Our support for SALT II in no way
signifies our approval of Soviet domestic or international policies. The SALT Treaty
is of momentous intrinsic, moral and strategic interest. It is deserving of ratification
on its own merits. If the world goes up in a nuclear holocaust, our concerns for
human rights and peace become irrelevant.
In fact, however, SALT II can only help to improve the situation of Soviet Jewry.
Recently Senator Kennedy put this problem to Andrei Sakharov, one of the truly
courageous fighters for human rights in the Soviet Union. Senator Kennedy report-
ed: "When I met last year with Andrei Sakharov in Moscow he stressed that the
greatest threat to humanity and human rights is the threat of nuclear war. His plea
to us is to ratify SALT: not only to reduce the threat of nuclear war but also to
create the mutual confidence necessary to resolve the other important issues be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States * • • Let the advocates of linkage
explain how the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union will be served by Senate
refusal to ratify SALT."
To the extent that the United States can influence Soviet performance on human
rights it can do so best in an atmosphere of detente and cooperation. If SALT II is
defeated it is unlikely that the United States will have any impact on U.S.S.R.
policies regarding human rights.
The ability of the United States to act as a constructive partner in further
progress towards reaching a peaceful resolution of Mid-East problems will be
strengthened by SALT II as well. First, progress towards peace requires stability —
stability among the superpowers and relative stability among the parties involved in
the Mid-East conflict. To the extent that SALT II allows for continued stability on
the nuclear front, it permits Israel and its neighbors to focus on their regional
concerns.
Secondly, the danger of horizontal nuclear proliferation threatens to engulf the
Middle East in a nuclear confrontation. Recent evidence indicates that Pakistan,
which may explode a nuclear device in a matter of months, has been bankrolled in
its efforts to develop "the bomb" by Libya. Reports indicate that Pakistan will
supply Libya with nuclear weapons, in return for its help. No leader on Earth would
so threaten nuclear stability as would Qaddaffi. It would be difficult to determine
whether his weapons would be aimed first at Egypt or Israel. Such proliferation
poses a massive threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, to Israel's survival and,
indeed, to the survival of the world.
Finally, the strategic impact of the SALT Treaty would have little effect on the
ability of U.S. forces to maintain a deterrence in the Middle East to Soviet designs.
Indeed, by diverting limited U.S. budgetary funds from a senseless and endless
strategic weapons arms race, we can better strengthen our conventional forces
which would increase our capacity to help our friends in Europe and the Mediterra-
nean basin.
Thus, ratification of the SALT II Treaty will enhance the ability of the American
government to further both peace in the Middle East and the cause of human rights
in the Soviet Union. During the past year we have made significant progress in both
these areas. The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and the unprecedented
levels of Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. have been due in large measure to a
sense of stability in the relationship of the global powers. We cannot continue to
progress towards peace and freedom in the atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust and
intense superpower competition which would inevitably follow the failure of the
Senate to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Rather, the spirit of cooperation and detente
which would be furthered by this treaty is essential to such progress in both of
these areas.
conclusion: the responsibility of the SENATE
The United States has not yet met the issue of arms reduction and control as
firmly as the situation requires. Both the religious community and the Senate must
bear the responsibility for that failure. The religious community has not posed the
moral challenge of the arms race with sufficient clarity and immediacy to capture
the imagination and concern of the American people. The Senate has too often
permitted the SALT II debate to deteriorate into rhetorical battle of militarism and
fear.
148
Rabbi David Polish points out an insightful lesson in the story of Samson. Before
he was born, Samson's mother was told that he was to grow up as a mighty savior
of Israel. He was to be set aside as a Nazirite, as a special kind of person, dedicated
to God, forbidden to drink wine or to cut his hair. When he was born, he was called
Shimshon, meaning sunperson, symbolizing that the brightness of the very sun
glowed within his being. What great promise burned within this man who grew to
be a powerful figure and who, indeed, did rescue Israel from its enemies. But this
giant of a man, this dazzling, brilliant judge in Israel soon forgot the source of his
power and his greatness. He was tricked into having his hair shorn. He was
captured by his enemies. They put out his eyes. They set him to work in the prison
yard, grinding grain. Day in, day out, chained to a huge stone wheel, he trod his
blind course, round and round like a beast. Time passed, and his hair grew and his
strength was restored. On a festive day, when the enemies of Israel were all
assembled in their Temple, he made his way there with the aid of an unsuspecting
lad. Planting himself between two huge pillars, he pushed mightily agamst them,
and crying, "let me die with the Philistines," he brought the Temple and its
celebrants crashing down upon him.
What do we know from this episode? We learn of the tragic and fatal combination
of power and blindness. Samson was once the union of strength and vision. But with
vision gone, all that Samson could do was to feed his renewed strength with the
venom of revenge, destroying himself with his enemies.
The story of Samson is a warning to America. Our nation arose m this new world
like a special being, blessed and nurtured by the sun, the source of light and of life.
This giant of a nation was born in the midst of a struggle against tyranny and
consecrated to a higher order of political existence than had ever been known. This
nation was a kind of Nazirite among the nations, denying itself the temptations of
rule by caste and the heady wine of government by the few. It was endowed in its
birth with the might of the continent which it straddled and the vision which it
drew from its unique history. But we stand in danger of seeing the eyes of the
sunblessed giant gouged out, not by its enemies, but at its own hands. Its strength
cannot be impaired, but its vision can be mortally impaired. Nothing can be as
destructive as the well-meaning power of a bewildered and frightened giant. How
well our prophets understood this when they said, "Where there is no vision the
people perish." , ^ , , , .... t> .l -x -n
Together we can ensure that the United States does not lose its vision. But it will
be your decision as to whether the debate over this treaty will focus attention on
the necessity of multilateral nuclear disarmament. You alone will decide what
message SALT II will carry beyond its substantive provisions. It might be a message
that this is but one stepping stone in an inevitable escalation of nuclear prolifera-
tion. Or the message of SALT II can be a proclamation heard throughout the world:
That the joint benefits for both sides outweight even deep differences;
That there are ways besides strife for nations to redress grievances and resolve
disputes; „ , . .,,. .. v, i.u
That nations will not be prisoners of a bitter, unremitting past— we can be the
shapers of a better and more hopeful future;
That humankind is not inexorably doomed to repeat the disasters of history—
what always was need not always be. , „ , ,, j
Just as the Bible tells us "the effect of righteousness shall be peace so do we
know— from observation and intuition— that we who share this vulnerable planet
can never come into our full human inheritance until we can put bloodshed and
war behind us. SALT II can help us achieve this goal.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Vorspan.
Mr. Vorspan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. That concludes the hearing this afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 5:24 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 10:30 a.m., September 7, 1979.]
SALT II TREATY
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1979
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Glenn, Stone, Javits, and Percy.
Senator Percy [presiding]. The committee will come to order.
opening statement
We apologize to our witnesses for the delay this morning. Obvi-
ously, the events of the last few days have torn into the schedules
of many of our Senators, including our chairman.
Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee continues to hear
from public witnesses on the SALT II Treaty. This morning we
have a panel consisting of Robert Schmidt, vice president of the
Control Data Corp., appearing on behalf of the American Commit-
tee on East-West Accord, Dr. Herbert Scoville, who serves as co-
chairman of the New Directions Task Force on Arms Control and
Disarmament; Peter Baugher, testifying for the Ripon Society; and
John Carey, appearing for the American Legion.
Following the panel. Lane Kirkland will deliver a statement for
the AFL-CIO.
Gentlemen, I understand that you each have 10-minute oral
presentations. Your longer written statements will be put in the
record. After your presentations, the committee will direct its ques-
tions to the entire panel.
I think the best way to proceed is in alphabetical order. We will
hear from the American Committee first, followed by the American
Legion, and so on. Mr. Schmidt, if you would please begin, and as
the Senators pay reasonably good attention to the lights, we would
appreciate your keeping them in mind as well. They will be just a
friendly warning to you. I think when the yellow light goes on, you
have 1 minute left. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. SCHMIDT, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
COMMITTEE ON EAST-WEST ACCORD, WASHINGTON, D.C.>
Mr. Schmidt. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I
am Robert D. Schmidt, president of the American Committee on
East- West Accord, and executive vice president of Control Data
Corp. The group I represent today, the American Committee on
See page 153 for Mr. Schmidt's prepared statement.
(149)
150
East-West Accord, is a diverse one. On its board and among its
officers and members are people of international repute, represent-
ing academia, industry, the world of science, diplomacy, private
foundations, labor unions, the legal and publishing professions, and
lay people who believe that only through normalization of relations
with the Soviet Union can we maintain a workable and lasting
peace on this planet.
The American Committee has a strong and continuing interest to
promote the SALT process. We have a strong and continuing inter-
est to promote United States-Soviet trade. Both are essential. Trade
and the SALT process reinforce each other. They both contribute to
lessening those international tensions we know must be controlled
lest our acknowledged ability to destroy life on Earth as we know it
■jo ii'Til^fisriGH
The hearings on SALT II thiis far have placed primary emphasis
on military relations between the Unites States and the U.S.S.R.
Who is ahead in what weapon? Who will be ahead in 1985? Which
nation is likely to get a scientific breakthrough providing a mili-
tary advantage? Which nation is spending more for military re-
search and development?
Both societies put more effort and money into planning for a war
than on planning how to get along. Both societies act as though the
best way to preserve peace is to prepare for war. There has been no
apparent progress from this kind of activity. We believe that the
SALT Treaty represents some progress.
Perhaps the best way to preserve peace is to adopt a new strat-
egy that depends more on negotiation than confrontation.
I am not so naive as to believe that either the United States or
the Soviet Union is about to summarily transfer research and
development funds from military purposes to peaceful purposes.
Nevertheless, there are many activities we might carry on in
tandem with our potential antagonists which may lessen the likeli-
hood of military confrontation.
SALT AND UNITED STATES-SOVIET TRADE
One of those areas is trade. I emphasize the importance of trade
because the American Committee believes Senate approval of
SALT II is essential to preserve and promote a climate in which
nonstrategic trade, joint development of energy, and other projects
of common interest may be carried out to the mutual advantage of
both societies, economically and politically.
Trade is a path to understanding. It costs us nothing. It costs the
Russians nothing. Trade is engaged in only if both parties receive
benefits for themselves.
Granted that ill-conceived trade policies can generate negative
relationships among countries, nevertheless, as Prof Thomas
Schelling has written, "Aside from war and preparations for
war * * * trade is the most important relationship most countries
have with each other. Broadly defined * * * trade is what most of
international relations is all about."
Accepting the importance of trade in international relations, it
follows that an even-handed, realistic, and vigorously pursued
trade policy can produce positive results. Trade can be a weapon of
war or an instrument for peace; or put more delicately, trade can
151
promote confrontation or negotiation. That is for the parties to
choose.
If SALT II is rejected, the temptation to use trade as a weapon
which will exacerbate conflict will be very great. On the other
hand, if SALT is approved, trade between the United States and
the Soviet Union will be expanded, and the ability of the United
States to influence the Soviet Union in ways which will serve our
long-term security will be enhanced.
There is another benefit for the American economy that will
flow from a successful SALT Treaty. It is the benefit based on the
common sense proposition we all recognize, that both parties bene-
fit from trading. If we are moving ahead in the mutual control of
strategic weapons, the climate of United States-Soviet relations will
be propitious for expanding United States-Soviet trade. Our ad-
verse balance of trade over the past few years demands expansion
of our export market, including exports to the Soviet Union. We all
know of the importance of Soviet purchases of grain and the help
that that has given to balance our trade deficit with the world, as
well as to maintain farm prices.
We have not done as well in the export of industrial products to
the Soviet Union. Discrimination against Soviet trade imposed by
the Jackson- Vanik and Stevenson amendments and the use of
trade as a political weapon to try to force Soviet emigration policy
into line with our concept of free emigration have seriously im-
paired American sales to and purchases from the Soviet Union, to
the detriment of our economy and our political relations.
Furthermore, these measures have not, in my view, been as
effective as would have been the encouragement of mutually bene-
ficial programs in science, culture, and nonstrategic trade.
There is another advantage to the United States in expanding
trade with the Soviet Union. It is that our system of free enterprise
is so much more efficient than the Soviet system that in time I
believe we will promote greater Soviet awareness of western
values. Those of us who have spent substantial periods of time in
the Soviet Union over the past decade have observed changes,
liberalization, if you will, which we would have thought impossible
a decade ago.
For example, 10 years ago, the word "profit" did not seem to
exist in the Soviet vocabulary, at least with the people to whom I
spoke. Now, it is commonplace to discuss profit. Five years ago it
was not possible to discuss questions of joint ventures. Now a
number of elements of Soviet society are exploring ways to accom-
modate joint ventures.
Five years ago the Soviets never mentioned the Voice of Amer-
ica. Indeed, Voice of America broadcasts were regularly jammed by
the Soviet Union until 1973. Not so long ago, in Novosibirsk, half-
way around the world from my home office in Minneapolis, Minn.,
a Soviet scientist remarked to me about a news item he heard the
previous evening on the Voice of America.
Western views are beginning to seep into Soviet society.
SALT AND AMERICAN SECURITY
Thus far, I have emphasized the importance of SALT to the
expansion of trade and U.S. influence in the Soviet Union, and one
152
might believe that I ignore the effect of SALT on our military
strength. In the words of Secretary of Defense Brown:
National security is more than a matter of military strength. It includes economic
strength. It includes, in the case of the United States, our enormous agricultural
production. It includes our technological capabilities, and it includes also our self-
confidence, self-cohesion, and will.
So much of the emphasis in these hearings has been on what I
consider to be the exaggerated strengths of the Soviet Union that
we forget our own tremendous strengths.
Consider, for example, some of the security advantages we have
over the Soviet Union — borders with friendly nations, Canada and
Mexico. In contrast, the Soviet Union has as neighbors China and a
number of Eastern European ethnic groups always threatening
turmoil. Consider our NATO allies in contrast to the Soviet
Warsaw Pact allies. And consider the Soviet domestic situation in
contrast to our own, a situation well summed up by Prof. J. S.
Berliner, an eminent Soviet specialist at Brandeis University and a
member of the Harvard Research Center.
Berliner writes that Soviet policy is in a shambles and believes
that they have lost most of their sources of influence around the
world that they had once hoped to have, to the point that their
economy has lost its djmamism and is no longer a model for the
Third World or anywhere else.
"It is ironic," Berliner writes, "that they have only one major
source of influence left, military prowess. That should be small
comfort for all that they do not have."
I will skip some of my oral testimony because I see the red light
is on.
The Chairman [presiding]. It is always surprising how fast 10
minutes does go by. It comes to only about 4 pages of written
testimony.
Mr. Schmidt. Let us look at the assertion that the one major
source of influence left to the Soviet Union is military prowess.
In the last few weeks we have heard opponents of the SALT
Treaty repeat and repeat that the United States is behind the
Soviet Union in military strength. For that reason, opponents
argue, the U.S. Senate must reject SALT II.
This makes no sense to me for the simple reason that if there
were no SALT agreement there would be no limitations whatsoever
on the production of nuclear weapons by either side. With SALT,
for the first time, we have an agreed overall limit on the number
of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for each side — 2,250.
But it is not to the numbers and the footnotes of the SALT
Treaty to which Americans must look to determine whether the
treaty is in our security interests. We need, rather, to apply our
own commonsense.
Is it reasonable to believe that for 7 years the Russians have
managed to out-negotiate American representatives of three Presi-
dents?
Is it reasonable to believe that our Joint Chiefs of Staff would
recommend the treaty to the Senate if they thought it would
damage their security interests?
Is it reasonable to believe that all of our NATO allies would urge
ratification of SALT if they did not mean it?
153
Is it reasonable to believe that American security will be promot-
ed by a reversion to the cold war, that we are more secure in a
world of confrontation than negotiation?
Even if one believes the United States is behind the Russians in
some categories of weapons, or that we are inferior militarily
across the board, which I do not accept, the problem is the failure
of our own system to use our resources wisely to achieve a qual-
ity— rather than quantity — defensive strategy.
In conclusion, though SALT may not be all we want, we will
invite a disastrous escalation of the arms race if it is rejected, but
with the approval of SALT, I believe we will move toward further
arms reductions which we and the Russians want and need, and
there will be a basis for improvement in United States-Soviet rela-
tions in other fields as well, including trade.
Mr. Chairman, the American Committee on East-West Accord
has recently adopted statements on SALT II and on trade, and I
ask that they be included at the end of my remarks. Thank you.
[Mr. Schmidt's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert D. Schmidt
Mr. Chairman and members of the C!ommittee: I am Robert D. Schmidt, President
of the American Committee on East- West Accord, and Executive Vice President of
Control Data Corporation.
The group I represent today — the American Committee on East-West Accord — is a
diverse one. On its board, and among its officers and members, are people of
international repute, representing academia, industry, the world of science, diplo-
macy, private foundations labor unions, the legal and publishing professions, and
lay people who believe that only through normalization of relations with the Soviet
Union can we maintain a workable and lasting peace on this planet.'
The American Committee has a strong and continuing interest to promote the
SALT process. We have a strong and continuing interest to promote United States-
Soviet trade. Both are essential. Trade and the SALT process reinforce each other.
They both contribute to lessening those international tensions we know must be
controlled lest our acknowledged ability to destroy life on Earth as we know it is
unleashed.
The hearings on SALT H, thus far, have placed primary emphasis on military
relations of the United States and the U.S.S.R. Who is ahead in what weapon? Who
will be ahead in 1985? Which nation is likely to get a scientific breakthrough
providing a military advantage? Which nation is spending more for military re-
search and development?
Both societies put more effort and money into planning for a war than on
planning on how to get along. Both societies act as though the best way to preserve
peace is to prepare for war. There has been no apparent progress from this kind of
activity.
Perhaps the best way to preserve peace is to adopt a new strategy that depends
more on negotiations than confrontation.
SALT AND united STATES-SOVIET TRADE
I am not so naive as to believe that either the United States or the Soviet Union
is about to summarily transfer research and development funds from military
purposes to peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, there are many activities we might
carry on in tandem with our potential antagonist which may lessen the likelihood of
military confrontation.
One of those areas is trade.
' Officers and members of the Board of the American Committee are: John Kenneth Gal-
braith — Co-Chairman, Donald M. Kendall — Co-Chairman, George F. Kennan — Co-Chairman,
Robert D. Schmidt — President, Fred Warner Neal — Executive Vice President, Stephen Schloss-
berg — Vice President, Carl Marcy — Secretary-Treasurer & Co-Director, William Attwood, Meyer
Berger, Tilford Dudley, Joseph Filner, Curtis Cans, Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C, Vice Admiral
J. M. Lee, Jeanne V. Mattison — Co-Director, Stewart R. Mott, Harold B. Scott, Jeremy J. Stone,
Kenneth W. Thompson, Mrs. James P. Warburg, Jerome B. Wiesner.
154
I emphasize the importance of trade because the American Ck)mmittee believes
Senate approval of SALT II is essential to preserve and promote a climate in which
non-strategic trade, joint development of energy, and other projects of common
interest may be carried out to the mutual advantage of both societies, economically
and politically.
Trade is a path to understanding. It costs us nothing, it costs the Russians
nothing. Trade is engaged in only if both parties perceive benefits for themselves.
Granted that ill-conceived trade policies can generate negative relationships
among countries, nevertheless, as Professor Thomas Schelling has written:
"Aside from war and preparations for war . . . trade is the most important
relationship most countries have with each other. Broadly defined . . . trade is
what most of international relations is all about."
Accepting the importance of trade in international relations, it follows that an
even-handed, realistic, and vigorously pursued trade policy can produce positive
results.
Trade can be a weapon of war, or an instrument for peace; or, put more delicate-
ly, trade can promote confrontations, or negotiations. That is for the parties to
choose.
If SALT II is rejected, the temptation to use trade as a weapon, which will
exacerbate conflict, will be very great. On the other hand, if SALT is approved,
trade between the United States and the Soviet Union will be expanded and the
ability of the United States to influence the Soviet Union in ways which will serve
our long term security will be enhanced.
But there is another benefit for the American economy that will flow from a
successful SALT Treaty. It is the benefit based on the common sense proposition we
all recognize — that both parties benefit from trading.
If we are moving ahead in the mutual control of strategic weapons, the climate of
United States-Soviet relations will be propitious for expanding United States-Soviet
trade. Our adverse balance of trade over the past few years demands expansion of
our export markets — including exports to the Soviet Union.
We all know of the importance of Soviet purchases of grain and the help that has
given to balance our trade deficit with the world, as well as to maintain farm prices.
We have not done as well in the export of industrial products to the Soviet Union.
Discrimination against Soviet trade imposed by the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson
amendments and the use of trade as a political weapon to try to force Soviet
emigration policy into line with our concepts of free emigration have seriously
impaired America sales to, and purchases from, the Soviet Union — to the detriment
of our economy and our political relations. Furthermore, these measures have not,
in my view, been as effective as would have been the encouragement of mutually
beneficial programs in science, culture, and non-strategic trade.
There is another advantage to the United States in expanding trade with the
Soviet Union. It is that our system of free enterprise is so incomparably more
efficient than the Soviet system that in time I believe we will promote greater
Soviet awareness of Western values. Those of us who have spent substantial periods
of time in the Soviet Union over the past decade have observed changes — liberaliza-
tion, if you will — which we would have thought impossible a decade ago.
For example:
Ten years ago, the word "profit" didn't seem to exist in the Soviet vocabulary — at
least with the people to whom I spoke. Now it is commonplace to discuss "profit."
Five years ago, it was not possible to discuss questions of joint ventures. Now, a
number of elements of Soviet society are exploring ways to accommodate joint
ventures.
Five years ago, the Soviets never mentioned the Voice of America. Indeed, Voice
of America broadcasts were regularly jammed by the Soviet Union until 1973. Not
so long ago, in Novosibirsk (halfway around the world from my home office in
Minneapolis, Minnesota) a Soviet scientist remarked to me about a news item he
heard the previous evening on the Voice of America.
Western views are beginning to seep into Soviet society.
SALT AND AMERICAN SECURITY
Thus far I have emphasized the importance of SALT to the expansion of trade
and U.S. influence in the Soviet Union and one might believe that I ignore the
effect of SALT on our military strength. In the words of Secretary of Defense
Brown, "national security is more than a matter of military strength. It includes
economic strength. It includes in the case of the United States our enormous
agricultural production; it includes our technological capabilities; and it includes
also, our self-confidence, self-cohesion, and will."
155
So much of the emphasis in these hearings has been on what I consider to be the
exaggerated strengths of the Soviet Union that we forget our own tremendous
Consider, for example, some of the security advantages we have over the Soviet
Union— borders with friendly nations, Canada and Mexico. In contrast, the Soviet
Union has as neighbors China and a number of Eastern European ethnic groups
always threatening turmoil.
Consider our NATO allies, in contrast to the Soviets' Warsaw Pact allies.
And consider the Soviet domestic situation in contrast to our own— a situation
well summed up by Professor J. S. Berliner, an eminent Soviet specialist at Bran-
deis University and a member of the Harvard Research Center.
Berliner writes that Soviet policy is in a shambles, and believes that they have
lost most of their sources of influence around the world that they had once hoped to
have, to the point that their economy has lost its dynamism and is no longer a
model for the Third World or anywhere else.
"It is ironic," Berliner writes, "that they have only one major source of influence
left, military prowess. . . . That should be small comfort for all that they do not
have." (Taken from article to be published in the forthcoming issue of Commentary.)
Let us look at the assertion that the one major source of influence left to the
Soviet Union is military prowess.
In the last few weeks we have heard opponents of the SALT Treaty repeat and
repeat that the United States is behind the Soviet Union in military strength. For
that reason, opponents argue, the U.S. Senate must reject SALT II.
This makes no sense to me for the simple reason that if there were no SALT
agreement there would be no limitations whatsoever on the production of nuclear
weapons by either side. With SALT, for the first time, we have an agreed overall
limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for each side— 2,250.
But it is not to the numbers and the footnotes of the SALT Treaty to which
Americans must look to determine whether the Treaty is in our security interests.
We need rather to apply our own good sense.
Is it reasonable to believe that for seven years the Russians have managed to out-
negotiate American representatives of three Presidents?
Is it reasonable to believe that our Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend the
Treaty to the Senate if they thought it damaged our security interests?
Is it reasonable to believe that all our NATO allies would urge ratification of
SALT if they didn't mean it?
Is it reasonable to believe that American security will be promoted by a reversion
to the Cold War, that we are more secure in a world of confrontation than negotia-
tion?
Even if one believes the United States is behind the Russians m some categories
of weapons, or that we are inferior militarily across the board— which I do not
accept— the problem is the failure of our own system to use our resources wisely to
achieve a quality— rather than quantity— defense strategy.
In conclusion, though SALT may not be all we want, we will invite a disastrous
escalation of the arms race if it is rejected. But with the approval of SALT, I believe
we will move toward further arms reductions which we and the Russians want and
need, and there will be a basis for improvements in United States— Soviet relations
in other fields as well, including trade.
Mr. Chairman, the American Committee on East- West Accord has recently adopt-
ed statements on SALT II and on trade. I ask that they be included at the end of my
remarks.
U8-260 0-79 Pt.U - 11
156
PAGE FIVE JUST FOR THE PRESS
AMERICAN COMMITTEE POLICIES
ON SALT, TRADE, AND EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES.
The purpose of ihe American Commiitee is to strengthen public understanding of arms control initiatives, and to encourage
mutually beneficial programs in science, culture, and non-siraicgic trade beineen the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Committee
believes this course of action is the most effective way of furthering human rights, liberalized emigration policies, exchange of
information, and freedom to travel for peoples of all nations.
The Board of Directors of the American Commiitee approved the following statement at its meeting on April 18. 1979:
STATEMENT ON SALT
The Amencan Commiitee on Easi-Wesi Accord supporis ihe draft treaty negotiated between ihe United States and the USSR on the
limitation of strategic arms and sirongK urges ils approval by the United Stales Senate.
The stakes are high. Either we move ahead with arms limitation and reduce the threat of nuclear war. or we slip back into an era of
confrontation and escalating arms competition. The dangers of such a setback are obvious and serious. The increasing sophistication of
strategic weapons on both sides seems to accord an advantage to the side which stnkes first. Even if. as we believe, neither side would
coniemplate such a step, growing vulnerabilities would be exploited on both sides b> those wishing lo escalate ihe arms race,
■ The proposed ireai> is the culmination of efforis b\ four US Administrations — two Democratic and tuo Republican — to stabilize the
nuclear threat posed b\ each superpower against the other. These efforis have won the increasing support of the American pubhc; ioda\ four
out of five approve the effort to reach a SALT agreement. Just as Americans have a high siake in the outcome of ihe Senate vote, so do our
allies, who could — and probably would — be destroyed along with ihe two major powers b> a U.S. -Soviet nuclear conflict.
Any agreement limiting strategic arms must meet one overriding requirement; it must enhance the securiu of the United States. We believe
This treaty meets that requirement. The strategic forces of the United States and the USSR are nol identical; ihe\ differ widel\ in structure,
deployment, and weapons systems, as geography makes it natural they should. But the treaty will bring these forces into overall balance. It will
for the first lime cause a reduction in the stockpiles of strategic delivery vehicles. It will place restrictions upon development and deployment
of certain types of strategic weapons It will moderate arms competition between the two great powers and ihus contribute to the maintenance
of the present essential equivalence in strategic nuclear arms.
We regret that SALT II does not place more effective controls upon improvements in the nuclear arms permitted under the treaty. Ii does
not prevent the development of a counterforce capability on either side and thus prolongs the danger that mutual fears and suspicions could
precipitate nuclear »ar in a critical situation. It might even encourage more intense arms competition m weapon systems nol limited or
proscribed b\ the treaty. We therefore call upon both governments to reexamine their military concepts and strategies and to clarify and
cunail their commitments to existing and contemplated arms programs.
Despite these weaknesses, SALT II isanindispensablesiepin the continuing process of lifting from mankind notonly the terrible shadow of
nuclear war but the dcbiliiaiing economic burden of arms expenditures. The resources of both countnes are already strained by the need to
maintain and to strengthen their militarv establishments. Without further progress on arms control be>ond SALT 11. both nations will
increase their arms ex|>enditures. thus diverting human and material resources from uses beneficial to mankind, causing both countries to
overtax their financial and material resources and — certainly in the United States — contributing to inflationar> pressure.
A failure to ratify SALT II would not only undermine the strategic balance which is achieved by the draft treaty but would scuttle arms
control for years to come. The fears and uncertainties which would ensue would make even more difficult than at present the problem of
pursuing a consistent and effective foreign policy insuppori of US, interests around the world Above all. it would be widely interpreted as a
sign that the American people had lost interest in reducing U.S. -Soviet tensions and improving the prospects for world peace.
Approval of SALT II should usher in a new- era in U.S. -Soviet relations. It will reduce mutual fears and suspicions. It will ease the resolution
of disputes between the two nations. It will create an atmosphere m which trade and cooperation can prosper. In such an atmosphere lies the
greatest chance not only for world peace but for the sort of liberalization in Soviet society that we would like to see.
We recognize that SALT II will not produce any sudden or dramatic abatement of the U.S. -Soviet competition for world influence. But in
approving the agreement and in continuation of the SALT process lies the greatest prospect that both countries will carry on that competition
by peaceful means and reduce their reliance upon military power.
The SALT 11 agreement deserves the overwhelming support of the American people and of its legislative representatives.
STATEMENT ON TRADE j^,^. ^ ^^-j^
While welcoming reports that the Caner Administration is about to sign a trade agreement with China, the American Committee has grave
misgivings as to the agreements impact on SALT II.
We are deeply concerned that the U.S, be even-handed in its treatment of China and the Soviet Union with respect to extension of
Mosi-Favored-Nation treatment of imports from both nations. We believe it would be a grave mistake ai this time to take any action which
would be viewed either in the US,, China, or the Soviet Union, as tilting toward China. Any discrimination in the treatment of the two
communist countnes on matters of trade could onK damage prospecis for SALT II.
The American Committee is in fa\or of a Presidential waiver, under ihe authority which the President now posesses. to extend
Mosi-Favored-Naiion treatment to both countries and Amendments to the Trade Act which would honor U.S. commitments under the 1972
Trade Agreement to extend unconditional and non-di*.criminator\ MFN tariff treatment and Export-Import Bank credits to the USSR and
China simultaneous!)
The American Committee believes such moves are in ihe national interest of the United States and also of importance for the American
economv.
The Committee believes these moves should proceed at the same iime as Administration efforts to obtain approval of SALT II
157
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Schmidt, for an
excellent statement. I am sorry to have to urge witnesses to limit
their presentations to 10 minutes, but in order for the committee to
remain on schedule and to give members an opportunity to ask
questions, I think that is just going to be necessary.
Our next witness is John Carey. Gentlemen, we will ask for each
of you to give your statements, and then we will question the panel
as the Senators may care to do.
John Carey is the immediate past national commander of the
American Legion.
Mr. Carey, we are very pleased to have you here and to have the
benefit of your testimony this morning.
STATEMENT OF JOHN CAREY, PAST NATIONAL COMMANDER,
THE AMERICAN LEGION, WASHINGTON, D.C.»
Mr. Carey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to present the views of the Ameri-
can Legion on a matter of vital interest to our organization and to
the Nation. We are well aware of the situation in Cuba, where the
Soviets have deployed a combat brigade, including armor, infantry,
and artillery units together with combat support units. We believe
this constitutes a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. We also believe
that the presence of this brigade constitutes a military base prohib-
ited in the 1962 agreements with the Soviets.
The American Legion 3 weeks ago at its national convention
urged Congress to take whatever action is necessary to oppose
spread of communism within the Western Hemisphere. This fla-
grant stationing of Soviet troops in nearby Cuba certainly violates
the unanimous position taken by our delegates. Accordingly, we
urge this committee to postpone any further action on the strategic
arms limitation agreement currently pending until such time as all
Soviet combat troops have been withdrawn from the island of
Cuba.
All members of the organization, Mr. Chairman, are veterans of
wartime service, and many of us have personally experienced the
horror of war. As veterans, we realize full well that if conventional
wars are horrendous, nuclear war would be an unspeakable catas-
trophe for mankind. Thus it should not be surprising that we have
long supported the concept of strategic arms limitation. Our funda-
mental position has been that a strategic arms limitation treaty
should be equitable, should actually halt the arms race, should
reduce tensions and the likelihood of war, and should be fully
verifiable.
We have insisted that such a treaty should not place the United
States in an inferior strategic position. We realize that each of the
contributions made by the treaty is subject to violations, and that
many experts have expressed concern over what they consider to
be our Nation's limited ability to detect violations.
Our organization, although likewise concerned, feels that it can
contribute very little to any serious debate on verification since we
have no information on the highly classified intelligence gathering
techniques which would be the focal points of any such debate.
' See page 160 for Mr. Carey's prepared statement.
158
We are aware that it was determined at an early stage of the
SALT negotiations that the total number of missiles and warheads
could not be limited because of verification problems, and that
therefore the criterion becomes the number of launchers, but we
strongly recommend that the United States not abandon the princi-
ple of counting all nuclear arms during the SALT III negotiations,
even if that means demanding onsite inspection.
The treaty's prohibition on the production of any heavy missiles
is tantamount to legitimizing the Soviet throw-weight advantage in
its land-based ICBM's as gained through deployment of the SS-18.
We believe there should be a counting rule adopted under the
treaty as an adjustment for the awesome power of the SS-18. Each
SS-18 should be counted as more than one launcher.
This provision would not require dismantling any of the heavy
missiles, but would necessitate some changes in the makeup or
other components of the Soviet arsenal.
The American Legion is fully aware of how firm Soviet negotia-
tors have been in demanding full complement of the SS-18. It
therefore might be advisable for this committee to consider the
adoption of a new heavy missile counting rule with an effective
date perhaps in 1981 to allow the Soviets time to make the neces-
sary adjustments to their arsenal.
Our next major concern over the pending treaty deals with the
failure to include the Soviet Backfire bomber as a strategic nuclear
delivery vehicle under terms of the agreement. There is general
agreement that the Backfire can reach targets in the continental
United States by aerial refueling or making one-way flights. We
have two recommendations to make relevant to the Backfire
bomber.
The first is that the Soviet Union be required to sign and official-
ly acknowledge the letter presented by Secretary General Brezhnev
to President Carter which promised the bomber would not be de-
ployed in intercontinental mode and that its production would not
exceed 30 per year.
Our second recommendation is that the United States develop
and deploy a similar number of comparable aircraft. Another
aspect of the treaty that essentially disturbs us is the provisions
regarding encryption of telemetry data. The treaty prohibits the
encoding of radioed missile test data that would be needed to verify
compliance with the treaty. Each side, however, is allowed to deter-
mine whether or not such data would be needed to verify compli-
ance.
Our recommendation is that both sides formally agree not to
encrypt any missile test data.
We are also concerned with the treaty's protocol which bans the
development or flight testing of ICBM's from mobile launchers, and
the deployment of cruise missiles with ranges of more than 600
kilometers until the end of 1981, "will assume a life of its own,"
and that the United States will give in to Soviet demands that the
protocol remain in force during the course of SALT III negotia-
tions.
We recommend that the Senate approve an understanding or
reservation stating that the protocol will expire on schedule unless
this extension is specifically approved by the Senate. We agree
159
with the critics of SALT II who express concern that the treaty
may prevent us from transferring cruise missile or other technol-
ogy to our NATO allies. We believe it is necessary that the Senate
clarify U.S. intentions regarding technology transfer by adopting a
reservation or understanding. It is very clear to anyone who consid-
ers himself a student of arms limitation talks that our NATO allies
in Western Europe have more than a passing interest in the pend-
ing agreement.
Since the Soviets would rather the United States not assist
NATO in improving its defenses, especially in the area of nuclear
weaponry, they have disputed the United States' right to continue
to exchange nuclear weapons technology with Western Europe. A
Senate understanding that nothing in the treaty precludes a con-
tinuation of U.S. technology transfer with NATO would reaffirm
our commitment to the alliance, and would create Soviet uneasi-
ness over having a formidable opposing nuclear strike on the same
continent.
Mr. Chairman, the American Legion seeks an adjustment in the
procedure for reporting treaty violations. The treaty now provides
that all actual or suspected violations be reported to a standing
commission for consideration. We propose a reservation or under-
standing that would require a simultaneous reporting of all such
actual or suspected violations to the Senate for referral to the
appropriate committee.
Such reporting of violations would strengthen the United States
commitment for Soviet compliance with the agreement.
Our final recommendation to correct what we consider to be a
flaw in the treaty deals with the agreed statements and common
understanding. It appears as though these explanations of treaty
provisions have been presented as separate documents and there-
fore are not subject to ratification process. If this is the case, then
we demand formal Soviet agreement that these agreed statements
and common understandings be made part of the treaty text.
The treaty would be simply unmanageable without such an
agreement.
Mr. Chairman, we have called for several modifications to the
treaty, some of which seek amendments to the language, and
others which seek unilateral declarations by you and your col-
leagues, and there is little doubt in my mind that the American
Legion will be accused by some of proposing so-called killer amend-
ments and accused of trying to sabotage the treaty.
I began my statement by saying that our organization has
historically endorsed the concept of limiting strategic arms. I came
here today with that attitude, and presented these recommended
modifications in that spirit.
In fact, our organization would have been happy if both sides
were forced to reduce their strategic arsenals by 50 percent or
more, but of course we realize that such reductions ignore the
realities of negotiating an arms agreement in an environment of
unprecedented weapons production.
I have asked you to consider three amendments, to address the
ovei-whelming Soviet advantage in heavy missiles, to prohibit the
encryption of telemetry, and to insure that the agreed statements
and common understandings are legally binding. Up to this point
160
we have recommended certain amendments to the treaty, reserva-
tions by the Senate for weapons programs to help compensate for
Soviet strategic advantages. These measures alone, ho^vever, are
insufficient to ensure essential equivalence and effective deter-
rence.
As I mentioned earlier, our organization believes that the time
has come to reconsider our fundamental nuclear strategy. Again, I
shall have to skip in the interest of time, sir, and will say that we
are very concerned about the position of the United States people
and their apathy toward what may happen if a treaty is signed.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, we believe that although the SALT II
Treaty, if it is adhered to fully and in good faith, has certain
positive features, it also has a number of serious deficiencies. An
even greater danger than the deficiencies of the treaty, however, is
the prospect that the people of the United States will be lulled into
a false sense of security and assume that the treaty will eliminate
the likelihood of nuclear war.
We must realize that we can have peace only through strength.
The Soviet Union is already ahead of the United States in a
number of strategic areas, and by all projections we have seen that
the gap will grow in years to come. The American Legion will
consider support of the SALT II Treaty only if we are assured that
the United States will strengthen its defenses along the lines we
have outlined, and the treaty as amended and modified in the
areas that we have mentioned. Thank you, sir.
[Mr. Carey's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Carey
Thank you Mr. Chairman: I am Jack Carey, immediate past National Commander
of The American Legion. I appreciate the opportunity to present the views of The
American Legion on a matter of vital interest to our organization and to the
nation— the limitation of strategic nuclear arms. All members of The American
Legion, Mr. Chairman, are veterans of wartime service, and many of us have
personally experienced the horror of war. As veterans, we realize full well that if
conventional wars are horrendous, nuclear war would be an unspeakable catas-
trophy for mankind. Thus, it should not be surprising that we have long supported
the concept of strategic arms limitations.
Our fundamental position has been that a strategic arms limitation treaty should
be equitable, should actually halt the arms race, should reduce tensions and the
likelihood of war, and should be fully verifiable. We have insisted, however, that
such a treaty should not place the United States in an inferior strategic position.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty now before the Senate does not fully meet
those criteria, but before we enumerate the treaty's shortcomings let us acknowl-
edge that it does make certain positive contributions.
Although both sides— especially the Soviet Union— will continue to add consider-
ably to their nuclear arsenals, upper limits are established on the total number of
strategic launchers, the number of ICBM's and SLBM's and MIRVed warheads, and
so on.
The treaty restricts the number of reentry vehicles either country can install on
the various types of ICBM's and SLBM missiles.
The treaty prohibits certain basing modes for strategic launchers.
The treaty prohibits the placing in orbit nuclear weapons of any kind including
fractional orbital missiles. , j , i. *■ j
The treaty establishes maximum parameters for the development, testing, and
deployment of new missile types. , . , .
We realize that each of these provisions is subject to violations and that many
experts have expressed concern over what they consider to be our nation s limited
ability to detect violations. Our organization, although likewise concerned, feels that
it can contribute very little to any serious debate on verification since we have no
information on the highly classified intelligence-gathering techniques which would
be the focal points of any such debate.
161
Perhaps the most serious flaw in the pending treaty is that it covers not the total
number of missiles and warheads possessed by each side. The Soviet Union could
legally stockpile an unlimited number of missiles. Although the treaty pledges both
sides to a rather vague commitment not to develop a "rapid reload" system, the
Soviets can launch most of their missiles from a "cold launch" mode. Even without
improving existing technology, they could launch a second, or perhaps third, salvo
from their silos in a matter of hours. Furthermore, many of the reserve missiles
could be stored in such a way that they could be fired in place within a short period
of time. Then, of course, there is the possibility of outright cheating, of concealing
full-fledged launchers in violation of the treaty. In the event of a war or a major
crisis, the existence of such a "ready reserve" could give the U.S.S.R. an enormous
strategic advantage. o a t m ■ •
We are aware that it was determined at an early stage of the SALT negotiations
that the total number of missiles and warheads could not be limited because of
verification problems, and that therefore the criterion became the number of
"launchers". But we strongly recommend that the United States not abandon the
principle of counting all nuclear arms during the SALT III negotiations, even if that
means demanding on-site inspections.
Another glaring deficiency of the treaty is that the Soviet Union is allowed a
monopoly on heavy missiles— the SS-18. As has been pointed out numerous times in
the course of these hearings, those missiles will be sufficiently accurate by the early
1980's to pose a significant threat to our land-based ICBM's. While we realize that
equivalence does not necessarily require our nuclear arsenal be a mirror image of
the Soviet Union's, we strongly recommend that the United States urgently proceed
with the development, production, and employment of the M-X missile, which will
give us roughly the same hard-target capabilities as the Soviet Union and a highly
survivable back-up system to our increasingly vulnerable land-based ICBM's.
The treaty's prohibition on the production of any heavy missiles is tantamount to
legitimizing the Soviet throw-weight advantage in its land-based ICBM's as gained
through deployment of the SS-18. There are those who would argue that U.S.
advantages in SLBM and cruise missile technology provides an overall strategic
balance. However, we view the heavy missile prohibition under SALT II as an
inequitable provision and one which must be addressed. We believe that there
should be a counting rule adopted under the treaty as an adjustment for the
awesome power of the SS-18. Each SS-18 should be counted as more than one
launcher. This provision would not require dismantling any of the heavy missiles
but would necessitate some changes in the makeup of other components of the the
Soviet arsenal.
The American Legion is fully aware of how firm the Soviet negotiators have been
in demanding a full compliment of SS-18's. It, therefore, might be advisable for this
Committee to consider the adoption of a new heavy missile counting rule with an
effective date several years in the future to allow the Soviets ample time to make
the necessary adjustments in their arsenal.
The value of the SS-18 is fully realized when evaluating the most often cited
nuclear exchange scenario— one in which the United States accepts a Soviet first
strike from its land-based ICBM force. With continuing improvements in Soviet
missile accuracy we could expect to lose more than half of our retalj-^.tory capability
during such an attack while the Soviets would retain as much as 75-80 percent of
their strike potential. This indeed is a rather shocking possibility and one which
should encourage our war planners to reconsider the wisdom of accepting a Soviet
first/ st^riiC6
We believe that one of the most effective ways of countering the SS-18 is to
minimize the damage inflicted by the weapon through the adoption of a "launch on
warning" policy. It s rather obvious that Soviet weapons experts have built such
explosive power into the SS-18 for one reason— to give it a hard target kill capabili-
ty, the sort of hard targets found in and around U.S. missile silos. If we adopt a
policy under which the S'^-18 would strike an empty silo then we have (1) substan-
tially reduced the effectiveness of an otherwise inflexible weapons system and (2)
created some doubt in the minds of Soviet war planners; thereby, reducing their
confidence that a Soviet victory can be achieved as a result of nuclear exchange.
I will expand upon our justification for "launch on warning" later in my state-
ment.
Our third major concern over the pending treaty deals with the failure of includ-
ing the Soviet Backfire bomber as a strategic nuclear delivery vehicle under terms
of the agreement. There is general agreement that the Backfire can reach targets in
the continental United States by aerial refueling or by making one-way flights.
We have two recommendations to make relevent to the Backfire bomber. The first
is that the Soviet Union be required to sign and officially acknowledge the letter
162
presented by Secretary General Brezhnev to President Carter which promised that
the bomber would not be deployed in an intercontinental mode and that its produc-
tion would not exceed 30 per year. Our second recommendation is that the United
States develop and deploy a similar number of comparable aircraft.
Another aspect of the treaty that especially disturbs us is the provision regarding
the encryption of telemetry data. The treaty prohibits the encoding of radios missile
test data that would be needed to verify compliance with the treaty. Each side,
however, is allowed to determine whether or not such data would be needed to
"verify compliance." Our recommendation is that both sides formally agree not to
encrypt any missile data.
Putting this matter in its simplest terms, we know that the United States does
not engage in the practice of encrypting telemetry and that the Soviets have
promised not to encrypt any telemetry which would impede verification. It seems
only logical that both sides should agree to ban all encryption. Such a ban would be
a demonstration of Soviet good faith as well as a commitment by them to the
maintenance of a verifiable treaty.
We are also concerned that the treaty's Protocol, which bans the development or
flight testing of ICBM's from mobile launchers and the deployment of cruise mis-
siles with ranges of more than 600 kilometers until the end of 1981 will "assume a
life of its own , and that the United States will give into Soviet demands that the
Protocol remain in force during the course of the SALT III negotiations. We recom-
mend that the Senate approve an understanding or reservation stating that the
Protocol will expire on schedule unless its extension is specifically approved by the
Senate.
There are those who argue that the Senate already has the power to veto an
extension of this or any other treaty protocol. However, our reasons for seeking
such an expression by the Senate is to put you and your colleagues firmly on record
and to put the Soviets on notice that there will be no tampering with the Protocol
termination date.
We also agree with critics of the SALT II Treaty who express concern that the
treaty may prevent us from transferring cruise missile and other technology to our
NATO allies. We believe it necessary that the Senate clarify U.S. intentions regard-
ing technology transfer by adopting a reservation or understanding. It is very clear
to anyone who considers himself a student of arms limitation talks that our NATO
allies in Western Europe have more than a passing interest in the pending agree-
ment. The Soviets view themselves as a people surrounded by enemies — a percep-
tion which has led to upgrading the armament of Warsaw Pact nations in Eastern
Europe. The activity, of course, poses a direct threat to the NATO nations and
demands a realistic response.
Since the Soviets would rather the United States not assist NATO in improving
its defenses, especially in the area of nuclear weaponry, they have disputed the U.S.
right to continue to exchange nuclear weapons technology with Western Euroj>e. A
Senate understanding that nothing in the treaty precludes a continuation of U.S.
technology transfer with NATO would reaffirm our commitment to the alliance and
would create Soviet uneeisiness over having a formidable opposing nuclear strike
force on the same continent.
We believe that such a Senate expression would provide the additional service of
promoting a continental balance between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact
nations; thereby, creating a stabilizing factor. Maintaining a viable nuclear strike
force in Europe also gives the Soviet war planners yet another contingency to be
concerned with, a fact which we believe reduces the threat of nuclear war.
Another step we should take to bolster the security and confidence of our NATO
allies is to deploy updated theatre nuclear weapons in Europe to help offset the
Soviet SS-20 intermediate range missile, which was not covered by the treaty. By
the early 1980's the Soviets are expected to have deployed in Eastern Europe 300
SS-20's with 3 warheads each.
Mr. Chairman, The American Legion also seeks an adjustment in the procedure
for reporting treaty violations. The treaty now provides that all actual or suspected
violations be reported to a standing commission for consideration. We proposed a
reservation or understanding that would require a simultaneous reporting of all
such actual or suspected violations to the Senate for referral to the appropriate
committee. Such reporting of violations would strengthen the U.S. commitment to
force Soviet compliance with the agreement.
Our final recommendation to correct what we consider to be a flaw in the treaty
deals with the agreed statements and common understandings. It appears as though
these explanations of treaty provisions have been presented as separate documents
and, therefore, not subject to the ratification process. If this is the case— and we
defer to your ruling on the matter — then we demand formal Soviet agreement that
163
these statements and understandings be made part of the treaty text. The treaty
would be simply unmanageable without such an agreement.
Mr. Chairman, we have called for several modifications of the treaty some of
which seek amendments to the language and others which seek unilateral declara-
tions by your and your colleagues. And there is little doubt in my mind that The
American Legion will be accused of proposing so called "killer amendments" and.
accused of trying to sabotage the treaty.
I began my statement by saying that our organization has historically endorsed
the concept of limiting strategic arms. I came here today with that attitude and
presented these recommended modifications in that spirit. In fact, our organization
would have been happy if both sides were forced to reduce their strategic arsenals
by 50 percent or more. But, of course, we realize that such reductions ignore the
realities of negotiating an arms agreement in an environment of unprecedented
weapons production.
I have asked you to consider three amendments — to address the overwhelming
Soviet advantage in heavy missiles; to prohibit the encryption of telemetry; and to
insure that agreed statements and understandings are legally binding. The first of
these creates obvious negotiating difficulties but the existing treaty provisions
simply guarantee the Soviets a superior hard target kill capability which must be
addressed in one of the ways we've recommended. The issue of heavy missiles will
continue to be a problem during SALT III and beyond unless we stand firm. The
second and third recommended amendments do not seek any significant changes in
the terms of the treaty. They are honest attempts at (1) making the agreement more
verifiable and (2) insuring that its provisions are precise enough to be manageable.
Up to this point we have recommended certain amendments to the treaty, reser-
vations by the Senate, or weapons programs to help compensate for Soviet strategic
advantages. These measures alone, however, are insufficient to assure "essential
equivalence" and effective deterrence. As I mentioned earlier, our organization
believes that the time has come to reconsider our fundamental nuclear strategy.
Our present strategy essentially dates back to the early 1960's when Defense
Secretary McNamara ordered a study to, for the first time, determined the specific
criteria of effective deterrence to serve as a guide for U.S. nuclear war planners. We
wanted to determine how much capability the United States would need, after
absorbing a Russian first strike, to retaliate and inflict "unacceptable damage" on
the Soviet Union. His planners concluded that the "unacceptable damage" thresh-
hold was the destruction of 20-25 percent of Russia's population and at least 50
percent of its industrial capacity. Any capability beyond that would be "overkill"
and could only "rearrange the rubble".
McNamara s "Assured destruction" led to the concept of MAD (Mutual Assured
Destruction) toward the end of the 1960's, by which time the Soviet Union had
developed a roughly equivalent strategic posture. The MAD concept denies any
significance to superiority in force levels, makes "sufficiency" the standard of deter-
rent capability, and requires that deterrence be mutual. Professor Richard Pipes
summed up the MAD concept with the ironic comment that "to feel secure the
United States actually requires the Soviet Union to have the capacity to destroy it".
To avoid upsetting mutual deterrence, the MAD concept requires that neither side
should threaten the survivability of the other's retaliatory forces.
U.S. nuclear strategy underwent another modification in 1974, when Defense
Secretary James Schlesinger, who continued to adhere to the Assured Destruction
concept, made explicit a second goal, that the U.S. Strategic forces should be
capable of limited attacks on selected economic or military targets, to provide the
President with "limited nuclear options" in situations short of an all-out nuclear
strike on U.S. cities.
During a recent appearance before this committee, Defense Secretary Brown
stated that, "We have today . . . survivable forces capable of massive destruction of
Soviet cities and industry, even after an all-out surprise attack on our forces by the
Soviets. We also have both the forces and the targeting and employment policies to
allow selective use of nuclear force to respond to more limited provocations". Thus
the Carter administration essentially retains the strategy of the previous adminis-
tration, the concept of assured destruction tempered with the concept of "limited
nuclear options".
It is evident that since the early 1960's we have taken what is essentially a
"second strike" posture. We have indicated, directly and indirectly and at the
highest levels, that we would absorb a first strike, and our basic strategy has
centered around that assumption. In recent months, high-ranking U.S. officials have
on several occasions sought to suggest that the United States might not absorb the
first blow, but in each instance they have hastened to add" of course, that is not our
164
policy", or some other disclaimer. If their intent was to inject an element of doubt
into the minds of Soviet war planners, it is doubtful that they have succeeded.
The only problem with the Mutual Assured Destruction thesis is that it is not
mutual. Western experts on Soviet military thought agree almost unanimously that
Soviet strategists have never regarded nuclear war as unthinkable or unwinnable.
In the words of one American analyst. "The only Soviet 'doctrine' is found in its
concept of fighting and winning nuclear wars".
Thus the Soviets refuse to accept any concept that would increase Soviet vulner-
ability, and believe that "deterrence" cannot lead to "victory" and that there is no
sense in absorbing an enemy strike merely to retaliate. During the SALT I negotia-
tions, the American delegation officially disavowed the "launch on warning' con-
cept which, it claimed, could result in automatic escalation or even in starting a
nuclear war by accident. But efforts to elicit a statement on Soviet policy toward
"launch on warning" met with silence. The only Soviet response was that such
matters went beyond the proper scope of the SALT talks.
Soviet military writers have clearly and consistently indicated that the Soviet
Union will, if attacked, "launch on warning". That policy was affirmed by Secretary
Brezhnev at the 24th Congress of the CPSU: "Any potential aggressor is well aware
that any attempt to launch a missile attack on our country would be met by
devastating retaliation." This fundamental difference in strategic outlook helps
explain the Soviet Union's relative lack of concern over the vulnerability of its
ICBM silos. At present, its land-based ICBM's carry about 70 percent of its strategic
warheads, which account for more than 80 percent of its megatonnage. In contrast,
U.S. ICBM's account for about 35 percent of our megatonnage.
Offensively, the Soviet Union has increasingly emphasized the deployment of
"hard target killers" — very large and accurate ICBM's such as the SS-18 s — which
according to the MAD doctrine are "destabilizing". As has been pointed out many
times in the course of the Senate SALT II hearings, by the early 1980's the Soviet
Union, with the improved accuracy of its powerful missiles, will be capable of
launching a counterforce strike that could well destroy 90 percent of our land-based
ICBM's (which account for about 35 percent of our megatonnage), at least half of
our B-52's (which carry about half of our total nuclear explosive power), and
perhaps one-third of our nuclear submarines. As a result, our total megatonnage
would be reduced by about 60 percent with the expenditure of only about 20 percent
of the Soviet nuclear force. The number of remaining U.S. ICBM's, SLBM's, and
bombers that could reach targets in the Soviet Union would be reduced by normal
systems failures (about 15 percent), improved Soviet anti-bomber and anti-subma-
rine capabilities, and ABM s. The damage the United States could inflict on the
Soviet Union would be further limited by the Soviet civil defense system, which is
not so much intended to cope with an all-out attack on its urban/industrial centers
as to minimize the damage that might result from U.S. strategic forces that have
been significantly reduced by a Soviet first strike and by active Soviet defenses.
Since it would, for example, require more than 100 SLBM's on target to inflict 40
percent damage on a city the size of Leningrad, it is quite possible that we would
not be capable of inflicting "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet Union with our
surviving forces, largely highly vulnerable B-52's and relatively inaccurate SLBM's.
That would be especially true if we had to expend a significant percentage of our
remaining delivery vehicles on counterforce targets. But our major concern is that
in view of the enormous nuclear disparity between the United States and the Soviet
Union following a Soviet first strike our leadership, especially if the Soviets left
many major U.S. population centers untouched as "second strike hostages", may
decide not to retaliate.
Instead of opting for a "surgical" first strike aimed only at our strategic nuclear
forces, the Soviets might attempt to strike a "knock out" blow, to paralyze the
United States by destroying all significant military targets, communications instal-
lations, transportation hubs, airfields, ports, refineries, power plants, governmental
centers, etc. 'The prospect that the Soviets might opt for more than our ICBM silos
on a first strike was reinforced by the late Marshal Krylov, Commander of Strategic
Rocket Forces, who in one of the most authoritative public comments on Soviet
targeting strategy, revealed that the principal targets of his forces would be the
enemy's delivery systems and weapons storage and manufacturing sites, military
installations, military industries and centers of political-military administration,
command and control. Such a massive assault by as many as 10,000 warheads (the
Soviets are expected to have deployed about 14,000 warheads by the early 1980's
might leave us with little capability or will to retaliate.
It should be pointed out that the first half of the 1980's, during which time the
Soviets will be capable of launching a perhaps decisive counterforce strike, will
precede the scheduled deployment phase of the M-X missile system (1986-1989). It
165
will also coincide with the period during which about half of the Polaris-Poseidon
fleet may have to be retired but before the full Trident fleet has been put into
service.
In our view, the most effective way of countering the vulnerability, of preventing
our ICBM's from being knocked out, assuring the maintenance of essential equiv-
alence and effective deterrence, and lessening the temptation for the Soviet Union
to launch a counterforce or nation-paralyzing first strike, would be to adopt a
"launch on warning" posture. The adoption of such a policy would also help nullify
any strategic advantages the Soviet Union might obtain by violating the SALT II
Treaty^ by concealing more than the stipulated number of launchers, by increasing
the number of reentry vehicles in MIRVed warheads, and so forth. In other words,
no matter what the Soviet Union did would be assured of an effective deterrent.
Those who oppose the "launch on warning" policy cite two principal objections.
One is the danger of accidental war, that our radar and monitoring systems are not
sufficiently reliable. We believe that there is virtually no chance of such an "acci-
dent". General James C. Hill, Commander of NORAD/ADCOM, recently remarked
that, "We do have the capability now to detect and assess a large-scale ICBM attack
on the United States — and so notify the President," although he warned that there
are deficiencies if the objective is to extend launch on warning to flexible response
and similar kinds of graduated retaliatory actions. Our ICBM warning network
consists of a number of redundant systems. First, there are the early warning
satellites which detect missile firings at the moment of launch. Confirmation and
assessment are provided by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System [BMEWS].
The Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System (formerly part of
the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system) has been integrated into our ICBM
warning system. In addition, the PAVE PAWS coastal phased array radar system
provide radar confirmation and assessment of SLBM launches to corroborate early
detection by early warning satellite systems. We should give the highest priority to
further improving our monitoring and communications systems, with the goal of
eliminating, to the extent that is humanly possible, the chance of accidental war.
The second major objection to a "launch on warning" policy is that it would
restrict the President's ability to employ limited nuclear options. In the words of
Secretary Brown, "While I have serious doubts about whether a nuclear war, once
started, could be kept limited, it would be imprudent to place the United States in a
position in which uncontrolled escalation would be the only course we could follow.
Massive retaliation may not be appropriate, nor will its prospect be sufficiently
credible in all circumstances to deter the full range of actions we seek to prevent."
We take issue with the views that a launch on warning policy is destabilizing or
may prevent uncontrolled escalation. In the first place, the Soviet Union now has,
and has long had, such a policy. Second, if there is a destabilizing factor in the
nuclear deterrence equation it is that Soviet war planners may be at least 90
percent certain that, according to our present policy, we would absorb a first strike
no matter what its magnitude. That could tempt the Soviet Union to try for a
"knock out" blow. The possibility of their opting for such a course would be greatly
diminished if they knew that their missiles would impact on empty silos.
Furthermore, we believe that there is little likelihood that the Soviet Union
would play our game of "limited nuclear options". They would in all likelihood
attempt to inflict maximum military-economic damage on the first strike, although
perhaps leaving certain population centers "hostage" to a second strike. We would
be left with shattered military forces, a shattered economy, and a bag full of limited
nuclear options.
In sum, we believe that the United States can no longer afford to pursue a
strategic policy that would oblige us to absorb a first strike. We must make it clear
to the Soviet Union and while we will not be the first to start a nuclear war, we are
prepared to retaliate immediately. This would decrease the likelihood of nuclear
war, not increase it.
Although the adoption of a "launch on warning" posture would go a long way
toward assuring that we could maintain an effective deterrent, we realize that at
the crucial moment the President may fail to act or that there may be some
breakdown in the communications link. We, therefore, believe that the M-X pro-
gram would be a good investment. It would provide the United States with a highly
survivable back-up system and with an accurate, powerful hard-target system simi-
lar to that of the Soviet Union. But deployment of the M-X system alone is not
enough. We must recommit ourselves to the modernization of our strategic Triad—
the concept developed as the basis for providing the President certain options
during a crisis. The survivability and strike capability of our submarine fleet are
matters of debate as the aging Polaris and Poseidon ships quickly approach their
166
scheduled retirement dates. The schedules for full deployment of the Trident
system, therefore, must be accelerated.
A manned penetrating bomber capable of delivering cruise missiles close to Soviet
targets is especially critical since B-52 vulnerability to Soviet air defenses is almost
a certainty. Our nation's war planners should also examine the feasibility and cost
effectiveness of deploying a portion of our current land-based ICBM force in a
mobile mode during the early 1980's since it will be a decade before the M-X system
is fully deployed.
We are aware that these recommended actions to modernize the strategic Triad
are expensive and there are many people in this country who have expressed
concern that the SALT II hearings have provided a marketplace in which defense-
minded groups and individuals have presented military hardware shopping lists
with the totals being the costs of their support of the agreement. We present our
recommendations as necessary expenditures, whether SALT II be approved or re-
jected.
The Soviet Union is a formidable opponent but the greatest potential danger
facing our nation today in terms of its security is not the threat of any foreign
power but the unwillingness of our citizenry to pay the price of pursuing peace
through a position of strength. Regardless of the disposition of this treaty, we will
be required to step up defense spending in order to counter improvements in the
Soviet strategic arsenal.
Our final recommendation is that the United States should make a much greater
effort in civil defense preparedness. The Soviet Union has long realized that civil
defense is an integral part of strategic policy. It has devoted a good deal of effort to
"hardening" key economic and military installations and in developing evacuation
capabilities, with special emphasis on evacuating essential industrial and political
personnel. An effective civil defense system would also give the Soviets a strategic
advantage in that in the event of a developing crisis they could evacuate their major
population centers, perhaps on the pretext that they fear a U.S. preemptive strike,
thus presenting U.S. war planners with empty cities while ours are filled with
people and panic. In addition to matching the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear
weapons, we must also endeavor to match it in terms of civil defense.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, we believe that although the SALT II Treaty, if it is
adhered to fully and in good faith, has certain positive features, it also has a
number of serious deficiencies. An even greater danger than the deficiencies of the
treaty, however, is the prospect that the p>eople of the United States will be lulled
into a false sense of security and assume that the treaty will eliminate the likeli-
hood of nuclear war. We must realize that we can have peace only through
strength. The Soviet Union is already ahead of the United States in a number of
strategic areas, and by all projections we have seen, that gap will grow in the years
ahead. But if such a disparity is allowed to exist, that will be not so much the fault
of the treaty as the lack of national will, as the result of our own deliberate policies.
We are willing to support the SALT II Treaty only if we are assured that the
United States will strengthen its defenses along the lines we have outlined and the
treaty is modified in the areas that we've mentioned.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Carey, and congratulations. I did
not think you were going to manage to keep your presentation
within 10 minutes. You had a 15-page statement, and you incorpo-
rated all of the major points as well.
Mr. Baugher is our next panelist. Mr. Baugher is the past chair-
man of the national governing board and present member of the
national governing board of the Ripon Society.
STATEMENT OF PETER VINCENT BAUGHER, PAST CHAIRMAN
AND PRESENT MEMBER, NATIONAL GOVERNING BOARD,
RIPON SOCIETY, WASHINGTON, D.C.*
Mr. Baugher. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Peter V. Baugher. I am a Chicago attorney, and past
chairman of the national governing board of the Ripon Society, on
whose behalf I am testifying this morning.
' See page 170 for Mr. Baugher's prepared statement.
167
The debate over the SALT II treaty has been vigorous and far-
ranging. We are mindful, Mr. Chairman, of the serious concerns
expressed by those who feel that passage of this agreement would
threaten U.S. security. We are also aware that the treaty more
closely resembles a set of marginal regulations on the nuclear
weapons buildup already planned by the parties than it does the
strict arms control accord we would have preferred.
These considerations notwithstanding, we believe that the case
for ratification remains clear and convincing. The principal bene-
fits of SALT II can be easily summarized.
The treaty places certain qualitative and quantitative limitations
on the nuclear arms race. These limitations are not as stringent as
we had hoped, but they are nonetheless a significant improvement
over the alternative, which is to have no ceilings at all.
The proposed treaty, moreover, is verifiable, and in fact will
enhance our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces. At a mini-
mum, the treaty's precise limits should enable the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. to avoid building excessive forces based on worst case
estimates.
Finally, ratification of SALT II, while not impairing our efforts
to maintain strategic equality, can provide the basis for further
negotiations with the Soviet Union out of which more substantial
arms control measures, including real reductions in the number
and quality of atomic weapons, might emerge.
Opponents of SALT II argue that approval of the treaty would
jeopardize our national security. They are wrong. These critics take
an inordinately narrow view of what elements contribute to real
security. The security of this Nation depends not only upon the
status of our nuclear arsenal, but also upon the strength of our
political institutions, the health of our economy, and the will of the
American people.
Even in terms of military security, our strategic weapons can
provide little more than a "force de frappe" if U.S. conventional
forces are inadequate.
These components of national security, and the debilitating effect
of a profligate nuclear arms race upon them, have been for the
most part ignored by SALT II's opponents.
Contrary to the fears of those who oppose the treaty, SALT II's
effect upon the strategic balance will be generally favorable. The
agreement is based on the principle of "equality and equal secu-
rity." The United States no longer enjoys nuclear superiority over
the Soviets, but only an essential equivalence. SALl" II acknowl-
edges and reflects this shift in power. But the treaty is not the
cause of the shift, nor will refusing to ratify the agreement reestab-
lish our nuclear preeminence.
Indeed, while SALT II places a lid on certain improvements in
the force levels of the two countries, these limits will impinge most
immediately on the Soviet Union. By contrast, the treaty interferes
with none of the prospective U.S. nuclear defense programs now
under consideration.
It is said that we should withhold approval of the treaty because
of the Soviet Union's aggressive behavior in the Third World.
Without a doubt, Soviet conduct has been disruptive and provoca-
tive. Clearly, our attitudes toward the Soviet Union and our will-
168
ingness to enter into agreements with it are, as a practical matter,
linked to what the Soviets do in other parts of the world.
We do not negotiate with the Soviet Union, however, because we
admire its policies. We negotiate with the U.S.S.R. because it is to
our advantage in the long run to compete diplomatically, political-
ly, and economically, rather than just militarily. The SALT II
agreement must accordingly be evaluated on its own merits. It
ought to be ratified because it offers significant benefits to the
United States, and not defeated because our adversary shows every
sign of continuing to displease us.
Finally, the rejection of SALT II would inevitably heighten ten-
sions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The political
repercussions of such new tensions could adversely affect our allies,
as well, who rely on us to manage a stable East- West relationship.
Rejection of the SALT II Treaty would also further undermine the
credibility of the Carter administration and its ability to manage
our international relations. While as Republicans we have fre-
quently been critical of the administration's foreign policy, as
Americans we believe that it is important to present a reasonably
unified front to the rest of the world, and especially to the Soviet
Union.
Secretary of Defense Brown and General Jones both testified
that, while today our nuclear forces are essentially equivalent to
those of the U.S.S.R., the trend is that the Soviets will possess
advantages in most of the major indicators of strategic force within
the next few years. In particular our land-based ICBM's are pro-
jected to be critically vulnerable by the mid-1980's.
The danger of this deterioration in our once dominant strategic
position is not that the Soviets would be tempted to launch a
nuclear first strike against the United States. In view of the very
substantial U.S. retaliatory capacity that would survive any Soviet
attack, this eventuality seems highly unlikely.
Rather, as General Jones suggested, the growing disparity would
probably be reflected in a more confident Soviet leadership, in-
creasingly inclined toward adventuresome behavior in areas where
our interests might clash, and where America's ability to respond
by conventional means could be circumscribed. This is not a devel-
opment the United States can afford to permit.
The trend to which I refer has emerged over the past 15 years as
a consequence of unilateral decisions by the United States and the
U.S.S.R. It is not the result of SALT, nor will ratification of the
proposed agreement in any way aggravate our problem. Indeed, in
that it places limits on the further growth of the parties' atomic
forces, it should act to stabilize the arms race and to minimize
whatever apparent strategic advantage the Soviets may have
achieved by the first half of the next decade.
SALT II, however, is not a substitute for a strong defense; nor
are America's hopes for SALT III an alternative to an ongoing
program of upgrading our strategic forces. This means that within
the life of the SALT II Treaty, the United States must develop and
deploy several major new atomic weapons systems and modernize
those strategic systems already in existence.
As the fact of the Soviet arms buildup has become more general-
ly known, many have assumed that the solution to our projected
169
strategic deficiencies is to bolster the military budget — typically by
3 to 5 percent, in real dollars. This approach misses the mark. The
new weapons systems we need will be costly, but this is exactly
why the multibillion dollar programs now envisioned must be
judged on an individual basis, not as part of a mandatory quota for
overall spending. Dollars alone will not buy national defense.
In order to meet the Soviet challenge and to maintain strategic
parity we may be required to boost our real outlays for defense by
5 percent or more every year for the next 5 to 10 years. But this is
a conclusion that should be reached after the relative cost-effective-
ness of each potential new weapons system has been carefully
evaluated. It is not a goal to be sought as an end in itself.
One way of meeting the Soviet military challenge is to augment
and modernize our forces. Another is to challenge the Soviet Union
to engage in negotiations about actual reductions of nuclear arma-
ments, not just limitations. We advocate that these approaches be
pursued concurrently.
It is ironic that the SALT debate has become a debate on rear-
mament. The problem, unfortunately, is endemic to arms limita-
tion talk, in which the Soviet Union exhibits little interest in
curbing the weapons race. The Soviet military buildup has been
underway now for 15 years. It began before formal SALT negotia-
tions were inaugurated, and it has continued unabated during the
period following the war in Vietnam when U.S. defense spending
declined markedly.
Under these conditions arms control talks with the Soviet Union
have too frequently served to ratify and legitimize the U.S.S.R.'s
latest plans for military expansion. There is no reason to believe
that SALT III will offer any more meaningful opportunity. The
United States entered the negotiations for SALT I with a pro-
nounced superiority in strategic weapons, and commenced the
SALT II talks with a lesser but still significant advantage. The
likelihood is that SALT III will begin with the Soviets expecting
strategic supremacy by the end of these negotiations.
In such circumstances, the promise of any real arms reduction is
illusory. Our best hope is to obtain agreement for a SALT III
reduction in arms now, while the United States still retains the
power to forestall this shift in the strategic balance. If there are to
be substantial weapons cutbacks in SALT III, the mandate for
those cuts must be written into SALT II.
Toward this end. Senator Mojmihan has proposed an amendment
to the treaty, directing that the United States an'^. the Soviet
Union "effect Significant and substantial reductions in the num-
bers of strategic offensive arms consistent with the requirement for
the maintenance of essential strategic equivalence." If the parties
were unable to conclude such an agr3ement by December 31, 1981,
SALT II would terminate on that date.
Unlike some other proposals that have been made to force the
pace of the SALT III negotiations, such an amendment would not
require undoing the substantive terms of the present SALT II
treaty. A less demanding alternative that could still improve the
chances for a "deep cut" SALT III agreement would be to amend
the resolution of ratification to include a set of explicit and appro-
170
priately ambitious guidelines for the next round of negotiations.
These kinds of approaches deserve your support.
The SALT II Treaty should be approved because it is a useful, if
modest, step in the long-range process of controlling nuclear arma-
ments. But if the SALT process itself is to be preserved, the time
has come to face the real issues and the real prospects of substan-
tial arms reductions.
We hope that your committee wdll recommend the incorporation
of a SALT III mandate into the existing agreement and urge that
the Senate give its advice and consent to the treaty as so amended.
Thank you.
[Mr. Baugher's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter V. Baugher
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations: I appreciate
this opportunity to appear befor you to urge that the Senate give its advice and
consent to ratification of the proposed Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offen-
sive Arms (SALT II).
INTRODUCTION
My name is Peter V. Baugher. I am a Chicago attorney and a member of the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. I also serve on the Republican National
Committee's Advisory Council on National Security and International Affairs and
am past Chairman of the National Governing Board of the Ripon Society, on whose
behalf I am testifying this morning.
Over the past two decades the Ripon Society has studied and taken positions on
many issues of major public importance. Few matters have commanded as much
attention, or aroused as much controversy, though, as has the debate over the SALT
II Treaty. The agreement now before this Committee bears not only upon our
military security and international political relations, but also on what America's
role in the world ought to be, whether we are strong enough to carry out that role,
and whether the American sun is rising or setting on the world scene. SALT II has
thus taken on sjrmbolic importance far exceeding its value as an agreement to limit
nuclear weapons. In evaluating the Treaty we are mindful of the serious concerns
expressed by those who believe its passage would threaten U.S. security. We are
also aware that SALT II more closely resembles a set of marginal regulations on the
nuclear weapons build-up already planned by the parties than it does the strict
arms control accord we would have preferred. These considerations notwithstand-
ing, we believe that the case for ratification remains clear and convincing.
the benefits of salt II
The testimony on nuclear diplomacy received by this Committee during the last
two months has been characterized by a high level of sophistication and expertise.
The principal benefits of SALT II can nevertheless be easily summarized. The
Treaty places certain carefully defined quantitative and qualitative limitations on
the nuclear arms race, which — if permitted to proceed unchecked — would be mili-
tarily and politically hazardous, and which could impose the burden of massive
additional defense spending upon our citizens. These limitations are not as stringent
as we had hoped. But they are nonetheless a significant improvement over the
alternative, which is to have no ceilings at all. The proposed Treaty, moreover, is
verifiable, and in fact will enhance our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces. At
a minimum the Treaty's precise and agreed upon limits, reinforced by the greater
knowledge each side will have of the other's capabilities, should enable the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. to avoid building excessive forces based on "worst-case" estimates. Finally,
ratification of SALT II, while not impairing our efforts to maintain strategic equali-
ty, can provide the basis for further negotiations with the Soviet Union out of which
more substantial arms control measures, including real reductions in the number of
quality of atomic weapons, might emerge.
More specifically, the major advantages of the SALT II Treaty may be enumer-
ated as follows:
First, the proposed agreement sets important quantitative limitations on the
number of strategic delivery vehicles. Both sides agree in Article III of the Treaty to
the imposition of a common aggregate ceiling (2,400 initially, to be reduced to 2,250
171
by the end of 1981) on ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) launchers, SLBM
(submarine-launched ballistic missile) launchers, and heavy bombers. This will
compel the Soviets to dismantle or destroy over 250 of the missile launchers or
heavy bombers they now have deployed. By contrast, because we are below the
SALT II limits, the United States could actually increase the number of launchers
and heavy bombers it deploys.
Article V of the Treaty also places equal subceilings on specific categories of
launchers. There is a limit of 1,320 on the combined total of MIRVed ICBM and
SLBM launchers, together with heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range, air-
launched cruise missiles (Paragraph 1). The total number of MIRVed launchers
cannot exceed 1,200 (Paragraph 2), and the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers —
potentially the most destabilizing weapon system — is restricted to a maximum of
820 (Paragraph 3).
Second, Article IV of the proposed agreement contains a number of qualitative
restraints. The Treaty freezes the number of warheads on existing types of ICBM's
(Paragraph 10) and establishes ceilings of 14 and 10, respectively, on the number of
warheads that can be placed on SLBM's and on any new type of ICBM (Paragraph
11). SALT II, further, bans new ICBM's and new SLBM's that are larger in throw-
weight than the largest current light ICBM, the Soviet SS-19 (Paragraph 7). The
Treaty permits production of only one new type of light ICBM for each side (Para-
graph 9). Article IV also limits improvements to existing t5T>es of ICBM's in such
characteristics as throw-weight, launch-weight, number of warheads, length, diame-
ter, and fuel type.
"There are other qualitative constraints in the Treaty. SALT II (Paragraph 5 of
Article IV) bans rapid missile reload systems which, if made workable, could greatly
multiply the military capabilities of ICBM launchers. To reinforce this restriction,
storage of excess missiles near launch sites is also barred. In addition, Article IX of
the Treaty prohibits development, testing, and deplojTnent of seabed, outer space,
and a variety of other types of weapons not yet deployed by either side.
Third, under the terms of Articles XV, XVI, and XVII of the proposed agreement
our ability to monitor Soviet Strategic systems will be protected and enhanced.
Deliberate concealment measures that impede verification, such as encryption of the
telemetry associated with missile tests, are banned by SALT II, as is any interfer-
ence with national technical means of verification. The Treaty, moreover, requires
the parties to exchange information on the numbers, sizes, and kinds of their
strategic systems, and to notify one another in advance about all planned ICBM
launches. Through the Standing Consultative Commission (Article XVII), an institu-
tional mechanism for discussing compliance and verification problems is also made
available to the parties.
Fourth, ratification of the proposed agreement will facilitate continuation of the
SALT process. The talks on limitation of strategic armaments begun by President
Nixon in 1969, buoyed by the signing of the ABM Treaty and Interim SALT
agreement in 1972, and accelerated by President Ford at Vladivostok in 1974, may
now progress to a new level of negotiations — SALT III— sustaining the forward
momentum generated by the successful conclusions of SALT I and II.
THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE TREATY
Opponents of the SALT II agreement argue that approval of the Treaty would
jeopardize our national security. They are wrong. These critics take an inordinately
narrow view of what elements contribute to real security. The security of this
nation depends not only upon the status of our nuclear arsenal, but also upon the
strength of our political institutions, the health of our economy, and the will of the
American people. Even in terms of military security, our strategic weapons can
provide little more than a "force de frappe,' if U.S. conventional forces — those we
are most likely to rely upon in anything short of a nuclear catastrophe — are
inadequate. These components of national security, and the debilitating effect of a
profligate nuclear arms race upon them, have for the most part been ignored by
SALT II's opponents.
Contrary to the fears of those who oppose the Treaty, SALT II's effect upon the
strategic balance will be generally favorable. The agreement is based on the princi-
ple of "equality and equal security" (Preamble); the United States no longer enjoys
nuclear superiority over the Soviets, as it once did, but only an "essential equiv-
alence". SALT II acknowledges and reflects this shift in power. But the Treaty is
not the cause of the shift, nor will refusing to ratify the agreement reestablish our
nuclear preeminence.
Indeed, while SALT II places a lid on certain improvements in the force levels of
the two countries, these limits will impinge most immediately on the Soviet Union.
By contrast, the Treaty interferes with none of the prospective U.S. nuclear defense
48-260 0-79 Pt.U - 12
172
programs now under consideration — the M-X missile, the Trident submarine and
missiles, air, sea, and ground-launched cruise missiles, a cruise missile carrier, or a
possible new bomber. Should we decide to fund these programs, nothing in the
Treaty would prevent us from moving ahead with them on schedule.
Similarly, nothing in Article XII of the Treaty or elsewhere will prevent us from
continuing nuclear and conventional military cooperation with our allies. In partic-
ular, SALT II does not apply to "Eurostrategic weapons" — those nuclear forces
deployed in Europe — and we are free therefore to implement our announced plan to
modernize and upgrade NATO's strategic capabilities. For this reason, among
others, all of our European allies have endorsed the proposed agreement.
It is said that we should withhold approval of the Treaty because of the Soviet
Union's aggressive behavior in the Third World. Without a doubt Soviet conduct in
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East — and, as we learned only this week, its stationing
of combat troops in Cuba — has been disruptive and provocative. Clearly, our atti-
tudes toward the Soviet Union and our willingness to enter into agreements with it
are, as a practical matter, "linked" to what the Soviets (or their representatives) do
in other parts of the world.
We do not negotiate with the Soviet Union, however, because we admire its
policies. We negotiate with the U.S.S.R. because it is to our advantage, in the long
run, to compete diplomatically, politically, and economically, rather than just mili-
tarily. The SALT II agreement must accordingly be evaluated on its own merits. It
ought to be ratified because it offers significant benefits to the United States and
not defeated because our adversary shows every sign of continuing to displease us.
Finally, any examination of the consequences of approving SALT II must be
accompanied by an assessment of what is likely to happen if the Senate refuses to
give its consent to this agreement. The defeat of SALT II would inevitably heighten
tensions between the United States and the U.S.S.R., further eroding whatever may
be left of detente. The political repercussions of such new tensions could also
adversely affect our allies, who rely on us to manage a stable East-West relation-
ship. Rejection of the Treaty would tend, additionally, to reinforce the Soviet's
apparent belief that the only way to attain security is to act unilaterally, and
belligerently, to improve their position as a world power.
Beyond this, we are now engaged in a wide range of arms control ventures with
the Soviet Union and other nations. Although ratification of SALT II will not
guarantee success in these other arms control efforts, the failure of SALT II would
almost certainly damage them, perhaps fatally. In addition to the collapse of the
SALT process itself, the most important casualty of nonratification would be our
attempt to halt the spread of nuclear weapons through the 1968 Nonproliferation
Treaty, Article VI of which commits all parties — including the United States and
the Soviet Union — "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date." Nations now poised
on the brink of producing nuclear weapons might well use the breakdown of SALT
as an excuse (or a reason) to reconsider their own commitment to the Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty. It is also likely that rejection by the United States of the SALT II
agreement would impair our ongoing negotiations with the Soviets on a comprehen-
sive nuclear test ban, on the prohibition of antisatelli.e weaponry, and on mutual
and balanced force reductions in Europe.
Defeat of the SALT II Treaty would also further undermine the credibility of the
Carter Administration and its ability to manage our international relations. While
as Republicans we have frequently been critical of the Administration's foreign
policy, as Americans we believe that it is important to present a reasonably unified
front to the rest of the world, and especially to the Soviet Union. This does not
mean that the Senate should abdicate its constitutional r>3sponsibility to pass upon
all treaties between the United States and other nations. It does mean, however,
that in judging such treaties allowance must be made for the President's role as the
chief architect and m.anager of our foreign relations.
CLARIFICATION OF TREATY AMBIGUITIES
Like any negotiated agreement, the SALT II Treaty is not without problems. In
the context of an accord supposedly premised upon equality, we are concerned about
the Soviet Union's unilateral right to deploy 308 modern large ballistic missiles
(MLBM), a carryover from SALT I. Clearly, the desired result would have been a
major cutback in Soviet MLBM's in order to have reduced the U.S.S.R.'s substantial
throw-weight advantage over the United States. For the time being, limiting the SS-
18 to 10 warheads provides a significant restraint on their MLBM potential, but
obtaining sizeable reductions in the number of these heavy weapons should be one
of our major objectives in future negotiations.
173
Lest there be any confusion about U.S. intentions with respect to certain poten-
tially ambiguous provisions of the Treaty, the Senate should ratify SALT II subject
to the following understandings: (1) It should be made clear that the Protocol which,
among other things, bars until January 1, 1982, the deplo3Tnent of ground and sea-
launched cruise missiles with ranges of more than 600 kilometers, cannot be ex-
tended without the advice and consent of the Senate; (2) In order to clarify the
limited scope of our obligations under article XII, the so-called "non-circumvention"
clause, the Senate should state that nothing in the Treaty prohibits the United
States from continuing traditional patterns of allied defense co-operation, including
the transfer of cruise missile technology if it deems such a transfer necessary; (3)
President Brezhnev's statement delivered to President Carter at Vienna on June 16,
1979, pledging that the Soviet Union would not build more than 30 Backfire bomb-
ers a year and that it would not deploy them for intercontinental missions, should
be made a formal part of the Treaty.
These suggested understandings are modest and would not require renegotiation
of the agreement. They would, on the other hand, highlight several ambiguities in
SALT II which, if not resolved now, could conceivably lead to serious disagreements
after the Treaty has gone into effect.
MEETING THE SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE
From the outset of these hearings it has been conceded that the days of U.S.
nuclear supremacy are past, and that the momentum of atomic weapons develop-
ment belongs now to the Soviet Union. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and
General David Jones of the Joint Chief of Staff both testified that, while today our
nuclear forces are essentially equivalent to those of the U.S.S.R., the trend is that
the Soviets will possess advantages in most of the major indicators of strategic force
within the next few years. In particular, our land-based ICBM's are projected to be
critically vulnerable by the mid-1980's.
The danger of this deterioration in our once dominant strategic position is not
that the Soviets would be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike against the
United States. In view of the very substantial U.S. retaliatory capacity that would
survive any Soviet attack, this eventuality seems highly unlikely. Rather, as Gener-
al Jones suggested, the growing disparity would probably be reflected in a more
confident Soviet leadership, increasingly inclined toward adventurous behavior in
areas where our interests might clash, and where America's ability to respond by
conventional means could be circumscribed. "Such a situation," the General
warned, "would carry the seeds of serious miscalculation and run the risk of
precipitating a confrontation which neither side wanted nor intended." Plainly, this
is not a development the United States can afford to permit.
This trend, which (if allowed to continue) will tip the strategic balance precarious-
ly toward the Soviets, has emerged over the past 15 years as a consequence of
unilateral decision by the United States and the U.S.S.R. to invest at sharply
different rates in the acquisition of nuclear armaments. It is not the result of SALT,
nor will ratification of the proposed agreement in any way aggravate our problem.
Indeed, in that it places limits on the further growth of the parties' atomic forces, it
should act to stabilize the arms race and to minimize whatever apparent strategic
advantage the Soviets may have achieved by the first half of the next decade. SALT
II, however, is not a substitute for a strong defense; nor, regrettably, are America's
hopes for SALT III an alternative to an ongoing program for the upgrading of our
strategic forces.
This means that within the life of the SALT II Treaty the United States must
develop and deploy several major new atomic weapons systems and modernize those
strategic systems already in existence. As the fact of the Soviet arms buildup has
become more generally known, many have assumed that the solution to our project-
ed strategic deficiencies is to bolster the military budget — typically, by three to five
percent in real dollars. This approach misses the mark.
The new weapons systems we need will be costly. But this is exactly why the
multi-billion dollar programs now envisioned — whether one is speaking of the M-X
missile with its several competing basing modes (each more expensive than the
next), the Trident submarine or Trident missiles, the several varieties of cruise
missiles, or the B-1 bomber — must be judged on an individual basis, not as part of a
mandatory quota for overall spending. Dollars alone will not buy national defense.
Congressman Joseph Addabbo of New York, Chairman of the House Subcommit-
tee on Defense Appropriations, commented on this subject last month (CJongression-
al Record, August 2, 1979, pp. 7184-7185):
There is a limit to what we can afford to spend each year [on defense], yet
there are certain levels of capability that we must maintain. It is clear that we
174
are spending more and getting less for it, year by year, and that the tough
years lie ahead, not backward.
Budget officers, be they civilian or military, tend to stockpile dollars for a
rainy day. We just cannot afford to let them do this any longer, nor can we
begin a procurement unless we are reasonably sure that it will do the job it is
supposed to do when it comes into the inventory, and unless we are reasonably
sure it can be produced in line with what we anticipate, and unless we are sure
it is not low on the priority list.
These problems have been exacerbated by the failure of the Department of
Defense to improve its weapons program review capability. Without a strengthened
independent review effort it would be wasteful to increase the Pentagon's budget, no
matter how unfavorable the balance of forces might become.
In order to meet the Soviet challenge and to maintain strategic parity we may be
required to boost our real outlays for defense by five percent or more every year for
the next five to ten years. But this is a conclusion that should be reached after the
relative cost-effectiveness of each potential new weapons system has been carefully
evaluated. It is not a goal to be sought as an end in itself.
CHALLENGING THE SOVIET UNION
One way of meeting the Soviet military challenge is to augment and modernize
our strategic (and conventional) forces. Another is to challenge the Soviet Union to
engage in negotiations about actual reductions in nuclear armaments, not just
limitations.' We advocate that these approaches be pursued concurrently.
It is ironic that the SALT debate has become (as Senator Moynihan recently
remarked) a "debate on rearmament." The problem, unfortunately, is endemic to
arms limitation talks in which the Soviet Union exhibits little interest in curbing
the weapons race. The Soviet military buildup has been underway now for 15 years.
It began before formal SALT negotiations were inaugurated in 1969, and it has
continued unabated during the period following the war in Vietnam when U.S.
defense spending declined markedly. It has never ceased because the Soviets have
thus far been unwilling to give up the advantages they perceive in acquiring new
and ever more powerful weapons systems.
Under these conditions arms control talks with the Soviet Union have too fre-
quently served to condone and legitimize the U.S.S.R.'s latest plans for military
expansion. The agreements resulting from these talks have as often as not encour-
aged both sides (and especially the Soviet Union) to enlarge their forces to the
maximum size allowed and to attempt to exploit to the fullest whatever marginal
advantages may be discerned in the accord.
There is no reason to believe that SALT III will offer any more meaningful
opportunities. The United States entered the negotiations for SALT I with a pro-
nounced superiority in strategic weapons and commenced the SALT II talks with a
lesser but still significant advantage. The likelihood is that SALT III will begin with
the Soviets expecting strategic supremacy by the end of those negotiations. In such
circumstances, the promise of any real arms reductions is illusory.
Our best hope is to obtain agreement for a SALT III reduction in arms now, while
the United States still retains the power to forestall this shift in the strategic
balance. If there are to be substantial weapons cutbacks in SALT III, the mandate
for those cuts must be written into SALT II.
Toward this end. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York has proposed an
amendment to the Treaty that would add a new Paragraph 4 to Article XIX of the
test:
The Parties shall conclude, by December 31, 1981, an agreement which shall,
as a result of the negotiations undertaken in accordance with the Joint State-
ment of Principles and Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limita-
tion of Strategic Arms agreed upon at Vienna on June 18, 1979, effect signifi-
cant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms,
consistent with the requirement for the maintenance of essential strategic equiv-
alence. This agreement shall enter into effect immediately upon the expiration
of the present Treaty or sooner, as the Parties shall decide. If the Parties are
unable to conclude such an agreement by December SI, 1981, the present Treaty
shall terminate on that date. (Emphasis added.)
'The agenda for future negotiations must also include (1) tighter limits on the testing and
development of new weapons, (2) some kind of answer to the concern the MIRVed Soviet ICBM's
will jeopardize the survivabihty of U.S. ICBM's, (3) mutual reductions in European theatre
nuclear weapons systems, and (4) a plan for regular on-site inspection of atomic arms facilities.
175
This kind of approach deserves your support. Unlike some other proposals that
have been made to force the pace of the SALT III negotiations, such an amendment
would not require undoing the substantive terms of the present SALT II Treaty. A
less demanding alternative that could still improve the chances for a "deep cut"
SALT III agreement of the kind we seek would be to amend the resolution of
ratification to include a set of explicit guidelines for the next round of negotiations.
This list of objectives would operate similarly to the amendment to SALT I which
required that future weapons limitations impose equal aggregate ceilings on both
countries.
As Senator Moynihan noted in advancing his proposal:
This much is certain: Our margin for error in SALT has disappeared. We
must rescue the "process" from itself; otherwise, it will present us with ever
more unappealing choices. We must recover for SALT the possibility of arms
limitation and genuine arms reductions. This, so it seems to me, is the major
contribution the Senate can make to preservation of the SALT process that the
President, and others, seek. We must at least make the effort.
This is a challenge, Mr. Chairman, worthy of the United States. The SALT II
Treaty should be approved because it is a useful, if modest, step in the long-range
process of controlling nuclear armaments. But if the SALT process itself is to be
preserved, the time has come to face the real issues and the real prospects of
substantial arms reductions. We hope that your Committee will recommend the
incorporation of a SALT III mandate into the existing agreement and urge that the
Senate give its advice and consent to the Treaty as so amended.
DESCRIPTION OF THE RIPON SOCIETY
Founded in 1962, the Ripon Society is a national Republican research and policy
organization that takes its name from Ripon, Wisconsin, the birthplace of the GOP.
It has chapters in cities across the country and members in all 50 States. The
Society encourages young men and women to participate actively in public affairs.
Ripon also works to formulate the kind of sound programs that will enable our
Party to better fulfill its potential for constructive political leadership. We believe
that we can assist the GOP in identifying and claiming the issues of the future; that
we can help Republicans to raise the questions others will not ask and to grasp
ideas whose times are yet to come. Above all, the Ripon Society seeks to serve as a
spokesman for the progressive Republican tradition whose integrity and vision have
inspired the GOP throughout its history.
The Society maintains its national headquarters at 800 Eighteenth Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20006 (202-347-6477).
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON PETER VINCENT BAUGHER
Peter Vincent Baugher is an attorney at Schiff Hardin & Waite law firm in
Chicago, Illinois. He was Law Clerk to Judge Philip W. Tone, United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in 1973-74.
Born in Chicago in 1948, Baugher received his legal training at Yale Law School
(J.D. 1973), and his undergraduate education at Princeton University (A.B. 1970),
where he studied in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.
Baugher is past Chairman of the National Governing Board of the Ripon Society
and serves on the Republican National Committee's Advisory Council on National
Security and International Affairs. He is a member of the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, the American Council on Germany, the Economic Club of Chica-
go, and a variety of other professional, civic, and community associations.
Baugher serves on several boards of directors, including those of the Chicago
Educational Television Association (WTTW/Chicago Public Television), WFMT, Inc.
(which owns and operates WFMT-FM radio and Chicago Magazine), and the Prince-
ton Club of Chicago.
Baugher is married to the former Robin Stickney of Pacific Palisades, California.
They live at 816 Monticello Place in Evanston, Illinois.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Baugher, for your statement.
Our next and final member of the panel is Mr. Herbert Scoville, a
member of the governing board of New Directions, of Washington,
D.C.
176
STATEMENT OF HERBERT J. SCOVILLE, JR., MEMBER,
GOVERNING BOARD, NEW DIRECTIONS, WASHINGTON, D.C.*
Mr. ScoviLLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much
this opportunity to appear before this committee and testify on the
SALT II Treaty on behalf of New Directions. New Directions is a
citizens' lobby for world security whose fuUtime president is former
Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr.
I, Herbert Scoville, cochair the New Directions Task Force on
Arms Control and Disarmament with Betty Goetz Lall.
New Directions supports the SALT II Treaty and urges that it be
ratified without amendment. We believe that SALT II improves the
United States-Soviet strategic balance, takes important first steps
in controlling the offensive strategic arms race, and will improve
our knowledge of Soviet military programs, and thereby reduce the
need to procure unnecessary weapons in order to deal with an
uncertain and unlimited Soviet threat.
We believe that a failure to ratify the treaty can only result in
increased tensions, in a less secure and more unstable strategic
balance, in accelerated arms buildups, and in increased and unnec-
essary military expenditures. In such a world, the real security of
the United States will be lower, and the Nation will be less able to
deal with the critical economic and political problems facing it.
Too often in the debate over the SALT II Treaty there has been a
tendency to focus on what the treaty does not do and to pay little
attention to its positive benefits. This, in our view, has led to a
distorted picture of the contribution that this treaty will make to
our national security. We believe that it would be most useful to
consider the treaty as a glass that is half full rather than half
empty.
In my written text, I have summarized some of the important
benefits of SALT, but I believe the committee has heard these
points from many sources already, and in the interest of saving
time, I will not repeat them this morning, but I would like to
address a couple of other points which have received less attention.
While we strongly support the ratification of the SALT II Treaty,
we are increasingly concerned with a tendency during the debate
to turn the SALT II Treaty into a Christmas tree loaded with
presents to be exchanged for SALT support. We have already seen
President Carter's decision only a week before he signed the SALT
II Treaty in Vienna to proceed with a full-scale development of a
new, large model M-X missile.
We, too, are concerned about the theoretical vulnerability of the
Minuteman ICBM, but it is not clear that the weapons procure-
ment rather than the weapons limitation approach is the best way
of solving this problem. In SALT I, the United States opted to
continue the arms race in MIRVed missiles. Then the United
States was more than 5 years ahead, since the Soviet Union had
not yet carried out its first test of such a missile system. Now the
United States is paying the price for its failure to deal with this
problem through arms control. Quite predictably, the Soviets have
followed along behind the United States, and will now in the 1980's
See page 178 for Mr. Scoville's prepared statement.
177
have sufficient numbers of accurate MIRVed warheads at least to
threaten our entire ICBM force.
Now it appears that the United States may be repeating this
failure of the early 1970's by not exploring vigorously enough possi-
ble arms control solutions to ICBM vulnerability. Instead of adopt-
ing with the M-X the new weapons route, which in the long run
may not work and would cost many tens of billions of dollars, we
should be exploring every effort to seek an arms control solution to
this problem and make sure that no doors are shut that would
foreclose such an option in the future.
The most obvious approach is to establish much stricter mutual
limitations on the total number of MIRV missiles and their war-
heads.
We have also seen explicit linkage of a 5-percent increase in the
total military budget as a price for supporting SALT ratification. A
decision to increase the military budget is of paramount national
importance, not only because of its effect on our military posture,
but also because of its effect on the economy of the country.
Dollars wasted on unnecessary strategic weapons means less
money for conventional forces. Dollars spent for the military
means less money available for other pressing national needs. Dol-
lars spent for the military means increased inflationary pressures.
Dollars spent for the military means fewer people employed. All
these facts must be taken into consideration, and the decision on
what funds to spend on nonstrategic weapons should not be tied to
support for SALT.
Furthermore, since in 1985 the relative United States-Soviet stra-
tegic balance will be more favorable to the United States with the
SALT Treaty than without, logic would say that there is less need
for increased military spending if SALT were ratified than if it
were not. Thus a more appropriate linkage with SALT would be an
increased military budget if SALT is not ratified and a decreased
budget if it were.
Tying SALT support to an increased military budget is a mind-
less connection.
Finally, it would be wrong to leave the discussion of SALT II
Treaty ratification without voicing the view that the entire climate
of the ratification debate in the United States is based on a funda-
mental misconception that somehow our Nation has become or is
rapidly becoming inferior to the Soviet Union and subject to mili-
tary coercion and blackmail.
Those who urge boosting military spending above the very high
levels projected for the coming years assume that the Soviet Union
is gradually becoming dominant on the world scene and that the
United States has been standing still militarily. They ignore three
factors: one, U.S. strategic programs and strength, two, Soviet
weaknesses, and three, the unlikelihood of translating nuclear ar-
senals into political advantage.
Let me comment briefly on these points. The United States has a
secure deterrent force composed of a triad of SLBM's, ICBM's, and
long-range bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has a
less secure force, of which 75 percent are fixed land-based ICBM's
which will become increasingly vulnerable in the 1980's.
178
Furthermore, contrary to the popular impression, the United
States has not been standing still. We have been developing and
deploying new strategic weapons in vast numbers in the last 10
years. In the past decade, the United States has increased the
number of its strategic force loadings, warheads and bombs by
5,250, to nearly 10,000; the Soviets, by 3,590, to only slightly more
than 5,000.
The Soviet Union is a military superpower, and there is no way
to prevent it from having nuclear weapons that can devastate the
United States, but it, too, cannot prevent catastrophic devastation
by the United States. Furthermore, it has major economic and
political weaknesses. The inefficient Soviet economy requires its
leadership to import grain and technology from the west. Accord-
ing to CIA estimates, this dependence will increase as the growth
rate of the Soviet economy dips below 1 percent in the mid-1980's.
After six decades in power, the Soviet leadership has no big
power ally. It is bordered by a hostile China and restive eastern
European countries. Compare this situation with the close ties the
United States has with its NATO partners and with Japan.
Three, the Soviet Union has been unable to use its nuclear
weapons for political advantage or even prevent a number of devel-
opments that are inimical to Soviet power. This situation will
continue into the future unless the United States talks itself into a
position of weakness. Despite their 5,000 strategic warheads, the
Soviets were unable to prevent Pope John Paul from speaking to
millions in Poland and were unable to require Romanian accept-
ance of the military budget increased by the Warsaw Pact.
In conclusion, as the United States faces the decision to ratify or
not to ratify the SALT II Treaty, it must recognize its real strength
and stop exaggerating its weaknesses. Poormouthing military capa-
bilities can only create self-fulfilling prophecies. Statements that
the United States would not retaliate even after a Soviet attack
that killed tens of millions of Americans do more to undercut the
deterrent than all the Soviet heavy missiles.
Implying that the President would have no choice but to retali-
ate against Soviet cities is dangerously misleading, when our capa-
bility and strategy have long been to attack military targets and
the industries supporting the military.
In conclusion. New Directions believes that security lies not in
supporting a self-defeating arms race, but in taking all the steps to
end it. The ratification of the SALT II Treaty is such a step.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. Scoville's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Herbert J. Scoville, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate very much this opportuni-
ty to appear before this Committee and testify on the SALT II Treaty in behalf of
New Directions. New Directions is a citizens' lobby for world security whose full-
time president is former Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr. I co-chair the New
Directions Task Force on Arms Control and Disarmament with Betty Goetz Lall.
New Directions supports the SALT II Treaty and urges that it be ratified without
amendment. We believe SALT II improves the United States-Soviet strategic bal-
ance, takes important first steps in controlling the offensive strategic arms race,
and will improve our knowledge of Soviet military programs and thereby reduce the
need to procure unnecessary weapons in order to deal with an uncertain and
unlimited Soviet threat. We believe that a failure to ratify the Treaty can only
result in increased tensions, in a less secure and more unstable strategic balance, in
179
accelerated arms buildups, and in increased and unnecessary military expenditures.
In such a world the real security of the United States will be lower and the nation
will be less able to deal with the critical economic and political problems facing it.
New Directions believes that a strong case can be made that with the Treaty our
security will be significantly enhanced and the dangerous arms race provided with
important brakes. Too often in the debate over the SALT II Treaty, there has been a
tendency to focus on what the Treaty does not do and to pay little attention to its
positive benefits. This, in our view, has led to a distorted picture of the contribution
that this treaty will make to our national security. We believe that it would be
useful to consider the Treaty as a glass that is half full rather than half empty.
It was never practical to expect that the SALT II Treaty would solve all our
strategic policy problems nor lead directly to the end of the arms race. Negotiated
arnis control agreements are only one means of ensuring that our security is
maintained and of reducing the burden of continued weapons procurement. Nation-
al decisions are equally important if we are to prevent new weapons from increasing
the risks that we will be embroiled in a nuclear conflict which can only lead to
catastrophic devastation of the United States and most of the world.
It is, of course, impossible to list in this testimony all of the benefits which the
SALT II agreements provide, but it might be useful to summarize some of the more
important elements.
1. The Treaty establishes ceilings on all t)^es of offensive strategic weapons,
heavy bombers as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. These ceilings are low enough
to require the Soviet Union to dismantle without replacement about 250 relatively
modern operational strategic delivery systems; therefore it establishes the precedent
of reducing weapons stockpiles rather than allowing continued buildups. Although
this cutback is only 10 percent of the Soviet strategic force, the direction of the
change is of prime importance. Furthermore, since this ceiling primarily affects the
U.S.S.R. and only marginally affects the United States, it will improve the relative
United States-Soviet strategic balance. Without this ceiling the Soviets could during
the lifetime of the Treaty increase substantially their lead in numbers of strategic
delivery vehicles.
2. The Treaty for the first time places an upper limit on the total number of
missile warheads that each side can have by setting ceilings on the number of
MIRVed missiles and the number of warheads each type of missile can carry. While
these limits are much higher than would have been desired, they will at least place
an upper range on the number of warheads, make finite the maximum threat to
U.S. land-based ICBM's and limit the potential advantage of the larger throw-
weight of Soviet ICBM's. They will provide a fixed base for possible future negotia-
tions to reduce the number of warheads on both sides to less threatening levels.
3. The Treaty will prevent the Soviets from deploying their potentially mobile SS-
16 ICBM, and the Protocol will ban the deployment of any mobile ICBM's by either
nation until 1982. The failure to include this prohibition in the Treaty lasting until
1985 is a result of the U.S. desire to keep the option open for the M-X mobile
deployment, but in the long run this loophole may prove to the U.S. security
disadvantage since deceptive mobile basing schemes, such as multiple launch point
systems, may be of greater advantage to the Soviet Union than to the United States.
Verification of future limits on ICBM's and warheads may prove very difficult, and
this could lead to a future breakdown in the ability to control the size of Soviet
strategic arsenals.
4. The Treaty includes air-launched cruise missile carriers within the 1,320 MIRV
delivery vehicle ceiling, and thus controls for the first time this new type of
strategic weapon. Without such provisions the way would be open for an uncon-
trolled race in this alternative to ballistic missiles. Long range ground- and sea-
launched cruise missiles cannot be deployed for the duration of the Protocol, but
their testing is permitted. This loophole could produce a difficult if not insoluble
problem in controlling such weapons after 1982. Although this option was kept open
in order to permit U.S. deployment of such weapons in the future, it could prove in
the long run to work to our detriment by preventing the achievement of verifiable
controls on this class of weapons.
5. The Treaty limits each side to the testing and deployment of only one new type
of ICBM. For many characteristics, modernization of existing types will now be
strictly limited so that any allowed changes would have little military significance.
For example, the launch-weight and throw-weight of current ICBM's cannot be
changed by more than 5 percent; such a change would make little military differ-
ence, particularly since the number of warheads a missile can carry cannot be
increased. However, for other characteristics, such as accuracy, no verifiable limita-
tions could be agreed upon. This loophole could not be closed, unfortunately, with-
out relaxation of U.S. standards for verifying compliance.
180
6. The Treaty contains many provisions that will improve the information on
Soviet strategic forces, without which major uncertainties could develop on the size
and nature of the Soviet strategic threat. Without the bans on deliberate conceal-
ment against national technical means of verification, the Soviets would be in a
position to adopt many techniques for denying intelligence on strategic weapons
developments to the United States. Without this intelligence the United States
would be forced to rely on worst case estimates, which could only lead to excessive
force buildups.
While we strongly supj)ort the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, we are increas-
ingly concerned with the tendency during the debate to turn the SALT II Treaty
into a Christmas tree loaded with presents to be exchanged for SALT support. We
have already seen President Carter's decision, only a week before he signed the
SALT II Treaty in Vienna, to proceed with the full-scale development of the new
large-model M-X missile. We, too, are concerned about the theoretical vulnerability
of the Minuteman ICBM. But it is not clear that the weapons-procurement rather
than the weapons-limitation approach is the best way of solving this problem. In
SALT I the United States opted to continue the arms race in MIRVed missiles when
the United States was more than 5 years ahead, since the Soviet Union had not yet
carried out a first test of such a missile system. Now the United States is paying the
price for its failure to deal with this problem through arms control; quite predict-
ably, the Soviets have followed along behind the United States and will now some
time in the 1980's have sufficient numbers of accurate MIRV warheads at least to
threaten our entire ICBM force. Now it appears that the United States is repeating
this failure of the early 1970's by not exploring vigorously enough possible arms
control solutions to ICBM vulnerability. Instead, it is adopting the new-weapons
route, which in the long run may not work and would cost many tens of billions of
dollars.
Furthermore, the decision by President Carter in June to procure the largest of
the candidate M-X missile models for full-scale development cannot be justified as a
solution to the ICBM vulnerability problem. Because of its large size, the missile
will be harder to make invulnerable than would smaller designs. In fact, the
characteristics of the new missile can only increase the potential vulnerability of
land-based ICBM's, since this M-X missile is designed to have a counter-silo capabil-
ity against Soviet ICBM's. Such a program can only force the Soviets, who rely on
fixed land-based ICBM's for 75 percent of their deterrent force, to take one or more
of the following alternative actions: (1) They could in time of crisis launch a
preemptive strike; (2) place all of their missiles on launch-on-warning, thus increas-
ing the risk of an accidental nuclear conflict, or (3) adopt a mobile basing scheme,
making it impossible for the United States to verify the number and type of missiles
which the Soviets had deployed. Each of these hurt U.S. security.
So far the Administration has not yet determined the exact basing scheme that it
will use for the new M-X missile, but it appears likely that it will involve some sort
of multiple-launch-point system. It is conceivable that a U.S. system could be de-
signed in some Rube Goldberg way so that the Soviets could verify the number of
U.S. ICBM's actually deployed. But the problem for the United States is not Soviet
verification of U.S. compliance, but instead. United States verification of Soviet
compliance. The Soviets may not find it so easy with their liquid-fueled missiles to
adopt a mobile system, a ceiling on which would be verifiable by U.S. intelligence.
Since they will feel threatened by the counter-silo capability of the United States
M-X, tliey may be forced to adopt such an unverifiable basing scheme even if it
were to lead to a breakdown of the entire SALT process. Yet, without SALT
limitation on the number of Soviet warheads the effectiveness of the multiple-
launch-point system for obtaining invulnerability for U.S. ICBM's is lost. There is
no easy solution to the ICBM vulnerability problem, and the United States should
not rush into \/eap>ons programs in order to solicit support for the SALT II Treaty
when these programs could well lead to a collapse in the efforts to establish long-
term controls on strategic nuclear weapons.
Instead, the United States should be exploring every effort to seek an arms
control solution to this problem and make sure that no doors are shut that would
foreclose such an option in the future. The most obvious approach is to establish
much stricter mutual limitations on the total number of MIRVed missiles and their
warhea<^. This should be the highest priority issue to be dealt with in the after-
math of SAL"! II. To be successful in controlling the theoretical threat to land-based
ICBM's, both negotiated agreements and difficult national decisions by the United
States and the U.S.S.R. will be required in the near future.
To date no other specific weapons programs have been directly tied to SALT
ratification, but such linkages could implicitly or explicitly develop at any time. One
can visualize attempts to get commitments for future deployment of ground- and
181
sea-launched strategic cruise missiles in exchange for SALT support. Decisions on
these weapons are very complicated and intimately related to the military and
political relationships with our NATO allies. They should not be taken hastily
during the SALT debate. The reason that provisions relating to these weapons were
placed in the Protocol, which expires in 1981, was to provide time to make these
decisions. One should not, in the heat of the SALT debate, preclude such careful
consideration.
There may also be pressures to add a new manned bomber to the SALT Christmas
tree. President Carter made the decision in 1977 against the B-1 and in favor of air-
launched cruise missiles on purely military-effectiveness grounds, not on arms-
control considerations. It would be a travesty if now a hasty decision were made to
proceed with a new manned bomber as well as cruise missiles to generate support
for an arms control agreement.
We have already seen explicit linkage of a 5 percent increase in the total military
budget as a price for supporting SALT ratification. A decision to increase the
military budget is of paramount national importance not only because of its effect
on our military posture but also of its effect on the economy of the country.
Dollars wasted on unnecessary strategic weapons means less money for conven-
tional forces.
Dollars spent for the military means less money available for other pressing
national needs.
Dollars spent for the military means increased inflationary pressures.
Dollars spent for the military means fewer people employed.
All of these facts must be taken into consideration, and the decision on what
funds to spend on non-strategic weapons should not be tied to support for SALT.
Furthermore, since in 1985 the relative United States-Soviet strategic balance will
be more favorable to the United States with the SALT Treaty than without, logic
would say that there is less need for increased military spending if SALT were
ratified than it it were not. Thus a more appropriate linkage with SALT would be
an increased military budget if SALT is not ratified and a decreased budget if it
were. Tying SALT support to an increased military budget is a mindless connection.
Finally, it would be wrong to leave the discussion of the SALT II Treaty ratifica-
tion without voicing the view that the entire climate of the ratification debate in
the United States is based on a fundamental misconception — that somehow our
nation has become or is rapidly becoming inferior to the Soviet Union and subject to
military coercion or blackmail. Yet Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said in his
January 25, 1979 Annual Report:
"National Security has always been comprised of a number of factors and has
always required a number of strengths — non-military as well as military. The
United States fortunately is by most measures the strongest nation in the world. No
other country — certainly not the Soviet Union — can compete with us in economic
power, political stability and cohesion, technological capability, national will, or
appeal as to way of life and international policies."
Those who urge boosting military spending above the very high levels projected
for the coming years assume that the Soviet Union is gradually becoming dominant
on the world scene and that the United States has been standing still militarily.
They ignore three factors: (1) U.S. strategic programs and strengths; (2) Soviet
weaknesses; and (3) the unlikelihood of translating nuclear arsenals into political
advantage.
Let me comment briefly on each of these points.
1. The United States has a secure deterrent force composed of a triad of SLBM's,
ICBM's, and long-range bombers; the Soviet Union has a less secure force of which
75 percent are fixed land-based ICBM's which will become increasingly vulnerable
in the 1980's. In the past decade the United States has increased the number of its
strategic force loadings (warheads and bombs) by 5,250 to nearly 10,000; the Soviets
by 3,590 to only slightly more than 5,000. As Dr. Kissinger once said when he
worked in the government, it is warheads, not delivery vehicles, that kill people and
destroy targets. Moreover, during the same period the United States deployed
hundreds of new Minuteman III ICBM's; upgraded its existing missiles by adding
new guidance systems and more powerful warheads; hardened the Minuteman silos;
deployed a thousand SRAM air-to-surface missiles; developed the highly accurate
air-launched cruise missiles, which will virtually nullify the large, extremely costly
Soviet Air Defense system; made major modifications in the B-52 bomber; deployed
hundreds of Poseidon MIRVed SLBM's, and developed the quieter "Trident subma-
rine and longer-range Trident I missile. The United States has not been standing
still. The United States has and will continue to have a balanced, enormously
destructive strategic deterrent, capable of retaliating after any Soviet attack and
destro3ring thousands of Soviet military and industrial targets.
182
2. The Soviet Union is a military superpower, and there is no way to prevent it
from having nuclear weapons that can devastate the United States. But it, too,
cannot prevent catastrophic devastation by the United States. Furthermore, it has
major economic and political weaknesses. The inefficient Soviet economy requires
its leadership to import grain and technology from the West. According to CIA
estimates, this dependence will increase as the growth rate of the Soviet economy
dips below 1 percent in the mid-1980's. After six decades in power, the Soviet
leadership has no big-power allies. It is bordered by a hostile China and restive East
European countries. Compare this situation with the close U.S. ties to its NATO
partners and to Japan.
3. The Soviet Union has been unable to use its nuclear weapons for political
advantage, or even to prevent a number of developments that were inimical to
Soviet power. This situation will continue into the future unless the United States
talks itself into a position of weakness. Despite their 5,000 strategic warheads, the
Soviets were unable to prevent Pope John Paul II from speaking to millions in
Poland, unable to prevent Hua Kuo-feng from visiting Eastern Europe, unable to
require Romanian acceptance of a military budget increase voted by the Warsaw
Pact, unable to exert its influence in the Middle East, and unable to dissuade the
Japanese from signing a peace treaty with China. In a world of two nuclear-armed
superpowers, there is no known way for one of them to use weapons of mass
destruction for limited political gains.
In conclusion, as the United States faces the decision to ratify or not to ratify the
SALT II Treaty, it must recognize its real strength and stop exaggerating its
weaknesses. Poor-mouthing military capabilities can only create self-fulfilling
prophecies. Statements that the United States would not retaliate, even after a
Soviet attack that killed tens of millions of Americans, do more to undercut the
deterrent than all the Soviet heavy missiles. Impljdng that the President would
have no choice but to retaliate against Soviet cities is dangerously misleading when
our capability and strategy have long been to attack military targets and the
industry supporting the military.
The SALT II agreements must be understood as useful and important steps, not
end points, toward improved security and toward controlling and reversing the
dangerous nuclear arms race. To this end we urge prompt ratification of the Treaty
without amendment. SALT II must not be asked to bear the burden of all the
complex problems of foreign relations. Neither must the ratification process be used
to adorn the SALT Christmas tree with all manner of new weapons programs, many
of which in the long run could not only decrease security but also make future
agreements to limit nuclear weapons more difficult, if not impossible. The United
States should make decisions on future military programs on the basis of its true
security needs in the light of the limitations that the SALT II Treaty provides, and
not in the light of whether they will provide increased support for its ratification.
New Directions believes that U.S. security between now and the expiration of the
SALT II Treaty would be greatly enhanced by taking further steps to end the
United States-Soviet competition in arms and to curb the spread of nuclear weapons
to additional countries. Among the steps that should be vigorously pursued during
this period are a Comprehensive Test Ban, an agreement banning anti-satellite
weapons, a first-step accord on mutual reductions in conventional forces in Europe,
and some partial agreements in SALT III that can be added as protocols to SALT II.
New Directions is most interested in securing deep cuts in MIRVed missiles in order
to allay fears of surprise attack. In addition, the first accords on medium-range
nuclear weapons could be achieved during this time frame.
Security lies not in pursuing a self-defeating arms race, but in taking all neces-
sary steps to end it.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr.
Scoville. I again want to thank the panel for its cooperation.
CONTRIBUTION OF TRADE TO PRESERVATION OF PEACE
I would like to go back first to Mr. Schmidt's testimony and its
emphasis upon the importance of the growth of trade and the
contribution that trade itself can make to stability in our relations
with the Soviet Union and in the preservation of peace. I agree
with that, and I think that the long period of time when we
engaged in no trade with the Soviet Union because we disapproved
of its society was typical of that tendency in our foreign policy, to
183
try and isolate countries that we dislike for one reason or another,
even though such a policy is almost always self-defeating.
I happen to think that our policy toward Cuba through the years
has been self-defeating. We have minimized our influence in that
country by refusing to trade with it for so many years having no
representation there, and we can see the end result in the most
recent developments in that country.
It has been an unproductive, indeed, a counterproductive policy
for the United States. I think we finally came to understand that
the same was true for the Soviet Union, and fortunately we did
commence some years ago to expand our trade with the Soviet
Union. I think that has been a very important step.
My question to you, Mr. Schmidt, is this. Don't you feel that one
of the most important benefits that could flow from the Senate's
ratification of the SALT treaty would be an improvement in the
general climate that could lead to further expansion of trade and
other peaceful contacts with the Soviet Union, and that this would
be stabilizing and beneficial to the prospects for continued peace,
that this indeed could help lay the basis for substantial reductions
in these arms that we must never fire except in the act of commit-
ting national suicide?
Aren't these collateral benefits that could and should flow from
the Senate's ratification of the treaty?
Mr. Schmidt. Yes, sir. I believe you have very accurately stated
those extra benefits that we would receive were the Senate to
ratify the SALT II Treaty. The Soviets are great immitators of the
United States. You see them imitate the United States in a mili-
tary environment. You see them imitate the United States in our
industrialization process, and if we were to ratify SALT II and
stabilize our trade with them, I think you would see a greater
emphasis on their part to imitate the United States in our mutual-
ly beneficial trade relationships. They believe that the United
States is large areas of production, and industrialization, and
maybe we should be given credit for that.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Schmidt. I personally concur in
your position.
Mr. Carey, as a long-time member of the American Legion I
want to say, first of all, that the Legion's position favoring limita-
tion of nuclear arms has always in my judgment been a very
enlightened position; for a veterans' organization, I think it has
been a courageous position.
Your statement today raising, as it does, certain recommenda-
tions for reservations, understandings, and modifications in this
treaty, is one that this committee will carefully weigh. I would like
to call your attention to certain reservations and understandings
that have been proposed by Senator Javits and myself and receive
your response and what you think the response of the Legion
would be to those proposals.
Since I cannot find them at the moment, let me briefly describe
them to you. We will supply you with a text of these proposals.
RESERVATION ON BACKFIRE STATUS IN TREATY
The first is a reservation. You mentioned in your testimony your
concern about the Backfire bomber because it does have a capabili-
184
ty, even though it may be primarily designed as a theater weapon,
in extremis to reach the United States with a refueUng in flight. In
your testimony you have dealt with the commitments that Mr.
Brezhnev made to President Carter in the unsigned statement,
offering the suggestion that we require the statement be signed by
Brezhnev.
Our reservation seeks to accomplish the same thing by making
the consent of the Senate conditional upon the reservation that the
commitments contained in the Soviet written statement, that is the
unsigned statement, and in his oral assurance that the production
of these bombers would not exceed 30 per year are essential, in the
words of the reservation, to the obligations assumed under the
treaty. These commitments are legally binding on the Soviet
Union, and their violation would give the United States the right
to withdraw from the treaty.
In other words, the reservation would in effect incorporate by
reference these gissurances, elevate them to the status of the treaty,
and provide that the violation of those commitments would be the
same as the violation of any provision of the treaty, and thus
grounds for withdrawal.
I take it the Legion would support such a reservation.
Mr. Carey. Yes, sir. I believe from the discussions we had from
our special committee's hours and days spent on this, it would be
acceptable to the organization.
RESERVATION ON COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREED
STATEMENTS
The Chairman. A second recommendation you made had to do
with the common understandings and the agreed statements.
Again, we have proposed a reservation to the effect that the agreed
statements and common understandings regarding the treaty and
the protocol transmitted by the President on June 22, 1979, with
the treaty are of the same force and effect as are the provisions of
the treaty itself.
The intent here is to make the Senate's consent conditional upon
an acceptance by both parties that the agreed statements and
common understandings are to be treated as though they were part
of the text of the treaty itself.
I take it that the Legion would also endorse that position.
Mr. Carey. Well, we definitely would like to see it a part of the
treaty. If you are saying that, Senator, I think we will have that.
The Chairman. This will have the same effect, because the con-
sent would be made conditional upon both parties treating these
agreed statements and common understandings as though they
were part of the treaty itself.
Mr. Carey. If I could say one thing, referring to the Backfire
bomber. Senator, it has bothered us very greatly. It bothers us as to
why — why do they have to say that they are going to continue to
build 30 Backfire bombers a year? Why do they need them if we
are supposed to have this peace and live with this peace? That is
the thing that h£is bothered us. We are recognizing that they can
go ahead and continue to build 30 Backfire bombers a year.
Again, in part of my statement that I was not able to make, and
in part of the statement which is on file, I know we want to limit
185
spending and we want to limit the whole situation, but if we are
recognizing and allowing them even to consider building that type
of thing, and we recognize that in this treaty of 30 per year, we
have to have a defense to go against that in this country, we had
better have something that can counteract it as far as that is
concerned.
That bothers us.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Carey. I see that my time is up.
I want to come back to a second round in order to address a couple
of questions to the other members of the panel, but under the 10-
minute rule I will turn now to Senator Percy.
Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carey, along with Senator Church, I have been a member of
the American Legion for a long time. I think my membership is in
its 34th year. I was very impressed with the statement you made
from the standpoint of the fundamental principles of the Legion,
and I applaud your long-term support for strategic arms limita-
tions.
FULLY VERIFIABLE IN AREAS AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY
I would like to ask for clarification on your position on verifica-
tion. The more we have looked into verifications, the more I have
come to the conclusion that it would be unrealistic to look for 100-
percent verifiability, but that if the treaty is sufficiently verifiable
so that we can have enough advanced notice to void the treaty or
withdraw from it and take action, that would be acceptable.
Would you accept the statement that it should be verifiable in
areas that affect the national security interests of the United
States and its allies? Is that the crux of what you are after?
Mr. Carey. That is, sir. As I said in the statement, this concerns
a lot of classified intelligence gathering information. Therefore, we
have to depend upon those people who have that information.
What you are saying is the fact that the statement would be for
those people who have that information and not available to the
general public have to be fully satisfied and concerned with this,
and that we would accept that.
AFFECT OF CUBAN SITUATION ON SALT NEGOTIATIONS
Senator Percy. The support the American Legion has given to
the treaty understandings some of us have proposed, including our
chairman and ranking member. Senator Javits, has been very help-
ful indeed, and we are appreciative. In your opening comments,
you spoke about the Cuban troop situation. What was your recom-
mendation with respect to carrying on these negotiations with the
Soviets regarding the troops in Cuba?
Mr. Carey. We talked about the particular fact. Senator, that we
feel this is a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and second, we
believe that the presence of that brigade constitutes a military base
which was prohibited in the 1962 agreements with the Soviets in
Cuba.
Our recommendation was that we urged the committee to post-
pone any further action, not hearings, but any further action on
the strategic arms limitation agreement currently pending until
186
such time as all Soviet combat troops have been withdrawn from
the island of Cuba.
Senator Percy. In other words, you feel we should continue with
the process of ratification, but not take final action until such time
as this is clarified?
Mr. Carey. That is right, until some understanding comes out of
that particular situation.
Senator Percy. I think you and I then both disagree with the
State Department as to whether or not this violates the Monroe
Doctrine. I happen to think it does. Department officials feel that
only the spirit of the doctrine is violated, but I am with you in that
I think it really does violate the doctrine. The Soviets in their
sophisticated knowledge of our system must really understand that
this is a fundamental thing that we cannot permit.
Mr. Carey. There are a lot of spirits floating around this coun-
try, Senator, and a lot of types of spirits that we can talk about,
too. [General laughter.]
Senator Percy. I would welcome warmly Mr. Peter Baugher, a
valued constituent. I commend him for the contributions he has
made through the years.
USE OF nuclear WEAPONS TO DEFEND EUROPE
Mr. Baugher, you made a very good point when you argued that
national strength is more than just military strength, that really it
is the whole composite. You mentioned the word "will." It is the
will that is important. Do you have any doubt that if there were an
invasion of Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact countries and our
conventional weaponry appeared inadequate to defend our allies,
we would use strategic nuclear weapons? Should the Soviet Union
be on notice that we would have the national will to use them on
those without hesitation in the case of that kind of provocation?
Mr. Baugher. My own view is that we do have the national will
to protect the security of Europe with the defense umbrella of the
United States, and this would include the use of nuclear weapons.
The more difficult question is whether our NATO allies and the
Soviet Union are persuaded of that point. The decline in recent
years of our military position relative to that of the Soviets, not
only in Europe but in the rest of the world as well, has made some
people doubt that we would ever use our nuclear weapons. But I
think that if we go forward with a sensible plan to strengthen both
our conventional and our strategic armaments, we will be able to
quiet those doubts.
Senator Percy. I agree with Mr. Carey about the horrible nature
of nuclear war and our abhorrence of it, but we have placed these
weapons there as a deterrent and they do not act as a deterrent,
we have to have the will to use them. There should be no ambigu-
ity or misunderstanding about that.
When the Ripon Society, not known for its right-wing positions
through the years, can state through it representative that we have
the will to use those weapons if it becomes necessary, then there
cannot be any ambiguity about it or any misunderstanding. I think
we all stand together on that — the Congress and the executive
branch. You also mentioned that our national strength reflects.
187
among other factors our economic strength. Here we face a
dilemma.
As you well know, I am totally committed to balancing this
budget. I am spending a tremendous amount of time and effort to
accomplish that. I think the strength of the dollar and the strength
of our whole economic situation is factor which is very important
and something that the Soviet Union fully respects. It is our eco-
nomic strength that would give us the ability to sustain an arms
race if that is what the Soviets want to continue to engage in.
BALANCING THE BUDGET AND FUTURE MIUTARY EXPENDITURES
What do we do if we get to the point where the increase in
military spending is such that we cannot balance the budget? I
think we will have to cut some social spending but we still may not
be able to balance the budget with large defense increases. What
do we do then? After all, we are committed as a nation to try to
balance our budget beginning October 1 of next year.
Mr. Baugher. That is correct. Senator. I think the commitment
to balance the budget is very important. In fact, it is essential to
our national security to try to get America's economic house in
order. If I were to list present threats to the United States, the
possible defeat of the SALT Treaty or the nuclear arms race gener-
ally, would not be the first items on my list. The first item on my
list would be the serious economic straits in which we now find
ourselves. The combination of inflation and recession is a problem
that we are going to have to cope with if we want to remain strong
in the world.
Now, as to how one makes the tradeoffs between boosting de-
fense spending and maintaining a ceiling on the overall budget,
this is something that I think has to be done on a program by
program basis. That is why we are critical of those who say, let's
just increase the defense budget by 5 or more percent. That is the
wrong way of going about the process. What we have to do is to
decide: Do we want to be spending our discretionary tax dollars on
the M-X missile system in 1979, or should we be spending that
money on social programs? Should we be devoting our limited
resources to new weaponry, whether strategic or conventional, or
should we be reducing the burden of taxation on our citizens?
Senator Percy. Thank you. Thank you very much.
AFFECT OF TRADE ON U.S. STRENGTH
Mr. Schmidt, I have a quick question for you. You have linked
the passage of SALT to continued U.S. trade with the Soviets.
There are those who would say there should be no trading with the
Soviets. Anything we trade to them somehow adds to their strength
and ability to be an adversary.
I have faith in trade. The Yankee trader certainly might not
always be getting the best of the deal, but we certainly should not
get the worst of the deal time after time.
Do you have confidence that trade can be carried on in such a
way that it does not weaken the United States but in fact actually
strengthens us economically?
48-260 0-79 Pt . 4 - 13
188
Mr. Schmidt. I would certainly agree with the statement that
trade with them does strengthen us economically, but it also
strengthens them economically. As many people argue trade also
strengthens them militarily. I always have been of the opinion that
we can wipe the floor with the Soviets militarily, economically, and
politically any time we decide we are going to exercise our will to
do so.
The Soviet Union cannot and will not get the best of us economi-
cally. You only need to observe that system for a little while to
observe that there is so much inefficiency in it, so much bureaucra-
cy that they cannot possibly compete with us, so it just makes
sense to me that we ought to strengthen our position more and
more with trade.
One of the things you do in business, and I am sure you may
know better than many without business experience, is the follow-
ing. When there is a competitive situation in business, the first
thing one does is to get close to your adversary. You want to know
exactly what he is going to do next. You want to know as much
about him as possible. You want to know about his people. You
want to know about his sales force. You have to get next to him
before you can adequately determine what his strengths and v/eak-
nesses are.
Senator Percy. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman, Thank you. Senator Percy.
Senator Stone is next.
Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
AMERICAN legion's POSITION TOWARD SOVIET TROOP SITUATION
Commander Carey, does the American Legion take a position on
what it feels would be acceptable in this Soviet troop situation?
Specifically, would the American Legion consider that it would be
acceptable if the Soviets left their forces there, but assured the
United States that they would not be used in an offensive mode, or
would it be acceptable to the Legion if most but not all of the
combat union were withdrawn so that a combat union presence
much reduced would be left there or anything short of total remov-
al of the combat union?
Mr. Carey. Sir, what we take and what we look at are the people
we have dealt with for years. I realize we need all the trade and
everything else that we need. We also take what I looked at in my
year of travel all over the world, the pincers movement that I see
and the involvement that I see in Africa, the Middle East, the Far
East, and so on where the Soviets' hands are in. You want to take
a look at the isolationism, what is happening to the United States
as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.
Our feelings at the present time, are that we feel that that whole
group must be removed just like they did in 1962 when they took
the missiles and the missile launchers that they were bringing m,
they put them back on the ships, and took them out of there. They
have no reason to be there, and we are still of the stand that they
should all come out of there before we continue to actually make a
final decision on SALT IL
Senator Stone. So the Legion's position is, it is appropriate to
continue these hearings, to continue our work, but not to take any
189
definitive action on this treaty pending the total removal of the
total combat unit. Is that right?
Mr. Carey. That is right, sir.
Let me make a statement to you that gets us possibly off the
hook. I have made it all year long on public television and in other
fora. We are a group of war veterans who have seen action. We
take care of those who are in the hospital and the families of those
who are killed. We never want to see war again, but we believe, as
history shows us, that peace through preparedness keeps the wolf
away from the door.
I think unless this country comes forth and sets forth, such as
the example in Cuba right now, and shows that we are the No. 1
free nation of the world, and we want the rest to look to us, that
we have to take this type of stand. We don't want to see another
war. We have seen war. But we also feel that there has to be peace
through preparedness, and through particularly not allowing their
actions to infringe on us. They are coming closer and closer to our
shores, and we do not feel they should be there.
Senator Stone. Thank you. Commander Carey.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Stone.
Senator Glenn, do you have any questions of this panel?
Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CAPABIUTIES OF SS-18
Gentlemen, I regret that I was not able to be here earlier.
Commander Carey, I was going through your statement, and I
have only one comment at this time, and it is your particular
concern about the SS-18 and its capabilities. I share your concerns
about that. My main concerns have been expressed in the possibil-
ity that they could do additional testing, have additional warheads
on that booster, and that they could theoretically come up with
some 6,000 to 8,000 additional warheads at least.
I know the intelligence community is doing its very best to try to
recoup the monitoring capability that we at one time had on the
SS-18 out of Iran, but which still, at least as of today, is probably
not a replacement for that monitoring capability that we want
American security to rely on in the future.
I just wanted to make that comment. It is not in the form of a
question, really. It would give them the potential for a breakout
capability later on resulting in a huge preponderance of available
weaponry opposed to the balance that we are trying to set, moni-
tor, maintain, and verify in the whole SALT II process. I was glad
to see that brought out in your statement. I think it is a very key
part of this whole thing.
We have to be able to monitor, as I see it, or we don't know what
is happening with the launch-weights, the throw-weights, and the
additional warheads that you talk about in your statement, which I
think we absolutely must be able to monitor. We want to have this
so that we can get on with SALT III, IV, V, and VI. We want to
scale down the nuclear weaponry arsenals throughout the world,
but it seems to me that we will only do that if we get enough
confidence in the Soviets living up to their agreements to warrant
going on with this.
190
Certainly, the Cuban situation ties into this. If we are building
confidence in each other or trying to, it sure isn't done by moving
troops into Cuba. No one is concerned that 2,000 or 3,000 troops
will attack Washington, D.C., Key West, or New Orleans, or any-
where else over here, but when we see the pattern of worldwide
expansionism going on, whether it be in Afghanistan, the Persian
Gulf, in Yemen or in Africa, where there are Cuban surrogates, we
see a big pattern. We see Cuba involved throughout the Third
World. We see MIG-23's coming into Cuba.
Well, I don't think that the MIG-23 is a big offensive nuclear
delivery system, but it is one more bit of a pattern where we are
being bit and piecemealed to death. We cannot ignore it and say it
has no relationship to SALT II. Of course, no one wants to start
World War III over this, but I share your concern about the
break-out capability and the SS-18 monitoring and various other
points. I just wanted to make that comment. I would, of course,
welcome any comment you wish to make at this time.
Mr. Carey. Thank you, sir. I prefer to leave your statement as it
stands. We do think there should be a new counting system which
is basically what I believe you suggest.
Senator Glenn. Mr. Chairman, I would make one other com-
ment. When it was stated that the negotiations perhaps should
have included some other things in SALT II, I basically agree with
that, but perhaps when SALT II was started so many years ago, I
do not believe anyone could have foreseen at that time the extent
to which MIRVing would take place, and the numbers of additional
warheads that we could put on these boosters.
With the throw-weight that they have on the SS-18, they could
theoretically deliver between 25 and 40 warheads. Although they
are limited to 10 now, we have already monitored them testing
beyond the 10 they are allowed by simulating a couple of additional
RV's.
It seems to me therefore they have already indicated what their
intention is if they can get away with it. That is the reason why I
put so much emphasis on our monitoring capability. I am willing to
sign a treaty with the Russians. I am willing to approve a treaty
and see it ratified, but only if we have high confidence in our
intelligence system, so that we will know what they are doing,
know whether they are living up to the treaty, just as they already
know through the open literature and easy monitoring of us that
we will live up to it.
It is on that basis that we will go on to SALT III, SALT IV, and
SALT V. If we don't do it on that basis, it seems to me we are just
playing russian roulette, and I don't mean to make a horrible pun.
We are playing russian roulette with American security for the
future, and I don't want to see us do that. I still think the Senate's
action should hinge in large measure on the monitoring which you
stress, particularly regarding the SS-18 and the other missiles
which they have tested from their southern site, the site we used to
monitor from Iran.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, time seems to be slipping away, so I
would thank you all for your help today.
191
Senator Percy. May I have one additional minute, please?
The Chairman. Of course, Senator Percy.
NEW DIRECTIONS SUPPORT FOR SENATE UNDERSTANDINGS
Senator Percy. Mr. Scoville, you say you support this treaty and
hope the Senate will not amend it in any way. Does New Direc-
tions support the understandings that the chairman has read?
Mr. Scoville. Yes, it does.
Senator Percy. Fine. Thank you.
TELEVISED COVERAGE OF SALT FLOOR DEBATE
I would appreciate a one-word answer from each of the panel on
this question. Do you think it would help public understanding if
we were technically able to work it out so that we had television
and radio coverage of the debate on the Senate floor, that is, the
SALT debate?
Mr. Scoville. Yes.
Mr. Carey. Yes.
Mr. Schmidt. Yes.
Mr. Baugher. Yes.
Senator Percy. Thank you very much. I appreciate all four ac-
ceptances on that.
The Chairman. Senator Percy, you have unanimous support, it
appears. That is an enviable political position.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. I want to acknowledge the
presence here of Carl Marcy, who is now the executive secretary
for the American Committee on East-West Accord, and for many
years has served this committee with ability and distinction as the
staff director of the committee.
Carl, it is nice to see you back again. We appreciate very much
your continued activities in a good cause.
Gentlemen, we thank you all very much.
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]
The Chairman. Our next witness is Mr. Lane Kirkland, Secre-
tary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations]. Mr. Kirkland, the committee
is very happy to welcome you today. We look forward to your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF LANE KIRKLAND, SECRETARY-TREASURER,
AFL-CIO, WASHINGTON, D.C.>
Mr. Kirkland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Lane Kirkland. I am Secretary-Treasurer of the
AFL-CIO. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the opportunity
to appear before the committee to advance the views of the AFL-
CIO on the SALT II Treaty which now awaits the advice and
consent of the Senate. The AFL-CIO has consistently supported a
strong national defense, not as a source of jobs, but as insurance of
our freedoms in a very dangerous world of continued social and
economic progress, and of the democratic values that we prize,
including free trade unions.
' See page 193 for the prepared statement of the AFL-CIO Executive Council.
192
We do not subscribe to the notion of inherent conflict between
the equally vital imperatives of necessary defense expenditures and
domestic programs and progress. The Constitution defines the duty
of government as to provide for the common defense and to pro-
mote the general welfare. It does not say to provide for the
common defense or to promote the general welfare. It is scarcely
prudent to finance one's household improvements by neglecting to
pay one's fire and insurance premiums.
Such a folly holds the prospect that all may well be lost. Defense
goals must, of course, be gaged and judged as relative to the threat
that one perceives. We perceive the threat presented by the rate of
expansion and improvement of Soviet strategic nuclear arms as
real and as growing and as not seriously deterred by this treaty or
by public need or opinion in that country, or by any benign inten-
tions on the part of the leaders of that power, present or future.
We believe that the security of our Nation and its allies, which is
the real issue here, can be enhanced by either or both of two
methods, stronger defenses or genuine significant and mutual arms
reduction agreements with our potential adversaries. We certainly
prefer the latter course, but we cannot assume it, and SALT II by
its terms does not assure us that it is yet more than a hope.
We do, however, support the proposition that that hope should be
kept alive long enough, at least, to test it once more, rather than to
abandon it now by rejecting the treaty. But that test should be an
urgent, real, and searching one, and we should be fully prepared to
live with the conclusion revealed by its success or failure. Nor
should we meanwhile permit that process to anchor us further
behind the defense posture that we ought to be in if the result is
failure.
We would welcome a treaty that would require and warrant
drastic dismantling on our part as well as that of the U.S.S.R., and
we would not mourn or grieve over or regard as wasted money the
expenditures negated by that happy event.
Limits to be obtained by dismantling only across the board ought
in fact to be the goal rather than, as in the present treaty, limits
well above levels currently in place in critical categories of weapon-
ry, establishing virtual goals and time tables for the further escala-
tion of an already staggering array of instruments of doom.
We must in the meanwhile do what is necessary to pursue parity
as well as security from the threat that will emerge under the
terms of the treaty before you rather than engage, through unilat-
eral restraint or attrition by neglect, in premature, preemptive
compliance with a treaty that does not yet exist, and may never
come to pass.
We are conscious that despite the administration's assurances of
prudent intent, there are many voices in and outside the Congress
that will ardently press for the consent of the Senate to SALT II
but that will, after the fact, just as ardently oppose the measures
necessary to maintain parity and security under the terms of the
treaty.
Such a posture, it seems to me, is far more dangerous to peace
and stability and destructive of the arms control process, if it
should prevail, than is any criticism of the treaty itself. That is
why we have conditioned our support of SALT II on a strong
193
expression in the instrument of advice and consent of the principle
that parity requires that we continue to modernize and develop our
forces and a further strong expression of a proposition that says, in
effect, that we shall not continue to pursue the beguiling phantom
of a process that produces nothing of consequence but dangerous
illusions. Those are the broad considerations that underly the
statement of policy on SALT II recently adopted by the AFL-CIO
executive council which has been previously provided to the Com-
mittee and which is our essential statement.
I ask at this point that the council's statement be made part of
the record, and I am ready to respond to any questions you may
have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Kirkland, your statement will appear at this
point as part of the record.
[The AFL-CIO executive council's statement of policy on SALT II
follows:]
Prepared Statement of the AFL-CIO Executive Council
The Strategic Arms Limitation negotiations, begun ten years ago, have so far
failed either to curb the nuclear arms race or to stabilize the strategic balance of
power. Whatever restraint we have been has been in the form of unilateral U.S.
decisions to cancel or delay new weapons systems, while the Soviet Union has
engaged in the most massive military buildup in peacetime history. The facts are no
longer contested.
Whether SALT II, by contrast, will serve as a significant step toward arms control
depends on what the U.S. government does within its terms. Inaction on the part of
the United States while the Soviets build up to the high limits allowed in the treaty,
would lead the U.S. into a position of gross inequality, from which this nation could
offer the Soviets no effective inducements to accept real arms reductions. The arms
race would continue.
The AFL-CIO will support SALT II if the following steps are taken both to
remedy the emerging strategic imbalance and to move toward genuine strategic
arms control:
(1) In its resolution of advice and consent to the ratification of SALT II, the
Senate should stipulate that under the terms of the treaty, parity requires the
modernization and development of U.S. strategic forces — including, and most par-
ticularly, the MX missile based in such a mode as to survive a first strike by Soviet
missiles.
Without the MX, the U.S. will be restricted to 3 warheads on its Minutemen
ICBMs' compared with 10, 6, and 4 on the Soviet's SS-18, SS-19, and SS-17. The
only way to protect U.S. ICBM's from a Soviet first-strike would then be to rely on
the most dangerous of all strategies: The launch-on-warning of hair-trigger missiles
that virtually fire themselves. If instead the U.S. is to maintain multiple presiden-
tial options in a crisis, this country must proceed to develop the MX in a survivable
basing mode so as to remove the temptation of a first strike.
(2) The way to reduce strategic arms expenditures is not to stand pat on inferior
or vulnerable systems but to proceed forthwith to real and dramatic mutual arms
reductions.
The Senate, therefore, should further stipulate in its instrument of advice and
consent more stringent and specific directives to U.S. negotiators than the vague
and general language now contained in the Statement of Principles for SALT III, so
as to assure that SALT III negotiations will constitute a genuine, early and search-
ing test of whether or not the SALT process will, in fact, lead to significant and
continuing reductions in strategic arms. A time limit for a final response and
evaluation, such as the termination date of the protocol (December 1981), should be
set forth so as to assure urgency and to avoid the endless protraction of negotiations
while the build-up continues beyond the point of no return.
The stipulation should also call for limits not only on launchers but on warheads-
which are the real instruments of destruction and which SALT II permits to
increase dramatically in numbers and accuracy.
The Senate should stipulate that U.S. negotiators in SALT III insist on limits
which would require the dismantling of warheads to a level of parity significantly
194
(at least 30 percent) below the existing level of the higher party in each leg of the
triad (air, sea and land-based strategic nuclear forces). Once these limits are set, the
basis will then exist for further annual across-the-board percentage reductions.
The general, unchecked growth of warheads, combined with the acquisition of
counterforce capability, exposes the inadequacy of Mutual Assured Destruction
(MAD) as a deterrence theory. To compel an American President, in the wake of a
SoAdet first strike, to choose between negotiating terms of surrender or launching an
annihilative retaliatory attack on Soviet civilians is both morally unacceptable and
lacking in the chief prerequisite of deterrence: credibility. The U.S. must move from
MAD to Mutual Assured Non-destruction (MAN). That is, these negotiations must
seek to create conditions which make it impossible for either side to destroy the
other as a viable society through a nuclear attack, or to believe that it can.
Only then can we begin to look forward with optimism to the ultimate goal of
total nuclear disarmament.
The Chairman. I commend you upon the clarity and precision
with which you summarized the statement of the AFL-CIO in an
extemporaneous way. I see that you are speaking from notes. I
always appreciate that, because it contributes to the brevity of the
presentation, and thus enables us to move ahead with questions.
Senator Percy has told me that he has a time problem. Senator
Javits has graciously agreed to permit Senator Percy to open the
questioning.
Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much indeed.
Senator Javits, thank you. I very much appreciate this.
AFL-CIO COSPONSORSHIP OF NEGATIVE FILM ON SALT
Mr. Kirkland, I think the position taken by the AFL-CIO is a
very, responsible position, and a very powerful voice has spoken
out on this matter. I have no doubt that the direction in which you
have indicated this Nation should go is probably the direction in
which it will go.
There was a film produced within the past year, I believe, by the
American Security Council. It was stated that the film was pro-
duced in cooperation with the AFL-CIO. It was a very negative
film on the whole United States-Soviet military balance and it had
implications for SALT process. Could you clarify whether the AFL-
CIO did sponsor that film, or was that a misimpression?
Mr. Kirkland. Not to my knowledge, sir.
TELEVISED COVERAGE OF FLOOR DEBATE
Senator Percy. Not to your knowledge. Could you tell us what
your reaction might be to having the Senate floor debate opened to
radio and television to permit a better understanding of this whole
process by the American people? Do you think it is essential and
important that the American people follow more closely this debate
and argument and have a better understanding of what the signifi-
cance of this treaty is?
Mr. Kirkland. I think it would be useful, sir.
UNKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA
Senator Percy. Do you believe the presence of Soviet combat
troops in Cuba should be linked in any way with the SALT debate,
and if so, in what way? What position would you as an individual
or would the AFL-CIO take in this matter?
195
Mr. KiRKLAND. Well, sir, that was not, of course, before the
council at the time we considered SALT II, so the council did not
act with the benefit of the information that is now generally avail-
able. I can, therefore, only speak for myself. I think it is an
exceedingly serious matter that we should press as an issue with or
without SALT. I find it rather difficult to see how the issue of
SALT alone will necessarily resolve it.
I think the important thing is to resolve the question. To put it
in another way, I think it ought to be looked at in terms of its
proper context. In the broad range and scale of Soviet adventures
that have been taking place in recent years this is simply another
episode. It calls into question two elements that I think are very
important in our consideration of arms control negotiations with
the Soviets. Those are the questions of intentions, and the question
of our prudence in relying on their observation of any agreements
that we make. But there are abundant reasons in recent history to
have those questions in our minds before this. I suspect that the
existence of those questions has far more to do with what misgiv-
ings there may be in the public mind about arms control negotia-
tions than anything else, than any appraisal of the particular
balance of forces in the treaty, the general suspicion and lack of
confidence in the Soviet Union as a negotiating partner, but I still
believe that should be tested and explored to its limits because of
the importance of the issues.
With respect to the Soviet troops in Cuba, I personally have
always regarded Cuba, since the advent of Mr. Castro, as a Soviet
colony. I think so far as it relates to the Monroe Doctrine, the
colonization of the Caribbean and that part of the Caribbean by the
Soviet Empire is for all practical purposes as much a matter of
concern as anything that has followed. I regard all troops in Cuba
as soldiers of the Soviet Empire, whether they are Cuban or Rus-
sian. I am somewhat more concerned with the presence of Soviet
troops in Cuba as it is related to the broader question, about the
soldiers of the Soviet Empire who happen to be Cuban, who are
operating widely in Africa, in an active mode, than I am with 2,000
or 3,000 Soviet troops under the same general command and serv-
ing the same general purpose in Cuba in thus far a passive mode.
AFFECT OF SALT DEFEAT ON NATO ALUANCE
Senator Percy. Thank you very much. My last question is this.
Let's assume that the conditions the council has laid down are met
by the Congress and the President, and yet either crippling amend-
ments are adopted by the Senate such that it is impossible for the
Soviet Union to accept the treaty modified in that way or it is just
flatly turned down by the Senate.
How do you feel a defeat of SALT II under such conditions would
affect our relationships throughout the world with our NATO
allies? What do you think would be the reaction of the American
people?
Mr. KiRKLAND. Well, sir, with respect to the question of amend-
ments which would require the renegotiation of SALT II or which
look to the prospect that the Soviet Union will return to the
negotiating table and deal with those issues that we raised through
amendments, I have thought about that very carefully. I have
196
reached the conclusion that I would prefer to see us press forward
with a genuine and real test for SALT III to see whether it is
productive and mate that the acid test of our future view of the
strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.
If we seek a return to the table on certain elements of SALT II
through amendments looking to renegotiation, I am somewhat ap-
prehensive that it might delay us and hold out some false hopes. It
would delay us from taking the prudent steps in terms of our own
forces that we need to do in the hope that we might accomplish
something through those renegotiations. It would also delay what I
would like to see as an early and severe and searching test of
whether we can achieve really genuine and severe drastic arms
reductions as early as possible. That is why you will note in the
statement of the council that the negotiations should be time
urgent and there should be a deadline for us to evaluate their
response, which would be coterminous with the expiration of the
protocol. I think we ought to be prepared to make that judgment.
There is some reason to say, I suppose, in SALT II that it was a
follow-on of Vladivostok and should have run its course in those
terms, and that these matters such as a search for more severe
cuts ought to be scheduled for the SALT III talks.
But let's get on with that, and get on with it quickly, and make a
judgment fast before we get led further down this path.
Senator Percy. Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. Kirkland. We
appreciate your appearance. And I thank my colleagues for jdeld-
ing to me.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Percy. Senator Glenn?
Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
AFL-CIO'S POSITION ON ABIUTY TO MONITOR AND VERIFY
Mr. Kirkland, I was just rereading the statement by the Execu-
tive Council that was adopted in Chicago on August 7 which you
asked be entered into the record. I think as a statement of the
objectives toward which we should be striving, it is an excellent
statement.
My question would be mainly on how we implement such a thing
and still know what the Soviets are doing in a secret society. Our
ability to monitor is not addressed in that statement — our ability to
verify. I think that is the key to whether we are willing to go these
extra steps which I agree with you completely should be our objec-
tives for future negotiations, and we all regret we are not part of
these negotiations.
How we implement those and still know what is going on in a
secret society and know, for instance, that this 30-percent reduction
called for in the statement is being carried out, is a very difficult
situation, and especially post-Iran, where we are not going to have
quite as good a handle on their testing program, and we only know
what has happened, perhaps, after the fact, after the weapons
system is deployed. Then we can measure things to a fine accuracy.
But did the AFL-CIO executive council consider this area of
monitoring and of verification and what their assessment of it
would be in getting on to these very laudible steps that are out-
lined in the statement?
197
Mr. KiRKLAND. Certainly, Senator, we were aware of the issues
raised with regard to verification in our consideration. But the
statement does not specifically address verification. Obviously, it
assumes at least some adequate capacity to verify the critical ele-
ments of an arms control agreement. My own view on verification
as it has affected negotiations in the past is that it has been
somewhat ambivalent, a sort of two-edged sword.
To some extent, I think it may have led us into the measurement
of the less relevant factors in the nuclear strategic arms balance.
The things that are simplest to verify — there is a temptation to
count those, even though they are far less important. Launchers,
for example, have been made largely irrelevant as a measure by
technology. To reduce launchers while letting other aspects of
weaponry run free, warheads specifically, is equivalent to sort of
replacing a muzzle-loaded rifle with an Ouzi or a Kalachnikov or
an Armalite, and I don't regard that as arms control. That is
productivity.
The SALT II agreement does for the first time create an obliga-
tion and a promise that warheads must now be brought within the
purview of our capacity to verify by at least imposing limits on the
number of warheads that can be launched with a particular con-
figuration of a missile. That implies to me that we must undertake
the responsibility of counting warheads and knowing how to count
warheads.
I have had some exposure to verification techniques in connec-
tion with my service on a number of presidential committees and
commissions. I have been generally impressed with our ability to
monitor. There are, of course, as you very well know, further steps
in ultimate verification. It is evaluating what you monitor and
being willing to face the results of that judgment.
I guess, in the last analysis, I think that during the term of the
treaty, and this perhaps bears on the question of the loss of the
stations in Iran, the monitoring stations there, and the time that it
will take to recover what we lost, the levels that are permitted are
so staggering in real weaponry, in warheads particularly, that a
modest infraction is of no great consequence. If you add another
100 when you cheat and produce another 100 or 150 warheads,
when you are up to the 9,000 or 10,000 level is not of earth-shaking
consequence as affecting the real utility of these forces.
I do think that if we succeed and were to get an agreement that
significantly reduces these levels, and that looks to further and
further reductions as we would hope and as we would regard as
necessary to say that this process is productive, as you get lower, I
think the issue of verification increases in importance. But I think
at these levels I tend to agree with the administration that verifi-
cation is probably adequate for all practical purposes.
Senator Glenn. I think both sides have a tremendous overkill
capability right now. What we are trjdng to establish, of course, is
this balance. I thnk we all regret that we did not make warheads
the subject of the negotiation early on in SALT II. I think the
whole process, however, is a step forward if we can work out
sufficient monitoring and verification capability to approve the
treaty as it is.
198
At least it is a step forward in placing some limit where no limit
previously existed, even though it is preposterously high. It is
generally recognized that we have some 10,000 deliverable war-
heads available right now. The Soviets have about five. Under
SALT II, you can set up a scenario of different missiles and num-
bers of warheads permitted that would permit them to triple their
five and for us to go up by 50 percent on ours, so we would come up
at around 15,000 on each side.
Although it is a little hard for me to accept that as much
progress in arms limitation and arms control, at least it is some
limit where none previously existed, and it is a base for getting on
to stressing warhead reduction in SALT III, IV, V, and VI.
Mr. KiRKLAND. I look at it as a way station on to some real test
of whether we are ever going to start turning that curve around.
The curve is still going up and that concerns me very deeply.
You mentioned that within this treaty the Soviet Union can
increase its warheads by a factor of three. I think it is somewhat
worse than that. They can and will increase their accuracy, I think
from something like 1,200 feet to 600 or 700 feet, which, as I am
told, makes a factor of four. It is not just the doubling, since there
is a geometric ratio. You multiply the factor of four on accuracy by
the factor of three on the number of warheads, and you have a
factor of escalation on their side of 12, 1200 percent, which is a far
cry from the kind of arms control that we would hope for if this
were the end of the line, these levels of real redundancy — I ques-
tion whether it would be of any great consequence to us whether
they added further than that, whether it would be cost effective
expenditure and of great concern to us.
But as I said, our final judgment tells us, OK, we will pass this
marker and move to the next, and let the next one be a real test
from which we ought to be willing to hold a position and walk
away from the table if necessary without continually bargaining
with ourselves to formulate a new position and another new
position.
Senator Glenn. My time is up. Thank you. I agree that we
should move on to that next step. I think we can only move on to
that next step, however, if we build enough confidence each step
along the way by knowing what they are doing so that we are
willing to move on to that next step. We are not willing to buy just
a pig in a poke and just assume they are living up to these things.
We have seen too many activities in other areas of the world where
we do not trust them to act in our best interest, to put it very
mildly.
I think I agree with your emphasis on warheads completely.
Unless SALT III is to have as its basis the limitation of deliverable
nuclear warheads, I would be prepared to vote against SALT II and
the whole works right now because it is a sham, a charade. We
should not go any further with it unless subsequent negotiations
are to bear on the subject of deliverable nuclear warheads. That is
what the big bang comes from. You are absolutely right on that.
Mr. KiRKLAND. I agree with that completely, sir.
Senator Glenn. I think that should be the absolute basis for any
future negotiation, and we not continue our emphasis on launch-
ers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
199
Mr. KiRKLAND. In fact, I have heard some students of this issue
argue that it is far more stabilizing to count warheads and let
launchers run free than the other way around.
Senator Glenn. That might give them a little additional flexibil-
ity that we might not prefer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Javits?
Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ATTITUDE OF AMERICANS TOWARD RISKTAKING
Mr. Kirkland, we welcome you here very much, first as an old
friend, and second, because you speak for such a vast constituency
of those who fight wars and make the things with which we fight
wars. One thing that has bedevilled Washington policymakers on
which I would greatly value your view is this. After Vietnam, after
Angola, and after Watergate, what is the attitude of the American
people toward the risktaking which is implied in your statement?
That is, we have certain stopping points, and we go so far and no
further, and then we will face whatever the issue is. We don't
know. That may be a very portentious decision. The way the Krem-
lin works, as we see it demonstrated in from Cuba, in this highly
surreptitious way, is that you don't know what they are liable to
spring, and you are always confronted, therefore, with the worst
case hypothesis.
As you reflect so ably, as you always do, the views of the Execu-
tive Council of the AFL-CIO for us today by their designation,
which is critically important, could you also reflect to us how you
feel the rank and file AFL-CIO members, feel about this issue? Do
you think notwithstanding the disillusionment of Watergate and
the reversals of Vietnam and the frustrations which we have suf-
fered, that they are nonetheless in the great tradition of this
country ready to face whatever it is, putting freedom even above
these dangers?
Mr. Kirkland. I am confident of that, Senator. I think that our
statement and our other statements — we had a parallel statement
on which the Council acted at the same time which addressed the
so-called transfer amendment with which I am sure you are all
familiar, that puts the proposition to you that the price of social
progress and domestic progress has to come out of defense expendi-
tures.
We oppose that. I think in my opening statement I refer to a
view of that principle. I am confident that that view reflects the
general view of the membership of the trade union movement. As
you very well know, we have a constant system of meetings, con-
ventions, conferences, board meetings, and so forth where these
things emerge and come to our attention. The executive council
represents a pretty good cross section of the leadership of the
American trade union movement, and that leadership reflects, I
think, quite accurately their perception of the attitudes of the
members, or they wouldn't survive too long.
I think the problem with any democracy is that we tend to relax
and hope for the best in between perceived crises. When we see a
crisis, when we see a gun at our head, we pull ourselves together
and do remarkable things. The challenge of leadership is how to do
200
those remarkable things when you are not looking down that gun
barrel, but the crisis is a little more vague and a little more
nebulous.
That places a great burden on leadership, but I think it is a
burden that has to be assumed day in and day out, and not just at
crisis time, if we are going to meet the sort of challenge presented
by a totalitarian society, which doesn't really count, and manipu-
lates the public attitudes or the public role.
Senator Javits. Mr. Kirkland, that is tremendously heartening
to me. I think it should be to the policymakers in addition to those
of us who are here. I think these are words the President should
hear and listen to and pay attention to. It is tremendously hearten-
ing to the country and a great tribute to the labor movement.
I personally agree with the two conditions that you set, that is,
tragic as it is, as you have just said, we are going to have to
continue to work to maintain parity. It is compelled upon us. I
agree with you that SALT III is the watershed, that our negotia-
tors of SALT III have to be told that we will reject SALT III if they
bring it back, without making substantial arms reduction.
Beyond that, from what you say, I am deeply heartened that our
people are willing. We must be alert about becoming ensnared time
and again in any euphoria which has been talked about so much
which, after another SALT. We are told it will put us to sleep, will
put us even further behind in negotiating power, and only bring us
to a day which could mean surrender, a word which we hate to
utter, let alone think about, but which the way this world is run,
we cannot simply forget.
I am very hopeful that the desires of the AFL-CIO will be
realized through the reservations we consider respecting this
treaty.
Mr. Kirkland. Senator, if I may just say a word and get back a
little bit to an observation of Senator Glenn's. I think it is true
there is some marginal value in a treaty which in effect sort of
administers and exchanges information and marginal assurances
on the tremendously continuing high level of weaponry. It is sort of
a gross redundant administration procedure. I just doubt whether
that sort of aim or object warrants a treaty, a treaty labeled arms
limitations, and surrounded by the hopes and expectations that we
are going to reduce in any genuine way.
The real treaty ought to have more substance than that. If we
are just going to administer redundancy on a mutual basis with the
Soviet Union, I think there are other procedures that would not
carry with it the expectations and promises that a treaty does. In
that case, I would far prefer to see us set up a bilateral permanent
administrative committee with the Soviet Union and let it sink
into the backwater that mutual and balanced force reduction has
been in for years.
Senator Javits. Isn't the difficulty, however, that considering
where we are and where we came from and the necessity for catch-
up, that you cannot just practically do that? It would put us in a
tailspin that would indicate a condition of instability in the world
which would make it impossible to do exactly what you want done.
If we had come from there, I would be inclined to agree with you,
but we have not, so it seems to me that in view of the situation
201
which we face, your resolution makes the best of a realistic exist-
ing situation, to wit, go ahead with SALT II with these caveats.
Mr. KiRKLAND. I believe so.
Senator Javits. I thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Javits.
REDUCTIONS IN SALT III IF PARITY IS NOT ACHIEVED
I fear we will have to cut this meeting short, because Senator
Javits and I have been asked to go to the White House, so I will
just ask one question, Mr. Kirkland, and with this question I also
want to express my thanks for your testimony. If parity is not
maintained during the period of the treaty, then it is really not
realistic to expect that we could ever secure substantial reductions
in nuclear arms in SALT III. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Kirkland. I agree with that completely, sir.
The Chairman. That is what has led me to believe that these
other weapons systems which have been proposed will be neces-
sary, because I share with you the goal that we must bring down
these hideous levels, and SALT III will be the test. Without parity
in our position there is no prospect that those reductions could be
achieved.
It is a price we have to pay, but it is the necessary price.
Mr. Kirkland. That is a major consideration to us, sir. The
position we are in in the ongoing negotiations and their perception
of our will and our x'esolve and our capacity plus, until we have a
SALT III in hand that tells us that it is worth the candle, we have
to operate on the assumption that this treaty defines the levels we
are going to have to live with, at least for its term, and establishes
the base, if the process fails us in the future.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Kirkland, for your
testimony.
This afternoon, the committee will resume its hearings on the
SALT II Treaty at 2 o'clock. Senator Stone will chair the afternoon
hearing, and Senator Zorinsky after him. Phyllis Schlafly will be a
witness. Edward Teller and Philip A. Carver are the other wit-
nesses on the agenda for this afternoon. The hearing for this morn-
ing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to recon-
vene at 2 p.m. the same day.]
202
Afternoon Session
The committee met, at 2:10 p.m., in room 318, Russell Senate
Office Building, Hon. Richard Stone presiding.
Present: Senators Stone, Javits, Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, and
Zorinsky.
OPENING STATEMENT
Senator Stone. This afternoon we will continue taking testimony
from public witnesses on their views on the SALT II Treaty.
Our first witness is Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly, representing the
American Conservative Union. Mrs. Schlafly is an analyst and
author with interests in national defense, nuclear strategy and
weaponry.
The American Conservative Union [ACU] is the first organiza-
tion we will hear from today. Following the ACU, we will hear
from Dr. Edward Teller, a world-renowned physicist, who will give
us his view as a scientist. Dr. Teller has spent much of his career
working on nuclear weapons and has often been termed the father
of the hydrogen bomb.
Our last witness this afternoon will be Mr. Phillip Karber, an
expert on the European military balance, both conventional and
nuclear.
Because the overall military balance in addition to the strategic
nuclear balance is important to our SALT deliberations, we believe
it important to review the European balance.
Mrs. Schlafly, we welcome you to the committee and ask you to
proceed with your statement.
STATEMENT OF PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY,^ AMERICAN CONSERVA-
TIVE UNION, ACCOMPANIED BY YVONNE CHICOINE AND
SUSIE BLOSSER
Mrs. Schlafly. Thank you, Senator Stone and members of the
committee. I appreciate your courtesy in being willing to hear me
today.
My name is Phyllis Schlafly, of Alton, 111. I am an author, a
journalist and a member of the Illinois Bar. I appear here as a
representative of the American Conservative Union, of which I am
a member of the board of directors. I am accompanied by several
members of their staff, including Yvonne Chicoine, on my right,
and Susie Blosser, on my left.
For the past 15 years, my major field of research and writing has
been strategy. I am the coauthor of five books on nuclear strategy,
books which made a series of remarkable predictions which, unfor-
tunately, have all come true.
At a time when others were discounting Soviet intentions and
capabilities, my books predicted that the Soviets would keep build-
ing nuclear weapons until they achieved decisive strategic superior-
ity, while the United States was opting out of the arms race by a
self-imposed freeze on the building of additional strategic weapons.
It is now obvious that this is exactly what has happened.
' See page 219 for Mrs. Schlafly's prepared statement.
203
Mr. Chairman, I ask that my full statement be printed in the
record and, in the interest of time, I be permitted to summarize it.
Senator Stone. Your full statement will appear in the record at
the appropriate point. Please proceed.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you.
My testimony shows that SALT II will deliver to the Soviet
Union three powerful political and economic weapons against
which we will have no defense. First, the oil weapon, the power to
cut off U.S. imported oil. Second, the dollar weapon, the power to
destroy our U.S. dollar by denying us the importation of strategic
materials and thereby unsettling our economy. And third, the Cuba
weapon, the power to put missiles and troops and bombers in Cuba.
We have already had a taste of what these weapons can mean. In
1973, we had oil embargo I when the Soviet Union openly and
flagrantly encouraged the oil-producing nations of the Middle East
to use their oil weapon against the West.
We all know that after an embargo of 5 months, they jacked up
the price fivefold. That was followed by tremendous inflation in our
own country, following which we have lost about one-half the value
of our dollar.
We all know about the troops in Cuba today. In my statement I
show several scenarios of what oil embargo II and Cuba crisis II
might mean to the United States if initiated by the Soviet Union.
Of course, these are just examples of what the Soviets might do.
There are any number of variations.
They could proceed by the salami technique instead of all at
once, say, cut off our oil 5 percent at a time. We already know
what that means after the cutoff of oil by the loss of Iran.
The point is that SALT II gives to the Soviets sufficient superior-
ity of nuclear weapons so that they can use the political and
economic weapons with impunity. Some people think that dropping
bombs is the only utility of nuclear weapons, but superiority would
give to the Soviets such economic and political weapons that they
could, in effect, tremendously upset our way of life.
I brought with me a map which shows how these political and
economic weapons are interrelated to Soviet strategic superiority
and how the Soviets and Cubans are already getting ready in
position to use them. The red countries are these where Cuba has
stationed troops in Africa. Cuba has about 50,000 troops there and,
of course, they are using Soviet weapons.
The red anchors show where the Soviets have, in effect, bases for
their fleet. They have three in the Mediterranean, two around
where Saudi Arabia and Kuwait send out their oil, three on the
eastern side of Africa. In addition to that, they have a bunkering
area in the Indian Ocean, and they have a great presence through
those vessels which are called fishing vessels stationed all around
the coast of Africa.
The red stars are friendly ports where the Soviets can bring
their navy in. We, of course, have no such ports on the continent of
Africa.
The big green stream shows the flow of oil from the Middle East
to Western Europe and to the United States, and the brown stream
is the flow of oil from Africa to western Europe and the United
States. I think the map makes it very clear how easy it would be
U8-260 0-79 Pt.i+ - 14
204
for the Soviets to use either their naval superiority or their strate-
gic superiority through nuclear blackmail in order to cut off the
flow of oil to the West.
It is obviously a much easier job to interrupt that flow than it is
to keep the sea lanes open. The Soviets will have sufficient superi-
ority through SALT II in addition to their tremendous naval
power.
We all know what the gas lines were in June when we lost 5
percent of our oil. I would suggest that, if you liked waiting in
gasoline lines in June, you will love SALT II. Half of our oil comes
from imports at the present time, and 59 percent of our imported
oil comes from Africa and the Middle East. How in the world dare
we give to the Soviet Union the power to cut off that oil, to cause
the economic dislocations that that would mean, with the resulting
effects in inflation, in the closing of plants, in unemployment, and
in all such disruption to the economic life of our country?
I believe that this map shows that the linkage between SALT
and oil and the dollar is tremendous. SALT II, in effect, would pour
salt into the gasoline tank of the free world. Translated into plain
English, SALT II equals Soviet superiority in nuclear weapons,
equals Soviet ability to wage political and economic blackmail in
the Middle East and in Africa, and equals more gasoline shortages
in America.
We have at stake not only our gasoline but the stability of our
U.S. dollar. The Soviets could even unsettle it by delays, by harass-
ments, or by cut-offs of that stream of gasoline flowing to our
country.
The map also shows the linkage between the Soviet strategic
superiority and Russian troops in Cuba and Cuban troops in Africa.
They are all tied in together. If we no longer have strategic superi-
ority, how are we going to make the Russians pull their troops out
of Cuba?
We can ask them. The President can say, please take them out.
Mr. Vance can call up and say, do you realize this is a very serious
matter, as he said the other day. The Soviets must know it is a
serious matter. They must have thought seriously about it before
they sent their troops into Cuba.
But the point is, can we make them? SALT II not only allows the
Soviets to have the power, but also the perception of power. It is
obvious that SALT is so unequal, so unfair, so humiliating to the
United States. It gives so many advantages to the Soviet Union
that I don't know how the Kremlin could have anything but con-
tempt for a country which would acquiesce in such an unequal,
unfair deal.
SALT allows the Soviets to have 308 heavy missiles and doesn't
allow us to have even one. It allows them to have four times the
number of land-based MIRV's that we have, MIRV's which will
have 26 times the power of our land-based MIRV's. It limits the
range of our cruise missiles but it allows their submarines to prowl
our coasts within range of our cities.
It does not allow us to have a mobile missile until 1982, but
allows the Soviets to have hundreds of mobile missiles today. It
forbids us to catch up with the Soviets in numbers of ICBM's, in
205
megatonnage, in throw-weight or in any meaningful measure of
what strategic superiority is all about.
And above all, SALT II gives to the Soviet Union the power to
use the political and economic weapons, the power to cut off our
oil, to destroy our dollar, and to use Cuba as a base.
If we ratify SALT II, that is what it means. If we reject SALT II,
on the other hand, we can be masters of our own destiny. We can
build the weapons that we need to defend the independence of our
country and its economic stability. Rejection of SALT II would
show that we are not going to let the Soviets have the power to cut
off our gasoline at the pump, to cut the value of our dollar to 10
cents, or to put troops, missiles or submarines or bombers in Cuba.
So the specter of gasoline lines and closed plants and unemploy-
ment hangs over SALT II. The linkage is complete. I believe that
our Nation is hungry for Senate leadership to say that the United
States will rebuild our strategic power so that we can assure the
political and economic independence of the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stone. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly.
Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mrs. Schlafly, we appreciate your coming before the committee
today. You are a distinguished American and I congratulate our
colleague from Illinois for having such a constituent as Mrs.
Schlafly.
Senator Percy. We haven't always seen eye to eye, but I have
always admired her many qualities, her tenacity, perseverence, and
her power of expression. It is one of the best testimonies I have
heard. I am sorry I was tied up and could not hear it from the
start.
Mrs. Schlafly. Thank you. Senator.
Senator Helms. The Chairman and I were just remarking that
there are very few witnesses who, while delivering testimony, could
get up and walk over to a map, describe it, come back and sit down
without missing a syllable. [Laughter.]
IMMORALITY OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION
Mrs. Schlafly, I had an opportunity to read your statement in
advance. In your statement, you refer to the doctrine of mutual
assured destruction, or MAD. Now, Henry Kissinger was recently
quoted in the Washington Star, I believe on September 2 of this
year, in reference to MAD.
In that article. Dr. Kissinger described mutual assured destruc-
tion as, and I quote: "a bloodthirsty doctrine which is immoral,
senseless, demoralizing." A moral issue is raised because the doc-
trine rests upon the idea that we shall use nuclear retaliation
against a civilian population.
Now, on the other end of the extreme of those who would target
civilian populations are those who wish to have the U.S. disarm
itself unilaterally. Their moral position appears to be that all kill-
ing is immoral; therefore, we should not even have arms to defend
ourselves since defense implies killing.
206
POUCY OF CHRISTIAN NATION IN WAR-TORN WORLD
Somewhere, Mrs. Schlafly, between those two extremes must lie
a rational explanation of how a Christian nation can conduct itself
in a war-torn world without losing its moral values. This is the
first question I would like to ask.
Do you agree with Dr. Kissinger that the MAD doctrine is im-
moral?
Mrs. Schlafly. Senator, I think the MAD doctrine is the most
immoral doctrine that anyone ever devised. The MAD doctrine is
based upon the proposition that if there is a war, we must kill the
maximum number of civilians it is possible to kill. That is what
mutual assured destruction means.
It is based on the doctrine that we keep all of our cities like
sitting ducks, open to any incoming missiles from any nation, while
we do nothing whatsoever to protect them. And if deterrence fails,
we have no alternative except surrender. But at that point we then
launch our missiles and kill millions of Russians who had nothing
to do with participation in the decision to make the launch.
I really don't know how anyone could support that theory, but it
is the basic theory of SALT II. As a matter of fact. Secretary
Brown testified before this committee that the MAD doctrine is the
bedrock of our policy and the bedrock of SALT II. Yet it is based on
killing people instead of keeping people alive.
I do not see what good millions of dead Russians will possibly do
for the United States if our cities have been hit. We should direct
our attention toward keeping Americans alive rather than killing
Russians.
On the whole moral issue, I think one of the most immoral
things I can think of is the absolute abandonment and default of
the United States in retaining the great gift of strategic superiority
that we had. Nuclear weapons in themselves are neither good nor
evil. They are instruments of power. In 1945, our country was so
fortunate that God allowed the great atomic weapon to be devel-
oped by the United States instead of by Hitler or Stalin. One can
speculate on what the world would have been like had the Nazis or
Russians gotten it.
But we got it and we built up that nuclear superiority to where
it peaked at 8 to 1 in 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.
What happened? We don't have the superiority any more. The
Joint Chiefs have said that even essential equivalence will be lost
in the early 1980's. Our superiority is gone. We have defaulted on
our responsibility to maintain the peace of Western civilization.
We proved, from 1945 to 1967 or 1972, that, when possessed by
the United States, nuclear power is the greatest instrument for
peace anyone developed. But in the hands of the Soviet Union, it is
not that at all. It is an instrument of aggression.
The Gospel of St. Luke tells us that, when a strong man armed
keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace. That is really the best
prescription for peace. Our large, wonderful, productive country,
has moral responsibility to defend our people and to defend the
whole of Western civilization, and not to default and give away this
great talent we were given in the nuclear weapon.
207
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY PARALLEL TO MORAL DUTY
Senator Helms. Well, the constitutional duty of this Government
to provide for the common defense, I judge you are sajdng, is
parallel to a moral duty, for this Government to protect American
citizens from war. Is that essentially what you are saying to me?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Yes. To provide for the common defense is the
first constitutional duty of our Government. But I would add to
that the moral duty to defend this great country, the lives of our
people and, in fact. Western civilization against an enemy, the
Soviet Union, which h£is built the most tremendous military arse-
nal in the history of the world and has never abandoned its goal to
use every weapon it has to achieve world conquest.
CONFUCT BETWEEN MORAL DUTY AND IMMORAL KILLING
Senator Helms. How does this moral duty to protect American
citizens at war square with the immorality of killing in the context
of your first eloquent answer?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. We proved when we had nuclear superiority
from 1945 through 1967 that there was nuclear peace. There was
peace between the nuclear superpowers. And if the United States
has nuclear superiority, there will be no nuclear war. That is the
surest way to peace.
As George Washington said: "To secure the peace it must be
known that we are at all times prepared for war." And nuclear
superiority in the hands of the United States is the surest, best
means of peace. We proved that when we had it.
The only reason we are nervous today and worried is because we
no longer have it. Decisions were made which allowed that great
superiority to shift to the Soviet Union.
SALT II PREVENTS UNITED STATES FROM MEETING MORAL
OBLIGATIONS
Senator Helms. In view of the acknowledged essential equiv-
alence by the early eighties, I take it you believe the SALT II
Treaty will not allow the United States to meet its moral obliga-
tions.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. That is correct, because SALT II prohibits us
from catching up with the Russians. It is that simple. SALT II
permits the Soviet Union to have all the weapons they need to
control the world. It enables them to have decisive military superi-
ority and it forbids us to catch up. It forbids us to increase our
numbers of missiles. It forbids us all across the board to catch up
with the Soviets in throw-weight, in megatonnage, in MIRV's, in
missiles and so forth on down the line.
SALT II means that, if it is ratified, we will be humbly accepting
a position of inferiority to the Soviet Union. What is our recourse
after that? After that, we can say please, Mr. Brezhnev, be nice to
us, but we will not have the power to force him to do it.
When Khrushchev put his missiles in Cuba in 1962, our great
Strategic Air Command went on airborne alert and could drop
50,000 megatons of nuclear striking power then. That is why we
208
were safe and there wasn't any war. We can't do that today. We
can't even make a credible threat of that today.
Senator Helms. And we will be even worse off.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. With each succeeding year, we will be worse off.
Senator Helms. Right. My time is up. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stone. Senator Hayakawa.
Senator Hayakawa. Senator Percy, would you like to question
now?
Senator Percy. No, please go ahead. I have time.
SOVIET STOPPAGE OF WORLD OIL FLOW
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly, for your able and
eloquent presentation. I would like further explanation of that
map, Mrs. Schlafly. There is that heavy green line of Middle East-
ern oil going around the Cape of Good Hope up through Europe
and the United States.
This shipment can be interdicted, interrupted, or stopped, you
are saying, by the Soviet Navy? Or what are the ways in which
this flow of oil can be stopped? What are the ways in which it is
likely to be stopped, given Soviet power and, as you say, Soviet
superiority in nuclear weapons?
Mrs. Schlafly. Once they have the strategic superiority, they
can stop it in any one of a variety of different ways. For example,
they could do it like oil embargo I in 1973. They could simply tell
the Middle East and African nations, we want you to embargo oil
for the next 5 months, and don't worry, you can recoup your losses
after that by jacking up the price 10 times.
The Soviets will have the power to do what they want. With
their great naval superiority, they could simply impose a blockade.
"They could harass our shipping line. They could cut it off at some
of those narrow points where the oil comes through. There are any
number of options. When you have the power, you can deal any
card in the deck,
AFRICAN seaports FRIENDLY TO SOVIET NAVY
Senator Hayakawa. What are the seaports on the east coast of
Africa which would be friendly to and therefore probably usable by
the Soviet Navy?
Mrs. Schlafly. They have several ports there at the present
time, and they have that bunkering facility where there is the
break in the green line.
Senator Hayakawa. Yes. What is that bunkering facility?
Mrs. Schlafly. A major place where they can come in for re-
pairs and do an5rthing they want.
Senator Hayakawa. What island is that?
Mrs. Schlafly. Senator, the technical information for this is
from a congressional source and some of the strategic authorities,
and I will be happy to submit the name of that island to you. I
don't have it right now.
Senator Hayakawa. I should know these things.
Senator Stone. It will be accepted into the record when it is
submitted.
209
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The name of the island is Mauritius. Data for the map was obtained from a House
Committee on International Relations publication of the 95th Congress, dated May
8, 1977 and entitled "The Soviet Union and the Thi-d World."
Senator Hayakawa. But there are seaports along the east coast
which the Soviet Navy could use, would be welcome at, and there
are some on the west coast as well?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Yes, they have many friendly ports in Africa —
any place where there is a country with Cuban troops with Russian
arms.
Senator Hayakawa. Like Angola?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Ycs, Angola will allow the Soviet Navy to come
in. It is my understanding that all up and down the coasts of both
sides of Africa, they have friendly ports where they can put in for
repairs, and supplies, and so forth.
Senator Hayakawa. They wouldn't have friendly ports in the
former French colonies like Gabon, the Ivory Coast, would they?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. The French have been doing a great job of main-
taining some very key spots, especially that one where the oil
comes out of Saudi Arabia. The Soviets wouldn't need every coun-
try. But as you can see by the map, they have plenty of countries
with plenty of ports.
Senator Hayakawa. So one of the very real dangers, given nucle-
ar superiority on the part of the Soviets, would be their power to
cut off oil altogether to us at any time they wanted to.
Mrs. Schlafly. Yes. And I think it is very important to face up
to the fact that it is not true that dropping bombs is the only
utility of nuclear weapons. You can use them to threaten, to black-
mail, to achieve political and economic objectives.
U.S. STRATEGIC SITUATION NOT RESULT OF SALT I
Senator Hayakawa. Isn't it a fact that our strategic situation is
not so much the result of SALT I but a self-inflicted condition of
weakness?
Mrs. Schlafly. That is true. The original decisions were made in
the mid and early 1960's.
Senator Hayakawa. But after the passage of SALT I, after the
ratification of SALT I.
Mrs. Schlafly. No. The original decisions were made when the
self-imposed freeze began, and that began right after the Cuban
missile crisis. 1967 was the last year when the United States added
a single strategic weapon.
Senator Hayakawa. I see. So that SALT I really reaffirmed that
which we were already doing insofar as arms limitation is con-
cerned.
Mrs. Schlafly. Yes; and it made public and official the second-
rate status of the United States, which I believe destroyed the
credibility of our nuclear umbrella and thereby led directly to oil
embargo I.
Senator Hayakawa. If the ratification, then, of SALT I didn't
matter one way or the other, in effect
Mrs. Schlafly. Oh, I wouldn't agree with that. I think SALT I
was a dreadful mistake. SALT I was a mistake because, in the first
210
place, we gave up our right to defend ourselves against incoming
missiles based upon the mutual-eissured-destruction rationale.
Second, we accepted inferiority in numbers at the ratio of 3 to 2.
That is, for every three ICBM's the Soviets were permitted to have
under SALT I, we said we will have only two. And for every three
missile-firing nuclear submarines the Soviets had, we permitted
ourselves to have only two.
What SALT I did was to codify and legitimize the self-imposed
freeze that started in the mid-1960's. The Soviets kept us negotiat-
ing until they had that advantage, and then they nailed it down in
SALT L
But time has gone on and the situation gets worse because the
Soviets keep building and we remain in at a freeze.
Senator Hayakawa. And we maintain a self-imposed reticence
about increasing our Armed Forces, our defenses.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Yes. I think it would come home to people if they
would realize that the numbers of our strategic weapons that
defend our country today, namely, 1,054 ICBM s and 41 Polaris
Poseidon submarines, and a shrinking number of B-52 bombers,
were the numbers that were set and established in the Eisenhower
administration before Eisenhower went out of office as the force we
needed to defend our country then.
Although some of those weapons kept coming in the pipelines up
to 1967, their numbers have never been changed. And certainly the
danger to us is infinitely greater than it was when Eisenhower was
in the White House.
Senator Hayakawa. So, if we continue in the next 10 years to
behave as we have in the last 10 years insofar as defense is con-
cerned, will not the nonsigning of SALT II be the solution?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. The rejection of SALT II will enable us to go
ahead and do what we need to defend our country. The ratification
of SALT II would deprive us of that right.
Senator Hayakawa. Of course, I am very nervous about our
determination to go ahead in any case.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. I am nervous about that, too, Senator, but in any
event, with SALT II our hands would be so tied that we would put
ourselves in a legal bind as well as other kinds of binds.
RATIFICATION TIED TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING
Senator Hayakawa. So when people like Senator Nunn and Dr.
Kissinger say that they would vote for the ratification of SALT II if
we expended x billion dollars a year for the improvement of our
weaponry, would you agree with that?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Senator, I would not put it in terms of a percent-
age of the defense budget. Over the past few years, as we all know,
the defense budget has gone up every year but we have not gotten
more strategic weapons. The strategic weapons are only a small
part of the defense budget, but they are the part that makes the
difference.
I think we must build mobile missiles. I think we must build the
B-1 bomber. I think we must build whatever mix and readiness of
weapons we need to defend ourselves. But we put ourselves in a
legal bind with SALT II.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you very much, Mrs. Schlafly.
211
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Stone. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.
Senator Percy.
SOVIET PRESSURE IN 1973 OIL EMBARGO
Senator Percy. Mrs. Schlafly, we welcome you once again. I have
just a few questions about your testimony first and then a couple of
other substantive questions that I would like to put to you. In a few
of the cases you cite in your testimony I view history a little bit
differently than you do. I would like to have your amplified
thoughts on some of these cases.
You state: "In October 1973, the Kremlin openly, brazenly, and
defiantly goaded the Middle East oil producers to use their oil
weapon against the West." I hope there is no implication on your
part that the Soviets should take credit for that oil embargo. That,
as I saw it, and I was out there at the time in the Middle East, was
entirely motivated by Middle Eastern events.
I think such anti-Soviet countries as Saudi Arabia and Oman
would be highly incensed at the thought that they were just a tool
of the Soviet Union in this regard. They were working entirely
from the standpoint of their own political interests in the Middle
East.
Could you document for us any evidence you have that they
"openly, brazenly and defiantly goaded the Middle East oil produc-
ers" and had any effect whatsoever?
Mrs. Schlafly. Yes; they did openly and brazenly do it through
their radio broadcasts and through their newspapers, through
every means of communication. That is the documentation of that.
Now, with regard to the motivation of the Arabs, of course there
are other factors and controversies in the Middle East. But I think
it is important to remember that in the Middle East, the Arabs and
the Israelis had fought, I believe, three previous wars, and our
policy was always to help Israel.
But before 1973, the Arabs didn't use their oil weapon against us,
and I think that is the big difference. In the previous controversies
they may have been unhappy about what we did. They may not
have liked our siding with Israel. But they did not use their oil
weapon.
And what was it that was different in 1973? It was that the
American nuclear umbrella had been replaced by the Soviet um-
brella, and no longer could the Arabs be in fear that we would send
the Marines in as Eisenhower sent the Marines into Lebanon in
1958, in a nice clean operation. We prevented the threatened coup.
No one got killed. It was a show of strength that everyone respect-
ed. But in 1973, the Arabs didn't need to worry that we were going
to send the marines in.
Senator Percy. I respectfully disassociate myself from that anal-
ysis. I think the Mideastern powers, the OPEC countries, acted
strictly in their own political interests there. I wouldn't want to
give the Soviets credit for that devastating economic blow against
us.
212
SALT I AND II PREVENT BUILDING OF ICBM's
In your statement you say our technique of keeping SALT I and
II negotiations pending for 12 years kept the United States from
building up any additional ICBM submarines or bombers. We have
been building submarines. John Glenn just dedicated the U.S.S.
Ohio, the first Trident submarine, and we have a full-scale pro-
gram underway to continue that.
We have the ability to build more ICBM's. We have just chosen
not to. SALT I has not inhibited us. We also have the right under
SALT I or II to build a B-1 bomber if we want.
Is that statement correct, that SALT I and II keeps us from
building any more ICBM's, submarines, or bombers?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Well, it is a fact that that is the way it has
happened.
Senator Percy. That is what happened but it is not because of
SALT I or II.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. But all those years of the negotiation of SALT I,
from 1967 to 1972, we were all told no, we don't need to build any
more weapons because we are going to have an arms control agree-
ment. And during that period, the Soviets were digging holes like
mad so they would have 1,618 by the time SALT I was signed.
So I think the SALT negotiations were a tactic of the Soviets to
inhibit our adding additional weapons.
Now, you mentioned the submarine. Of course, that Trident that
Senator Glenn christened is not going to be in the water for an-
other year or two. But the U.S. plan for the Tridents that we are
supposedly building is to take out and throw away a Polaris for
every Trident built. The number 41 has never changed since 1967
and it is not planned to change.
That is the shocking thing that has happened to this country.
While we have built some new weapons, some new missiles, some
new submarines, we have destroyed one for every one that was
built. As I pointed out in my testimony, one of the really shocking
things is that when we built 550 Minutemen Ill's, we could have
had 550 additional missiles for the puny additional expenditure of
$110 million.
Instead of that, it was the policy of this country to destroy a
Minuteman I or II for every Minuteman III that was built. So the
total figures remained the same. The SALT negotiations kept us
from ever changing the figures of 1,054 ICBM's and 41 submarines.
Senator Percy. From all the testimony we have had from the
Department of Defense, the decision not to go ahead with certain
weapon systems, the B-1, accelerating the Trident program, et
cetera, were all based on questions of cost, need, and effectiveness
rather than on SALT restrictions. We have, after all, in the last
decade doubled the number of warheads we have. There was no
inhibition in SAL'S" I or II from our going ahead with that particu-
lar program, and we did.
Mainly, canceling the B-1 was a decision reached by the Penta-.
gon, the administration, and backed by the Congress, although
some Members disagreed strongly and probably were right that we
have cut back too much. But I don't think we can attribute that to
SALT I.
213
As you know, you and I did disagree on SALT I. We had the
power under SALT I to go ahead with a second ABM site. We
voluntarily chose not to go ahead with it, and you cannot really
find any defenders of an ABM system today who feel that that
expenditure would have been cost-effective.
So whether it was right or wrong is immaterial. We voluntarily
decided not to do certain things.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Senator, may I say something to that? I did not
say
Senator Percy. My time is terribly short and I have a couple of
other points to cover with you.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. I did not say SALT I prevented us from doing
that. I said the tactic of keeping the negotiations pending kept us
from doing it. And you are right, those decisions were made by this
country. But I think they were wrong decisions.
Senator Percy. You mention a scenario, which is an interesting
scenario, of oil embargo No. 2 — and you are quoting, I think, the
Soviet Union's presumed speech — "the oil embargo II will enable
our Middle East friends to become richer and richer at the expense
of the capitalist imperialist nations."
I would hate for any of those nations to get the feeling that they
could somehow become richer by embargoing us again. They have
made all their investments here. I don't know of any investments
any OPEC countries have made in the Communist world. They
have put all their chips here.
Every bit of inflation we have here erodes their base. Every time
prices get higher, everything we build in Saudi Arabia gets more
expensive. And they have their money scattered all over our banks
and our bonds and everjrthing else.
Anything they do to undercut us — and Saudi Arabia has made
this very clear to other OPEC countries — undercuts them because
they have invested so heavily here.
DECUNE OF U.S. DOLLAR TIED TO SOVIET SUPERIORITY
You also indicate that the rapid decline of the U.S. dollar has
exactly tracked the world's perception of the fact that the Soviet
Union is building toward a decisive military superiority. I agree
with the feeling the world has that they are building toward it has
eroded America's position and we must find a way to correct that.
But wouldn't you agree that the thing that has really cut the
dollar is not that perception but low productivity in this country
and an unwillingness to work harder and smarter and better? Our
balance of pajonents is way out of balance. Ruinous inflation and
an excess of Federal spending, excess budgets year after year are
the things that have really eroded the dollar. It is not military
superiority of the Soviet Union.
Do we agree on that?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Those are all factors. Senator, but I would sug-
gest that the No. 1, most important factor was the 5-month oil
embargo in 1973 followed by the fivefold increase in oil prices
which unsettled everjrthing and was the start of the tremendous
inflation and other economic changes that resulted.
214
And again, I suggest that oil embargo I was the direct result of
the perception of who has strategic superiority, as explained by the
SALT I statistics.
Senator Percy. Thank you very much. My time is up and I have
a few more questions.
Senator Stone. Would you like to take an extra 2 or 3 minutes
out of my time, Senator Percy?
Senator Percy. I would be happy to.
Senator Stone. Go right ahead.
NECESSARY EXPENDITURE TO SAFEGUARD U.S. SECURITY
Senator Percy. Very quickly. We have a tremendous debate now
in the Congress as to whether our defense spending should be
increased by 5 percent, 3 percent, some lower figure, or some
higher figure. Could you, because of the amount of time, Mrs.
Schlafly, you spend on these matters, give us your judgment of
what expenditure would be necessary to really safeguard America's
security?
Mrs. Schlafly. As I mentioned earlier, I think it is the spending
on strategic weapons rather than the overall defense budget that
makes the difference. I believe that whoever has strategic superior-
ity will determine whether we can survive as a free nation. There
isn't anything that government does that is as important as that.
So I think the first thing is to decide what strategic weapons we
need and then go after that rather than saying that it should be a
2- or 5-percent increase in overall spending. It is not the overall
budget. The budget has been big and growing. It is the strategic
weapons that really matter.
I pointed out in my statement about how, for just a pitiful
expenditure, we could have increased our ICBM force by 50 percent
by simply digging 550 more holes. Exactly the same thing is true
when the Poseidons were built. We destroyed a Polaris for every
Poseidon that we built. For a minimal expense, we could have had
31 additional submarines instead of 31 Polaris-retrofitted-Poseidon
submarines.
Senator Percy. Could you give us some sort of a figure, though?
When we work with the concurrent budget resolution coming up
on the floor, we must work with specific figures. Do you have any
ideas you can give us as to how much you think we need to develop
to increase our overall spending to accommodate the program you
are talking about?
Mrs. Schlafly. If you defeat SALT II, I will come back and give
you those figures. [Laughter.]
But I don't think a specific budget is necessary in order to defeat
the treaty.
BALANCED BUDGET AS IT RELATES TO NATIONAL SECURITY
Senator Percy. A witness this morning said to us that the
strength of our country, and I agreed with him, is not just our
military superiority but it is also the will to use our weapons at the
right time and the right place. It is also our economic strength
which has to be dominant.
215
Now, when we are faced with problems like budget balancing,
and the second concurrent resolution is coming up, we are going to
be faced with some tough decisions. I think we have to cut back
some social programs. I have outlined a number of them which I
think are outrageous for this Nation at this time to be spending
money on.
We must cut some back, and I think we have to increase some-
what our Federal defense spending. But how important do you
think it is for this Nation to stick with its resolve now to balance
the budget and, as we are now projecting, have a surplus in the
fiscal year beginning October 1, 1981.
How important is that insofar as the perception of America's
strength, its will, its ability to manage its fiscal affairs in a sound
and prudent way? How much importance do you attach to that for
sustaining the image of this country as a powerful, strong, leading
nation?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. There is no question but that our country and
our Government has certain image, credibility, and confidence
problems at the present time. And one of the big areas is money.
But I do think that if we don't rebuild our strategic superiority, the
effect on the dollar will be more disastrous than anjrthing else.
I really think, as I pointed out in my statement, that the whole
matter of cost as related to strategic weapons is a phony issue. It is
such a small part of the budget that it does not really even figure
in the overall total. But I am glad to hear you say that you are
going to cut back some other programs in order to build defense,
because I do believe that that is the first duty of government.
Senator Percy, I think we simply have to. I think we can find a
way to do it and keep our objectives. I hope we do agree on an
objective to keep that budget balanced. It is a very, very high
priority as it relates to our national security and our strength as a
nation. Economic strength is just as important as military
strength. That shows our ability in the long run.
If they want to pursue an arms race and keep at it, we could
beat them hands down on that any time we decide we want to do
that.
The last question, Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me with one
more.
Senator Stone. Go right ahead.
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF EUROPE IS THREATENED
Senator Percy. It is a question that I put to the Ripon Society,
and there couldn't be a group of Republicans more on two ends of
the spectrum than the Ripon Society and the Conservative Union.
But I was pleased that the representative of the Ripon Society from
Evanston, 111., answered the question I put to him because our will
to use our weaponry has been questioned in Europe in recent days,
as you well know, and I think many wars come about as a result of
miscalculation by one of the adversaries as to the intention and
will of the other.
Is there any question in your mind that if, for instance, the
Warsaw Pact powers in the Soviet Union moved in with conven-
tional weaponry to threaten Western Europe, that we would and
should, if Western Europe was in danger, use our ultimate weapon,
216
which none of us want to use but which we have there as a
deterrent? Will it ever be a deterrent if we don't use it under those
circumstances?
Would you agree with the Ripon Society, who, I was pleased, said
yes? He thinks the country would have the will, as he knows it.
There are very few people who get around the country more than
you do and know more people. From the standpoint of conserva-
tives in the country, do you feel they would support the will to use
those weapons and that Russia should never miscalculate our first
line of defense being NATO and Europe?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. I believe the country has the will. But it is not
the American people who have their finger on the button; it is the
President. And I must tell you truthfully that I don't believe the
President has the will to use it. And he is the only one who will
decide.
When Secretary Brown went on "Meet the Press," he was asked
the question: What are we going to do if the Soviets fire their
missiles at our Minutemen? And he refused to say that we would
launch them before the Soviet missiles arrived. He is going to sit
there and let them be sitting ducks.
If they would simply say, out in public for everyone to see, that if
we get verified word of a Soviet launch, the "birds" will fly and
there will be nothing but empty holes for the Soviets to hit, that in
itself would be a tremendous deterrent. But when the Secretary of
Defense leaves it unsure, uncertain, then I don't believe he would
push the button and I don't believe the President would. And it
will not matter what the American people want because they are
not the ones who will make the decision.
Senator Percy. I will let others speak for the President. I don't
feel I can or should in this particular case. But whatever reason
Secretary Brown might have had for not enunciating what he
would do, I have known him for many, many years and I think he
is a man of a very strong will and a man who would recognize that
the potential use of a deterrent must always be present if it is to be
a deterrent.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. But if I am not sure, how are the Soviets to be
sure? The important thing is to let them know in advance. It
makes no sense to say that after they hit us, we will pause and
then we will think about it, and then we don't know what to do or
not, so we will have a conference in the situation room in the
White House.
It should be known in advance.
Senator Percy. Well, I feel very strongly that we should leave no
doubt in the minds of the Soviets where we would draw the line. I
have tried to draw that line with China on Formosa, and I have
tried to draw that line on Western Europe with the Soviet Union.
And I don't think the American people would tolerate the Govern-
ment which would not stand up for what we believe in and the
avowed pledge that we have to protect Europe.
I cannot conceive of the President of the United States not
having the will to carry that out, whether he be Democrat or
Republican.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. But the real issue is not whether we will or not,
but it is what the men in the Kremlin think we will do.
217
Senator Percy. That is right.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. And if I am unsure, you must admit that perhaps
they are unsure, too.
Senator Percy. That is why I wanted then and always to con-
stantly repeat, so that they at least know how one Senator feels
and interprets the will of the country and the Government of the
United States of America, so that tney never underestimate our
ability just because of Vietnam.
This is a different matter. Vietnam was never a matter of our
total national security. Our national security does depend upon
NATO countries. I think they know it and I think the Kremlin
knows it.
Thank you very much.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. But the best way to send the message is to defeat
SALT II. That would send a big message.
Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much your
yielding some of your time to me. I thank you very much and my
colleagues.
Senator Stone. Since I yielded my time to Senator Percy, I would
offer Senator Hayakawa and Senator Helms a second round, and
then I will do mine.
Senator Helms. No, you go right ahead.
[Senator Hayakawa indicating.]
Senator Stone. Thank you.
difference between soviet numbers and united states
NUMBERS
Mrs. Schlafly, early in your testimony, you provided quite a
remarkable summary, which is, I think, probably the most lucid
that I have heard, of the difference between Soviet numbers and
the American numbers as limited by SALT II. Would you repeat
that briefly?
You were talking about their heavy weapons as opposed to ours.
And in about 2 minutes you summarized the strategic numerical
differences at the very least in this treaty. Would you repeat that?
Mrs. Schlafly. SALT II allows the Soviets to have 308 heavy
missiles. It does not allow us to have a single one. SALT II allows
the Soviets to have — well, they did have 1,618 ICBM's. I think they
are claiming they have only about 1,500 now. But it allows us to
have only 1,054.
SALT II allows them to have almost 4 times as many MIRV's on
their land-based ICBM's as we have, and it allows those Soviet
MIRV's to be 26 times more powerful than our land-based MIRV's.
SALT II allows the Soviets to have their submarines prowling
our coast with weapons that can reach all of our major cities. But
we are prohibited from building a cruise missile that will reach
Soviet territory. It allows them to build all the Backfire bombers
they want, but we are strictly limited on our bombers and, in
effect, are very handicapped in building the B-1 bomber if we
choose to build it.
Nobody knows how many mobile missiles they have. Of course,
mobiles were the big loophole in SALT I. They had the legal right
and the capability to build a couple of thousand mobile missiles
under SALT I. We don't know how many they have built and
I 218
hidden. But under SALT II we would be prohibited from deploying
a mobile missile until 1982.
The disparities are so tremendous that the whole thing is humil-
iating to us. In addition to the actual differences in power and
numbers and throw-weight and megatonnage, there is the percep-
tion of power. Again, I don't see how they could respect us for
signing such an unequal agreement.
QUAUTY EDGE VERSUS QUANTITY EDGE
Senator Stone. Mrs. Schlafly, the administration argues that we
have a quality edge, while the Soviets under the treaty have a
quantity edge. What is your understanding of that quality edge in
the strategic missiles and other strategic weapons included in this
treaty?
Mrs. Schlafly. We did have a quality or accuracy edge, but I
think most people believe that most or all of that is gone now.
Recent tests show that the Soviet ICBM's are very accurate, possi-
bly as accurate as ours. The whole rationale originally for saying
that we would not build heavy missiles was a kind of pride that our
missiles were more accurate so we didn't need heavy missiles.
But now that their missiles are almost as accurate as ours, our
advantage is gone. It is like the old saying that a good big man can
always beat a good little man. If missiles are bigger and accurate,
they are going to be tremendously more powerful than smaller and
accurate missiles.
WINDOW OF vulnerability OF ICBM's
Senator Stone. Mrs. Schlafly, witnesses in opposition to the
treaty have expressed their military opposition, their prime mili-
tary opposition in regard to the window of vulnerability of our
land-based missiles, our current Minutemen III missiles, during the
mid life of this treaty, roughly from 1981 through 1984, maybe as
late as 1985, until the M-X mobile missile is deployed in sufficient
quantity.
Those opposition witnesses have advanced the thought that the
quickest way to even this out so that the vulnerability of our land-
based missiles would be reduced substantially would be to permit
by specific provision in this treaty multiple protective shelters,
vertical shelters or some other form of mobile basing. What do you
think about that?
Mrs. Schlafly. I think the window is very serious. Secretary
Brown talks about it as starting in the early 1980's, and that is
only about 4 or 5 months from now. I think the quickest way, the
easiest way, as I mentioned in my testimony, is to adopt a launch
on verification of warning strategy. In other words, the President
should proclaim that, if we pick up word that the Soviets have
launched, then our Minutemen fly; so the Soviet missiles would hit
nothing but empty holes.
That would give immediate invulnerability to the Minuteman
missile force.
I do agree that the next move should be the mobile basing.
219
INITIATION OF COUNTERFORCE STRATEGY
Senator Stone. Now, in regard to them flying, the way they are
targeted now, most people think, is against civiHan populations,
mainly; some hardened military targets, but mainly, because of the
doctrine of mutual assured destruction, they are targeted against
the Soviet civilian populations.
Others, mainly those in opposition to this treaty, have advocated
a counterforce approach in which, as soon as we can, we would
target the force, against the strategic missiles, of the Soviet Union,
What is your view about that?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Of course we should have a counterforce strat-
egy. The question is do we have the weapons that can do it? It is
not believed that our Minuteman missiles are sufficiently powerful
to knock out Soviet missiles in their hardened silos.
Senator Stone. That is part of this window of vulnerability until
we get a larger M-X missile, isn't that right?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. That is correct. And that is the reason why
SALT is so unfair in not permitting us to have heavy missiles,
because that is the value of a heavy missile. It can knock out a
missile in its hardened silo.
need for heavy missile during ufe of salt
Senator Stone. And you are saying we need a heavy missile and
we need it during the life of this treaty; is that right?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. I think we need everything, a mix, and readiness.
I think we need whatever it takes to stay ahead of the Soviet
Union. We have a nation that will support it. We have an economy
that will support it. We are blessed with a GNP twice that of the
Soviet Union. And I am convinced that the American people will
support it.
And if they find that some months hence we are all sitting in
gasoline lines because half of our gasoline has been cut off, and if
they find that we are absolutely unable to do anything about
Soviet troops or bombers or missiles in Cuba, I think they are going
to come right back and say: how did that happen?
ACU'S acceptance of resolution of CUBAN SITUATION
Senator Stone. Mrs. Schlafly, speaking of that Cuban situation,
would you or would you think the American Conservative Union
would accept a resolution of this problem at less than the full
withdrawal of the combat unit?
Mrs. Schlafly. No, we want them out. It is a real test and it is
only the harbinger of things to come.
Senator Stone. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly.
Mrs. Schlafly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Mrs. Schlafly's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mrs. Phylus Schlafly
My name is Phyllis Schlafly of Alton, Illinois. I am an author, a journalist, and a
member of the Illinois Bar. I appear here as a representative of the American
Conservative Union, of which I am a member of the board of directors.
For the past 15 years, my major field of research and writing has been strategy. I
am the co-author of five books on nuclear strategy, which have sold in the hundreds
of thousands of copies. Beginning in 1964, these books made a series of remarkable
48-260 0-79 Pt.4 - 15
220
predictions which, unfortunately, have all come true. At a time when others were
discounting Soviet intentions and capabilities, my books predicted that the Soviets
would keep building nuclear weapons until they achieve decisive strategic superior-
ity, while the United States was opting out of the arms race by a self-imposed freeze
on the building of additional strategic weapons. It is now obvious that this is what
happ)ened.
Strategy is the science of planning and using your assets to achieve your objec-
tive. Many people seem to assume that the only utility of nuclear weapons is to kill
millions of people. Nothing could be further from the truth, and nothing could be a
more dangerous assumption. Today I ask you to consider the other uses of nuclear
weapons, and how ratification of the SALT II Treaty would allow the Soviet Union
to have powerful political and economic weapons against which we would have no
defense.
Ratification of the SALT II Treaty would deliver to the Soviet Union: (1) the
power to cut off U.S. imported oil, (2) the power to destroy the U.S. dollar, and (3)
the power to use Cuba as a Soviet base. Ratification of the SALT II Treaty will
prevent the United States from effectively interfering with or stopping the Soviet
exercise of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon.
Rejection of SALT II, on the other hand, will not give the Soviet Union any
additional power which is realistically usable, but it will permit the United States to
control our own destiny, politically and economically.
I. THE OIL WEAPON
The great American industrial nation, a people on wheels to whom gasoline is
almost as much an essential of life as water, is now facing the prospect of gasoline
rationing. What is it that has brought us to the point of accepting rationing?
President Carter says he needs standby power to cope with a sudden, massive oil
shortage. Obviously, all the oil wells in the United States will not dry up at the
same time. The very request for rationing power reveals our humiliating depend-
ence on the whim of the OPEC nations thousands of miles away, in the shadow of
the Soviet Union.
In October 1973, the Kremlin openly, brazenly, and defiantly goaded the Middle
East oil producers to use their oil weapon" against the West. Use of the "oil
weapon" was so very simple: just embargo oil to the West for five months, and then
jack up the price fivefold. It cost the Soviets nothing. With the higher prices, the
Arabs quickly recouped their temporary losses. And the United States was exposed
as an impotent giant who could do nothing, absolutely nothing, to force the Arabs to
respect U.S. property and contracts.
We have had six years since Oil Embargo I to prepare and defend our nation
against the contingency of Oil Embargo II. Instead of improving our situation, we
have become dependent on imported oil for an even larger percentage of our
consumption. Nobody likes to talk about it publicly, but the only reason there is the
slightest need for gasoline rationing is the clear and present danger from the threat
of Oil Embargo II. Dr. Ghazi A. Algossibi, Saudi Arabia's Minister of Industry and
Electricity, said in a July speech in Los Angeles: Your industrial way of life for the
coming decades will collapse without Arab oil. The independence of the Arab
countries in the face of expanding Communism cannot be maintained without your
strength and resolve. No interdependence could be more complete."
Translated into plain English, SALT 11 = Soviet superiority in nuclear
arms = Soviet ability to wage political nuclear blackmail in the Middle East = more
gasoline shortages in America. So, let's consider a possible scenario of what Oil
Embargo II might mean to America.
scenario: oil embargo ii
Time: Early 1980. Scene: The Kremlin, Moscow. Members of the Politburo are
hosting a meeting of the chiefs of the Middle East oil-producing states. Brezhnev (or
his successor) is doing all the talking.
"Comrades of the Middle East, we all have a common interest in world peace and
prosperity. Although we have been enjoying apparent peace, our great leader Lenin
warned us that, so long as Capitalist Imperialism exists, war is a constant danger.
Our courageous intelligence agents have uncovered a massive plot by the Capitalist
Imperialist Warmongers to launch a new world war. This would bring death and
destruction such as the world has never seen before. This would be bad for your
business. Your good customers, the United States and Western Europe, would be
destroyed by our necessary retaliation. Since your economies are based on continu-
ing revenues from your great oil resources, you have a vital interest in preventing
such a senseless Armageddon.
221
"Fortunately, there is a peaceful way to avert this nuclear destruction, and that is
why I have invited you to Moscow. I want you all to agree to impose immediately a
total embargo on sales of oil to the warmongering United States and her NATO
allies. Within a few weeks, hardly a wheel will be turning in Western factories.
They will have little electricity. They will be on their knees to you, pleading for oil
on any terms. Then you and the great peace-loving U.S.S.R. will impose our joint
terms. The Western democracies will pay any price you set for your oil and you can
easily recover tenfold the revenues you lost during the embargo.
"For our part in the settlement, the Soviet Union will demand that the Capitalist
Imperalist Warmongers surrender all their nuclear and conventional weapons to
the United Nations. And, since most UN members do not possess the technology to
handle the takeover of nuclear weapons, the U.S.S.R. will gladly take custody for
the UN.
"Do you want to know what the United States will do to pressure you into
terminating your embargo? The answer is NOTHING. Just remember back to your
first courageous and innovative use of your oil weapon back in 1973. What did the
United States and Western Europe do then? Nothing! They meekly agreed to pay
you a fivefold increase in the price of oil, even though that increase disrupted the
stability of their economies. It was your courageous action in 1973 which brought
about so much costly inflation and unemployrnent in the Western nations.
"The United States had far more conventional military power than any of the
Middle East nations. Yet the United States did not dare to use its conventional
military power because the great peace-loving Soviet Union gave you the protection
of our strategic nuclear umbrella.
"The United States will never again dare to send in the Marines as President
Eisenhower did to avert a threatened coup in Lebanon in 1958.
"Our technique of keeping SALT I and II negotiations pending for 12 years kept
the United States from building up any additional ICBM's, submarines, or bombers,
whUe we built up continuously and massively. The Soviet nuclear umbrella is now
three times more powerful than it was in 1973. During the last six years, we have
tripled the throw-weight of our strategic forces. We have replaced a thousand of our
older ICBM's with advanced models many times more powerful and more accurate.
We have deployed 29 of our huge Delta-class missile-firing submarines and hundreds
of new strategic bombers.
"Thus, Oil Embargo II will enable our Middle East friends to become richer and
richer at the expense of the Capitalist Imperialist nations, and it will give the great
Soviet Union the power to enforce world peace, on our terms of course. The massive
nuclear power we were allowed to retain under the terms of the SALT II Treaty has
made all this possible. SALT II prevented the United States from building any
weapons to challenge our use of the Oil Weapon.
"We realize that Saudi Arabia recently established a friendly relationship with
the United States, selling them oil at less than world prices and increasing produc-
tion to help them alleviate their shortages. However, in view of the massive shift in
the world's strategic balance, it would be very foolish of the Saudis to remain
friends with the Capitalist Imperialists. We can stop the flow of oil with our naval
superiority alone. It is in your own best interests to cooperate with our plan for
world peace."
II. THE DOLLAR WEAPON
The second power that the SALT II Treaty, if ratified, would accord to the Soviet
Union is the power to destroy the U.S. dollar. The value of a nation's paper
currency is based directly on that nation's promise-to-pay credibility and on the
public's perception of the government's ability to survive and redeem its paper-
money promises. "The rapid decline of the value of the U.S. dollar in the last few
years exactly tracks the world's perception of the fact that the Soviet Union is
building toward a decisive military superiority which will soon be able to dictate the
terms of surrender-or-survival to the United States.
From 1945 to 1967, the United States had clear and undisputed nuclear superior-
ity which peaked at the ratio of 8-to-l. During those years of undisputed U.S.
nuclear superiority (which were disparagingly known as the Cold War), we had hard
currencies, a stable dollar, and inflation only in that controllable degree which
accompanies an increase in the Gross National Product. The U.S. nuclear umbrella
was the basis for the stability of relationships in the Western world, not only for
political freedom, but for trade relationships and agreements, for the stability of the
flow of raw materials in and finished products out, and for the availability of oil and
other energy sources at reasonable prices.
"The year 1967 was the last year in which the United States added a single
strategic weapon (ICBM, nuclear missile-firing submarine, or strategic bomber) to
222
our forces. Many of us knew that the United States that year opted out of the arms
race at a time when the Soviets were building toward a first-strike capability, but
most Americans refused to believe it. The U.S. nuclear umbrella remained credible,
and therefore effective, for another five years because of the lag in international
perception that the strategic balance was shifting in favor of the Soviets.
The SALT I Agreements signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, made it officially and
publicly apparent that the United States had voluntarily and unilaterally put
ourselves in a nuclear-weapons freeze and abandoned our once-overwhelming strate-
gic superiority. Under the SALT I Treaty (on defensive weapons), the United States
gave up our right to defend our population against incoming nuclear missiles, and
under the SALT I Interim Agreement (on offensive weapons), we agreed that, for
every three ICMB's and every three nuclear missile-firing submarines the Soviets
build, we will limit the United States to only two, respectively.
Publication of the SALT I statistics in Alay 1972 destroyed the credibility of the
U.S. strategic umbrella. The newly credible Soviet strategic umbrella protected the
Arabs in their effective use of the oil weapon against the great oil-consuming
Western nations. Although the conventional military power of the Western nations
overshadowed that of the Arabs by a factor of about 1,000-to-l, that was no help
whatsoever in the face of the soviet nuclear umbrella.
Thus, mere possession by the Soviets of nuclear weapons of sufficient numbers
and power rendered impotent all other forms of American power, including conven-
tional military power, industrial power, financial power, technological power, popu-
lation power, and even food power. All those other factors, however mighty in
themselves, even in combination are not enough to challenge Soviet nuclear power.
It is not even necessary to discuss the point of whether the 3-to-2 numbers
superiority in ICBM's and nuclear missile-firing submarines did or did not give the
Soviets an across-the-board strategic superiority. The fact is that the SALT I gave
the Soviets a worldwide perception of nuclear superiority, and it gave the Soviets a
sufficiency of nuclear power to use the Oil Weapon and the Dollar Weapon.
THE FINANCIAL COST OF SALT I
When we plot on a graph what has happened to the U.S. dollar, it is clear that
our runaway inflation started with the signing of SALT I in 1972. If our leaders
don't learn the lesson of the financial cost of SALT I, we will find to our sorrow that
the cost of SALT II is far higher.
The (Consumer Price Index is based on the 1967 dollar (the last year the United
States acquired an additional strategic weapon). The Consumer Price Index, which
stood at 100 in 1967, had risen only to 125 by 1972 (the year of SALT I). However,
subsequent to SALT I and Oil Embargo I, we slid into double-digit inflation. By 1979
the Consumer Price Index had shot up to 217, and inflation is now running at 13.4
gercent a year. It now takes $2.17 to buy what $1.00 would buy the year the United
tates stopped building nuclear weapons. This means that more than half of all our
savings in bank accounts, savings and loan companies, life insurance, pensions, and
other money investments has been stolen from us by those who changed American
strategic policy from superiority to inferiority.
According to conventional wisdom, stocks are supposed to be a good hedge against
inflation. From 1950 to 1968, stocks did as expected, rising 436 percent during a
period of relatively low inflation. But since 1968, while consumer prices have more
than doubled, stocks have fluctuated widely and the 1979 average is a pitiful two
percent higher than in 1968. This means that stocks in 1979 have really lost half
their 1968 value, because the dollars they are worth will buy only half as much.
And the price of gold rose from $60 in the year of SALT I to $329 in the year of
SALT II.
American history provides a tragic lesson of what happens to paper money when
the government which issues it lacks the military weapons necessary to maintain
itself as an independent nation. In the South, children of the second generation
after the War Between the States in impoverished households had a unique toy.
Instead of play money, they had quite literally scores of thousands of dollars in
genuine American currency. Thousands of southern patriots had turned in their
gold for this currency in order to buy essential food and war materials from abroad.
The first postwar generation still treasured this paper, hoping that some day it
might be redeemed. They finally learned the bitter lesson that the paper-money
promises of a government which has been militarily destroyed will never again be
honored.
However, Confederate paper money did not lose its value overnight. When it was
first issued, it was accepted at face value in the South. Progressively, as it became
apparent that the industrial North was building toward decisive military superior-
ity, the credibility of the Confederate Government's promise-to-pay began to deterio-
223
rate. As it was perceived that the North's power would soon become overwhelming,
C!onfederate currency began its slide down to nothingness.
This is what is happening to the American dollar as the power centers of the
world progressively grasp the fact that the Soviet Union is building toward decisive
military superiority. The progressive attainment by the Soviet Union of the military
power which will enable it to fulfill what it has openly declared to be its "historic"
mission (to destroy the Western capitalist nations) hgis resulted in a growing loss of
confidence in the U.S. dollar.
SALT I and Oil Embargo I which resulted cut the value of the U.S. dollar in half.
SALT II and any resulting Oil Embargo II will complete the destruction of the U.S.
dollar.
ra. THE CUBA WEAPON
The recent relevation that there are thousands of Russian combat troops in Cuba
is only the tip of the iceberg of what a Cuban Crisis II could mean to the United
States. What will we do if the Soviets send 200 Backfire bombers or 225 SS-20
missiles to Cuba?
At the time of Cuban Crisis I (the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962), the United States
was able to face down Khrushchev because our Strategic Air Command put our
then-new and impressive B-52 fleet on airborne alert. This constituted a credible
threat that we could deliver up to 50,000 megatons of nuclear striking power on
Soviet territory.
No U.S. President could make that threat today. It would not be credible to the
Soviets or to anyone else. So what will our President do if the Soviets send Backfire
bombers or nuclear missiles into Cuba? Plead with them to take them out? Humbly
appeal to their good faith? Tell them we will denounce them in the UN or the OAS?
Is that what the great United States is reduced to when it comes to the supreme
matter of protecting the lives and property of our own citizens?
First, let's consider a scenario of the Soviets sending 200 Backfire bombers to
Cuba. Basing Backfire bombers in Cuba would give the Soviets a dramatic option to
exercise their strategic power without the launching of a single missile or the
dropping of a single bomb.
"rhe Kremlin could send a flight of 200 Backfire bombers to overfly New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland, Chica-
go, St. Louis, Atlanta, and any other cities convenient to a plan of concentrating on
areas of dense population. The flight could be timed to arrive over the cities during
late-afternoon rush hours. No bombs would be dropped, but they would be on board.
The force of 200 could be divided into flights of 10 Backfires each, and they could
sweep in low over our great cities at, say, ten-minute intervals; each flight could
make two sweeps over each city. The Backfires are large and impressive, and they
fly at mach 2.2. Sonic booms would break windows by the thousands. Motorists on
the freeways would abandon their cars, attempting to find shelter from what they
would think was a bombing attack. No wheels would be moving because of the
massive traffic jams. Telephone systems would be swamped by the volume of calls
from frightened people trying to find out where to go and what to do.
What would our President do? Get on the Hot Line and ask the Kremlin, please
not to drop any bombs? Or please, order the bombers home? There is no way we
could stop the overflights because our policy for years has been one of zero defense
against bombers.
This use of the Backfires to create Cuban Crisis II would be in exquisite technical
compliance with the SALT II Protocol which allegedly (though not directly) prohib-
its the Backfire bombers from "operating at intercontinental distances" or from "in-
flight refueling" or from a production rate of not more than 30 per year. Of course
the Backfires would not run out of gasoline on this overflight mission; they could all
return to their bases in Cuba.
Second, let's consider the scenario of the Soviets' sending 350 SS-20s into Cuba.
The SS-20 is a compact, land-mobile missile launcher having three MIRV warheads.
The 350 SS-20s would give the Soviets a total of 1,050 warheads, or about one
warhead for each of our 1,000 Minuteman missiles and 54 Titan II missiles. It is
reasonable to suppose that U.S. intelligence will be just as slow in discovering SS-
20s in Cuba as it was in discovering offensive missiles in Cuba in 1962 and in
discovering thousands of Russian troops in 1979; so the Soviets could expect to get
them all deployed before a U.S. President recognized the threat.
The strategic power which 350 SS-20s in Cuba would give to the Soviets is almost
incalculable. The Soviets would know that, even if we had instantaneous warning of
a launch from Cuba, it would require 10 to 12 minutes time to launch our ICBMs.
But missiles launched from Cuba would require only 8 or 9 minutes travel time to
224
reach most of our Minuteman bases. So the SS-20s could reach our ICBMs before
they could be launched.
The Soviets would not have to violate SALT II to carry out this SS-20 scenario.
The SS-20 is not an ICBM, is not fixed-based, and is not a "heavy" missile, so is not
covered by SALT II.
Again, the question remains, what would the United States do? What could the
United States do? We would be reduced to doing nothing at all except pleading on
the Hot Line for the Kremlin to show compassion, mercy, and good faith. Ask
Alexander Solzhenitsyn how much compassion the Kremlin bosses show when there
is no force able to make them act in a civilized manner. If our State Department
couldn't even make the Soviets accede to our request to let Russian ballerina
Vlasova be interviewed on American soil without the intimidating presence of 12
KGB Iddnappers, how can we make the Soviets respect our demands about Cuba?
RATIFICATION V. REJECTION RISKS
What are the risks of SALT II Treaty ratification versus rejection? If the Treaty
is rejected, we risk a tantrum by Kremlin officials. If the Treaty is ratified, we risk
Soviet use of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, and the Cuba Weapon. Is it worth
the risk? I think not.
If SALT II is ratified, the Soviets will be given both the power and the perception
of power to use the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, and the Cuban Weapon. If
SALT II is rejected, the Soviets will have substantially the same power, but the
worldwide perception of that power will be diminished because of new respect for
the United States in rejecting such an unequal deal. Everywhere in the world,
people will have a new respect for the determination of the United States to control
its own destiny.
The perception of power can be just £is important as the power itself. Neither
idealism nor semantics can conceal the fact that SALT II is an unequal bargain for
the United States. The Treaty does not limit the carrying capacity of either individ-
ual weapons or the total weapons forces of the two superpowers.
The alleged "equality" of SALT II is like saying that two intercontinental freight-
moving firms are equal when each one has 2,250 "delivery vehicles," even though
one firm has all 50-ton tractor-trailers and the other has only one-ton pickup trucks.
Our principal ICBM, the Minuteman, has a "carrying capacity" of one megaton; the
308 Soviet SS-18 ICBMs have a "carrying capacity" of 50 megatons each.
The humiliating inequality of SALT II is also shown by the comparison of what
the Treaty allows each side in the most powerful category of nuclear weapons: land-
based ICBM MIRVs. Article V allows each side to have 820 land-based ICBMs which
can be MIRVed. The Soviets have 308 heavy SS-18 ICBMs. Article IV, Section 10,
allows each SS-18 to have ten MIRVs. That leaves 512 (820 minus 308) other land-
based launchers of ICBMs which the Treaty allows the Soviets to equip with MIRVs.
Since the Treaty allows the Soviets to MIRV any mix of ICBMs they choose, and
since neither the Soviets nor the Pentagon will say how many SS-17s and SS-18s
the Soviets have, they can choose to deploy 512 SS-19s with MIRVs. Article IV
permits six MIRVs on each SS-19. The Treaty thus permits the Soviets to have
3,080 (308 times 10) MIRVs on their SS-18 force, and 3,072 (512 times 6) MIRVs on
their SS-19 force; making a total of 6,152 Soviet MIRVs on their land-based
MIRVed ICBM force alone.
The United States has no heavy ICBMs at all. We have 550 Minuteman Ills, our
only ICBMs capable of being MIRVed, and the Treaty does not permit us to add any
more. The "Common Understanding" of Article FV prohibits the United States from
flight-testing or deplojang the Minuteman III "with more than three reentry vehi-
cles." Therefore, the United States is effectively limited to only 1,650 (550 times 3)
MIRVs on our land-based missile force.
The Treaty, therefore, allows the Soviets to build almost four times as many
MIRVs on land-based ICBM's as it allows the United States to build: 6,162 to 1,650.
But that's not all. The treaty places no limit whatsoever on the power of MIRVed
warheads. The Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 MIRVs are estimated at a power of 1.2
megatons each. Multiplying 1.2 megatons by 6,152 MIRVs gives the Soviets at least
7,382.4 megatons (7 billion, 382 million, 400 thousand tons) of TNT explosive-equiva-
lent in our land-based MIRVed missile force.
The U.S. Minuteman III MIRVs are only 0.17 megaton each. Multiplying 0.17
megaton by 1,650 U.S. MIRVs gives us 280.5 megatons (280 million, 500 thousand
tons) of TNT explosive-equivalent in our land-based MIRVed missile force.
The Treaty thus allows the Soviets to have land-based ICBM MIRVs with explo-
sive f>ower more than 26 times that of ours. The power centers of the world will not
be fooled by calling this fantastic disparity "equality." With SALT II, the Soviets
225
will not only have the power, but just as important, they will have the worldwide
perception of power.
Defense Secretary Harold Brown argues that, without SALT II, the Soviets could
build even more strategic weapons. His speculation as to how many more weapons
the Soviets might build sets up a strawman in the SALT II debate. Nobody can offer
any reason for why the Soviets might want to build more strategic weapons than
they are permitted under the terms of SALT II; there simply are not that many
targets in the world. Under SALT II, the Soviets clearly have enough weapons to
destroy the United States as a viable Nation if they choose to use that power and
risk our retaliation.
But even assuming the existence of Secretary Brown's boogeyman of the addition-
al weapons the Soviets might build if we reject SALT II, those hypothetical addition-
al weapons add nothing whatsoever to the Soviet power to use the Oil Weapon, the
Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon. The lessons of history are impressive and
convincing on this point. The lesson of Oil Embargo I, the decline of the U.S. dollar
since then, and Cuba Crisis I, all prove that the Soviets now have a sufficiency of
power to confront us with Oil Embargo II, a coordinated assault on the U.S. dollar,
and Cuba Crisis II. The Kremlin will not need to launch any missiles against us.
The Soviets will not even need to suggest the use of nuclear missiles against us. A
few "peaceful" measures will suffice: cut off our oil supplies from abroad, cut off our
imports of other essential materials, and make the dollar unacceptable in interna-
tional trade.
Now let's look at the differences to the United States between ratification and
rejection of the SALT II Treaty. If SALT II is ratified, we clearly will not have the
power to prevent the Soviets from using the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the
Cuba Weapon. SALT II prevents us from ever catching up with the Soviets in major
strategic weapons. We couldn't do anything to save ourseh-es from Oil Embargo I,
and our position is vastly weaker as we face the possibility of Oil Embargo II. The
galloping dollar decline is a pervasive reality. There is no way we could face down
the Soviets in Cuban Crisis II.
With SALT II ratification, we would lose the perception of power even more
dramatically than we did after SALT I. SALT II is so obviously unequal that nations
which respect power would lose all respect for us. Ratification of SALT II would
advertise to the world that we have accepted strategic inferiority to the Soviets and
are willing to place our destiny in the hands of the good faith of the Kremlin bosses.
It is important that we not get hung up on the issue of whether the United States
is inferior today or whether that point will arrive in 1981 or 1984. The prevailing
dogma is that, while the United States does not have superiority today, we enjoy an
intangible something called "essential equivalence." Nobody knows for sure what
that is, but assuming it means something like "rough equality," even if this were an
accurate assessment (which it is not), it would not be good enough to prevent the
Soviets from using the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon. In a
situation of equivalence or parity, all the odds favor the aggressors, not the defend-
ers. "The side committed to the strategy of a surprise attack needs fewer weapons
than the side which must defend its people at all times. The side which places no
value on human life can afford to take more risks than the side which values the
life of every citizen. Tlie side which has the nerve to use nuclear blackmail can
outmaneuver the side which respects life, liberty, and property.
American strategy for survival in the nuclear age is still based on the long-since
discredited and now hopelessly-obsolete doctrine called Mutual Assured Destruction
(MAD). This strategy keeps American citizens as hostages in the face of the Soviet
nuclear weapons force, hoping that the men in the Kremlin will be deterred from
attacking us by the knowledge that we will retaliate and kill millions of Russians. If
deterrence fails, we have no contingency plan except surrender. Even if the plan
works, it is based on killing Russians instead of on saving American lives.
But most immediately relevant here, this strategy is completely unable to cope
with Soviet use of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon.
If SALT II is rejected, the United States would be vastly better off It will
immediately give us a new perception of power because it will be a clear signal to
the world that we intend to be masters of our own destiny, and that we are not
going to submit to Soviet blackmail in the Middle East or in Cuba or elsewhere.
If SALT II is ratified, it will prevent the United States from taking those steps
which are essential to the survival of our Nation.
THE ALTERNATIVE TO SALT II
The best and time-proven strategy for survival in the nuclear-space age is the one
which worked so well in its first 27 years from 1945 to 1972, namely, U.S. nuclear
superiority combined with a war-winning capability. The history of 1945 to 1972
226
proves — and millions of us are wdtness to it — that American nuclear superiority did
preserve the nuclear peace between the great powers. In themselves, nuclear weap-
ons are neither good nor evil. They are just instruments of power. In the hands of a
peaceful nation like America, nuclear weapons can ensure world peace because no
nation would be able to challenge them. In the hands of an evil, aggressor nation
like the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons are a force for tyranny, destruction, and
world conquest.
Our first priority must be to rebuild the credibility of our strategic deterrent, and
our second priority must be to rebuild our strategic deterrent itself. Unless we do
that, our entire population, deprived of all ABM defenses by the SALT I Treaty, will
be sitting ducks for mass murder, nuclear blackmail, or economic disaster, at the
will or caprice of the Kremlin.
The fastest and easiest way of restoring the credibility of our strategic deterrent
would be for the United States to adopt a launch-on-verification-of-warning strategy
as a substitute for our present strategy of not launching our ICBMs until after a
Soviet disarming strike has impacted. This is the only way we can preserve our
Minuteman force as a credible deterrent. This changeover in strategy will immedi-
ately render our 1,000 Minuteman force invulnerable and make it safe against a
preemptive strike by the Soviets. Defense Secretary Brown has testified that our
Minuteman missile force will be "vulnerable" in the 1980s, a timeframe which
begins in only a few months. A launch-on-verification-of-warning strategy can pre-
vent that vulnerability before it begins.
The second way to rebuild the credibility of our strategic deterrent is to reject the
SALT II Treaty. This would be a clear signal to the world that the United States
will not accept a position inferior to the Soviet Union, and that we will reassume
control of our responsibility to defend our own people and our allies from any vital
threat, political or economic.
Then comes the task of rebuilding our strategic deterrent. Remembering always
that it is the mix and the readiness of weapons which are paramount, here are some
specific suggestions — all of which would be prohibited if we ratify SALT II, but
which becomes possible if we reject SALT II.
1. Start immediate production of the B-1 bomber. SALT II would effectively limit
bomber production because the Treaty would force us to count every B-1 built
under SALT II limits. Without SALT II, we can build all the bombers we need. If
the Soviets can build 30 Backfires a year, we can build 60 B-ls a year.
2. Reopen production lines for the Minuteman III. Deploy the missiles as land-
based or sea-based mobile missiles or, alternatively, install them in Minuteman I
silos and immediately transfer the Minuteman Is to mobile launching pads. This
would be prohibited by SALT II because the Treaty does not permit us to deploy
mobile missile launchers until 1982.
3. Proceed immediately and rapidly with development and deployment of the MX
mobile missile, and deploy it variously on railroad cars and trucks. This would make
effective use of one of our great American assets: our far-flung and efficient trans-
portation system. This can be our counterbalance to the Soviet capability of hiding
their mobile missiles in their enormous land mass protected by the tight security of
their closed society. The Soviets had the capability and the legal right under SALT I
to build and hide 2,000 mobile missiles; no one knows how many they have.
4. Develop, test, and deploy the cruise missile in ranges that can reach the Soviet
Union from our delivery vehicles. This is prohibited by the SALT II Protocol until
1982.
5. Go into immediate and rapid production of the Trident submarine and subma-
rine-launched missiles. If the Soviets can build eight such submarines a year, we
can build 16. The Soviets already have 27 Trident-class submarines, and at our
present snail's pace of production, we will have only one in 1981.
6. Withdraw from the SALT I ABM Treaty in accord with Article 15 which
permits either country to do that when "extraordinary events related to the subject-
matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." Certainly the stagger-
ing momentum of Soviet weapons buildup and their steady substitution of heavy
missiles for lighter missiles jeopardize our supreme interests.
7. Proceed with research and development on the beam weapon, as urged by
Major General George Keegan, former head of U.S. Air Force Intelligence. If ever
developed, this beam weapon may be the "ultimate weapon" and we cannot afford
to let the Soviets get it first. Evidence indicates that the Soviets are five to seven
years ahead of U.S. physicists in beam weapon research.
A country so divinely blessed as America, with boundless resources, a Gross
National Product twice that of the Soviet Union, a technology which is the envy of
the world, and the "can-do" resourcefulness that put a man on the moon, certainly
has all the qualities it takes to defend ourselves against the Soviet Union — not only
227
against its nuclear arsenal, but also against its use of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar
Weapon, and the Cuba Weapon. Some will say that the rebuilding of our strategic
deterrent along the lines outlined here will cost too much money, and that we
cannot afford it. I submit that "cost" is now and has always been a phony argument
when applied to strategic weapons. Here is just one shocking example to prove that
statement.
This phony "cost" argument is brought forth by the same deceptive persons who
destroyed 550 Minuteman missiles. When our nation built and deployed our 550
Minuteman III missiles, we did not get a single additional missile because the
Defense Department scrapped one Minuteman I or II for every minuteman III we
built. We were told it was more cost-effective to use the same silos used by the
Minuteman I and II. But digging holes with modern earth-moving equipment is a
very minor expense. New holes for the Minuteman Ill's would not have cost more
than $1 million per Minuteman III, complete with launch tube and hole, as com-
pared to the $800,000 we paid to "modify" each existing launch tube and fit each
Minuteman III into it. We invested at least $2y2 billion in the cost of the 550
Minuteman Ill's. But because we used the Minuteman I and II holes, we did not add
a single missile. For a puny $110 million more, we could have increased our missile
force by 50 percent! Such an addition would have been vastly more valuable than
adding extra warheads to a constant number of missiles; such an addition would
have kept our Minuteman missile force invulnerable years past 1980. It cannot be
argued that such an addition was prohibited by SALT I: the Minuteman Ills were
ready for deployment in 1970, two years before SALT I imposed a freeze on digging
new holes; and it was widely known that the Soviets were rapidly digging holes
during that same period.
Cost was a phony argument then, and it is a phony argument today. The funds
spent for strategic weapons are the smallest part of the Defense Department budget;
yet strategic weapons will determine whether we survive as a free nation, and
whether we are able to defend ourselves against the Soviet use of the Oil Weapon,
the Dollar Weapon, and the Cuba Weapon.
In conclusion, I ask the Senators to ponder the warning given to us by Winston
Churchill in his later years when he surveyed the prospects for survival in the
nuclear age:
"Sometimes in the past we have committed the folly of throwing away our arms.
Under the mercy of Providence, and at great cost and sacrifice, we have been able
to recreate them when the need arose. But if we abandon our nuclear deterrent,
there will be no second chance. To abandon it now would be to abandon it forever."
Those who vote for SALT II will be abandoning our nuclear deterrent forever.
Our nation will never get a second chance. The "peace" bought by the SALT II
Treaty will be as fragile, as temporary, and as dangerous as the "peace in our time"
bought by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain at Munich in 1938.
Senator Stone, Mrs. Schlafly, we thank you and the American
Conservative Union very much. Are there further questions?
[There was no response.]
Our next witness is Dr. Edward Teller of the Hoover Institution
of Stanford, California.
Dr. Teller, before calling on you for your testimony. Senator
Hayakawa has a short statement he wants to make.
Senator Hayakawa.
Senator Hayakawa. Mr. Chairman, it was my hope that one of
Dr. Teller's associates. Dr. Charles Teevan from the Lawrence
Livermore Laboratories, would also be one of the witnesses before
this committee. As you know, the schedule of the committee has
been so crowded that it was impossible to include Dr. Teevan in the
witness list.
I have asked Dr. Teevan, therefore, to send me his statement,
and I would appreciate it greatly if it could be included in the
record.
Senator Stone. It will be included in the record at this point.
Thank you, Senator Hayakawa, for that addition to the record.
[Mr. Charles L. Teevan's statement follows:]
228
Prepared Statement of Charles L. Teevan
salt and the control of u.s. national destiny
The Secretary of Defense has informed us that a relatively small fraction of
Soviet MIRVed ICBMs could, by the early to mid-1980's, reduce the number of U.S.
MINUTEMAN ICBMs to low levels. Soviet ICBMs that threaten MINUTEMAN
have all been developed and deployed since the 1972 SALT I agreements. We have
also been advised by the Secretary that the Soviet Union, on the eve of a SALT II
agreement, has a new generation of ICBMs in development, estimated to consist of
up to four new or modified missiles. These missiles are expected to begin flight
testing at any time or at the latest by the early 1980's; however, we know little
about their characteristics or capabilities. We may not know these characteristics
until they are tested — and not necessarily even then. The implications of this
information are that the Soviet Union has maintained an industrial capability of
producing several hundreds or more ICBMs per year and making qualitative im-
provements in forces that undeniably are intended to further improve their strate-
gic position; we do not even know the degree to which their posture will be
improved nor are we preparing any concrete response, achievable within the next
five years, to any challenge that these new missiles may present.
New policies, and most importantly actions are required if we are to survive as a
nation. The United States is presently committed to the negotiating table as a
principal means of attaining and preserving national security. Our objectives during
the 1970s were to have the Soviet Union negotiate away future military expansions
while we offered appropriate measures in return. Although claims of accomplish-
ment have been made concerning the enhancement of U.S. national security, these
claims at best are misconceptions; they are overstated, incorrect, misleading, and
self-serving to those who believe that any agreement is better than no agreement at
all. By any measure, the relative position of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union has declined more rapidly during the pjeriod following the SALT I agree-
ments than during any other comparable period. It is important that we recognize
the circumstances leading to this decline in U.S. strategic power during an era that
was dominated by political control of strategic weaponry. Simply, the agreements
represented an admirable experiment that has failed to attain the expected goals.
The U.S. entered these agreements aware that the Soviet potential existed for
continued improvement and expansion of their forces. The U.S. position relied on
the good faith and good will of Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union, in return,
manipulated the literal content of these treaties to allow accomplishment of its
planned objectives without restrictions. The Soviet Union achieved these objec-
tives—to a greater extent than the most farsighted U.S. observer could have predict-
ed. The U.S., if it derived any benefit, should have learned a valuable lesson;
however, this lesson must be explicitly understood now if it is not to be repeated.
Time is working in favor of the Soviet Union; we can not afford to waste another
five years.
To understand the severity of the U.S. position, several points will be discussed in
this paper. First, the SALT I agreements provided the mechanism for the Soviet
Union to achieve an unprecedented, unanticipated and unopposed strategic position.
Second, the provisions of the SALT II agreement will not allow the U.S. to enhance
its relative strategic jwsition or to arrest the trend of growing Soviet power. Third,
our verification process is inadequate and outdated. If we continue to place high
confidence in this process, we practice self-deception and provide the Soviets with a
means for subterfuge on a grand scale.
RESULTS OF SALT I
The U.S. claimed that SALT I had halted or frozen Soviet strategic programs. The
Soviet Union has since accomplished, among other things, the following:
1. Introduced new ICBMs leading to a twofold increase in overall throw-weight for
the entire force.
2. Introduced MIRVs on both ICBMs and SLBMs leading to more and larger
deliverable warheads than the U.S.
3. Developed one of the new ICBMs as a mobile system.
4. Achieved a capability through accuracy improvements to attack and destroy a
large percentage of U.S. ICBMs before they are launched.
5. Introduced new and larger SSBNs. Doubled the number of SSBNs and SLBM
launchers. Unveiled new SLBMs with ranges and throw-weights far exceeding those
under development prior to SALT I.
6. Developed a rapidly deployable and transportable ABM system.
7. Developed the Backfire bomber with an inter-continental range.
229
8. Developed a mobile IRBM system and the technology to convert the deployed
version to a mobile ICBM system.
PROSPECTS FOR SALT II
In 1972, during the SALT I debate, the U.S. pointed to several advantages that it
believed it would maintain as a result of the SALT I Interim Agreement. These
advantages, namely a greater number of heavy bombers and a greater number of
MIRVed ballistic missile warheads, are disappearing. Soviet air defenses are so
massive that the effectiveness of U.S. bombers, even if they are equipped with cruise
missiles is questionable and the Soviets will be allowed to produce the Backfire
bomber, in sufficient quantities to eliminate U.S. numerical superiority in this field.
Soviet MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs will provide them with not only larger but with
a greater number of ballistic missile warheads than the U.S. has.
In 1979, it is not possible to point out any U.S. advantages. Furthermore, the
SALT II agreements, do not provide for the U.S. to regain any of the lost posture of
the past decade, nor do the provisions of the agreements reduce Soviet potential for
causing a further decline of this posture. One reason for this is that SALT II does
not consider strategic defensive systems or theater nuclear forces. Although it may
be convenient for negotiators to separate strategic systems from defensive systems
for negotiating purposes, negotiations alone are not the goal. In practice, strategic
defenses are intimately related to offensive forces. For example, the Soviet Union
has air defenses ten times larger than the U.S. had when the principal threat to
this country was from an air attack. Soviet air defenses are being increased and
improved continually. On the other hand, the U.S. has essentially no air defense;
Soviet bombers, including Backfires, can attack the U.S. virtually unopposed. The
Soviets can rapidly deploy an ABM defense around key targets and further develop
and expand their already impressive Civil Defenses. The result of these efforts are a
further reduction in the effectiveness and deterrence of U.S. offensive forces and
therefore must be considered a very important factor of the strategic balance.
The introduction of a mobile IRBM force by the Soviet Union is also extremely
disturbing. This force completely dominates the European continent and, therefore,
our allies and U.S. forces in Europe. Furthermore, by relatively simple modifica-
tions it can be upgraded to a mobile ICBM. Soviet potential in deplo3dng this force,
without restrictions and with its inherent technicsd flexibility, provides them with
an opportunity to circumvent SALT II beyond any reasonable justification.
Another reason for a declining U.S. posture is the Soviet potential for expansion
and modernization of strategic offensive forces to achieve an almost fivefold advan-
tage over the U.S. This paper makes no prediction but it does provide some exam-
ples of how the Soviet Union has the capability to benefit from the technical
flexibility inherent in their existing systems. As an example, the Soviet SSBN/
SLBM force although larger than its U.S. counterpart, can be considered at an
embryonic stage in its development. It has already demonstrated an SLBM with a
MIRV capability and with a range far exceeding that required for a missile based
on a nuclear submarine. This excess range capability could be converted into an
increase in the throw-weight and provide for increased numbers or sizes or war-
heads. We also expect qualitative improvements in the Soviet ICBM force in the
near future; however, as noted earlier, we are unaware of how great an effect these
improvements will have on the strategic balance.
Perhaps the greatest opportunity for force expansion as a result of SALT II is our
acceptance of the Backfire Statement in which the Soviet Union states its intentions
not to give the Backfire an intercontinental capability. This statement of course, is
misleading. Backfires can fly from Russia to Mexico, Cuba, or even as far as
Panama without refueling and with several megaton bombs on board. By further
stating: "In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the
radius of action (emphasis by author) of this airplane as to enable it to strike
targets on the territory of the USA," they compound this deception — no heavy
bomber, including those that are counted in SALT, can fly such a two-way intercon-
tinental mission without refueling.
Not including Backfire in SALT II, not only provides the U.S.S.R. with a modern
bomber force that is not counted under SALT, but more importantly, it allows them
to dispense with their older bombers that are presently counted and to replace them
on a one-to-one basis with ICBM or SLBM launchers.
THE INADEQUACY OF VERIFICATION
U.S. dependence upon its verification capability can only aggravate the deteriorat-
ing strategic situation. Our sources of information for verification of this treaty can
230
no longer be considered reliable; verification is based upon an intelligence system
that has been compromised. Ck)nditions leading to this assertion are:
1. A major portion of U.S. intelligence upon which verification depends is ob-
tained through sensors carried by satellites and other platforms.
2. To impress the U.S. with Soviet might and to deter the U.S. from attacking the
Soviet Union, sufficient information on Soviet strategic military forces must be
displayed for U.S. observation.
3. To allow the U.S. to establish a basis for treaty verification of Soviet compli-
ance with the SALT agreements and at the same time prevent unnecessary, unau-
thorized or undesirable observations, rigid control and high level authorization of
these displays are necessary.
4. The Soviet Union deliberately conceals information on major strategic systems,
yet we claim that they do not violate the treaty; this is further indication of the
control and finesse that is employed in the management of our observations.
5. The Soviet Union is therefore, sensitive to and aware of, and arranges for
essentially all of the information obtained by the U.S. and which we regard as
"intelligence".
Recently, Secretary of State Vance, advised the Ck)ngress that in 1975, two years
following SALT I, the extent of Soviet concealment activities associated with strate-
gic weapons programs had increased substantially. The U.S. stated its concern to
the Soviet side and, in 1975, the U.S. concluded that an expanding program no
longer appeared to be associated with this concealment. However, the Secretary has
also advised us of more recent Soviet concealment activities involving the SS-16
mobile ICBM, ICBM launchers at R&D facilities, and the encoding of telemetry.
These concealment attempts, are readily detected; they involve major strategic
systems and politically sensitive agreements and therefore must be sanctioned and
coordinated at the highest levels; they are unquestionably the product of a deliber-
ate arrangement.
From the above conditions it is obvious that the information provided by our
national technical means for verification should be regarded with the same skepti-
cism as that provided by a double-agent, i.e., a spy who has been identified by his
enemies but tolerated because he becomes the means for providing information that
is managed, probably false or misleading and, when accurate, of questionable utility.
Moreover, and in accordance with long standing protocol, double-agents are removed
when they have served their purpose. The Soviet Union, equipped with an op)er-
ational antisatellite system, stands ready to destroy these satellites when they have
served their purpose and at a time of Soviet choosing.
As a nation concerned with our destiny, we have grave cause to review our
position at this time. SALT II places technical, political, and military restrictions on
what this nation can and needs to accomplish. In the light of increasing Soviet
military strength, industrial momentum and political assertiveness, such restric-
tions are leading to a precarious situation in which by default, our destiny as a
sovereign nation is being placed in the hands of the Soviet leadership — an intoler-
able posture.
Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, may I join you in welcoming Dr.
Teller. I look back on the days that I served together with him on
the Rockefeller Brothers Study Project as one of the more informa-
tive periods of my life. And for better or worse, that is what
brought me into public life.
I appreciate all of the time and talent Dr. Teller gave that study
project.
I certainly welcome you, sir.
Senator Hayakawa. It is also my pleasure to welcome my dear
friend Dr. Teller, who has instructed me in so many areas.
Senator Stone. Thank you. Senators Percy and Hayakawa.
Dr. Teller, you may proceed.
231
STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD TELLER,* HOOVER INSTITUTION
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE, ACCOMPANIED BY HON.
DAN KUYKENDALL
Dr. Teller. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen. I think it has become
very clear in the debate on SALT II that we are at a watershed.
For many years, the balance of power between the United States
and the Soviet Union has been shifting. Now it has shifted.
I would like to emphasize one point. The men who are leading
the Pentagon today are excellent, dedicated people working under
difficult conditions. They have made the best of possible decisions
in many respects.
Yet almost all of them believe that unless we do something, we
will soon be in a position of inferiority.
One of your most eminent witnesses. General Haig, has argued
that we are inferior even today. So have others. There is plenty of
evidence, and I will give you some of it, that they are right.
I think that we have made, historically throughout the years, a
tremendous mistake. We have confused the words "arms race"
with the concept of a race in technology. An arms race is some-
thing that you can quantify, something that you can regulate,
something that you can limit. A race in technology cannot be
quantified or limited.
It is not possible to make rules about ideas that are yet to come,
and such ideas do emerge in a time of rapidly developing, unpre-
dictable technology. I have been associated with intelligence, and
unfortunately I am not allowed to tell you everything I have
learned.
But I know and many of you know that we have observed in
Russia a number of projects which we do not know how to inter-
pret. I don't think the Russians are crazy. As long as they were
following in our footsteps, they were moving rapidly. Novv they
have moved ahead of us according to the indications we can gather,
not only quantitatively but also qualitatively.
I do not believe that SALT II should be ratified provided our
military budget is increased. What is needed is specific projects.
And today it is extremely difficult even to propose these specific
projects. I will try to, and I will not succeed. I am 71 years old.
Senator Javits. You are a young man.
Dr. Teller. Thank you, sir.
Our young scientists, our young men have been indoctrinated
that to work on arms is the wrong thing to do, and in scientific
circles this point of view is widespread. Gentlemen, I had a hard
time trying to make up my mind to work on the Manhattan
Project. What decided me was a speech, the only speech I heard
President Roosevelt deliver. He said that if scientists in the free
world won't work on weapons, freedom will cease to exist.
It was true then. It is true now. Then the world was bigger.
Today we are more exposed. Then our opponent attacked prema-
turely. Today our opponents are deliberate. The Russians move
when they are sure of their goal, in the Middle East, in Europe, in
the Caribbean.
' See page 239 for Dr. Teller's prepared statement.
232
We are offered a treaty. If we reject it, it will become clear that
we don't need to worry. If we accept it, we are apt to ignore a very
dangerous situation which I want to describe to you.
We are told that retaliation rests on three secure foundations:
Land-based missiles, bombers, and submarines. Of the three legs,
two are very doubtful. This is admitted about land-based missiles
by the administration. They will deploy the M-X, but under pres-
ent plans, the deplo3Tiient will not have an effect during the time
of validity of SALT II.
We have accepted a form of the M-X which is costly and slow to
develop, although I am happy to see from today's press that the
President, under the urging of the Pentagon, has decided on a big
missile. That, at least, was a good point. Our land based missiles
are certainly vulnerable.
Our planes are exposed to a Russian first strike because our air
bases are close to the coast. They can be shot down by saboteurs
shortly after they take off, with relative ease. They can be stopped
in mid-course, having been observed by Russian radar, before they
can release their cruise missiles. And then they face a tremendous
air defense.
We have practically no air defense, not against the older Russian
bombers and not against the Backfire. Instead of three solid legs,
we have a single wobbly leg. Our submarines may survive, but the
Russians are working diligently not only on acoustic detection but
on all kinds of much more advanced detection.
This is one of many examples where we have reason to believe
that Russian military technology is ahead of ours. The fact that
their civilian technology is way behind us has lulled us into a false
sense of security.
Apart from its inherent weakness, the treaty as it is written is
very hard to verify. Just one example: It limits only launchers, not
missiles. The Russians, openly or covertly, could deploy in ware-
houses away from their launching sites, hundreds, even thousands
of additional missiles, together with makeshift launchers we could
never identify. Thus they could develop a much greater superiority
even than the one they possess today.
There are other ways in which they can further enhance their
lead over us.
The fact is they can evacuate their cities, threaten to destroy us,
and I believe there is today no realistic way to respond to the
threat. Apart from all of this, the treaty practically disregards our
allies; there are no limitations on the Backfire, in the hope it
might not reach us, even though it is certain that the Backfire is a
dreadful threat to our allies. There are no limitations on the SS-20,
which could be easily and rapidly changed to become an interconti-
nental missile. But even as it now stands, it can destroy the Euro-
pean forces overnight. This, together with the noncircumvention
clauses, articles XII and XIII, is deeply discouraging to our allies.
The testimony of General Haig, who until recently served our
Government, is the most eloquent and the most authoritative to
show our weakness and our need to act.
We are in an extremely difficult situation. The debate on SALT
II is something upon which I look as an opportunity. By voting
against the ratification of SALT II, you can deliver a message to
233
the American people that we are in danger. We cannot be saved
except by mobilizing our scientists and our industry, and we need
that more badly than we ever needed it when the Second World
War was impending.
Young people with imagination are desperately needed to do
what they should have been doing in the last 20 years, inventing
ways out of difficulties. What we need equally, perhaps even more,
is discussions with our allies who otherwise in their desperation
may have to submit to the Soviet Union or else develop — openly or
covertly — their own nuclear deterrent.
The research, the preparation should be our main immediate
purpose. I would not settle for any increase in the budget. I might
be tempted to settle for concrete and helpful projects that would, in
fact, deter the Russians. But these projects themselves should be
preceded by thorough research and development of technology.
It is not the money that will save us. It is the ideas. And you
have a handle. You have a signal that you can give to the Ameri-
can people that unless we come up with new ideas for our defense,
the lives of all Americans are at risk.
I want to finish by making one remark. The weakness that has
developed throughout the years is made visible by SALT II. It has
persuaded many, and not only Mrs. Schlafly, that we should fire on
warning; that when the Russians fire at our missiles, we should
retaliate by firing on Russian cities.
I am against it. I am against the arms race. I am for new ideas.
And one of these ideas is not so new. The Russians have a plan to
evacuate their cities. When we notice it, we should warn our citi-
zens to evacuate, and they could do so, promptly, provided that we
prepare now.
We can do many other things. Our electronics is superb. We
could develop remotely controlled vehicles in the air, on land, and
in the sea more cheaply and effectively. These would be both more
expendable, more survivable than our present arms, which are, in
fact, obsolete.
The Russians are working on ABM. We should work on ABM. A
new line of research is laser research. Three people shared the
Nobel Prize for lasers: The American, Townes, who is now working
on the question what happens in our galaxy and in distant galsix-
ies, and two Russian scientists, Basow and Prokcroff, who are
working on lasers and working to help Soviet defense, which is
really preparation for Soviet aggression. All of this is narrowly and
closely linked.
That is narrowly and closely linked with all kinds of plans to
increase the Communist sway over the world.
I have in the past said that trouble is coming. Today I am not
alone in saying that trouble has arrived. Our Secretary of Defense,
in the guarded language imposed by his office, said, in his way, the
very same thing.
Thank you very much.
Senator Javits [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Teller. We
all know your repute and sincerity. We deeply appreciate your
testimony.
We operate under a 10-minute rule of questions and answers.
Senator Helms is first.
234
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions of Mr. Teller
but I do want to express to him my appreciation for his coming
here today, and also I want to express my admiration for you, sir.
Senator Javits. Thank you very much.
Senator Hayakawa.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
RELEVANCE OF SALT II TO TECHNOLOGICAL RACE
I too am extremely grateful for Dr. Teller's testimony. He
aroused my curiousity a great deal about the coming race in tech-
nology. The old concept of an arms race which is purely quantita-
tive in weapons is obsolete. The future lies in a technological race,
and to that technological race, SALT II is practically irrelevant, if I
understand you correctly.
Dr. Teller. SALT II is doubly relevant.
Senator Hayakawa. Is what?
Dr. Teller. Doubly relevant for the technology race. It is specifi-
cally relevant, and it is relevant in connection with motivation.
SALT II, for instance, permits only one new missile to be tested. Of
course, that applies to the Russians as well. But what a new
missile is is so loosely defined that the Russians can circumvent it.
We in our open system cannot.
The very fact that we outlaw new missiles is a clear signal to our
young and imaginative people not to engage in this work. By
working closely with our allies, we could mobilize the immense
manpower and intellectual power that exists in the free world.
That is explicitly forbidden in SALT II.
Finally, to give you one other example, the deployment of the M-
X is slow, clumsy and, in the end, ineffective because of real
limitations or perceptions that today govern decisions about the M-
X. This is one end. The other end I have indicated.
Unless our people will hear words similar to the words that I
heard from Roosevelt in 1940, they will continue to feel that they
would rather look into the structure of the smallest particles in the
world and will not worry about the defense of our country because
that presumably has been taken care of by the SALT II agree-
ments.
It is up to you to tell them clearly.
Senator Hayakawa. Would you quote again for me what you
quoted from Franklin Roosevelt, that one sentence?
Dr. Teller. Franklin Roosevelt, on the day after Hitler invaded
Belgium and Holland, addressed the Pan American Scientific Con-
gress, which I attended. It was the first political meeting I ever
attended. He said: "You scientists are being blamed for the weap-
ons of destruction that are now being used. But I tell you, unless
scientists in the free world work on weapons, freedom will cease to
exist."
I w£is very deeply impressed, Senator Hayakawa, because I was
there when Einstein signed a letter to Roosevelt a few months
earlier suggesting the development of atomic weapons. I thought I
knew what Roosevelt was talking about.
Today, not many people and in particular not many people in
high authority think this way.
235
Senator Hayakawa. What you said about young scientists at
that point — and you were a young scientist then — struck me very
forcibly because at that time I was teaching at the lUinois Institute
of Technology. I remember that my colleagues in the scientific
departments, in physics, in chemistry and metallurgy and so on,
suddenly disappeared. And after the war was over, I learned they
had been at Oak Ridge.
But I do know that they were motivated by exactly the kind of
idea that President Roosevelt formulated at that time. Unless sci-
entists in the free world work on weaponry, there will no longer be
any freedom.
So, as a former college president and educator, I would like to
ask you, what about young scientists now? Are they willing to
engage in this kind of race in technology to protect our freedoms?
Dr. Teller. No. And I would like to have permission to give you
a further example.
Senator Hayakawa. Please.
Dr. Teller. Christmas 1950, the president of the Physical Soci-
ety, later scientific adviser of the President, addressed a meeting of
physicists in Pasadena at Cal Tech, of which he was then president.
And he said:
We are now at war in Korea. Many of the young people have come to me and
asked should we go back and work on weapons? I had been in Washington. I had
inquired. I can tell you the answer is no, we have all the weapons, all the ideas we
can possibly use. All we need to worry about is that what we have learned should
not be misused.
As far back as 29 years ago, our young people were indoctrinated
by their highest authority not to work for the military. We knew
everything.
That was just the beginning of the debate on the hydrogen bomb
which DuBridge and many others opposed. We now know that the
hydrogen bomb was produced by the Russians and by us, as far as
one can tell, at the same time. Had we not produced the hydrogen
bomb and the Russians would have produced it, we would have
denied that it exists. We would have ignored it as we are now
tr5dng to ignore the reality of Russian superiority.
Senator Hayakawa. So this is a message which must ultimately
be brought to young scientists, is it not?
Dr. Teller. Senator Hayakawa, this is the case. And my question
is: Who will do it?
My hope is that you in the Senate might make a tremendous
contribution in bringing home to our young people that peace can
be kept if there is power in the hands of those who love peace more
than they love domination.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Dr. Teller. Thank you very
much.
Senator Zorinsky [presiding]. Senator Javits.
MAIN FAULTS OF SALT II
Senator Javits. Dr. Teller, I just want to be sure that I under-
stand very clearly your argument because I would like to pose
what I consider to be a grave dilemma to you concerning young
scientists.
1+8-260 0-79 Pt.t - 16
236
In the first place, may I say that although your views and mine
may not necessarily be parallel, there are few men in American
life who are more valuable to our country in compounding our
national decisions which require men of strong views, of high char-
acter and of great professional and personal ability.
So the fact that we may not agree does not mean a thing to me.
Do I understand your argument to be that the main fault with
SALT II is that it doesn't accomplish anything and that it will
again make us complacent, and will lull us to sleep? Or do I
understand your argument to be that SALT II affirmatively hurts
us, for example, that at the end of the SALT II period, no matter
what we do, the Russians will be at us. No matter what we do,
even if we do everything you say.
Dr. Teller. Senator Javits, I want to say two very difficult
things. First, the possibility for us to disagree is the very essence of
the idea of freedom and this is what both you and I want to defend.
Second, I want to say that a few months ago I had the opportuni-
ty to talk to an official in the White House, not a very high official,
about SALT. I said to him, there is one condition under which I
would consider SALT as possibly acceptable, not as helpful, not as
valuable, but as acceptable: If the President would put it before the
American people together with the statement that we are in deep
trouble and in great danger; that we must take immediate steps to
mobilize our scientists and our technologists to remedy all deficien-
cies that we can.
Even then, SALT would have great shortcomings. But a state-
ment of that kind coming from the President, put forward in a
forceful and clear manner, could sway my opinion.
The President instead addressed the joint Congress with the false
statement, which he should have known is false, that America is
the strongest military power.
Since this is the history of SALT II, I see no way in which I can
recommend its support.
Senator Javits. That leads me to this dilemma. As I say, I am
not going to in any way dispute details with you. For example, my
staff gave me a long list of all the strategic weapons we are
developing now, including new weaponry like particle beams and
so on, but you are very familiar with that, much more than I.
Dr. Teller. Senator, may I tell you, on particle beams we are
spending a few million dollars. We have a program on that. I am
not sure that it is the most essential program but I have supported
it.
future role of young scientists in armament programs
Senator Javits. I won't even debate that, but I would like to ask
you a fundamental question.
You spoke of young scientists. I agree with you a lot about that, I
really do. We have an excellent educator here in Senator
Hayakawa, and he agrees with you, which is more important than
my agreeing. But this is an equation that troubles me. And I am
speaking as a politician.
These very young scientists, maybe, are much more likely to go
to work if we approve SALT II with some declaration dedicating
237
ourselves to equity, parity, equivalency, whatever you may call it. I
am sure it is coming and I will be for it, I will help to work it out.
What concerns me is then that these young scientists who think
differently in many respects from you and from me, may be much
more willing to say, OK, my Senator really tried. They approved
what was before them. They continued this process. So OK, now we
will go with them whereas before we hung back because we didn't
want to contribute to warmaking. We think they, too, are men of
peace, they are trying. We will go with them.
Whereas, if we turned down SALT II, maybe their reaction will
confound you and other very able people who think like you, and
they will say, oh, the jig is up. These people think about nothing
but armament, nothing but confrontation, nothing but war. We are
not going, we are against it. We don't believe that the human race
should be exterminated with our aid.
I ask you that question. Is it not possible that their reaction will
be precisely the contrary of what you picture for us in the greatest
good faith?
Dr. Teller. Senator, you ask me an honest question.
Senator Javits. I do.
Dr. Teller. And I will give you an honest answer. I supported, I
am sorry to say, SALT I. I did because at that time the danger was
not as imminent as it is today. I did it because SALT I for the first
time spelled out an actual disparity, which the Senate did point
out.
We did at that time what you now recommend. It did not help.
Would it not be better this time to do the opposite and raise the
red flag of danger? Short of that, you cannot be effective.
It is important that our young people work for peace, but if we
talk not of the United States but of the free world, if we combined
the mobilization of our scientists with the unification of the free
world for the common defense in an unreserved manner, in such a
program there could be enough ideals to attract many young
people who probably are not so different from what you and I used
to be.
Senator Javits. Dr. Teller, my time is up and I would just like to
make this one comment. I have felt very deeply that there is
nothing wrong with the world, including the danger of the Soviet
Union, that could not be fixed infinitely more quickly by real
harmony and unity in the policy of western Europe and the United
States and Japan.
We still have it. I don't know how long we will keep it, but we
have it.
Dr. Teller. And SALT II may do its greatest damage in disrupt-
ing this harmony.
Senator Javits. What I say to you is this: We may have even
more trouble with the European countries and the European scien-
tists than with the young American scientists precisely because we
turned down SALT II, but I appreciate your thesis. It is tremen-
dously helpful and informative.
Dr. Teller. Sir, I appreciate yours fully.
238
ADVOCATE QUAUTATIVE RACE
Senator Zorinsky. Dr. Teller, you indicate that there is a vast
disparity between the Soviet Union's quantitative nuclear ability
and that of our Nation. Do you advocate, rather than engaging in a
numbers race, a quantitative race, that we direct our attention to
technology and improving the quality of our delivery systems and
our capability? Is that correct?
Dr. Teller. In part, sir.
Senator Zorinsky. Do we have time?
Dr. Teller. I would not limit it to our delivery systems. I would
include active defense, like ABM. And now I am in a really diffi-
cult position because if we realize that there is trouble, what can
be invented is not something for one person — and at that, an old
person — to say.
What I do know is that in our efforts, essentially new ideas have
been missing for almost 20 years. This is a direct consequence of
the discouragement of this type of work among scientists. This is
the point we have to remedy. I hope that the outcome will be
different from more arms of destruction.
Civil defense is one thing I strongly and most seriously advocate.
There are many other things that probably will emerge, and I
mentioned only a few.
Senator Zorinsky. You indicate that we should not engage in
quantitative but rather qualitative competition, and my question is:
Do you feel we have time to enter the qualitative field rather than
the quantitative field inasmuch as you do indicate a feeling of
hesitancy in the document you presented today?
Dr. Teller. I am deeply grateful to you for this last point. I
hesitate. There may not be time for the qualitative development. It
may be necessary to spend more money, perhaps in a non-too-
effective manner, because the trouble is upon us. But the more we
delay in informing and mobilizing all the young people of the free
world, the more we will be driven toward the ineffective and more
destructive quantitative aspects.
That is the very reason why we should act fast and act now. I am
much more interested in this point of mobilization than in the
point of any special problem. But as things are at the present, I
believe that your best choice of appealing to the sense of urgency of
all Americans, including the scientists
PRECLUSION OF ACTIONS BY SALT II
Senator Zorinsky. Other than the psychological aspects of a
ratification of SALT II, is there anything in SALT II that would
prohibit or preclude the American public and the scientists from
doing exactly what you are recommending?
Dr. Teller. Yes, there is. There are words in the whole SALT
process, ill-defined words to the effect that more weapons, new
weapons, should not be introduced. When we outlawed ABM, we
made it very clear that we oppose defensive weapons as well as
weapons of destruction. The whole disarmament procedure, the
whole tradition of SALT negotiations is, in a sense, to discourage
new ideas in weapons.. This is a part of the agreement which we
observe and the Russians never have observed.
239
Senator Zorinsky. But it mentions no specific prohibition of
increased technology or research and development in that area
other, maybe, than deplojonent and a protocol beyond a certain
year.
Dr. Teller. It does so in this connection. But I would say — and I
am very sorry that Senator Percy is no longer here — I most defi-
nitely disagree with his statement that nobody any longer advo-
cates ABM. I certainly do. I had considered it in the late fifties as
too difficult. The more I see of scientific developments, the more I
believe that it is possible. And the more I observe what the Rus-
sians are doing, the more I feel that in this specific instance they
are apt to be way ahead of us.
If you could manage to abrogate the ABM Treaty, it might be a
long step in the right direction.
Senator Zorinsky. Thank you very much. Dr. Teller. I appreciate
the context of your statement, together with your taking your time
to appear before this committee to enlighten not only us but the
American public as to your views on this vital issue of concern to
our Nation.
Thank you very much.
[Dr. Teller's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Edward Teller
SALT II AND arms RACE OR RESEARCH AND SAFETY
Introduction
The SALT II Treaty was presented to the Joint Session of Congress by President
Carter and most Americans were listening. We were told that the United States is
the strongest military power, that atomic weapons are too dangerous, and the
danger for everybody can be diminished if SALT II is ratified. Ensuing discussions
resulted in proposals that SALT II indeed should be ratified provided that by
further expenditures we increase our military preparedness. It is indeed generally
believed that we are involved in a quantitative arms race and our military experts
are beginning to recognize that the Russians are outspending us. Indeed Secretary
of Defense Brown has stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee:
". . . the gap between U.S. and Soviet defense expenditures cannot go on increasing
without a dangerous tilt in the relevant balances of power and a weakening of the
overall U.S. deterrent."
He also said: ". . . our strategic submarines and bombers are aging; the ICBM leg
of the TRIAD is becoming vulnerable; and our command and control system is not
as capable as it should be. '
I claim that all these somewhat divergent statements point in the wrong direc-
tion. They suggest that we are, and for some time will be, involved in an arms race,
that the race can be slowed down by ratifying SALT II and if there are residual
dangers they can be rectified by spending more money.
To the extent to which we are involved in an arms race, we have lost it and it will
take many years and extremely heavy financial sacrifices to catch up. Even in the
quality of the weapons the Soviets are ahead of us, a shocking circumstance since
many Americans continue to think of the Soviet Union as a primitive nation.
If we continue on our present course, adopt SALT II, and try to apply the
proposed corrective measures we shall fail and the 1980s will become an exceedingly
dangerous period for the United States as well as for the Free World.
There is a possibility to correct this dangerous situation. We should get rid of the
idea that we are involved in an arms race. We should realize that we are involved
in a race of technology. If we turn our full attention to the weakest points in our
defense, to qualitative improvements of our weapons, to strengthening our alliances,
and sharing responsibilities and benefits with our friends, and if we place the
highest priority on defending the lives of the citizens of America, we still may
escape the consequences of mistakes that have been made in past years.
One essential difference between an arms race and a race in technology is that in
the former quantities are important and limitation of the number of weapons makes
sense; in the latter qualitative improvements are emphasized and there is not much
240
point in counting the numbers of various pieces of equipment. In an arms race arms
limitations such as proposed in SALT II could, under some circumstances, lead to
more security; in a race of technology arms limitations can hardly be formulated.
Conversely, ratification of SALT II will of necessity drive us into a continuing
arms race. In playing "catch up" we are not apt to be successful, particularly
because of the sense of prevailing complacency which has been strengthened by the
President's over-optimistic presentation.
If on the other hand we realize the present danger, if we mobilize American
talent, inventiveness and capability of innovative production, the United States
together with its Allies may prevail in an effort to stabilize peace and avoid war.
The more we emphasize ingenuity in defense and the less we rely on the obsolete
idea of an arms race the less expensive it will be to insure desperately needed
stability.
The imbalance of arms
We have been told by our government officials that at present Russian and
American strategic forces are roughly equivalent. This statement is made in spite of
the accepted fact that in one of the categories where comparisons are most easily
made, the land-based missiles, the Russians enjoy a 5 to 1 advantage in throw
weight, that is, the weight of the explosives that the rockets can carry across the
ocean. That the Russian advantage is not only in quantity but also is in quality has
been denied by our Secretary of Defense. Even he admits, however, that the Rus-
sians "have been developing several land-based missiles, their fifth generation of
them." By comparison our missiles are fifteen years old. Even to maintain them
places considerable burden on our economy.
Our bombers have been built thirty years ago while the Soviets are turning out
the new "Backfires," planes that constitute a formidable danger to our Allies and
that can cross the Atlantic, deliver atomic bombs on the United States and land in
Cuba.
There is evidence of considerable Russian progress in submarines, which is not
fully acknowledged by our Navy and is known to our public only through rumors.
We are being told that our retaliatory force is three-fold assured. The 'three legs
of the TRIAD are the land-based missiles, the American bombers, and the missile-
canying submarines. Let us consider these three legs.
It is officially acknowledged that by the early 1980's our land-based missiles can
be wiped out by a Russian first strike. We are told that the new big MX missile will
be survivable. Unfortunately MX is supposed to be flight tested only in 1983. Full
deplo3Tnent cannot be expected before 1986 and probably not even then. In the
meantime the Soviets have several methods by which they can destroy our present
Minuteman together with the new MX sites. Tliis situation is in part due to the fact
that for MX an optimal mode of deployment has not been chosen. The deplo5Tnent
appears to have been influenced by acceptability to the Soviets even though other
modes of deployment could be checked as easily as the presently planned MX. The
Soviets seem to be more willing to accept our present plans which are more
expensive, less efficient, and slower in deployment than others that have been
suggested. From the Soviet point of view their behavior is fully understandable.
In this difficult situation it has been even suggested that our land-based missiles
should be fired "on warning." This is a proposal dangerously close to the concept of
an American first strike which in my opinion we must avoid. By overemphasizing
insufficiently controlled arms reduction we appear to be driven into the destabiliz-
ing position where we may be willing to release our rockets before America or our
Allies have actually suffered nuclear damage at the hands of the Soviets.
I am not suggesting that our land-based missiles should be abandoned. I am
suggesting that constructive improvements should be sought and that these im-
provements should not be constrained by arbitrary restrictions presumably originat-
ing in the Kremlin.
Our reliance on retaliation by our airplanes is hardly more secure. Practically all
our airfields are a short distance from the ocean and can be destroyed within a few
minutes by rockets launched from Russian submarines. To establish an inland air
field will cost 50 million dollars and it is difficult to understand why a considerable
number of such air fields have not yet been established.
Airplanes are also vulnerable shortly after takeoff by rockets fired by saboteurs.
This is all the more easy since the course of an airplane immediately after takeoff is
relatively easily predicted.
Deployment of cruise missiles on airplanes is a real help. It is therefore no
surprise that in the SALT II negotiations the Soviets objected to the cruise missiles
in a most vigorous manner.
There is a serious danger that for a considerable period to come our planes will be
vulnerable to Russian air defense before they can release the cruise missiles. Taking
241
all this into account I am happy to express my strongest support to Secretary
Brown's advocacy of the cruise missile. I wish he had been even more successful in
the rapid deployment of this instrument.
This is indeed one of the examples where American know-how is making an
improvement in a difficult situation.
And the situation is indeed difficult. Soviet air c'efenses are by far the best in the
world, while we have practically nothing with which to stop Soviet bombers if they
choose to attack us.
Considering the danger to our air fields, the danger to our planes at takeoff, the
danger to our planes in midcourse as they are being observed by long-range Soviet
radar and subsequently attacked, and finally considering Soviet air defenses by
which they can oppose airplanes and also a considerable number of cruise missiles,
we have to conclude that our strategic bomber force is not a reliable leg of the
TRIAD.
This leaves a single leg: our missile-carrying submarines. Here we are moving in
the direction of putting more and more eggs into fewer and fewer baskets. We hope,
but we do not know, that our submarines will not be detected. We have paid careful
attention to minimize the noise of the submarines and the Soviets may find acoustic
detection difficult indeed. They have openly stated that they are working on non-
acoustical unconventional means of detection. This is one field where we have to
suspect that their technology is ahead of ours. That suspicion of course cannot be
proved even though the Russians have stated that they have solved the submarine
detection problem. Our information on this topic is so highly classified that the
Navy practically keeps these data secret from itself.
This question has been carefully discussed in a book entitled, "Strategic Deter-
rents in the 1980's" by Dr. Roger Speed. The book is based on unclassified data. The
relevant portion on our submarines, taken from Chapter 3 on the "The Surviva-
bility of U.S. Strategic Forces," is attached as Appendix I to this report.
The conclusion is that the uncertainty concerning submarines is the greatest.
They may work, but on the other hand, they may be the first which are lost.
CAN SALT II BE VERIFIED?
In his testimony before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown stated: "This (SALT II) would require the Soviets to reduce
by approximately 250 these strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Without SALT II, if
the present trend continued, as I believe it would, the Soviet Union would instead
have about 3,000 such weapons by 1985, instead of 2250."
According to the Secretary, one of the considerable advantages of SALT II is
therefore to reduce the prospective number of Soviet weapons in 1985 by 25%.
The remarkable point is that according to the provisions of SALT II the difference
of 750 weapons could hardly be noticed. Indeed SALT II permits to produce addition-
al rockets which could be stored in unknown locations, in warehouses or even in
holds of ships as long as no launching equipment is associated wdth them.' Of
course, these sites would not be hardened but they also would not be known to us.
Soft launching equipment can be exceedingly simple and can be rapidly assembled,
probably in not more than 24 hours.
This example illustrates how easy it is for the Soviets to evade a provision of the
SALT II agreements which our Secretary of Defense counts as one of the big
advantages of SALT II.'
Article XV, paragraph 2, provides that neither Party will: "interfere with the
national technical means of verification of the other Party."
It also states in paragraph 3 that: "Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate
concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty."
While this seems to be a satisfactory statement it becomes dubious due to the
Second Common Understanding attached to this provision according to which:
"Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telernetric information
during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provi-
sions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in
deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry
encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provi-
sions of the Treaty."
It would be interesting to know how complete an explanation of the encryption
would be needed in order to be assured that Soviet encryption does not carry
additional information which is denied to our side.
' See Appendix II.
242
This point is of importance, for instance, in connection with obtaining most
important information concerning accuracy of Soviet missiles. We have consistently
claimed that the accuracy of our missiles is considerably higher than that of the
Soviets. This claim has been always based on somewhat involved and complicated
inferences. SALT II opens an easy possibility for the Soviets to let us know as much
of the details of their telemetry as is convenient for them and to deny information
which they want to keep concealed.
In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee Secretary Brown
rightly places emphasis on the limitation that the Treaty imposes on "fractiona-
tion." He points out that within the Treaty only ten-fold MIRVing is permitted and
continues: "Were it not for this limit, the Soviet SS-18 missile could be equipped to
carry as many as 30 independently targeted warheads in the 1980's. With SALT II,
that will not happen. . . . The treaty also provides measures to permit unimpeded
verification by national technical means."
The question must be raised whether a thirty-fold MIRVed SS-18 may be tested
but only ten of the thirty reentry vehicles may be released. This would be a
sufficient test from the point of view of the Soviets. That two-thirds of the payload
is not released as reentry vehicles could in principle be detected by our side. Such
detection, however, would be hard and the evidence would be dubious particularly
in view of permission that Soviet telemetry be encrypted.
In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee Secretary Brown
states: "The Treaty limit means that now all but one of those new missiles^ will
have to be restricted to designs whose capabilities C£ui differ from those of their
predecessors in only quite limited fashion."
This claim is based on Article IV, paragraph 9: "Each Party undertakes not to
flight-test or deploy new t5T)es of ICBMs, that is, t3Tpes of ICBMs not flight-tested as
of May 1, 1979, except that each Party may flight-test and deploy one new type of
light ICBM," and in particular on the Second Common Understanding, according to
which: "the term 'different,' referring to the length, the diameter, the launch- weight
and the throw-weight, of the missile, means a difference in excess of five percent
from the value established for each of the above parameters as of the twenty-fifth
launch or as of the last launch before deployment begins, whichever occurs earlier.
The values demonstrated in each of the above parameters during the last twelve of
the twenty-five launches or during the last twelve launches before deployment
begins, whichever twelve launches occur earlier, shall not vary by more than ten
percent from anjy other of the corresponding values demonstrated during those
twelve launches.'
It is remarkable that the Soviets have not communicated to us the values from
which according to the Second Common Understanding they must not deviate by
more than five percent or more than ten percent. "These values are based on
American inferences. The difficulty of verification is obvious and has been empha-
sized in the press.' In particular it was pointed out that the text of Article IV was
drafted in such a manner to give latitude for Soviet tests sufficient to gain a
decisive advantage.
SOVIET GOALS
Our Secretary of Defense, to my positive knowledge, has given the question of
Soviet goals careful thought for many years. In his testimony to the Senate Armed
Service Committee he has stated:
"Although Soviet intentions cannot be confidently assessed, there can be no doubt
about the steady increase in the Soviet defense effort. As the Soviet gross national
product has grown, so have expenditures on the defense effort; Soviet armed forces
have improved substantially with these steadily increasing outlays.
"My judgment is that these developments have been for more than a decade
substantially insensitive to changes in the magnitude of U.S. and allied programs.
"It is worth noting, moreover, that the growth in Soviet military spending has
correlated quite closely with the overall growth in the U.S.S.R.'s economy, while our
own military effort has steadily shrunk as a fraction of our economy. Nowhere in
the record do I find historical evidence that if we are restrained, the Soviets will
reciprocate — except where specific and verifiable arms control agreements are nego-
tiated.
"The Soviets have made steady and impressive military strides during the last 15
years. We cannot afford either to underestimate or to exaggerate them."
It has been widely noted that as Soviet strength has continued to increase so did
Soviet interference in parts of the world which were not previously included in their
' The Secretary refers here to the fifth generation of Russian missiles.
' See Appendix III.
243
zone of influence. This fact has been stressed in the testimony of Secretary Kissin-
ger. Soviet weapons have appeared in Angola, in the guerrilla fights in Rhodesia,
and they have established Soviet dominance in the horn of Africa. South Yemen
now does the bidding of the Kremlin. The regime in Afghanistan is based on Soviet
arms. Soviet influence has aided in bringing about the present continuing disorder
in Iran.
The time may not be distant when the Soviet Union can dictate terms to the oil-
producing countries in the Middle East. It is not difficult to foresee that Soviet
confidence in their own arms may enable them to extend their domination into the
Middle East, that is into a region which in turn, through the oil weapon, could have
the most deep influence on decisions made in Western Europe, in Japan and in the
Third World.
To what extent and how explicitly the Kremlin intends to use its military power
as a threat and whether any such threat may be carried to the extreme of action
and in particular employment of nuclear weapons, this is and remains impossible to
predict.
EFFECT OF SALT 11 ON NATO
The United States negotiated a treaty with the Soviet Union which includes no
limitations on the SS-20 missiles and little limitation on the "Backfire" airplane.
These are formidable weapons which put our NATO Allies into mortal danger. Our
Allies not wanting to offend both the super powers are under extreme pressure to
agree to the SALT II Treaty. This agreement is further based on general fear of
nuclear weapons, a motivation which for understandable reasons is shared by many
people in the United States.
In spite of this there can be no question that our NATO Allies are deeply
disturbed by the turn of events. It is probable that both England and France will
increase their nuclear preparedness and thereby decrease their reliance on the
United States. Germany and also Japan (which of course is outside the NATO
Alliance) are in an even more difficult position. These countries may have to make
a choice in the coming years between being Finlandized or developing, probably in
complete secrecy, a nuclear strike force of their own.
The upshot of all this is that SALT II, instead of decreasing the arms race, will
contribute to nuclear arms proliferation in a most dangerous manner.
THE TESTIMONY FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Statements of support of SALT II from our Allies cannot be considered as being
made in a completely free and voluntary manner. The same may hold for witnesses
who are a part of the Executive Branch of our Government.
I have little doubt that discussions within the Executive Branch are conducted on
the highest intellectual level and in a free manner. But when the Executive Branch
comes to a policy decision members of the Executive Branch must work as a team.
For this reason they cannot oppose the policy decisions of the Executive Branch
without losing their effectiveness or at least a great part of their effectiveness.
In a problem as complex as SALT II it is not easy to arrive at a clear and
conclusive answer. The result is that testimony in favor of SALT 11 must be
carefully reviewed and should not always be taken completely at its face value.
The division of power in our Constitution has the purpose of rendering the other
Branches of our Government truly independent of the Executive Branch. If the
Senate is overly influenced by testimony from the Executive Branch this would
contradict the spirit of our Constitution.
I would like to add a personal remark. The testimony of our Secretary of Defense
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, which I have quoted on several
occasions, comes from a person of the highest competence and of impeccable hones-
ty. I believe that he is the best qualified Secretary of Defense this Country has ever
had in the Modern Age. It is significant that his testimony in favor of SALT II
contains a number of serious warnings.
It may be even more significant that General Haig who left the Executive Branch
before testifying came among his colleagues closest to a recommendation against
ratifying the SALT 11 Treaty.
CONSEQUENCES OF REJECTING SALT U
It has been repeatedly stated that rejection of SALT 11 would result in an arms
race and in high expenditures. Secretary Brown estimates that total added expendi-
tures needed would be 30 billion dollars. Others have rightly suggested that in case
of ratification of SALT II the defense budget in real dollars should be increased by 5
billion dollars annually for a number of years, a total expenditure considerably in
244
excess of what Secretary Brown has recommended. In the whole discussion whether
one argues for SALT II or against it, it seems that we will have to spend more
dollars. This whole line of reasoning is faulty and is a symptom of the arms-race
mentality which is closely connected to SALT II.
I would like to recommend a radically different approach, the first step of which
would be to deliver a negative vote on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty,
thereby providing the incentive for a number of events.
The first is a widespread realization that we are in serious trouble. Indeed SALT
II is not a measure by which our danger is decreased. Rather it is a measure by
which our danger will be hidden. The ultimate consequence of a belated realization
of our troubles will be greater and perhaps even inescapable danger to the welfare
and perhaps even to the survival of our Country.
The second consequence should be to take some elementary steps to insure the
survival of our citizens. I recommend a first inexpensive step toward civil defense
which should consist in a careful plan for national counter-evacuation in case we
observe that the Soviets evacuate their cities. It is a well known fact published by
the Soviets and verified in detail by our intelligence that the Soviets have a very
thorough evacuation plan which is obligatory for all citizens affected by it. Our own
plan could not and should not be obligatory but should consist in advising our
citizens to evacuate in case of an emergency and making it possible for them to find
temporary shelter and food and to construct elementary protection against an
atomic attack. The Federal Emergency Management Agency could provide an ade-
quate framework for this procedure if it would be properly supported and properly
staffed. That this Agency performs important duties in peace time is an added
advantage. Unfortunately the President has separated its civil defense activities
from its remaining duties and has reduced its civil defense budget recently from the
low figure of 106 million dollars to the even lower figure of 100 million dollars.
The third action that should follow the refusal to ratify SALT II is to introduce
negotiations not with the Russians but with our friends and allies. We should make
sure that our NATO Allies as well as Japan should be fully satisfied that the joint
defenses of the Free World are being planned in an optimal fashion for the purpose
of preserving the peace in the interest of all of us. The best and probably the only
way to prevent dangerous nuclear proliferation is to make sure that none of the
powerful countries perceives nuclear defense in its own hands as a necessary meas-
ure of preserving its own independence. What the outcome of such negotiations
should be can of course not be predicted. We must postulate however one part of the
outcome: All parties must be satisfied, that their interests are protected, and all
parties must understand that they must make a proper contribution to the common
defense of all of us.
The fourth step is the mobilization of American science and industry to insure the
common defense. The danger to freedom from Soviet Imperialism is less visible than
the danger signals that preceded World War II. This is due to the fact that the
Soviet leaders are incomparably more cautious than Hitler had been. The greater
caution on the part of our opponents provide us with some time but it also has the
consequence that unless we take timely counter-measures it will become too late to
defend ourselves. If this fact is fully understood by the American community I have
no doubt that in the course of a few years we can establish a stable equilibrium in
the world.
What technical measures should be taken, no single person is qualified to state.
As one man's opinion I may state that we should exploit our undoubted lead in
electronics. This leadership position enables us to construct unmanned, remotely
piloted vehicles in the air, on the ground, and also on the oceans. Such a develop-
ment could reverse the trend that has dominated our defense development for many
years: to construct ever more costly weapons which are fewer in number and
therefore basically more vulnerable. It is a characteristic fact that a first step in
that direction, the cruise missile, strongly advocated by our Secretary of Defense,
has also strongly, and in part successfully, been opposed by the Soviets in the SALT
II negotiations.
What I have said so far could be carried out with relatively little expenditures.
They are the preliminary steps needed to change the arms race into a technological
race in which we could prevail and thereby serve the interest of peace. I had argued
that our deterrent which we call the TRIAD stands on one dubious leg rather than
being based on three firm foundations. The one presently proposed improvement
called MX has been adjusted to Soviet demands in the SALT II negotiations and
has thereby become expensive, late in execution and probably ineffective when
executed.
245
Into what kind of deterrent the TRIAD should be changed is something that must
be determined by careful and diligent cooperation between our scientists, our tech-
nologists, and our military leaders.
A compromise that has been proposed concerning SALT II starts with more
expenditures and proceeds to si>end more money without introducing basic improve-
ments. This is the reverse of the proper order. We should start by careful study,
proceed to detailed technological plans and then spend the money that is necessary.
The technological effort which we should pursue and by which we can win may in
the end be less expensive than the present defense effort which is dominated by the
weight of obsolescent equipment.
CONCLUSION
If the Senate ratifies the SALT II Treaty it will have contributed to a most
dangerous cover-up. It will have helped to lull the American public into a sense of
security which is not based on reality and which in itself is our greatest danger.
If, on the other hand, the Senate rejects SALT II the American people will
become aware of the need to reconsider our defense posture. I have the firm
confidence that once the American people realize that they are facing a real danger
they will act with determination, with moderation, and with success.
SUMMARY
The majority of Americans dislike the arms race. So do I. SALT II is offered as a
palliative. In fact, if ratified, it will intensify the arms race and make it more
disastrous. If the Senate refuses to ratify SALT II more reasonable alternatives will
emerge.
An arms race is a quantitative competition. SALT II claims to limit it. But the
limitations are unfair and they are not verifiable.
The Soviets have won the arms race. They possess a 5 to 1 advantage in throw
weight of their missiles. Our planes are 30 years old, our missiles 15 years old.
Soviet equipment is new and is in the process of rapid improvement. SALT II would
freeze us in a state of perpetual inferiority.
We are told that our retaliatory force, the TRIAD, rests on three solid founda-
tions. Actually the Administration admits that one leg of the TRIAD, our land-based
missiles, is losing its survivability. Unfortunately the remedy, called M-X, cannot be
deployed before SALT II has expired.
The second leg, our bomber force, can be destroyed on the ground by Soviet
submarine-launched missiles, by saboteurs shortly after takeoff, by the Soviet air
force in midcourse before cruise missiles can be launched or by the powerful air
defense of the Soviet Union. We cannot rely on our B-52s as the Soviets can on
their Badgers, Bears, Blinders or Backfires, which can penetrate practically unop-
posed by any American air defense.
The only remaining leg of the TRIAD is our missile-carrying submarine force. The
Soviets have pursued unconventional detection methods in which they appear to be
qualitatively superior to American research. This retaliatory force is the most
uncertain one. It may survive but it may well be the first to be wiped out.
The result of SALT II will not be safety for the United States but the illusion of
safety.
This Treaty apart from other shortcomings is not verifiable. Because we have
concentrated on missile launchers rather than the missiles themselves, the Soviets
can covertly or legally store hundreds or even thousands of additional missiles in
warehouses or holds of ships. These missiles could well be launched within 24 hours.
The Treaty will not impede the Soviets from testing of essentially new missiles
which they will claim as insignificant modifications of old ones.
The Treaty permits encrypted telemetering of tests which means that secret
messages are exchanged but we are supposed to believe that we shall be given a key
to all the secrets contained in the messages.
The Treaty does not limit Soviet SS-20 missiles and relies on the Russian assur-
smces concerning the Backfire bombers. These weapons can be used easily after
minor changes have been made in an attack on our Country. They are an obvious
and deadly danger to our Allies. Together with the noncircumvention provisions
(Articles XII and XIII) the Treaty will serve to undermine the NATO Alliance.
If SALT II is ratified, even with the provision that our defense spending shall be
greatly increased, we shall further contribute to the arms race mentality.
If the Treaty is not ratified, this will serve as a clear message to the American
people and warn them of the real danger that has developed in the last decade. The
road will be open for us to engage in a technological competition. This competition,
246
which is quite different from an arms race, we can win and we can, thereby, insure
stability and peace.
To do so two measures are necessary.
One is to replace negotiations with the Soviet Union by careful and complete
discussions with our friends and Allies. The free democracies are collectively strong-
er than the Soviet Union, provided that full cooperation is established between
these free countries. In the absence of such full cooperation our friends may have to
choose between surrender to the Soviet Union or development, in some cases secret
development, of their own nuclear deterrents.
The second obvious step is to mobilize American and Allied science and industry
for the technological race. What the result of such activity will be depends on the
collective inventiveness and wisdom of the best experts. A technological race is, of
course, unpredictable and cannot be limited by treaty restrictions.
My own guess is that American superior know-how in electronics could be put to
excellent use in defense. We should construct unmanned, remotely-piloted vehicles
in the air, on the ground, and on the oceans. Thereby we could reverse the present
trend toward bigger and more costly weapons which are becoming fewer in number
and ever more vulnerable. A first step in this direction, the cruise missile, has been
vigorously opposed by the Soviets in the SALT II negotiations. They succeeded in
imposing serious limitations on these missiles.
The consequences of the current trends can be illustrated by a final juxtaposition.
One of our eminent officials stated that our missiles may have to be fired on
warnin?. This terrible and destabilizing plan is a direct result of the SALT process.
Would it not be better to match Soviet civil defense plans by an inexpensive
procedure of voluntary evacuation in case that we observe that the Soviets evacuate
their cities? Peaceful protection of our citizens is a better deterrent than missiles
that would be fired by a hair trigger procedure.
If the Soviets know that we are making realistic plans to survive, if they notice
that together with our Allies we have developed novel weapons, they will never
dare to attack us.
Appendix I
(Reprinted from "Strategic Deterrents in the 1980's" by Dr. Roger Speed)
Chapter 3— The Survivability of U.S. Strategic Forces
TRAIL
The primary mode of protecting the SSBNs is to "hide" them in the vast expanse
of the ocean. The SSBNs do, however, return to port after two months at sea. The
protection of the ocean can thus be negated if the Soviets undertake a trail of
SSBNs as they leave port.
Because Soviet attack submarines are faster than U.S. SSBNs, they are an ideal
vehicle for traclcing. Although it is difficult for the Soviets to maintain a covert trail
using passive sonar (because U.S. submarines are quieter than those of the Soviets),
a covert trail using nonacoustic techniques (to be discussed below) could be feasi-
ble." However, even if the tracking submarine were discovered, the SSBN could
find it difficult to break trail if the Soviet submarine used its active sonar system,
particularly if the Soviets supported their attack submarines with surface ships.
The argument raised against the possibility of the Soviets undertaking such overt
trails has been more political than technical. It has been suggested that such
threatening actions would cause the breakdown of detente. Although, the Soviets
may not be willing at present to damage the chances for detente, a change in world
conditions could create a state of tension lasting for several months, and detente
may then cease to be a prime consideration in Soviet strategic planning.
AREA SEARCHES
If a U.S. SSBN is not trailed as it leaves port, the Soviets face the much more
difficult task of finding it in the open ocean. Because the range of the Polaris and
the Poseidon missiles is about 2,500 nm and because at any one time, about 55
percent of the SSBNs are at sea, the Soviets must contend with sixteen or seventeen
boats in an Atlantic patrol area of around one million square nautical miles.
" It should be noted that the Soviets maintain a fleet of 128 diesel-powered attack submarines
in addition to their 39 nuclear-powered attack submarines (see "The Military Balance 1977/78,"
op. cit., p. 69). Diesel submarines running on batteries are even quieter than U.S. nuclear
submarines. Thus, a threat of a covert trail may exist, particularly for those SSBNs operating
out of European ports.
247
Several acoustic and nonacoustic techniques that could possibly be used by the
Soviets for this task are described below.
Towed arrays. — The development of a line array of hydrophones that can be
towed through the water represents a potential breakthrough in acoustic ASW
technology. According to Larry L. Booda, an editor of Sea Technology: "The success
of towed hydrophone arrays has been outstanding. They have b^n designed for
towing by surface ships, submarines and helicopters. (They are used as protective
detection devices by the ballistic missile submarines.) These arrays offer high gain
reception combined with a very narrow beam. Thus two of them deployed one
hundred miles or more apart can locate a submarine with sufficient accuracy for
the pinpointing detectors of the operating forces to take over to complete the
mission. ' **
In the hands of the Soviets, this new technology could pose a serious threat to the
SSBNs. If the detection range is, in fact, at least 50 nm, the SSBN patrol area can
be searched in two days or less.*" The data from the arrays could be processed on
board the towing ships or relayed via satellite back to the Soviet Union for process-
ing at a larger computer center. Once a submarine is detected, other forces (aircraft
and surface ships) can be assigned to verify the detection and to maintain trail.
Another approach to area surveillance is to augment these towed arrays with
small, portable, active acoustic sources, either small, disposable explosive charges or
more conventional, very high-powered but portable acoustic generators.*" A few
acoustic sources could be operated by a small number of towed-array ships distribut-
ed about the SSBN patrol area. By listening for a signal bouncing off a submarine,
it could be possible to obtain a cross-fix and to localize a submarine in a half hour or
less. Soviet ICBMs could then be targeted to the suspected targets, or aircraft and
ships could be used to verify each detection.'"
Sonobuoy surveillance. — At present, when a submarine is detected, aircraft-
dropped sonobuoys are generally used to localize it. The data obtained from these
buoys are relayed by radio to the aircraft for analysis. Because the buoys deploy
hydrophones with directional capabilities, two or more buoys can give a cross-
bearing to localize the target.
Most buoys float on the surface and generally have a short detection range, but
this range can be extended considerably by mooring the hydrophones to the ocean
bottom. The United States has a program of this type called the Moored Surveil-
lance System.** It is an aerially dropped sonobuoy system that is self-mooring and is
intended to create a surveillance barrier. The data from these sonobuoys can either
be transmitted to aircraft for retransmission to ships and to shore-based processing
centers or be sent to shore by satellite relay.
If the Soviets were to deploy a similar system, they could cover a million square
nautical miles by using from around 1,000 to 1,500 sonobuoys if the detection radius
at the surface were 15 to 20 nm. The sonobuoys could be clandestinely deployed by
" Booda, op. cit., pp. 13, 40. For a description of the current U.S. progrsun, see Harold Brown,
op. cit., pp. 181-182.
" With a detection range of 50 nm (on either side of the boat), twenty vessels towing these
arrays at a speed of ten knots (nm/hr) could search an area of one million square nautical miles
in about two days.
" The Soviets could use larger sources. By 1970, high-energy transducers that could generate
acoustic power in the millions of watts were available. (Even a noisy submarine radiates less
than one watt of acoustic power.) Dr. Victor Anderson of the Scripps Institution of Oceanog-
raphy predicted that this technology, when combined with the advances in signal processing
that enable the returning signal from a submarine to be distinguished from background noise,
could in effect make the oceans transparent, and submarines would no longer be safe from
detection. The Soviets could deploy such transducers from large, stable, surface platforms in the
open ocean. However, the effectiveness of this approach is unclear. Because these large plat-
forms could be easily detected, the United States could employ countermeasures. The outcome is
uncertain because attempts to jam the receiver with noise might be overcome by adaptive
processing techniques (which, in effect, filter out the noise from the jammer). (See V. C.
Anderson, "Ocean Technology," in Impact of New Technologies on the Arms Race, ed. Feld et
al. [Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971], pp. 201-216.)
" The effectiveness of this approach depends to a great extent on the false-alarm rate. If only
the seventeen SSBNs are detected, it may take 150 1-MT warheads to barrage the area in which
the submarines are thought to be located. (This assumes that the SSBNs patrol at five knots,
that their initial positions are known within a radius of 15 nm, and the warheads arrive one
hour after detection.) If there are 100 total targets (only seventeen actually being submarines),
the Soviets will have to use about 800 warheads to cover the area of uncertainty. They could, in
theory, do this with 100 SS-18 ICBMs and still have around 1,300 ICBMs left. However,
warheads exploded at or near the ocean surface are not as effective against undersea targets as
those burst at some depth under the ocean surface. Thus, this approach might require the
development of a warhead that could withstand the impact of hitting the ocean surface or the
use of more warheads if a surface burst were used.
" Booda, op. cit., p. 40.
248
surface ships and set to start broadcasting at a particular time, sending their data
via satellite to the Soviet Union for processing. All designated targets could be
attacked using ICBMs within a half hour of the start of broadcasting. Or, on a
longer time scale, aircraft and surface ships could be used to investigate suspected
targets, bring them under trail, and, if required, deliver weapons against them.
NONACOUSTIC THREATS
Although the United States has devoted most of its ASW effort to acoustic
techniques of detection, nonacoustic techniques also exist. Admiral Donald P.
Harvey, director of Naval Intelligence, stated in 1978 that "methods of detection
could include, but not be limited to, radars, optical systems, and lasers." " The
United States now has a limited capacity to detect submarines using nonacoustic
techniques. A more extensive, operational capability is expected in the 1980s.'*
Some of the phenomena that the Soviets might exploit to detect submarines are
described below."
Surface effects. — When a body moves through a stratified medium like the ocean,
internal waves are generated that make their way to the surface, and the interac-
tion of these internal waves with the surface changes the reflective properties of the
surface. This change reportedly can be detected by radars operating in the millime-
ter wavelength region =** and possibly by other systems such as lasers.
Other hydrodynamic phenomena associated with the passing of a submarine can
cause a difference in surface temperature. For example: "The sea water used to cool
machinery discharged from a submerged submarine is warmer than the surround-
ing water and, therefore, represents a heat anomaly in that region of the ocean." "
According to the Soviets, such temperature differences can be detected by earth
satellites.'*
Another potential threat results from the small rise in the surface level of the
water above a passing submarine." Both optical and radar techniques could possibly
be used to detect this change.
Finally, there is another phenomenon that reportedly not only affects the ocean
surface but also the atmosphere above it and thus may be easier to detect. Accord-
ing to Air Force Magazine.
"There's mounting concern that the Soviets may have made significant progress
in submarine detection through the energy emissions that surface from the wake of
even deeply submerged boats. These irregular emissions, called convective cells,
show up as hot sports in the atmosphere and cause moisture. They are detectable by
special radar and infrared detection systems on ships or in space, "^o
Contaminant wakes. — Besides a hydrodynamic wake, a submarine can leave
behind other indications of its recent presence. Because some neutrons escape from
the nuclear reactor used to power a submarine, it leaves behind a trail of neutrons
and radionuclides. It has also been suggested that a submarine leaves a biological
track formed by microorganisms killed by its passage.*' Finally, submarines use
electrolysis of water to obtain oxygen for their crews. If precautions are not taken,
the residual hydrogen can leave a trail in the water and at the surface that can be
detected by such means as lasers.*^
"Testimony of Adm. Donald P. Harvey, in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed
Services, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development,
and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilan Personnel Strengths: Hearings on S. 210, 95th
Cong., 1st sess., 1977, part 10, p. 6655.
" Testimony of Adm. James HoUoway, chief of Naval Operations, in ibid., part 2, p. 1043.
'* Until about 1965, the Soviets wrote quite openly about most of these nonacoustic techniques.
For a review of the Soviet literature, see K. J. Moore, "Antisubmarine Warfare," in "Soviet
Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions," ed. M. McGwine and J. McDonnell (New
York: Praeger. 1977), pp. 185-200.
"Ibid, p. 192.
" Testimony of Rear Adm. J. Metzel, in U.S., Congress, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, op.
cit., part 10, p. 6655.
** Moore, op. cit., p. 191. Infrared detectors deployed on aircraft can reportedly detect tempera-
ture variations on the sea surface of 0.2°C. (See "Strategy Survey, 1970',- London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), p. 14.
" Moore, op. cit., p. 192.
«" "Focus On . . . ," Air Force Magazine, May 1978, p. 20. See also Henry S. Bradsher,
"Vulnerability Growing for U.S. Sub-based Missiles?" Washington Star, Dec. 12, 1977, Focus
section, p. 1.
" Moore, op. cit., p. 191; and Bradsher, op. cit.
'* Hydrogen in concentrations of one part per million can be detected at 300-400 yards by
laser resonance Raman spectrography. Whether the concentration of a hydrogen wake left by a
submarine is greater or lesser than this is unknown.
249
EM Signals. — Electrochemical processes generate varying electrical potentials at
different points on a submarine.*' Because seawater is a conductor of electricity, an
electric current (which is modulated at the frequency the propeller shaft is turning)
travels between the points of different electrical potential. The resulting low-fre-
quency electromagnetic (EM) field can be detected by a number of devices, such as
those using very large magnetic loops or those using superconducting devices based
on the Josephson effect.**
Direct detection. — Water is opaque to visible light except for a very narrow fre-
quency band. However, lasers operating in the blue-green region of the spectrum
can penetrate to some depth underwater and detect submarines. This is of particu-
lar concern because U.S. submarines must remain fairly close to the surface for
communication purposes.
Conclusion. — A serious threat to the SSBNs would exist if nonacoustic techniques
could be used by aircraft to make detections. Aircraft with a detection range of
around 10 nm could complete a search of the SSBN patrol area in a few hours.**
Satellites would, of course, be even more effective. The detection of subsurface
wakes by surface ships or submarines could also present a threat even though their
sweep of the patrol area would be slower. If these subsurface wakes persisted for a
long enough time, a covert trail might be established as an SSBN left port since the
trailer could remain outside the acoustic range of the SSBN.
OTHER THREATS
In addition to acoustic and nonacoustic threats, there are a number of other
methods of detecting submarines that do not fit either of these two categories,
although they obviously use one or the other (or both) of these techniques.
Trailing communications wire or buoy. — The requirement that the U.S. SSBN
fleet remain in constant communication with the U.S. military command poses a
serious hazard to the survival of the fleet. Because most radio waves cannot signifi-
cantly penetrate the ocean, each submarine is required to maintain an antenna at
or near the surface. This antenna (which is connected by a buoyant cable to the
submarine takes the form of a long communications wire ** or a communications
buoy. "
The Navy has testified before Congress that this arrangement offers many oppor-
tunities for detection.*' Both the wake of the antenna and the antenna itself can be
detected by radar, infrared, laser, or visual (photographic and television) tech-
niques.*'
Other means of communication are }X)ssible. Extremely low frequency (ELF) radio
can penetrate the ocean to great depths. An ELF communications system (originally
called Sanguine but now known as Seafarer) has been proposed for some time by
the Navy but has been delayed, primarily because of opposition from environmen-
talists. Until this or other methods of communicating with the SSBNs are deployed,
the trailing antennas will remain a significant threat to the safety of the subma-
rines.
Tags. — U.S. SSBNs operate from only a few ports and are constantly observed by
Russian trawlers as they leave. It is possible that as a submarine leaves port, some
device (a "tag") could be attached to its hull by a frogman or a trained animal (sea
*' Moore, op. cit., p. 190. See also Giordio tacconi, "Fundamentals of ELF Communication and
Detection," in "Applications of Remote Sensing to Ocean Surveillance." AGARD Lecture Series
No. 88 (Neuilly Sur Seine, France: NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace Research & Develop-
ment, 1977) pp. 9-17, 9-18.
" See Frank Chilton, Lowell Wood, and Rod Buntzen, "Electric and Magnetic Sensing Sensors:
Applications," UCID — 17597 (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 1977). Also
contained in "Applications of Remote Sensing to Ocean Surveillance," op. cit. p. 10-1.
'' With a detection range of 10 nm (and a "sweep width" of 14 nm), 30 aircraft flying at 300
knots could search an area of one million square nautical miles in about eight hours. Of course,
even smaller detection ranges could be quite useful.
** As described by Fessenden and Cheng: "Since the early nineteen sixties, U.S. submarines
have utilized trailing-wire antennas in order to remain submerged while maintaining RF
reception with an antenna at or near the ocean surface. The trailing wire is simply an RF
transmission line and/or single conductor encased in a buoyant, polyethylene foam jacket and is
usually referred to as a buoyant cable. It is normally about 2000 ft (610 m) in length and may be
divided, functionally, into three parts: transmission line section, antenna section, and drogue
section (if any)." A typical configuration would have a 105 ft section at the end of the cable to
receive very-low-frequency (VLF) up to high-frequency (HF) messages. (Charles T. Fessenden and
David H. S. Cheng, 'Development of a Trailing-Wire E-Field Submarine Antenna for Extremely
Low Frequency (ELF) Reception," IEEE Transactions on Communications 22 [April, 1974]: 428.)
" See U.S., Congress, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, op. cit., part 10, pp. 6690-6695.
" Ibid.
«» For a photograph of the trailing wire floating on the surface, see ibid., p. 6694.
250
lion or dolphin). This tag could take many forms and could be designed either to
release a device that vsdll rise to the surface at a set time to reveal the submarine's
position or to release a series of devices that will reveal the submarine's position
over a long period of time. To reveal the position of the submarine at a preset time,
a miniature radio broadcaster could be used. To maintain a trail over a longer
period of time, a series of devices that remain silent until interrogated by some
Soviet surveillance system could be used. A number of such devices are conceivable.
For example, recent advances in large-scale integrated circuits make possible the
construction of tiny transponders designed to respond only when interrogated by a
specially coded pulse from a microwave radar. Thousands of these devices could be
placed in a relatively small package and periodically released to form an easily
followed trail on the ocean surface.
Sabotage. — The U.S. SSBN is a formidable nuclear force, but it is also a very
concentrated one. Normally, about half the force (around twenty boats) is at sea
while the rest are in port and vulnerable to attack. A boat remains at sea for about
two months and then returns to port for another month before returning to sea
again. If the Soviets ever believed that war was inevitable, they could decide that
the sabotage of a submarine while in port would be far easier than attacking it at
sea.
There are any number of chemical and biological agents that could incapacitate
or kill a submarine crew. They could be brought on board in the ship's supplies (or
through other means) and released at a preset time. In this way, the whole at-sea
fleet could be attacked at once."
Boost phase intercept. — Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) systems placed in the
vicinity of a U.S. launch area could be more effective than those systems that have
to wait until a U.S. RV enters the atmosphere over the Soviet Union. If Soviet ships
(and possibly aircraft) with radars and ABM missiles were placed in the U.S. SSBN
patrol area, a serious threat would exist to any SLBM that was fired (and also to
the submarine because a missile could be backtracked by radar to its point of origin,
thus revealing the submarine's position).
Such an ABM system would be designed to attack the booster or the postboost
vehicle (the "bus") before the RVs were released. These boosters are easy to track
because they make very large targets for ABM radars. Once the booster is above the
atmosphere, the computers used for guidance and control aboard the booster and
the bus can be incapacitated by a nuclear explosion at a very large distance
(perhaps 50 to 100 nm depending on the computer hardness and the yield of the
ABM warhead). A successful attack on the computers insures that, at a minimum,
the RVs will miss their targets.
Forward-based ABMs are now outlawed by treaty. However, the Soviets have
continued a massive ABM research and development program. If the treaty is ever
abrogated, they may be able to deploy a forward-based system of this type much
more rapidly than they can a land-based system.
CONCLUSION
The military doctrine of the Soviet Union takes the possibility of war, even
nuclear war, seriously, and the Soviets have made a concentrated effort to develop
countermeasures to America's strategic forces. By the early 1980s, the Soviets could
(if appropriate counteractions are not taken) seriously threaten the ICBM and
bomber legs of the triad. It is unlikely that they will fail to try to counter the
SSBNs also.
This section has discussed a large number of individual threats, but it should be
noted that the Soviets practice "defense in depth." If one technique or system
guarantees only partial success, then the Soviets add another to improve their
chances. For example, the Soviet air defense system consists of many layers, and the
Soviets continue to upgrade, improve, and expand their forces. A similar approach
can be expected in ASW, although any one of the techniques mentioned above could
be enough to compromise almost the entire SSBN fleet.
Understanding the extent of the Soviet ASW threat is one of the more crucial
tasks of the intelligence community, but it is an area in which great uncertainties
exist. As Admiral Harvey, director of Naval Intelligence, noted in 1978, the Soviets'
'° This approach has the possible drawback that it would take about two months before all the
boats had been cycled through port and returned to sea with the sabotage devices aboard. This
conflicts considerably with the general notion that a nuclear war would occur by accident or in
the heart of a worldwide crisis. Of course, the crisis could come and appear to subside in the
eyes of the West. The Soviet perception might be quite different. In the height of the crisis, the
Kremlin might decide that war is inevitable and proceed with war preparations while giving all
appearances of cooling the crisis and pushing for a return to the precrisis political atmosphere.
251
"extensive [ASW] R&D effort ... is the area in which we could be expected to know
the least, because it does not have the manifestations in the open seas that their
weapons and platforms do." " Because these ASW systems often have no easily
identifiable characteristics, the Soviets can successfully disguise or hide critical
aspects of their program.
It is known, however, that the Soviets have for some time had an extensive ASW
program, and there appears to be growing concern recently over the possibility of a
breakthrough, particularly in the nonacoustic area." In this field, the Soviets are
known to have research programs on lasers, processed optical scanners, advanced
radar, and infrared detection systems." It is the evaluation of the U.S. Navy that a
"significant advancement in any of these techniques would pose a potential threat
to the security of our SSBNs." '<
Considering the wide range of possible threats (acoustic, nonacoustic, and uncon-
ventional) and the intensive Soviet ASW effort, the continued survivability of the
SSBNs should not be taken for granted. In fact, unless appropriated countermeas-
ures are taken, the viability of this force in the near future could be in serious
doubt.
Early Warning and Strategic C^
The United States maintains tactical warning systems to detect an incoming
attack and a command, control, and communications (O) network to assure that
war orders are implemented. Quick and reliable tactical warning of an attack on
U.S. bomber bases is particularly critical because, as noted earlier, a delay of a few
minutes could result in almost complete destruction of the strategic bomber force.
The maintenance of a communications network between the strategic forces and the
National Command Authority (NCA) (the president or his designated successor) is
also critical because all strategic forces are under positive control: U.S. missiles
cannot be launched nor can U.S. bombers proceed to target without positive authori-
zation from the NCA. The following sections briefly describe these systems and
discuss some of their major weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
STRATEGIC WARNING
Strategic warning is usually on a time scale of hours, days, or weeks before actual
hostilities begin. It might result from an evaluation that a severe international
political crisis existed or from positive intelligence that an attack was being
planned. Strategic warning is important because it would allow the readiness status
(alert rate) of the strategic forces and the C^ network to be raised. At the highest
level of alert, the president could be airborne and prepared to direct the retaliatory
strike if an attack materialized.
The technical means of obtaining strategic warning (as opposed to normal diplo-
matic assessment of the political situation) primarily consists of photographic and
electronic satellites and numerous electronic surveillance ground stations located
around the periphery of the Soviet Union. In addition, some observers believe the
disposition of Soviet missile-carrying nuclear submarines (SSBNs) could offer a
means of strategic warning. At present, the Soviets operate only a few SSBNs off
U.S. coasts, and none are located very close. Under present bomber basing patterns,
alert rates, and reaction times, this small force could post a threat to much of the
bomber force in a surprise attack (at the minimum it could destroy the 70 percent of
the force not on alert). However, most defense planners assume that the Soviets will
move fifteen or twenty boats closer to U.S. coasts if they are planning an attack.
To follow the movements of Soviet submarines, the United States uses SOSUS, a
system of underwater hydrophones.'* These hydrophone line arrays are generally
located along the edge of the continental shelf and feed their data through under-
water cables to shore-based stations along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Ship-
towed hydrophone arrays are being developed to supplement the SOSUS system.
Their data will probably be relayed via satellite to a shore-based processing center.
It is likely, but not certain, that the United States would detect a change in
Soviet SSBN deployments. Detection depends on the noise level of the submarines,
and it is possible that this noise level will be lowered in the future. In addition,
" Testimony of Adm. Donald P. Harvey, in U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, op.
cit., part 10, p. 6620.
"■ Bradsher, op. cit.
'3 Testimony of Vice Adm. Robert Kaufman, director, Command, Control and Communica-
tions, in U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization, op. cit., part 10, p. 6756.
" Ibid.
" For a description of SOSUS and other U.S. ASW systems, see the November issues of "Sea
Technology" for 1974, 1975, and 1976.
H8-260 0-79 Pt.U - 17
252
there may be gaps in the coverage; apparently, the Gulf of Mexico is not covered,
for example. Also, because the SOSUS hydrophones are located in the so-called
"deep sound channel" (in order to obtain the low-frequency signals that travel great
distances at this depth), a submarine operating close to shore in shallow water could
go undetected.
A more important point is that if the Soviets were planning an attack, it seems
unlikely that they would suddenly move twenty SSBNs close to the U.S. coasts. If
the Soviets were to build up their force over a period of several months, it is
doubtful that true strategic warning (in the sense of a conviction that the Soviets
were planning a war) would be obtained or acted upon.
In general, strategic warning can be very beneficial, but, as noted in chapter 2, it
may fail to materialize at the critical moment. This may not be due to lack of data,
but rather to a failure to perceive the significance of the data or to believe data that
conflict with preconceived notions of the other party's behavior. In view of the long-
held American belief that a deliberate nuclear war is almost inconceivable, the past
history of the success of surprise attacks is even more relevant.
Appendix II
SALT II, Article VI, paragraph 1 states:
"The limitations provided for in this Treaty shall apply to those arms which are:
(a) operational;
(b) in the final stage of construction;
(c) in reserve, in storage, or mothballed;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair, modernization, or conversion."
The statement would seem to exclude keeping considerable numbers of added
missiles in storage. Actually the number of surface-to-surface missiles is nowhere
explicitly regulated in the SALT II Treaty.
The limitations apply, according to Article III, only to ICBM launchers, SLBM
launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles. Therefore production
and widespread distribution of excess numbers of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles
would not only be difficult to find but if found would not be in clear violation of the
Treaty. Deployment of launchers, however primitive, would be in violation, but
primitive launchers particularly in a not completely assembled form, could hardly
be identified.
Appendix III
[From Inside Report (Field Newspaper Syndicate), Aug. 10, 1979]
(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)
SALT, Soviet-Style
Washington. — Preparation of three "distinctly new" test silos for "modernized"
Soviet long-range missiles are now receiving final preparations at Soviet test ranges,
a piece of intelligence that could doom continuation of SALT as a game that runs so
heavily in the Kremlin's favor.
No longer in question is the clarity of intelligence demonstrating Moscow's intent
to trigger a huge new test program the instant the new Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty (SALT II) is ratified. It seems likely to harden American public opinion
against what has come to be called the SALT "process."
"This may well prove to be the end of the SALT process," says a Nixon-Ford
administration official, who was one of the original authors of SAL'T II and supports
the final version. "When our people read about what Moscow is legally doing under
this new treaty, they may say to hell with SALT."
Students of SAL'T, mostly critics but also including important supporters, long
have been concerned that the "process" of SALT, replacing substance, has become
the political objective. The impending Soviet test program could stop this dangerous
inversion by concentrating public attention on substance.
During the period of intense Soviet testing following SALT I, the U.S. still had
strategic superiority. In contrast, the U.S. today is on the verge of losing, if it has
not already lost, strategic parity. That points to outrage as the public watches four
free years of testing for Moscow, while the U.S. fails to test a single new interconti-
nental ballistic missile (ICBM).
Preparations of the new test silos to let Moscow exploit Article 4 of SALT II are
virtually complete. High Pentagon officials are privately warning Senators and
other politicians not to be surprised when "modernized" (improved) versions of the
main Soviet ICBM force are tested immediately following the final ratification of
the new treaty.
253
One defense official made this clear last week to a meeting attended by Senate
staff experts: U.S. negotiators of SALT II "know that the Russians deliberately
negotiated Article 4 so that they could go ahead and test and deploy all their new
missiles without violating the treaty."
This Soviet upgrading or modernization of the existing force is a loophole totally
separate from the provision in the treaty (Article 2) that gives each side the right to
build one new missile. President Carter has announced a decision (still resisted by
arms control enthusiasts) for the U.S. to build the MX mobile missile as its new
missile.
The U.S. has no plans for upgrading or modernizing its present landbased missile
force. There is today no intention to fire a single test of any long-range missile until
the MX itself is fired (now scheduled for 1983).
That means silence from the Americans amid heavy Russian missile-rattling. The
Soviet Union, without cheating, is in the same position to modernize its land-based
long-range missiles as it was after ratification of SALT I on Sept. 14, 1972. Immedi-
ately thereafter, the Soviets began initial tests of the huge SS-18 and the large SS-
19, whose size did violent injustice to the spirit of SALT I. Now, both the SS-18 and
the SS-19 will be modernized under SALT II, along with three lesser missiles.
Skeptics within the U.S. SALT delegation sounded repeated warnings during the
negotiations that Article 4 must not leave the "modernizing" door wide open. One
result was to limit the modernized missiles to a 5 percent variation from the older
missiles (which the Soviets can easily violate).
Moscow's negotiators never have been willing to give the U.S. accurate measure-
ments of its existing missiles from which to measure the permitted 5 percent
variations. Indeed, the "modernizing door" was left open, as the intelligence reports
of the new silos at Soviet test sites prove.
That sets the stage for public outcry as soon as the new Soviet tests are launched.
It could mark the end of the innocence that up to now has made the SALT process a
self-contained objective even more important than the SALT substance.
Senator Zorinsky. Mr. Phillip Karber, vice president of the na-
tional security programs at BDM Corp. in McLean is our next
witness.
Mr. Karber, you have a prepared testimony. If you would like to
give us a condensed version, you may.
Mr. Karber. I have a prepared testimony.
Senator Zorinsky. Fine. It will be included in the proceedings at
the appropriate point and you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF PHILLIP A. KARBER, VICE PRESIDENT, BDM
CORP.!
Mr. Karber. I thought I would quickly summarize and perhaps
raise some of the issues that I went into in more depth in the
prepared text and offer you the opportunity to ask some questions.
Before starting, I would like to emphasize that I am testifying as
an individual, and that my remarks reflect neither the views of my
corporation nor any agency with which I have been associated.
I was asked to address the relationship between SALT II and the
European balance. I don't claim great personal expertise in terms
of strategic arms, but I have spent the last 12 years looking at the
balance in Europe relatively closely.
The first thing I would like to point out is I think there is a
tendency which has grown ever since 1969 to separate the strategic
balance from the theater balance. I think it is in some ways logical
to do that. The systems are so complex and the quantities of the
weapons so much greater, and it is very difficult to have meaning-
ful negotiations in a multilateral context.
It makes sense for two countries to negotiate together, but the
result of that has been that we have artificially — to a great extent.
' See page 264 for Mr. Karber's prepared statement.
254
to a phony extent — separated the strategic balance from the NATO
theater balance.
I say it is phony or artificial for several reasons. First of all, if
you look at the history of the strategic arms race going back to the
forties, we find that we were members of NATO, we deployed the
Seventh Army to Europe before we really had a strategic retali-
atory capability.
We seemed to think that the strategic balance is sort of histori-
cal, that it started by itself and has progressed by itself. But in fact
the strategic arms race grew out of our concern to protect our
NATO allies from what was then perceived as a very strong Euro-
pean imbalance balance of forces in the late forties and early
fifties.
We felt we had to depend upon nuclear weapons, and have
increasingly put a heavy dependence on them because neither our
European allies nor we felt that we could afford to match the
Soviets in conventional weapons. But it is not just in terms of
history that this dependence has grown.
The Soviets were unable through a good part of the fifties to
target the United States, were unable to match our deployed sys-
tems overseas which could reach the Soviet Union, and thus de-
ployed most of their medium bombers and medium and intermedi-
ate range ballistic missiles opposite Europe.
In essence, they held our European allies as hostages to our
nonuse of the nuclear weapons that were deployed to originally
protect our NATO allies. In fact, I think to a great extent that
experience which had a psychological impact on our allies is some-
thing we Americans didn't really understand.
In 1957, Khrushchev announced to our European allies that
unless they did certain things, nuclear rockets would rain down on
their capitals. We never experienced that hostage mentality that
the Soviets held over our European allies. I think even today that
background influences them.
The Soviets have since, of course, built up a strategic retaliatory
capability against us. They continue building a very strong nuclear
force opposite Europe.
I know of relatively little evidence of Soviet planning that as-
sumes a strategic nuclear exchange out of the blue. I think when
people talk about that, it is relatively absurd to say that Brezhnev
wakes up in the morning and he says, "oh, gee, there's no soccer
game and my masseuse is off, so let's start a strategic war. After
all, the indicators look pretty good".
I think all the evidence suggests that the Soviets tend to see a
strategic exchange growing out of the theater conflict, and today,
the theater that they still see as the most likely to produce a
strategic exchange is Central Europe.
There is another reason not to divorce the two, and that is
NATO doctrine as it has evolved over the years, particularly as
codified in its 1967 flexible response strategy, laid out three princi-
ples for the defense of Central Europe, principles which we essen-
tially sold to our European allies, principles which we said "accept
them and we will back you up".
The first principle was direct defense. That is, in the event of
aggression, we want to have sufficient conventional forces to make
255
sure that we don't start a strategic nuclear exchange over a few
troops across the border. We wanted that direct defense to be able
to hold, to buy us time to feel out Soviet motivations, to try and see
the size of the attack, see if we couldn't limit it.
If our direct defense forces or conventional defenses could not
hold, the second concept was deliberate escalation, to employ, in a
restricted way, use relatively few warheads against relatively few
targets, to demonstrate that NATO had the willpower to back up
its conventional defense with the initiation of nuclear war, without
starting the immediate strategic exchange. The Soviets would have
some idea they were going too far and it was time to quit.
But there was a third element, general nuclear response, one
which has increasingly, I think, been ignored and which is directly
related to SALT and our strategic balance. And to this day neither
we nor our European allies have ever repealed that element of the
current NATO doctrine of flexible response.
Remember, flexible response presumes our first use of nuclear
weapons if we can't hold conventionally and the eventual initiation
of a strategic nuclear strike.
To back this strategy up, we gave NATO elements of our strate-
gic forces for to use in the general nuclear response. We even
assumed that under certain circumstances it would be launched
simultaneously with our SIOP.
The point I am trying to make, through background, through
current Soviet doctrine, through our own doctrine of the defense of
Europe, is that we have inextricably and irrevocably linked the
defense of Central Europe to the strategic balance.
To a certain extent, any SALT Treaty is damaging to the doc-
trine of flexible response. This one, ones of the past, and undoubt-
edly ones of the future. To the extent that SALT codifies or legiti-
mizes strategic parity and essentially symbolizes that strategic
forces are of relatively little value other than to deter their own
first use. Any agreement that emphasizes that, pulls out from
underneath NATO this doctrine which says we will initiate first
use of nuclear weapons if we can't hold conventionally and we will
escalate the strategic level unilaterally if we have to.
Now, that in itself, I would argue, would not be decisive in
accepting or rejecting this treaty. We have known it for a long
time. Analysts have been talking about it, predicting it ever since
the fifties.
But several things have changed since the beginning of the SALT
process. First of all, there has been a massive arms race in Central
Europe, one which has received relatively little attention. Since the
SALT negotiations started in 1969, the Soviet Union and its East
European allies. East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland, have
added — not replaced in terms of modernization, but added — 12,000
major pieces of combat equipment. I have the charts in my pre-
pared statement which you may want to refer later for more detail.
The impact of this Soviet led build-up is that it has altered NATO's
ability to fight a successful direct defense, initiate a deliberate
escalation or deter via a credible general nuclear response.
You might call it a NATO Triad. That is, by having a conven-
tional defense, a deliberate escalation capability within the theater,
and then the tie-in to strategic forces, we hope to have a credible
256
deterrent force that we would never really have to exercise and
use.
Unfortunately, the conventional balance has eroded and very
little attention has been paid to that.
Second, there has been no greater myth that has been promul-
gated in the American strategic community than that American
technology or Western technology offsets the Soviet quantitative
superiority in Central Europe. You see it over and over. In the
State Department bulletin several months ago, there was an article
that said, oh, after all, NATO superiority in antitank weapons,
qualitatively and quantitatively, offset Soviet Warsaw Pact tank
strength.
It has never been true when it was first stated in 1968, and it is
not true today. The Warsaw Pact has 16,000 tanks in Central
Europe today, and NATO has 3,500 of the new modern antitank
guided missiles launchers. The Warsaw Pact, which ostensibly is on
the offensive have 5,000 of the antitank guided missile launchers.
In essence, they have more of these defensive weapons than we
do.
Another aspect in the late 1960's in terms of our direct defense
was that we had a clear superiority in terms of advanced technol-
ogy. We have lost it. We, in terms of the United States, had a lost
decade in which we spent most of our time and most of the general
purpose forces budget focused on Southeast Asia.
Today in Central Europe, the Soviet Army has more of their new
main battle tanks than we or the West Germans will have, Leop-
ard II or X-M I, in the mid-1980's. They have more of their new
infantry fighting vehicles than we and all of NATO will have in
the mid-eighties.
Their new self-propelled artillery is better than anything being
designed in central Europe.
The point I am trying to make is that in terms of the convention-
al defense, it is eroded and eroded quite badly. That is not the only
area that is eroded.
In the late 1960's NATO had a clear intratheater nuclear capa-
bility that supplied the link between conventional defense and
strategic forces. Today that has been lost by a substantial increase
in Warsaw Pact theater nuclear forces. The Warsaw Pact increase
in theater nuclear forces combined with a strong chemical warfare
capability, which NATO has no capacity to even defend itself, let
alone respond in kind, offers the potential of a very devastating
Soviet riposte or first use coercive potential vis-a-vis central
Europe.
I notice the lights are out. Is my time up?
Senator Zorinsky. If you could sort of summarize.
Senator Javits. Especially tell us what you want us to do about
SALT 11.
Mr. Karber. The reason I have emphasized the European de-
fense aspects is that if we had a strong conventional defense in
Europe, if we had a credible intratheater nuclear defense, the
pressures on SALT II in terms of its relationship to our allies
would be far less. The fact is, we don't.
With SALT II essentially adding one more step in terms of the
codification of parity, that nuclear weapons only deter the use by
257
the opponent in a strategic context, day by day, NATO's depend-
ence on first use of nuclear fire is being weakened. The Euro-
strategic linkage, the life blood of the alliance — and I am not
saying that strategy can't be changed, but it hasn't been and I
know of no conversations being conducted to change it — is becom-
ing more hollow with the passing of every day.
That in itself does not argue against SALT II. What it does
suggest is that if SALT II is going to be a success over the long
term, it means that we are going to have to increase two facets of
the NATO alliance: its theater nuclear capability and its conven-
tional capability.
Various people have proposed in relation to SALT substantial
spending on arms. I know of no evidence where throwing money at
a problem is necessarily a solution. But there are some very hard
things we need to do. I would never tie it to SALT II specifically —
as an amendment or condition — but I think in the interest of the
people who are in favor of SALT, more resources, the right kinds of
resources, have to be spent to restabilize the European balance.
Otherwise, the treaty itself in the long run, assuming it passes
now, will be, in my opinion, in trouble.
Senator Zorinsky. Senator Hayakawa, have you any questions
you would like to ask?
Senator Hayakawa. I really don't, Mr. Chairman. I am simply
tr3dng to digest what you have said.
If I may summarize, you are saying that we have to consider the
strategic treaty relationship in full conjunction with the theater
relationships and relative strength of the theater; and since we are
very much weaker in the European theater, then what are the
consequences of that weakness insofar as the ratification of SALT
is concerned? That I didn't quite get clear.
Mr. Karber. If one did not ratify SALT, I think the potential for
Soviet malevolence to teach us a lesson could be quite high. And
perhaps it is a statement on the European perception of our leader-
ship or our own global military capability. But they could make
things quite rough for us. I know of no current NATO capability,
for example, if the access routes were closed to Berlin, to retrieve
them other than to politically make some concessions.
Senator Hayakawa. Our NATO allies, then, really want us very
much to ratify SALT?
EUROPEAN ATTITUDES
Mr. Karber. I spent a portion of the prepared statement, and I
apologize for not spending more time on it, tr)dng to address the
European attitudes. I have listened to previous testimony which
sounds like a game of "name your favorite European." People say,
I have talked to so-and-so and he is in favor or against and the
Government is in favor and so forth.
My experience is that there are many people in Europe who are
very much in favor of SALT. But having said that, I think we
ought to realize, and it doesn't necessarily argue against the SALT
Treaty, but we ought to realize why they are in favor of it.
I spent some time in the statement on this and maybe I can
recap it very quickly. I think one of the major reasons they place
such an emphasis on SALT and believe in it, is that every time
258
there has been a superpower confrontation, they feel caught in the
middle. And not only is their security directly threatened, but they
have no recourse or they feel they have no recourse to control the
events threatening their security. That is why they, far more than
we, I think, have embraced the concept of detente in a political
sense as opposed to a military power sense. They don't want to be
caught in more confrontations.
Second, however, and it almost produces a schizoid attitude, if I
can use the expression, they are desperately afraid of being left out
by the United States. And the French today are quite smug in
pointing out to other Europeans we told you so, DeGauUe was
right, the United States will go hand in hand with the Soviet
Union and slowly withdraw its protection from the alliance.
And those Europeans who are involved in defense planning, for
example, and one has to differentiate their private views and those
which they feel they have to support officially, repeatedly note a
high degree of concern about the need to continue the link between
the European balance and the strategic balance, and any percep-
tion that the strategic balance has become so stable that it is
unusable then is seen as dangerously eroding the European deter-
rent.
Now, in terms of SALT, if in fact the process of ratifying SALT
or the negotiated treaty leads to the suggestion that the strategic
balance is getting so stable we can no longer credibly threaten its
use, then we have a concomitant responsibility, if we want to save
the alliance, to start building up the other two elements of that
Triad, which are really quite weak right now.
OFFER OF EQUIVALENCE THROUGH SALT
Senator Hayakawa. Do you feel that the treaty does offer equiv-
alence?
Mr. Karber. There are several aspects of that, I think, and
again, to put it from a European perspective: One is the equiv-
alence of assured destruction. I think most Europeans believe that
once you have launched so many warheads, it really doesn't matter
very much. I haven't found too many of them who are willing to
get out their bomb damage calculator and run their equation and
say, oh, yes, the Warsaw Pact is ahead by so many.
So I think there is a point where they overdose on strategic
numbers and say, well, they sort of all equal each other out.
There is another aspect to it, and that is what might be called
the perceptual aspect. We all know it is relatively simple minded,
but when one reads in a newspaper that the Russians have x
number of warheads or x number of missiles and we have a coun-
tervailing number, it is very tempting for people to sort of say, oh,
who is on top today? Who is 10 feet high and who is 6 feet high?
I think there is a growing perception that the United States is
becoming less and less willing to risk its own survival for that of
the NATO alliance. I think that is not the only problem and that is
not the sole cause of potential European disenchantment over the
next several years, but it is certainly a key element.
The other has been a slow erosion in their faith in U.S. leader-
ship.
259
REASSURANCE TO EUROPEANS THROUGH SALT REJECTION
Senator Hayakawa. Would we reassure the Europeans in any
way if we were to reject SALT?
Mr. Karber. I am sorry, I did not hear the question?
Senator Hayakawa. Would it reassure the Europeans in any
way if we were to reject SALT, or would it reassure them if we
were to ratify it?
Mr. Karber. General Haig had an interesting comment before
this committee several weeks ago. I was talking to several Europe-
ans about his comment that they would be relieved if it were not
ratified and would hope that there would be a new breath of
American leadership.
The Europeans I have talked to — and, of course, everyone has
their favorite Europeans, so I claim no statistical significance — felt
generally that that was very unlikely. That if SALT were rejected,
they felt the administration would continue to observe it, and then
you would have sort of the worst of both worlds, from the Europe-
an perspective.
So I think they are very concerned that the rejection of SALT II
is, in a way, a rejection by the United States of its role as the
alliance's chief negotiator with the Soviet Union.
I think there is also a danger, in several of the major NATO
countries, some of the ones who contribute the most today to
NATO's defense, believe that there is a growing sentiment among
them that if the United States can't provide the negotiating leader-
ship, perhaps they should do it themselves.
In fact, I was told by one European parliamentarian that "maybe
it is time for us to pack the bags and go to Moscow and see what
kind of deal they will offer us. We are not going to give up the
farm, but maybe they will offer us a deal."
In West Germany today, it is no secret that one element of a
major political party believes very strongly that the Soviets would
like to have detente with them, a much more friendly relationship,
use German influence to help stabilize the East German regime,
and all they have to do is cooperate with the Soviet Union in the
international political sphere, be very cooperative on arms control,
be very cooperative in terms of economic relationships.
And that, I think, is endemic of what we are probably going to
see a lot more of unless the United States is willing to go back into
central Europe and play a significant role as a superpower.
It is interesting. The Soviet Army today represents over 50 per-
cent of the forces deployed in central Europe. The U.S. Army
represents less than 25 percent, and there is an asymmetry in
superpower presence there that cannot help but affect political
attitudes.
I think it is probably a legitimate point to say what does this
have to do with the SALT II Treaty? And I don't think it is a cop-
out to say the impact of these issues on SALT II Treaty is far less
in terms of whether the treaty is accepted or rejected than in
whether the treaty is a success or a failure over the long term.
260
EVIDENCE OF LEADERSHIP THROUGH RATIFICATION OF SALT
Senator Hayakawa. I want to get clear this one last question.
Would ratification of SALT assure Western Europe and the NATO
allies that we do maintain leadership? Can you simply say yes or
no?
Mr. Karber. No, and I don't think the reciprocal of that question
would be yes, either. In other words, I think whether SALT is
passed or rejected, I don't see it as being a major element in
Europeans saying, ah, yes, the United States has assumed leader-
ship again.
Senator Hayakawa. What I am trying to get is some sense of
what you are recommending £is a witness.
Mr. Karber. I guess what I am trying to get across is less a point
of whether the treaty should be ratified in terms of its specific
elements, because they are hard to forecast. In my testimony I talk
about some of the potential problems protocol could cause in our
European relations, but they are relatively minor.
They are relatively minor compared to the real question of
whether the treaty is going to be a success or not. And it is my
argument that the treaty is probably going to be a failure unless
we conduct a substantial buildup in American arms, coupling it
with very aggressive attempts at arms control in terms of central
Europe.
And if we don't do that and the treaty is accepted, then we, I
think, are buying a treaty that will over the long run be relatively
weak and we will be very sorry for it in terms of our relationship
with the NATO Alliance.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is more
than up.
Senator Zorinsky. Thank you.
Dr. Karber, the day of the vote on SALT, we get to say one of
two words, "aye" or "nay." And there is no "maybe" column. And
therefore, I am asking you: are you a proponent or an opponent of
SALT II?
Mr. Karber. It is time to vote?
Senator Zorinsky. I wish I could vote 60 percent "yes" and 40
percent "no." But unfortunately, I only get it one way or the other.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Karber. But everyone has to live with their vote or their
hypothetical vote.
Senator Zorinsky. I understand.
Mr. Karber. I will answer the question but there is an explana-
tion for it. If I were a U.S. Senator, which I am not, and if I felt
that there was support within the U.S. Congress to not only meet
the administration's request for the new NATO defense plans but
to really push forward and if I felt the kinds of recommendations
that had been placed by General Hollingsworth, and currently by
Ambassador Komer for the administration would receive full sup-
port in the Congress, then I would vote yes because I think over
the long term the treaty would have a chance of being a success.
If I felt the current trend of imbalance in Central Europe was
going to continue to slide and get us caught, then I think I would
have to vote "no." Is that too much of a cop-out?
261
Senator Zorinsky. No. I have done it myself. I S3mipathize with
^ou.
EQUALIZING ABILITY OF THE NEUTRON WARHEAD
You indicate that there is a disparity in NATO concerning, well,
ake the area of tanks. Certainly the Soviet Union is recognized as
laving far greater superiority in that area. Would the neutron
varhead be an equalizer of the numerical disparity numbers in
anks?
Mr. Karber. You know we are always talking about new technol-
>gy. The cruise missile is another one. But the neutron bomb is an
nteresting one as well. We are always talking about both of them
LS if that technology is solely possessed by us.
The current warheads for the nuclear artillery in NATO are so
•bsolete they are almost unusable. You take the warhead apart
ind you have 57 parts, and some tech sergeant is trying to put it
ogether in the mud. It is really quite incredible to try to effective-
y use them.
They are not ballistically matched to conventional shells, so you
ire and you don't know where it will land. We have problems with
ur current stockpile and I suggest they need to be improved. The
leutron bomb, the enhanced radiation warhead, coupled with other
heater nuclear modernizations, given the current balance, and if
he Warsaw Pact did not respond in kind, would have been a
ubstantial increase in the credibility of NATO's doctrine, even
uring conventional operations, because the opponent knowing
hat you have a usable tactical capability, cannot then afford to
lass against your conventional defenses, because you might use it
n him.
So it even increases the viability of your conventional defenses
efore nuclear weapons are used. If it is solely possessed! I am not
ure that the option of enhanced radiation warheads is solely ours.
EXISTENCE OF NATO IF SALT IS DEFEATED
Senator Zorinsky. Carrying that one step further then, if we
uilt more tanks we wouldn't be the only one to have tanks, so
herefore let's not build any more tanks because the Soviet Union
an build tanks. But the point I am making is it is an offset to the
umbers of tanks.
Any military commander I have ever talked to, including Gener-
1 Haig, has admitted to that. So therefore, I ask you why won't
hese NATO nations looking to us for leadership allow us to deploy
eutron warheads? If they are the ones who indicate we are not
iving them that leadership, why not accept our attempt to equal-
le an equation on their behalf?
And certainly I think the leadership in this country got a bum
ap when they held up production. The reason production was held
p was the inability of our nation to deploy this type of equipment
1 the very countries that are seeking leadership from us to equal-
se the equation.
It doesn't stop there. We have offered the deutschmark the lead
s the monetary value of the world. They say, oh, no, strengthen
262
the dollar, we don't want any part of putting our deutschmark out
there to assume the financial leadership in this world.
Everybody looks for leadership to this country but everyone
wants to cop out when the time comes to put their neck out where
the United States neck is. And the point I am trying to make is
what do you suggest in the way of getting an affirmative answer
from the participants in NATO to allow us to exert that leader-
ship? And if we don't, do you think that without the ratification of
SALT II, that NATO as we know it today would continue to exist?
EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Mr. Karber. I was asked to testify before the Dutch Parliament
not too long after the neutron bomb embroglio, and I had an
opportunity to talk to a lot of the members and find out what it
was that bothered them. Put yourself in their shoes. They were
being asked, essentially, to fight what they perceived as a tactical
nuclear war in their backyard.
Sitting here in Washington, it is like using nuclear weapons out
on the beltway. And they were willing to do that. But they didn't
want to do it for a long time, and they didn't want to do it all
across the breadth of Central Europe. So they said what is the next
step? Are you expecting us to fight this tactical nuclear campaign
solely within Europe?
When do we stop targeting Eastern Europe, because while the
majority of NATO's current tactical and theater and nuclear sys-
tems can only reach Eastern Europe, the Eastern Europeans are
not the ones who have initiated aggression or who have a nuclear
striking ability in Europe. It is the Soviet Union.
And, most significantly our allies asked — what is the likelihood
the U.S. will go after the guy who really perpetrated this? When do
we start targeting the Soviet Union? And the conclusion they came
to after participating in numerous NATO exercises and watching
the extreme hesitance of many Americans in even planning go to
that step was that the credibility of our willingness to back them
up by putting our cities on the line like we were asking them to do
was not there.
Quite frankly
Senator Zorinsky. Are they so naive that they don't think our
cities are targeted from the Soviet Union and that we haven't
targeted Soviet cities?
Mr. Karber. No, not at all. The point they make is — that is, is
one thing to be on a target list, and it is something else, knowing
your cities are on a target list, to start firing at the other super-
power. They found they were being asked to fight a nuclear cam-
paign essentially in their backyard in their countryside when it
wasn't even clear that warheads were going to be used against
tank armies moving through Eastern Europe, let alone major as-
sembly points, let alone the SS-4's and SS-5's stationed in western
U.S.S.R. or against Soviet air bases in Russia.
They were very, very concerned that as a result of the American
preoccupation with strategic stability, we had essentially given
away our commitment to them that we will share vulnerability.
We were asking them to carry a higher vulnerability ratio in the
263
conduct of an actual campaign as opposed to being on a peacetime
target list than we were willing to bear.
I am not saying that is the truth. I am saying that is a percep-
tion which I think is growing throughout much of Central Europe.
And the day, and I don't think it will be that far away — that is a
personal opinion — the day that this perception becomes wide-
spread, we will not have much of an alliance any more.
ABILITY OF NATO TO EQUALIZE EQUATION WITH U.S.S.R.
Senator Zorinsky. Do you feel, then, without the ratification of
SALT II, that NATO can still proceed to equalize the equation with
the Soviet Union?
Mr. Karber. It is doubtful. As I said, I don't consider myself an
expert in the strategic side as in the amount of time I have spent
in Europe. But if one looks at it, the Soviet momentum gained in
strategic weapons is substantial. I don't think it is within our
capacity, at least in terms of a first strike capacity, to recoup any
meaningful sense of superiority. There are technologies one could
try to employ to reduce one's vulnerability, the ABM, for example,
but they are of questionable total utility.
One of the advantages is they tend to create a higher ambiguity
so it allows you to have some flexibility in at least selecting a
target.
Senator Zorinsky. Mr. Karber, you are saying then, in conclu-
sion, your advice to me as a Senator and to other Senators is if we
see a commitment by the leadership to future equalization of our
capabilities with those of the Soviet Union in the area of offensive
and defensive weapons, to vote for SALT; and if not, to vote against
SALT?
Dr. Karber. That would be my personal criteria, yes, sir.
Senator Zorinsky. And how, in your estimation, would I be able
to bind a future administration to what this administration says it
would do to equalize that equation, or even the Congress in which I
serve?
Mr. Karber. Obviously, you cannot bind another administration
or the U.S. Congress. I think, though, you can establish a sense, not
a formal sense of the Congress, but a sense that something needs to
be done.
Senator Zorinsky. Like we did under SALT I and with the B-1
bomber and the Trident, all of those things we talked about?
Mr. Karber. I think there was a difference there, if I might
respond to that. I don't think we said what we wanted to do. It
wasn't really clear why we wanted those systems. In other words,
they were more systems, they were modern systems. Yes, the
others were antiquated, but we didn't really get specific and say
here is how the B-1 contributes to our defense. And this is why the
B-1 and not a B-52 with cruise missiles is so important.
Senator Zorinsky. I was mayor of Omaha, Nebraska then, and
SAC headquarters is located there and they knew what they
wanted the B-1 for. They knew exactly what they wanted it for.
They laid out and stated what they wanted it for.
Mr. Karber. I am not sure it was conveyed to the people who
made decisions. It is interesting. If one looks, for example, at the
way most weapons bills are handled here in the Congress, there is
264
relatively little emphasis on the mission and how it fits into the
actual force structure and doctrine of use.
It tends to be what kinds of tradeoffs can we make with this
versus another one. It is frequently a very simplistic cost-effective-
ness tradeoff. We do very little what one might call — planning for
a strategy of long term competition — laying out what it is you are
trying to do and then establishing a force optimized to meet those
objectives. We tend to talk in sort of vague generalities of a Triad,
and so forth. We don't really get down and say what specifically is
a B-1 supposed to do or an aircraft like it.
So it is very easy then to give them up and trade them off.
Senator Zorinsky. Thank you very much, Mr. Karber, for taking
your time to be with us. And on behalf of the rest of the commit-
tee. Senator Javits and Senator Hayakawa specifically, I would like
to thank you for your presence and your astute observations.
Thank you for being here.
[Mr. Karber's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Phillip A. Karber
SALT II AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I would like to thank you for the
honor of testifying. The focus of my remarks will be addressed to the relationship
between SALT on the one hand and European security and the security of the
NATO alliance on the other. This is the subject I was asked to address and the area
where I have spent most of my professional time. In my prepared opening remarks I
have not recommended either the rejection or acceptance of this treaty, its protocol,
or any recommended amendments. If you would like my views on this, I would be
glad to give them, but, I would like to make it clear that they are my personal
opinion and not based on professional expertise.
There are four major points which I would like to make:
1. European security is intimately and inextricably linked to the strategic balance
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union by history, alliance politics, current military
strategy and public perception. Any discussion of a strategic arms limitations agree-
ment which does not take into consideration the potential impact on European
security, even though subtle and implicit, may produce disastrous political conse-
quences.
2. NATO's current strategy, the doctrine of flexible response, is directly depend-
ent on the use of nuclear weapons by the United States in the event that NATO
conventional defenses cannot hold against a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact attack. Since
the beginning of the SALT negotiations over a decade ago, the conventional military
balance in central Europe has eroded significantly, creating a potentially unstable
correlation of forces and making NATO more dependent than ever on the first use
of nuclear weapons. Yet NATO's once clear superiority in tactical and theater
nuclear weapons has declined to the point that when considered with the ratifica-
tion of parity under SALT, the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent has
become in danger of being decoupled from Europe.
3. There has been considerable discussion before this committee with respect to
European attitudes toward SALT II. I believe it is fair to say that the NATO allies
generally support detente and simultaneously have deep concerns about its long-
term consequences. 'This apparent contradiction is more understandable, if more
complex, when one looks at it from a European perspective.
4. Failure to ratify the SALT Treaty expeditiously may produce reactions within
the NATO alliance and by the Soviet Union which could have seriously destabiliz-
ing consequences for European security. It is perhaps unfortunate that the negotiat-
ed treaty— admittedly less than perfect— threatens such dire consequences to which
both the proponents and opposition should give careful consideration.
I. THE EURO-STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP
There has been a growing tendency in the United States, reinforced in each
succeeding discussion of SALT, to divorce the strategic United States /Soviet balance
from considerations of European security. There is a certain logic for doing this.
Soviet strategic nuclear weapons pose a direct threat to the survival of the United
265
States and it makes sense to reduce these weapons via arms control. That is, the
most obvious threat must be addressed first. Second, the complexities involved in
defining weapon systems and placing restrictive parameters on their quantity and
technical specifications is difficult enough with strategic weapons, without adding
the ambiguities inherent in so many of the "gray area" systems (e.g. multiple
mission profiles, rapid redeployable mobility, and employment contingencies). Third,
recent experience has shown that there is a much higher probability of success in
bilateral arms control negotiations than when many states are involved each with
differing preceptions, strengths and security requirements.
Nevertheless, having recognized that a dyadic relationship between the United
States and Soviet Union is important and deserving of special attention, we should
also realize that it is an arbitrary, indeed false duality. Europe is intimately and
irrevocably tied to the strategic balance between the superpowers. This, as I noted,
is a product of history, alliance strategy, Soviet force posture, current NATO doc-
trine and the political requirements of our closest allies.
History may be prologue, but it is seldom predictive. And thus, it is quite specious
to claim that what has been, will be. Nevertheless, the United States, the Soviet
Union and our European allies are, to a great extent, products of our past experi-
ence, and that experience shows a very clear interrelationship between the U.S.
strategic deterrent posture and our commitment to Europe. It is interesting to note
that the U.S. signed the NATO Treaty and deployed the Seventh Army in Europe to
back it up, before we possessed a significant strategic nuclear force, before we
adopted a doctrine of massive retaliation, and before the continental United States
was vulnerable to Soviet retaliation. Indeed, it was the perceived Soviet threat to
Europe and the inability of the West to match with conventional forces, which led
us to attempt to redress the conventional imbalance by depending upon our strate-
gic forces. Thus, it is fair to say that not only did NATO antedate our strategic
posture, but necessitated it. Moreover, throughout the 1950's the United States used
Eurpoean territory in order to deploy much of our strategic force capability.
Since the Soviet Union could not match our advantage, indeed superiority, in
their own overseas deployment, they concentrated on a major build-up of European
oriented strategic forces (medium bombers and MR/IRBMs). In essence, the Soviets
held the European NATO member nations as hostages to the American strategic
deterrent that was there to protect them. Furthermore, the leadership of the Soviet
Union showed no reticence in making this unambiguously obvious. There has been
considerable discussion about Soviet military doctrine with respect to whether it is
oriented to war-fighting as opposed to retalitory deterrence. The evidence is unambi-
guously clear that whUe they do not relish the prospect of a major conflict, either
conventional or nuclear, should such a war occur, it would be waged to achieve
definite political /military objectives, one of which being the destruction of NATO's
military capabilities through offensive action. Likewise, the evidence equally demon-
strates that the Soviets believe that the most likely route to a strategic nuclear
change is via a European connection. If they perceive the highest proximity between
European security and strategic stability, we cannot afford to do anything less.
Most of the political upheavals within the Atlantic Alliance have been as a result
of U.S. attempts to cope with our growing vulnerability to Soviet nuclear strikes.
Thus the withdrawal of France from military cooperation with NATO was a direct
product of U.S. reluctance to share authority over nuclear weapon emplojmient with
our allies, when we expected them to share the consequences. The imbroglios over
the Multi-Lateral Force, the cancellation of Skybolt, and even the fallout from the
neutron bomb decision were clearly exacerbated, if not caused, by U.S. insensitivity
to legitimate allied security concerns. NATO's current doctrine of flexible response,
promulgated by the U.S. at a time when we had clear strategic superiority, was
predicted on the unambiguous and deliberate commitment of U.S. strategy nuclear
power to NATO's security. The U.S. has repeatedly emphasized this coupling
through such actions as: deploying large quantities of tactical nuclear weapons and
delivery systems to our European allies (albeit under U.S. control); formally dedicat-
ing strategic nuclear delivery systems to NATO; and announcing a selective Europe-
an-oriented targeting doctrine for the U.S. ICBMs.
The point is that the U.S. Government, through successive administrations includ-
ing the current one, has drawn a direct and purposeful linkage between NATO
security and the U.S. strategic forces. It is we who have repeatedly asked them to
accept that linkage and we should not think anything less of them now or in the
future for taking us at our word. Our European allies cast their future with ours,
not because they had no other option nor because they were coerced, but because
they had an honest faith that the United States had irretrievably cast its fate with
them. They believed and continue to believe that we define their existence as co-
terminous with ours, that we are consciously willing to share the threat of nuclear
266
annihilation equally. Any negotiations that the United States conducts with the
Soviet Union which have the appearance — let alone the reality — of implicit hedging
of this EURO-Strategic linkage requires the most deliberate consideration. If we
decide to alter our commitment, we, at a minimum, owe our NATO allies an
explanation before, not after the fact.
In no way, however, does this suggest that the intent of the current SALT II
Treaty or those who negotiated it, at least from the American side, was to weaken
the linkage of U.S. strategic forces to our NATO commitment. In fact, from personal
observation, I believe that those representing this administration have as strong a
desire to maintain that linksige as any who have preceded them. Nevertheless,
appearances are not always the product of conscious decisions. Strategic nuclear
parity reduces the credibility of U.S. strategic first use against the Soviet Union.
Suicide is not a credible means of demonstrating one's feality to a friend. To the
extent that a SALT agreement codifies strategic parity, it gives a global recognition
to the illogic of strategic first use. This is compounded if the targets of such strikes
are the opponent's civilian population centers, due to limitations in the survivabil-
ity, penetrability, and/or sufficient quantity of systems. It is magnified even more,
if, as a result of either unilateral inhibitions or the provisions of a treaty, there is
an appearance of asymmetrical parity — that is, if our side is notably weaker in the
typical measures of a strategic equality: throw-weight, delivery vehicles, equivalent
megatonage, warheads. It is unfortunate, although undoubtably necessary, that the
expressions of "Angst" over U.S. nuclear viability produced by the current strategic
debate does not help in giving the appearance of credibility to our European allies.
If the United States has no intention of weakening the linkage, it is less than
obvious that the Soviets share that same motivation. In fact, the politics that they
have played in the SALT negotiations and other arms control forums (the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and MBFR negotiations), coupled with their theater force
deployment and modernization, suggest just the opposite. The Soviet Union appar-
ently considers it most fortuitous to sever the U.S. EURO-strategic relationship by
simultaneously trying to reduce: (1) the linkage between NATO's conventional de-
fense and its escalatory first use of tactical weapons; and (2) the European theater
nuclear forces linkage with U.S. strategic strike systems. One does not have to
manufacture a myth of Soviet malevolence to suggest that since the mid-1950's, they
have considered that the de-coupling of Europe from their American strategic
deterrent is in their highest political self-interest and is a major policy objective.
Recognizing that the Soviets have considerable self-interest in producing such a
decoupling does not mean that we cannot negotiate meaningful strategic arms
agreements which are mutually satisfying. It does suggest, however, that if as the
consequence of a strategic arms limitations agreement the linkage of the American
deterrent to Europe should come into question, we should not optimistically expect
the Soviets to come to our rescue. In fact, we should realistically anticipate that
they will try and make the most political capital, should our strategic currency be
devalued.
II. NATO STRATEGY AND THE EUROPEAN ARMS RACE
In 1967, NATO formally adopted the strategy of flexible response. This strategy,
frequently cited but seldom discussed in depth, specified three sequential but co-
equal defense requirements necessary to deter, with a sufficient level of confidence,
any Soviet-led Warsaw Pact attack on NATO's territory. The first of these require-
ments was Direct Defense, which called for the maintenance of adequate ground, air
and naval forces in a high state of peacetime readiness to meet any likely contin-
gency. Although there was a recognition that defensive nuclear weapons employ-
ment on or over NATO territory might be necessary during Direct Defense, the
primary emphasis was on having sufficient conventional forces to meet a major
Warsaw Pact attack. And, if unable to defeat a massive attack, then at least be able
to hold it at bay for a considerable period of time, while defending as far forward as
possible, so as to provide adequate time to determine the optimum level of response
for the later doctrinal phases.
The second phase of flexible response was Deliberate Escalation; clearly intended
to symbolize, by a nuclear strike on Warsaw Pact territory, the seriousness with
which NATO viewed the aggression. The scope, magnitude and duration of the
Deliberate Escalation phase has never been explicitly defined. Rather NATO de-
fense planners have assumed that by keeping it ambiguous, Soviet military and
political elites will be uncertain as to its application, and thus be deterred by this
uncertainty. There was also the implicit assumption that Deliberate Escalation is
unlikely to be exercised until the prospect of the collapse of NATO's conventional
defense and or the loss of sufficient territory is imminent.
267
Quite clearly the Deliberate Escalation phase was conceived as a transitory pause,
after which, should the situation continue to deteriorate, NATO would initiate a
General Nuclear Response. This large-scale nuclear strike would not only be deliv-
ered against Eastern Europe but also against critical military targets in the USSR
as far as the Urals. A major element in NATO's General Nuclear Response would
be U.S. strategic forces and the implementation of this phase could either precede
or be exercised simultaneously with the unleashing of U.S. SIOP.
These three phases remain current NATO strategy. However, events over the
intervening period may call into question the viability of some, perhaps all, of these
three elements. Shortly after the adoption of flexible response, the NATO leader-
ship recognized that arms control and force reduction could enhance the viability of
its flexible response strategy. It was assumed that a reduction of forces to a more
balanced position would not only increase the stability of the European balance but
would perhaps even favor NATO, given the West's substantial qualitative superior-
ity in conventional weapons technology. Thus, after repeated invitations, the
Warsaw Pact joined with NATO in 1972 in the MBFR talks. To date, although there
is increased speculation that the positions of the two sides are getting closer, there
has been no formal agreement.
Unfortunately, many of the assumptions upon which NATO's Flexible Response
strategy were initially premised have been undermined. The Soviets have not been
content with the balances that have existed in 1967 but rather have undertaken a
major arms build-up opposite NATO in Central Europe. The clear qualitative superi-
ority of NATO in conventional weapons technology has been nullified by the exten-
sive modernization of Soviet forces and the overall quantitative increase in the
threat. What could have been characterized as a fairly stable balance in which
neither side had any incentive to undertake rash actions, has now become highly
unstable. A Soviet-led attack, even with relatively small East European participa-
tion, would enjoy major advantages if launched with minimum preparation (and
thus warning) while NATO's conventional defenses are still in the process of mobili-
zation and forward deployment.
By striking before NATO's defenses are fully prepared, there is even the prospect
that the survivability of NATO nuclear forces could be so seriously degraded, its air
base and command and control elements so greatly disrupted, and ground defenses
so rapidly and deeply penetrated and overrun, that NATO's Deliberated Escalation
policy would be in large measure irrelevant. The accompanying charts, utilizing the
same definitions of units and geography that are under consideration in the MBFR
negotiations, graphically illustrate to the extent to which the arms race in Central
Europe has been one sided— a race that NATO is clearly losing. Figure 1 shows the
geographical area and forces involved in the MBFR discussions.
It is interesting to note that since the inception of the SALT negotiations, the
Warsaw Pact has introduced nearly 12,000 major combatant weapons into Central
Europe. These are given for major weapon categories in Figure 2. In almost every
major weapons category where they had a lead they have increased it. In most areas
where the Soviets were behind (mostly notably in SAMS and antitank guided
missiles), they have since taken the lead.
In terms of the quality of conventional weapons, in many areas the Soviets have
not only caught up but surpassed NATO's deployment of new technology. For
example, Soviet forces in Eastern Europe today have a greater quantity of new
tanks— the T-64— than NATO will have Leopard II and XM-1 tanks in 1983. Like-
wise, the number of Soviet BMP's (infantry fighting vehicles) in Central Europe
today exceeds the counterpart systems that NATO will have in the mid 80s. This is
also true in the areas of surface-to-air missiles and self-propelled, radar directed, air
defense guns. Where NATO had a clear lead in self-propelled artillery this is being
matched by the extensive deployment throughout the Warsaw Pact of new Soviet
designed self-propelled systems which are at least the equal of NATO deployed
artillery weapons. Where in 1970 it could be rightly claimed that the quality of
NATO aircraft more than compensated for their quantitative inferiority, the rapid
and extensive modernization of Soviet frontal aviation in Central Europe clearly
opens to question the long held premise of NATO air superiority over the battle-
field. (It should be noted that Soviet frontal aviation in Central Europe by itself is
equal to the total number of available NATO aircraft, with Soviet aircraft payloads
in addition being doubled.)
48-?Rn 0-79 Pt.U - 18
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270
There is no more persistent myth than the repeated claim that NATO's superior-
ity in the number and quahty of its antitank weapons makes up for its quantitative
inferiority in tanks. This misconception, which started in the late 1960s, has persist-
ed with such resiliance that I hope you will forgive a short digression aimed at
putting this falsehood to rest. NATO has never had a sufficient enough quantity of
antitank weapons (either antitank guided missiles, antitank guns or antitank gre-
nade launchers) to offset its noticible lack of tanks. Today NATO faces in Central
Europe over 36,000 Soviet and Warsaw Pact armored vehicles (16,000 tanks, and
over 20,000 APC's, light tanks and armored reconnaissance vehicles). As the defend-
er, NATO's tank and antitank crews cannot afford to concentrate solely on the
opposing tanks while having their positions overrun by the other armored vehicles.
To oppose this array of Warsaw Pact armor, NATO has a total of 6,000 tanks,
approximately 4,000 antitank guided missile launchers, and no more than 2,000
light tanks and antitank guns. While many exaggerated claims have been made for
the antitank guided missile, the combined effect of its deficiencies to include low
rate of fire, terrain limitations in Europe which preclude its maximum range of
effectiveness, the lack of armored protection or tactical mobility for its crews, and
the fact that the high theoretical accuracy of these systems is degraded by two
thirds due to the finanical limitations on training, all contribute to minimizing the
impact of these weapons. Moreover while NATO had a clear advantage in guidance
technology this has been lost with the introduction of second and even third genera-
tion guidance for Warsaw Pact ATGMs. It should be pointed out that today the
Warsaw Pact has more antitank guided missile launchers deployed in Central
Europe than does NATO, and over 80 percent of these are mounted on armored
vehicles providing protection and tactical mobility to the crews. This is in compari-
son to only 40 percent for NATO.
In other areas NATO has not been able to exploit its supposed technological lead
in weaponry. One looks in vain for precision delivered air munitions (such as
Maverick) in the air forces of our European allies: their high cost, limited utility in
European weather, and operational problems having been a disincentive for our
allies. NATO has placed heavy emphasis on the use of the armed helicopter
equipped with antitank weapons, but the numbers deployed or programmed are
pathetically small in comparison to the quantities of armor they face and the
density of the opposing air defenses. In fact, the Warsaw Pact has nearly matched
NATO's deployment of armed helicopter; their MI-24 Hind helicopter equaling the
best that NATO has available. The U.S. Army has been intensely developing a long-
range multiple rocket launcher (called GSRS) for dispensing antitank mines de-
signed to impede the rapid advance of second echelon armored formations. It is
depressing to consider that this system, which is scheduled to be available in the
mid 1980's, already has a counterpart deployed today with Soviet Ground Forces.
Thus, NATO has lost the quantitative race and is rapidly falling behind in the
qualitative aspects as well. If an MBFR agreement had been reached early on, quite
clearly the conventional threat would be far less. In fact the Soviets have intro-
duced more combat equipment into Central Europe since 1973 than the current
MBFR proposals would require them to remove. Perhaps we were overly ambitious
in attempting scaled reductions when a simple ceiling or qualitative moderization
sub-ceiling would have helped considerably. On the other hand, no one predicted
such a massive expansion and modernization build-up when MBFR started.
The erosion of NATO's relative conventional capability to conduct a Direct De-
fense, coupled with a decline in its force readiness due to the high cost of modern-
ization, also impacts negatively on the Alliance's ability to provide sufficient time
for a well planned and conscious exercise of Deliberate Escalation. Moreover
NATO's clear superiority in tactical nuclear weapons has been substantially degrad-
ed by a series of Warsaw Pact actions. They have a substantial lead in the surviva-
bility of their tactical air bases and the command/control structure. Extensive
modernization of Soviet Frontal Aviation gives it a battlefield and interdiction dual
capability almost double what it had a few years ago. The extensive quantities of
chemical warheads, and delivery systems and protective measures of the Warsaw
Pact have no equal within NATO. And should they be used either prior to or
simultaneously with tactical nuclear weapons, NATO's ground and air capabilities
could be decisively impared within a few hours. This is not to mention Soviet
doctrine, which clearly calls for the purposeful degradation of NATO's nuclear
capability and command survivability during the conventional phase of battle. Nor
does it include the clear escalatory dominance in Soviet long-range, theater-oriented
bombers and MR/IRBM systems deployed in the Western USSR sanctuary — this
being an effective staging area for launching strikes against NATO's land based
delivery systems.
271
The point is that the conventional and theater nuclear legs of the NATO "triad"
are in bad shape and seem to get worse with the passing of each year. This would
not be so destabilizing if the U.S. had still clear strategic superiority. Those days,
however, are long gone and while we can bemoan their passing a dependance on
U.S. strategic forces to make up for NATO's inadequacy in conventional and theater
nuclear weapons makes the implementation of current NATO strategy an exercise
in Nihilism.
III. EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD SALT II
There has been considerable discussion before this committee with respect to the
European attitude toward SALT II. Some suggest that they wholeheartedly endorse
it while others, citing unnamed sources, suggest that the Europeans haroor grave
misgivings. While there appears to be an apparent contradiction between these two
perspectives, the reality seems more complex and perhaps these views are even
complementary.
Before addressing this question, however, several points are worth noting. First,
there is no single integrated European perspective on SALT II or an3^hing else for
that matter. There are considerable differences between political parties, within
governments and between the NATO members states themselves. If we are willing
to except the ambivalence of a strategic debate in this country with all its varying
nuances and shades of perceptions, we should expect no more certitude from our
allies.
Secondly, I have noticed from personal experience a considerable difference be-
tween official utterances in public forums, and the personal convictions conveyed in
privacy by the same people. This is neither duplicity nor lack of courage on their
parts. Most, by definition, are "influential" Europeans tending to be officials in
their respective governments and feel that they have an obligation to support the
official position. They are sufficiently sophisticated to be able to differentiate per-
sonal opinion from their official responsibility. This is no different than what
happens daily in the United States. There is also a deep-rooted deference to the
NATO alliance and very few individuals feel that it is worth undermining a jointly
agreed position or appearing to contradict what the United States, as the leader of
the alliance, has made a cornerstone of its foreign policy.
Thirdly, no American can or should presume ' to speak for" the Europeans. All
too often the United States has treated our allies with condescension rather than
understanding, management instead of maturity. European governmental leaders
have minds of their own, and, if they have decided to support SALT II it should be
taken as a given government's position. I know of no case where any government
has been coerced by the U.S. administration into an endorsement of SAL'T II. In
fact — and just to the contrary — I have been told repeatedly by Europeans at many
different levels how much they appreciate the extent to which this administration,
far more than its predecessors, has kept them informed on the developments in
SALT II and listened with open ears to their views and concerns, even if they were
not reflected in the final treaty.
Having registered these caveats, I would like to try and explain the apparent
ambivalence that I believe many Europeans feel toward SALT II. As a whole they
are far more committed to detente as a long term political process than we in the
United States. There is a good reason for this. They have to live on the same
continent as the Soviet Union, an environment which could place them directly in
the middle of a superpower confrontation. It simultaneously heightens their anxi-
eties with respect to their own security and yet gives them a feeling of impotence at
not being able to control or even significantly influence actions which may have
dire consequences for them. At the same time the Europeans realize that to a great
extent they have been left out of the bilateral SALT negotiations. And they have
watched from the sidelines as each successive negotiation has involved itself more
and more with that part of the strategic balance that relates to them. Thus the
ABM Treaty only affected Europe tangentially in that it highlighted U.S. accept-
ance of shared vulnerability with them and the Soviet Union. In the interim
agreement, the Soviets unilaterally interpreted the U.S. SLBM limitations as includ-
ing French and British systems. While this did not have any effect on their pro-
grammed forces, no one likes to have someone else to take it upon themselves to
negotiate for them. This was more than compensated for by the onset of superpower
agreement and the effervescent euphoria of detente. The Vladivostok Accord im-
pacted more directly in that it appeared to codify a strategic assymetry even if the
net affect was parity.
SALT II has increased their direct interest not only because the protocol affects
systems which they may receive and calls for even further discussions in their area
under SALT III but, as a result of U.S. policy they were briefed extensively on its
272
developments and watched from the sidelines as the Backfire bomber slipped
through the cracks. We should thus expect that in the future our NATO allies,
having tasted the semblance of participation, will expect a greater amount of
influence in the outcome of strategic negotiations.
The greater the apprehension in the United States over the credibility of the
linkage between our strategic systems and our commitment to European security,
the greater will be European desire to actively participate. The key to the long-term
success in this process is U.S. leadership in demonstrating that we know where we
are going, that we still hold a shared destiny, and that the United States is willing
to cooperate as well as consult.
Our European allies have consistently followed our lead. When the U.S. ignored
European defense during our preoccupation with Southeast Asia they followed suit
with unilateral manpower reductions and force economizing measures. Now that
the U.S. has "rediscovered Europe" our European allies have certainly kept up their
end of the bargain. In fact, to the extent that NATO forces in Central Europe have
increased at all during the last decade it has been primarily due to the European
contribution rather than that of the U.S.
There is no greater injustice done to our European allies than the claim that they
are unwilling to provide for their own defense. They realize that there is a growing
conventional imbalance and that something needs to be done with respect to
NATO's theater nuclear modernization although they are far less certain with
respect to what is the right course in the latter area.
They are not blind. Increasingly West Europeans realize that the credibility of
NATO's first use of nuclear weapons, the fundamental cornerstone of alliance
strategy and the critical link to the U.S. strategic deterrent is becoming less credi-
ble. Moreover there is increasing concern in the more informed circles (particularly
the military) that the option for first use is not NATO's alone, and that the growing
Soviet theater nuclear capability requires some point of modernization of NATO's
systems if nothing more than to insure their survival as a deterrent to preemption.
IV. SALT II RATIFICATION AND ALUANCE INSTABIUTY
Whether or not the SALT II Treaty is ratified or rejected, it is my opinion there is
a significant chance for instability within the alliance. This does not mean that the
resultant perturbations would be the same or the consequences symmetrical. Never-
theless, the significances of these potential instabilities ought to be given consider-
able attention. If the treaty is ratified we should be aware of the potential dangers
posed by: (1) the inhibiting potential for TNF moderation following the inclusion of
cruise missile range limitations in the protocol; and (2) the transference of super-
power confrontations in the third world to a crisis in Europe. If the treaty is
rejected the Soviet ability to teach us a lesson and the potential anxiety wathin the
NATO alliance should not be minimized.
A potential problem inherent in the passage of SALT II is the political effect in
Europe of the inclusion of cruise missile range limitations in the protocol. Recogniz-
ing that an amendment to the SALT II Treaty may specify to the Soviets that the
extention of these limitations is unlikely short of major arms control agreements
dealing with theater oriented systems, nevertheless the mere fact that these sys-
tems are covered under the treaty may mean that some European governments
could have difficulty convincing their electorates that they should commit them-
selves to a nuclear modernization program, parts of which are banned for the
present. For those who witnessed the Soviet propaganda campaign directed at
Europe on the possible deployment of the neutron bomb this raises the spectre of a
fertile area for similar efforts with even more devisive effects upon the NATO TNF
modernization program in particular.
There has been considerable discussion before this committee with respect to
Soviet adventurism in the Third World, and its "linkage" to the Treaty. I personally
find this argument more convincing in a debate over detente foreign policy rather
than in terms of the specifics of SALT II. There is an element here which could
have an adverse effect on our European allies. If the Treaty is passed and such
adventurism continues in the absence of an effective U.S. repoiste the tendancy in
Europe to identify strategic parity with the loss of United States will, could lead to
the unwarranted extrapolation that the Euro-Strategic relationship is also in doubt.
The stability of the European balance is not unrelated to events in the Third World.
If we and the Soviet Union should come into confrontation there is a distinct
potential that this "macho" political posturing may be transferred to calls for
increased readiness of the forces in Europe, the only place where units of two
superpowers are currently in direct opposition. This could result in a breakdown of
the very detente environment which the Europeans depend upon so heavily. Thus is
273
we do not deal with Soviet adventurism now in SALT the U.S. had better do it soon
before it is too late and the reverberations are bouncing off European capitals.
Far more likely is a negative reaction that the rejection of SALT ratification
could have on the European alliance at least initially. The Soviet military capability
and political capacity to "teach us a lesson" has in my opinion received far too little
attention to date. If SALT II is spurned, there is n my opinion no small likelihood
that the Soviet Union would take this as a national insult and it is no great
inferential leap from there to a coordinated political/military strategy that is de-
signed to demonstrate that the global correlation of forces has changed. To be quite
frank, the United States and NATO have many areas of potential politico-military
vulnerabilities in which the Soviets could apply substantial pressure with minimal
risk. At least the option of terminating the crisis would be theirs with the escala-
tory onus on the West. To name only one, it is difficult to conceive how the West
would be able to achieve a favorable accommodation should the Soviets exercise a
contingency to enforce East German sovereignty over Berlin. If the land and air
routes were closed I can conceive of no readily available means given the current
imbalance of forces in Central Europe to reopen them short of a political concession.
By such action this or other less dramatic actions the Soviets could not only
demonstrate to us that they are not to be trifled with but also bring out the most
latent tensions inherent in the NATO alliance structure.
The same divisive effect could be achieved, albeit less dramatically, by a misbegot-
ten attempt to accelerate "the internal contradictions of capitalist strategy" by
increasing Soviet theater nuclear capability. It would not surprise me to find that
within the next several years that the Soviets have introduced a whole new genera-
tion of tactical rockets and missiles (to replace or augment Frog, Scud, and Scale-
board) into their forces located in Central Europe.
Over the last several years the Soviets have been deploying considerable quanti-
ties of the self-propelled 152mm artillery systems. There has been increasing specu-
lation in Europe that these weapon systems are capable of firing a low yield tactical
nuclear device and that warheads may be soon deployed. If such an eventuality
occurs it will erase the last semblance of NATO tactical nuclear superiority repre-
sented by the current 155mm and 203mm artillery systems. NATO has long as-
sumed that nuclear artillery provided a substantial advantage to the defense which,
because of its accuracy, response time, and direct battlefield impact serves as an
inhibitant to the attackers massing of armor. However, when both sides have
nuclear artillery of comparable range and warhead size, it is far from self evident
that mutual possession inherently favors the defense.
If the Soviet artillery systems are equipped with a nuclear capability it would not
be out of the question for us to "discover" sometime in the 1980s that these
warheads have an enhanced radiation (ER) effect— a Soviet neutron bomb. Contrary
to many statements that were made during the recent Western neutron debate, low
yield accurate artillery delivered munitions with an ER capability are likely to aid
the attacker more than the defender because it is the latter's infantry, deployed on
the ground in relatively static and open positions who are far more vulnerable than
fast moving armored columns. Needless to say that the political reaction in Europe
accompanying such a "discovery" would create considerable public pressure for a
mutual cessation of TNF modernization and possibly a no first use agreement.
Many in the West are acting as if cruise missile technology were beyond the
reach of Soviet science. It is only a matter of time and resource commitment. They
could appear in much larger quantities and much quicker than we expect. The short
ranges to NATO targets, their high vulnerability, and the great number of Soviet
medium bombers, a Soviet theater oriented ALCM could significantly tip the TNF
balance scales with a far less sophisticated technology.
These speculations could certainly be characterized as alarmist and I am not
predicting them. On the other hand the Soviets may not wait for NATOs TNF
modernization to mature or for the United States to regain strategic ascendence. Of
course, there is nothing in SALT II that would prevent Soviet TNF "posturing"
either except their desire to keep the treaty in force.
Less dramatic but no less significant, even in the absence of Soviet actions (other
than verbal abuse) following the rejection of SALT II, would be the negative impact
on allied politics. Having committed themselves to favoring the treaty its rejection
could lead to the most devisive tendencies. While some would hope that rejection
would lead to a new vigor in U.S. world leadership, others would see it as a symbolic
proof of American administrative division and impotence. In the rejection of SALT
II, there are those in Europe, and their numbers are currently growing, who would
argue that individually their countries should maintain the momentum of detente
and approach Moscow to negotiate the best deal they can. The effects of such action
on the NATO alliance would be catastrophic.
274
Thus, on balance, the onerous aspects of the rejection of the SALT II Treaty seem
to have a more immediate and dangerous consequence for the stability of our
European alliance than would be the more tangential negative consequences of
ratification. On the other hand it is a commentary on the current state of U.S.
military preparedness and the perception of U.S. leadership within the alliance that
such coercive elements as Soviet crisis manipulation, TNF posturing or playmg on
European fears, must be considered with respect of the ratification of this treaty.
With or without SALT II, if the current trends with Central Europe continue the
day will come when the credibility of the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee to our
European allies will not be in doubt but a recognized anachronism. The political
result is not likely to bear any resemblance to the much maligned status of Finland.
If one must use analogies, the European environment is far more likely to resemble
"Balkanization" rather than "Finlandization", with all the attendant instabilities
and dangers to world peace.
V. CONCLUSIONS
With respect to SALT II, the stability in Central Europe and the security of the
NATO alliance, I have one recommendation: the United States must increase the
American forces deployed in and programed for Central Europe. I would not recom-
mend this as a formal condition to the Treaty, but it seems only prudent that if
SALT II is going to have a fraction of the success its proponents hope, the Treaty
should neither undermine the Euro-Strategic Relationship nor be undermined by
current force imbalance in Central Europe.
The administration has made major strides in this direction. The positive actions
of the Secretary of Defense and his advisor on NATO Affairs have had a noticeable
impact in giving a renewed sense of purpose to the alliance, enhancing the commit-
ment of its membership and in initiating major substantive improvements. Never-
theless the administration's NATO initiatives desperately need additional congres-
sional support. Inflation is hollowing out much of the increased NATO oriented
defense spending, each of the services require additional support if they are to fulfill
their NATO oriented missions, and there are many areas for force improvements
that need even greater emphasis. Two years ago I described these initiatives as
helpful actions to help redress the European imbalance. Now I believe they are the
minimum necessary to keep it from getting worse.
Arms control and the theater force improvement can be mutually supported
rather than mutually exclusive. A dynamic U.S. leadership which encompasses both
a combined European oriented strategy and puts the security of our allies above the
good will of our opponents could produce a restabilization of the European military
balance. I could think of no more meaningful contribution which could come in the
wake of the current SALT II debate than the conveyance of the message to the
Soviet Union that they cannot have it both ways: that Europe and the United States
are indivisible. The security of one directly affecting the other. That the stabiliza-
tion produced by arms control with one alliance partner must ultimately be availa-
ble to all.
Senator Zorinsky. This hearing is in recess until Monday at 10
a.m. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., September 10, 1979.]
SALT II TREATY
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1979
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on European Affairs
OF the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Church, McGovern, Biden, Javits, Percy,
Helms and Hayakawa.
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
opening statement
Today the Subcommittee on European Affairs is honored to have
a particularly distinguished group of witnesses to testify on the
subject of allied attitudes toward the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty that is before the U.S. Senate. Appearing first is Prof.
Stanley Hoffmann, a very eminent expert on American foreign
policy in general and alliance relations in particular. The subcom-
mittee will then hear from a panel consisting of four European
parliamentarians, each of whom is an active member of the North
Atlantic Assembly. While it has long been a tradition of the For-
eign Relations Committee to receive testimony only from American
citizens, an exception is being made today because of the impor-
tance of our subject, and because this group of men represents an
interparliamentary organization which is an adjunct to NATO, and
in which Members of the Congress regularly participate as part of
their formal responsibilities.
Gentlemen, I look forward to hearing the testimony of each of
you, and I would like to thank you for making the long journey
across the ocean to help us with what many view as a U.S. ques-
tion, but which I believe is an Alliance question.
As we begin, I would like to insert in our record, testimony from
Prof. George Kennan, who was invited to be here with us today,
but unfortunately could not appear because he has been temporar-
ily hospitalized. He was kind enough, however, to send us a short
statement in which in discussing the SALT issue he displays his
characteristic lucidity as well as a certain understandable pessi-
mism about our ability to manage the superpower relationship in a
calm and rational manner.
[Prof. George F. Kennan's prepared statement follows:]
(275)
276
Prepared Statement of George F. Kennan, Professor Emeritus, The
Institute for Advanced Study
I appreciate the invitation to appear before the Subcommittee on European Af-
fairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and regret that ill health has
made it impossible for me to do so. The following represents, for whatever interest it
may hold for the members of the Subcommittee, a summary of those views which I
would have presented to the members of the Subcommittee had it been possible for
me to appear.
1. I would like to say at the start that I am not an enthusiast for such negotia-
tions as those out of which the present SALT agreement has flowed. I never
regarded the SALT negotiating process as the best means of trying to bring about
the control and reduction in nuclear weaponry. It seemed clear to me from the start
that the pace of advancement in military technology was faster, and would continue
to be faster, than the predictable pace of such negotiations; and this, I believe, has
been borne out by recent experience. Talks of the SALT variety have, no doubt, a
certain positive value as one more form of communication between the Soviet
Government and our own; but they should not be expected to produce adequate
results unless they are accompanied by unilateral measures of restraint on both
sides in weapons development.
I did not, therefore, expect much more from these negotiations than has actually
come out of them; and this last I regard as wholly inadequate for the overcoming of
a situation which is becoming more burdensome and potentially more dangerous
with the passage of every year.
2. On the other hand, whereas what has been achieved to date in these negotia-
tions, as represented by the final agreement, does not go very far, it is positive as
far as it goes; and it seems clear to me that the rejection of it would be a tragic, and
perhaps final, blow to the entire effort to bring about the control and reduction of
this form of weaponry. It would also be an unnecessary blow. While claiming no
expertise on the technical aspects of the problems at issue, I cannot see that there is
anything of real significance which we would like to do in the strengthening of our
own armed forces which the terms of the treaty would prevent us from doing; nor
am I able to see that there are any of the dangers which critics of the treaty profess
to see in it which would not exist, and in an even more acute form, if there were no
treaty at all.
For these reasons, I favor ratification of the treaty, always bearing in mind that it
has, and could have, only a modest practical value. Its ratification should be regard-
ed, I consider, only as a beginning, not an end, to what needs urgently to be done if
the increase in nuclear arsenals, which have already achieved nightmarish dimen-
sions, is to be halted.
3. While recognizing that failure of ratification of the SALT accord would have
serious and highly unfortunate effects on Soviet-American relations, I would like to
warn against the assumption that everj^hing depends on this one factor. There is, it
seems to me, reason to suppose that Soviet attitudes towards Soviet-American
relations have already been deeply affected by a number of other developments of
the past four or five years. It would be unrealistic not to recognize the probability
that there are already important factions in the Soviet structure of power which
would argue, on the basis of recent experience, that no real improvement of Soviet-
American relations could be had, except at a price which no Soviet leader would be
willing to pay. Such people would maintain that other alternatives ought therefore
to be found. There is also good reason to assume that views of this sort \yill
inevitably enter into the crisis of succession to the Brezhnev regime — a crisis which
cannot now be far off. While ratification of SALT would certainly strengthen the
hands of those who have supported Mr. Brezhnev's policies towards this country,
just as rejection of the treaty would strengthen those of his hard-line opponents, it
would be wrong to suppose that this would be the only factor, or even necessarily
the decisive one, in the designing of the policies of a post-Brezhnev regime. For this,
other factors, including our policies on trade, on credits, on "human rights," and on
China, would have to be taken into consideration.
4. Finally, I see no reason why the ratification of the SALT accord should be
influenced by Soviet behavior in other areas of United States-Soviet relations. This
is not, as I see it, a favor we are doing the Soviet Government, for which we could
expect concessions in other fields. If this is the way we regarded it, we ought not to
have entered into these negotiations in the first place. We have, in my own view, as
deep an interest as they have in bringing about, if possible and to the extent
possible, a reduction in nuclear armaments and the removal of the immense dan-
gers associated therewith. If this requires negotiation even with a regime whose
policies and actions in other fields are unacceptable to us, I consider that we have
no choice but to pursue such negotiations; and I think we should not try to sell
277
twice over, for purposes ulterior to this undertaking, whatever concessions we find
it possible to make with a view to arriving at an acceptable agreement.
The Chairman. Professor Hoffmann, please begin in any manner
which is most comfortable to you, and again, welcome to the com-
mittee.
STATEMENT OF PROF. STANLEY HOFFMANN, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.>
Mr. Hoffmann. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to read some excerpts from my testimony in which I
deal with two different issues. The first one is the agreement itself,
its flaws and its advantages. The second one, since the agreement
does not exist in a vacuum, is the military and political environ-
ment.
Let me begin with some remarks about the agreement itself. I
see it as having some flaws and many advantages. I find three
flaws, none of which are fatal. First of all, from the viewpoint of
arms control, it has been pointed out that the treaty allows for a
vast increase in the number of warheads, in the development of
new launchers, and the modernization of existing forces. Once
more it has become clear that arms control and arms reduction are
not the same thing.
However, it is true that the restrictions imposed by SALT II are
more comprehensive than those of SALT I and will constrain and
regulate the arms race more than did SALT I. Moreover, the
alternative to this agreement is most likely to be not a better
agreement with deep cuts, but no agreement for a long time and
political tension.
Second, from the viewpoint of American security, opponents of
the treaty have pointed out that it allows the Soviets to keep their
heavy missiles and that it leaves our land-based missile force vul-
nerable to a Soviet first strike in the early or middle 1980's, but
this vulnerability was not created by SALT II, and the agreement
leaves us free to take steps to try to reduce it.
While heavy missiles give the Soviet a throw weight advantage,
the number of warheads capable of hitting missiles is a far more
significant measure. Precisely, the treaty puts limits on the num-
bers of Soviet warheads and in the long run the treaty also places
the heavy Soviet missiles in jeopardy since it bans mobile heavy
missiles.
Third, from the viewpoints of both security and arms control, the
provision of the protocol which temporarily bans land- and sea-
launched cruise missiles of a range superior to 600 kilometers, but
imposes no restriction on the SS-20 and no other restriction on the
Backfire bomber than Mr. Brezhnev's promise, leaves much to be
desired.
Soviet weapons systems aimed at our allies in Western Europe
have not been curbed. We have, however, accepted to place restric-
tions on systems that could give us a comparable ability.
However, this is no reason to repudiate the protocol as it now
stands. We could not deploy those cruise missiles before 1981
anyhow, and the protocol allows the United States and its allies
full freedom to deploy a middle range mobile land-based missile
' See page 289 for Professor Hoffmann's prepared statement.
278
capable of reaching Soviet targets from positions in Western
Europe, so this third flaw can be reduced to small proportions.
The advantages of SALT far exceed the disadvantages. First of
all, from the viewpoint of security, the Soviets have accepted a
number of major restrictions that blunt their throw weight advan-
tage, slow down their threat to the Minuteman, make a mobile
land-based missile system more survivable, and attainment of over-
all Soviet strategic superiority less possible.
It is true, as Secretary Kissinger said in his testimony, that
quantitative limits on launchers are not the most significant meas-
ures but SALT II goes much beyond this by limiting the number of
warheads that can be placed on each type of launcher and by
limiting quite strictly the number and type of new ICBM systems
or the conversion of existing ones.
Without SALT, the problems which the Soviet buildup and the
gallop of technology have created for us would worsen, since the
Soviets could have many more launchers and particularly Mirv'ed
ones, many thousands of more warheads on these, more heavy
missiles, more new types of ICBM's, more Backfire bombers, and
more methods of concealment.
Those who argue that the Soviets aim is strategic superiority and
political exploitation still have to explain why the U.S.S.R. has
accepted the handicaps created by this agreement, and if the tenta-
tive answer is that the Soviets have obtained an end to the Ameri-
can lead in technology, there remains a need to explain why the
Soviets did not obtain a ban on airborne cruise missiles, the Tri-
dent submarine, the M-X, or more accurate warheads.
Second, from the viewpoint of arms control, the treaty will pro-
vide both sides with a modicum of predictability. It will also help
lay the foundations for efforts in other areas than those covered by
SALT, such as a comprehensive test ban, efforts at limiting conven-
tional or theater nuclear arms races, and nonproliferation.
Third, from the viewpoint of security and arms control, SALT is
important because it provides the main cooperative element in
Soviet-American relations at present, and there are two main rea-
sons why this link has to be preserved. First, our common interest
in limiting nuclear war does in fact create a common bond. It is
absurd to invoke the lack of trust and fundamental differences
between us and the Soviets as arguments against a balanced SALT
agreement. In the nuclear age especially, it is between adversaries
that such an agreement is indispensable. If trust and a common
code of behavior existed, the elaborate network of formal deals
could be replaced by informal understandings.
Fourth, our allies. Western Europe and also Japan, are keen on
preserving what has been accomplished through detente. Since
they have no or practically no arms control agreements with the
Soviets, they have built a network of cultural and economic rela-
tions and political consultation. We have no comparable network.
For our allies, the preservation and pursuit of SALT are evidence
of continuing convergence between their course and ours. They
want both security and detente, and they worry not only when
they suspect us of neglecting the European balance of forces in
favor of the global strategic one but also when they hear us argu-
ing about security versus detente.
279
For the United States to reject the SALT agreement after 7 years
of bargaining would weaken our alUes' confidence in America's
ability to follow a steady and responsible course.
Let me now turn to the military and political environment on
which opposition to SALT has concentrated.
It has been said that our strategic situation has seriously dete-
rioriated, and that the Soviets have launched an unprecedented
geopolitical offensive. Let me start with the strategic issues, two of
which are worth mentioning, Soviet strategic conception and the
growmg vulnerability of our land-based missiles.
It has been said that the United States has put all of its eggs in
the basket of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, whereas
the Soviets are following a war-winning strategy. This strikes me
as a distortion of reality. First, it is true that we had in the sixties
proclaimed the virtues of mutual assured destruction, but the more
the Soviets succeeded in reducing our superiority, the less credible
our strategy of massive retaliation for all occasions became, and
the more warheads we had, the more opportunities for selective
and accurate targeting. As a result, we developed the idea of a
limited counterforce strategy which may not be a war-winning
strategy— nobody has yet explained how nuclear war can be won—
but certainly is a war-fighting strategy.
On the other side, the Soviet strategy is not a simple war-win-
ning strategy that treats nuclear weapons like ordinary ones. The
Soviets have repeatedly acknowledged the folly of nuclear war or
superiority. On the other hand, their conception differs from ours
In Moscow, deterrence is seen not as the opposite of war, not as
sharply distinct from defense, as we tend to do, but as part of the
science of war, and inseparable from defense, because they assume
that war is still possible and must, if it comes, aim, as before, above
all at the destruction of enemy forces; and since war may come
they believe they have an interest in limiting damage to them-
selves.
Now, the question raised by this difference in conceptions is, does
it matter? It has not prevented pragmatic incremental bargaining
on arms control. Indeed, the difference makes arms control more
rather than less necessary while also making it more difficult The
problem with the difference is that it allows for wide divergences
in the assessment of Soviet strategic purposes. First, does the
fcjoviet design aim at winning a nuclear war or only at deterring us
from resorting to nuclear weapons and at limiting damage to
Soviet society if deterrence fails?
My own assessment is that it aims at the latter. The Soviets are
tully aware of the enormity of our capabilities, hence their deter-
mination to try to reduce them; and the limitations they have
accepted in SALT II are far more comparable with the second
interpretation than with the first.
However, even the second interpretation presents serious prob-
lems tor us, because there is another alternative. Is the Soviet
conception essentially defensive or is it primarily offensive, aimed
at making it possible for them to win either without resort just to
nuclear weapons, for instance, by resorting to conventional weap-
ons, or through pressure, through blackmail, through the political
280
exploitation of their advantages in regional balances and the com-
position of nuclear forces.
Now, it is here that the issue of Minuteman vulnerability comes
in. We have for months now been obsessed by a nightmare scenar-
io. At the height of a political crisis, for instance in Europe, we
would let ourselves be intimidated by the Soviets' ability to destroy
our ICBM's, leaving us with no alternative to capitulation, other
than mutual destruction.
This scenario strikes me as perverse and as an extraordinary
instance of self-intimidation and self-scare. First, purely in military
terms, the Soviets could never be sure that an attack on all our
land-based forces, which would cause considerable civilian casual-
ties, would not trigger off our remaining retaliatory force, 75 per-
cent of our arsenal. For the Soviets, it would be a cosmic roll of
dice, expecting perfect success on their side and cool, rational con-
trol on ours.
If the Soviets simply waged selective strikes against our land-
based missiles, we would have enough ICBM's to retaliate against
their land-based forces, and anyhow, the scenario of a nuclear war
of attrition is highly dubious. The ultimate threat in the nuclear
age remains the menace of city destruction. Counterforce war can
give a side victory only if it deters the loser from carrring out the
supreme threat, and this is quite independent of the momentary
military balance, since the ability to hit the other side's cities
exists whether one is superior or inferior in first strike forces.
Second, even in military terms, after a Soviet first strike aimed
at all our ICBM's, if we chose not to attack their cities, we would
have another alternative to capitulation. Given our advantages in
bombers and air-launched cruise missiles, we would have huge
residual means of hitting Soviet military targets, and enough war-
heads left to be able to hit Soviet cities later.
Third, the vulnerability of land-based forces is not an American
problem only. Both sides' land-based missile forces will be vulner-
able.
Fourth, it is impossible to prove that the outcome of political
conflict in the last 30 years has been determined by the exact ratio
of strategic military forces. It is the relative importance of the
stake to each side in every crisis which has been decisive. Now, to
be sure, we may try to fortify our resolve and to make that impor-
tance more manifest by having essential equivalence in nuclear
forces, as Secretary Brown has stated, but nuclear equivalence or
superiority did not help us in Vietnam and there are other ways to
bolster one's resolve and to demonstrate one's commitment.
I come to the conclusion that the seriousness of our strategic
situation, vis-a-vis the Soviets, has been much exaggerated. If es-
sential equivalence means that we must be perceived by others,
and that we must perceive ourselves as able to do whatever the
Soviets are technically able to do, then a limited deployment of the
M-X is justified. If, however, one concludes, as I do, that there is
nothing to be gained by having a first-strike ability against land-
based missiles, the M-X becomes more difficult to justify — by con-
trast with just giving a mobile basing system to Minuteman.
In the meantime, our main military effort ought to be aimed at
shoring up regional balances. None of the scenarios that entail the
281
use of strategic nuclear weapons really makes sense, neither mas-
sive retaliation nor limited counterforce. The function of nuclear
weapons is likely to remain deterrence from their use. This means
that the real danger lies in the problems of regional instability in a
world strategically fragmented under a stable superpower nuclear
umbrella.
In the specific case of Western Europe, what is needed is both
modernization of conventional forces and an effort at restoring the
theater nuclear balance in such a way both as to deprive the
Soviets of any reason to believe that they could start a convention-
al war and keep it from escalating, and so as to provide an incen-
tive for mutual limitations and reductions in theater nuclear
forces.
Finally, let me make a few remarks about the political environ-
ment itself. Two issues must be addressed here, that of Soviet
behavior and that of American power.
It has been asserted that the Soviets have launched a geopolitical
offensive precisely because military might is the only dimension in
which they are a superpower. I believe that this view imposes far
more coherence and design on Soviet policy than is warranted by
reality. Frankly, what has happened since I sent this paper has not
changed my opinion. Rather than as a deliberate, planned and
masterly march toward world domination, Soviet policy is much
easier to interpret as first a relentless attempt at achieving equal-
ity with the United States by breaking the American monopoly of
control of the high seas, or of means to intervene all over the
world, and imposing Soviet participation in the settlement of all
major disputes, and second, as the skillful exploitation of opportu-
nities, many of which arise either without having been created by
the Soviets or through the actions of a Soviet client or ally.
To be sure, recent Soviet successes are profoundly irritating to
Americans, but the idea of linking explicitly arms control agree-
ments to Soviet good behavior does not deserve being revived. It
suggests that such agreements must somehow be in the Soviets
interests more than in ours, which is false.
It also suggests that they are so much in the Soviets interest that
we could use them as a lever and shortcut to obtain Soviet acquies-
cence to our idea of international stability and moderation, a very
static idea. Not only is it hard to believe that a power that has
never given up the effort to tilt the correlation of forces in the
world in its favor would do so in exchange for mutually beneficial
arms restraints, but we must also reflect first that we ourselves
would not like to have to give up the pursuit of unilateral advan-
tages—think about the Middle East or relations with China — and
that we would object violently to any Soviet attempt to subordinate
SALT or Soviet cooperation in nonproliferation efforts to our be-
having the way they would like us to behave in every part of the
world.
There is in any case an implicit linkage. If the Soviets do rock
the boat too much, they will find it impossible to get the American
Senate and American opinion to endorse arms agreements that see
incompatible with such behavior. If it is military might only that
bolsters the Soviet claim to world power, then the appropriate
strategy for us is first to constrain that might through SALT and
282
arms control bargains, second, to match it and help others match
or deter it in those areas where it is already deployed, and third, to
see to it that third party conflicts do not provide the Soviets with
opportunities to project and inject their power in a manner detri-
mental to our interests.
Strategic arms control agreements should not explicity be linked
to anything. However, their own progress will depend on the super-
powers' ability to manage their inevitable contest in a less antago-
nistic way.
Next, those who speak of the retreat of American power seem to
me to lump together very different factors. One is inevitable com-
parative decline. The preponderance which we had in economic
and military might in 1945 simply could not last.
The second factor is quite different. It consists of recent Ameri-
can defeats. In almost every instance, we find that our failure was
due not to a lack of material power, but to a deficiency in political
analysis and skill, in the use of our power, in our capacity to
control the outcomes, in our ability to anticipate events and to
either exploit opportunities or get out of hopeless situations in time
or align ourselves with the forces that were destined to prevail, not
in order to capitulate to them, but in order to influence them. In
other words, it has to do not with muscle but with brain.
On the other hand, the world as seen from Moscow is not rosier
than the world as seen from here. China's drive for development,
its rapprochement with Japan, largely because of Soviet bungling,
at least partial peace under American auspices in the Middle East,
continuing negotiations under Western auspices about Zimbabwe
and Namibia, the consolidation and enlargement of the European
community, the cooling of relations with India, continuing discon-
tent in Eastern Europe, quagmires in Eritrea and Afghanistan, all
of this shows that growing might is not a perfect answer on the
other side, either.
A third factor lumped with the other two is our alleged lack of
will or resolve, but will, resolve, or taking a stand become much too
easily show without substance and empty rhetoric or recipes for
disaster. The key problem here is that the instruments of control
on which we used to rely, the application of military force or
assistance, the provision of economic aid, are simply inappropriate
or insufficient in three kinds of issues that dominate today's
agenda: Economic problems — the energy crisis, inflation, reces-
sion— disputes between states both of which happen to be our
friends or our allies, and internal disorder in friendly countries
whose problems are too deep to be resolved by covert action.
The real drama is the divorce between an expectation of control
and the difficulties of influence. It is not the absence but the
impotence of power in a world in which America's own preponder-
ance and position as guardian of the status quo make it the inevita-
ble target of all the discontent.
In concluding, let me say that although there are more than
enough reasons to worry about the future of America's role in the
world, I am more disturbed by some conceptual or perceptual defi-
ciencies that mark the way Americans look at the world. The first
deficiency is the tough guy approach to international affairs; the
number of problems likely to be resolved or even just improved by
283
displays of force and dramatic acts of commitment is limited. Such
acts are often useful in a crisis, but there is no substitute for
political skill before, even during and after the crisis.
Yet there is in the land a nostalgia for big sticks and heroic
strikes, for a kind of "High Noon" version of international diploma-
cy, for a world policed by America's sheriffs or marshals, for the
superiority of American might and simplicity of moral division
between good and evil that such a world entails.
The Carter administration has been good at resisting such pres-
sures, but one does not win much support by pointing out what
mistakes one has not made, what follies one has avoided, especially
not when the official voice is as hesitant and cacophonous as has
sometimes been the case in the past 3 years.
There is a second manifestation of the same flight from the
imperatives of political analysis and skill; the obsession with calcu-
lations of strategic nuclear equivalence and in particular of Min-
uteman vulnerability. It is as if numbers of warheads or launchers,
figures of throw-weight and potential destruction provided one with
a gruesome but welcome certainty, with a firm and measurable
handle over the messy uncertainties of international relations.
The overemphasis of very improbable doomsday military scenar-
ios, like the recurrent belief in the domino theory shows a never-
abandoned quest for precision and predictability. Not only is this a
misplaced quest, it is also dangerous insofar as it takes attention
and money away from the indispensable study of the mass of
complex economic, social, and political forces that crisscross in
more than 150 countries, and that we desperately need to under-
stand if we want to be able not to control them, because this is far
beyond one country's reach, but to affect them and to prevent them
from pushing us into the decline we seem to fear so much.
Arms control agreements such as SALT II which do not lull us
into complacency about the military balance, at least provide us
with more leeway to turn to what really counts. I won't say ulti-
mately in order not to offend those who believe that military might
remains decisive in the last resort, but certainly in the daily con-
tests of world politics.
A rejection of SALT or amendments that would in effect destroy
the agreements would encourage the national obsession with num-
bers of weapons, concentrate attention on the arms race, and divert
it from all the rest.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Professor, thank you very much. I cannot re-
strain myself from making the following statement. As have my
colleagues, I have sat through hours and hours of these hearings, I
personally have traveled halfway around the world to speak with
our allies, and with our antagonists, and I have heard everyone
from Dr. Kissinger, who is presented as the high prophet, straight
through to my gas station attendant, comment on SALT.
Your statement is without question the best statement I have
ever heard. And I sincerely mean that. We always say when we
hear a witness: "Thank you for the very cogent, informative state-
ment. You have obviously put a lot of time into it, et cetera." But
let me do away with all that pap. This is the best statement I have
ever heard. I hope we can get every one of my colleagues to read it.
uR-9Kn n _ 7Q p-h u
284
Whether or not they will agree with it, I don't know, and for that
matter I would like to get all my constituents to read it. It would
be incredibly helpful in our effort to deal maturely with the subject
matter not only of SALT but also all the related foreign policy
questions it is raising.
Well, enough praise. Let me now ask a few questions. We will
proceed with the 10-minute rule, gentlemen. Let me inform our
friends from Europe that there is a senatorial disease that every-
one becomes afflicted with once elected, and that is the inability to
stop talking. I am probably the most afflicted of all my colleagues.
Those little lights up there operate just like traffic lights. When
that red light goes on, not you, but we must stop.
There were a number of points that you raised, and I hope I will
have an opportunity to come back after my colleagues have asked
some questions and go into more detail in the second round of
questioning. Let me begin by discussing the question which I raised
during my recent trip to Europe with several of my colleagues. I
believe it was unintentionally misrepresented by Dr. Kissinger in
his recent visit to Brussels to speak at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies Conference held a week or so ago.
DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILE WHEN PROTOCOL ENDS
Let me quote from Dr. Kissinger. He said:
But first, let us have another effort at negotiating. I saw a report about a
distinguished American Senator —
I assume he was referring to me —
returning from Moscow the other day who said, "It is virtually certain that cruise
missiles will be deployed and that NATO will undertake a buildup of its own unless
negotiations to a new treaty are begun soon." This is still our position. All the
Soviets have to do is begin a negotiation to keep us from doing what they are
already doing, negotiating or not negotiating.
Since I was the only one who made a statement remotely close to
that, I would like to clarify for the record and also ask for your
comment on what I said. I informed the Soviets, Mr. Gromyko in
particular, that it was my opinion that when the protocol ended, it
ended, and that there was virtually no prospect of the U.S. Senate
allowing the President to continue the protocol.
I was, as strongly as I could, admonishing the Soviets not to
engage in what Dr. Kissinger suggests they would, and that is to
say, "We will negotiate beginning January 1, 1982, what we will do
about the extension," which would in effect be a de facto extension
of the protocol.
As I said, I firmly believe that the United States will deploy — not
if, not maybe, but will. This leads us to the point that if the Soviets
or anyone interested in arms control wants to prevent the deploy-
ment of the GLCM's and SLCM's, the Soviets will have to make
some major concessions prior to December 31, 1981. That was one
of the reasons for my visit to Moscow, to urge that process be
moved on rapidly.
That brings me to this question: Do you believe that there is a
need for the United States, absent the Soviet Union making a
demonstrable concession, to deploy in the earliest time frame that
we can?
285
Mr. Hoffmann. I think there is a need for a number of reasons.
I am not sure that cruise missiles are the answer. In fact, as I said
in the paper, I am almost sure that ground-launched cruise mis-
siles are not the answer, simply because one would need far too
many of them, and the same could be achieved more easily both in
military and in diplomatic terms through an extended Pershing
which is not covered by the protocol at all. But I think such a
deployment would probably be necessary partly because the Soviet
advantage in theater nuclear weapons due to the SS-20 and Back-
fire does create for the first time the possibility of a Soviet conven-
tional strike that they could think might remain purely conven-
tional. As long as we had thousands of short-range nuclear war-
heads in Europe and all they had was the very heavy missiles
capable of reaching not only Western Europe but also the United
States, I think it would have been foolish for them to believe that
they could start a conventional strike and not have us resort to
nuclear weapons.
Once they have achieved superiority in theater nuclear forces,
they may believe that they will thereby intimidate us or prevent us
from resorting to our tactical nuclear weapons. I think it is mainly
in order to redress that imbalance that we have to do something,
but again, whether it takes the form of cruise missiles, I do not
know.
There is another problem which your question raises. When it
comes to getting the Soviets to make concessions in exchange for
our continuing in some form to curtail ground- and sea-launched
cruise missiles, we may find them rather edgy because their view-
point is likely to be that they have already made some concessions
in this treaty in exchange for our acceptance of restrictions on the
cruise missiles.
They may object to our asking them to pay twice. On the other
hand, there is political reality which is exactly the one you men-
tioned, so they may very well have to.
The Chairman. Whether or not they think it is double paying,
they should understand that the register shuts on that date.
rationalism in political process and debate
I have many more questions, but let me skip to the end of your
statement, because I am sure that my time is rapidly evaporating.
In your closing analysis, you suggested that the SALT debate, with
all of its numbers and focus on an identifiable adversary, is a kind
of surrogate for our concern with other problems which we find it
difficult to understand and resolve, such as energy, inflation, and
regional conflicts.
Do you have any suggestions as to how we can make our political
process and debate any more rational, or is the genie out of the
bottle now?
Mr. Hoffmann. No; I don't think it is out of the bottle. At least I
hope not, but I am going to give you an extr-aordinarily parochial
answer. I am an educator, and it seems to me that there is no
substitute for education, that what is missing and what has been
missing for many years is simply sufficient attention to everything
that goes on in the outside world and that is neither a crisis — we
get very excited when something happens, when the Shah falls or
286
when a Somoza falls, but we have not followed it up to then, we
are not very sensitive to what happens which is neither a crisis nor
a purely military affair. Yet if you look at what I called in the
paper the litany of American defeats in recent years, such as Iran,
the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, South Yemen, what have you, it
seems to me that in almost every instance rational debate would
presuppose much more knowledge of what is going on and also, I
think, a much more relaxed view of things, much more confidence
in the fact that in a world of 150 powers, there are very few
definitive victories or definitive defeats. My former colleague, Mr.
Kissinger, has, as you know, very often talked about the terrible
consequences of Angola. Well, if one looks at international affairs
today, it is very hard to look at Angola as a pure and simple Soviet
satellite. We have not found the Angolans totally untractable, for
instance, when it came to negotiating over Zimbabwe and Namibia.
So, it seems to me that what is needed is much more willingness
to study cultures and political forces and economic forces very
alien to us. Here, what disturbs me is, I would say, perhaps not the
disappearance, because that is too big a word, but the shrinking of
the space devoted to the outside world by the American media in
the last 10 years. Now it is inevitable that American Senators and
Congressmen concentrate primarily on domestic problems because
this is indeed what concerns their constituents most, but at a time
when the interconnection between domestic politics and foreign
policies is as great as it is, if our legislators do not spend enough
time on political, economic, and social forces by contrast with the
seductive military calculations, there will be a terrible tendency to
treat foreign policy as an appendix of domestic politics. That is
very dangerous.
The Chairman. Thank you. My time is up. I would like to get
back to you to discuss Cuba and a number of other things, but I
will yield to Senator Percy.
Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
WILL TO USE MILITARY FORCE IF NECESSARY
Professor Hoffmann, I agree with our chairman that your contri-
bution this morning is an unusual one. The preparation that you
have put into your testimony is very apparent indeed. You do
speak from a very unique perspective, having your roots deep in
Europe and in the United States. Your European ties could be
possibly exceeded only by our next distinguished panel, where we
break our precedent of not having testimony from foreign leaders
but because of the unusual nature of the contribution that they
can make, we are looking forward to it. I would like to ask you as
someone who has a strong background in Europe and can speak on
behalf of the Europeans, this question. The question came up last
week al90ut not just having military equality but the will to use
military force if necessary. This question has been raised recently
in Europe at high levels.
From your perspective, if the Soviets invaded Western Europe
and if it appeared as though the conventional forces of NATO
would be inadequate to protect Europe, do you have any doubt at
all that the American people would support and that this adminis-
287
tration or any that you can see succeeding it would fail to use
nuclear weapons if necessary to save Europe?
Mr. Hoffmann. I have no doubts about it. What worries me are
two different sorts of connected issues. The first one is what would
happen if one were faced not with an overall Soviet conventional
attack, but with a more limited operation, what has sometimes
been referred to in NATO jargon as the "Hamburg Grab," al-
though why anybody would want to grab Hamburg and just stop I
have never understood. [General laughter.]
There, of course, serious questions would arise, and I think it
would be necessary in the case of a limited operation to try to
prevent what would be in fact the incineration of Europe before
one reaches the nuclear level.
Second, what also worries me is the following kind of ping pong
game, if that is the expression. A number of Americans go over to
Europe and tell the Europeans that America has lost its will, that
America has lost its nerve, that really the threat of massive retali-
ation has become totally incredible and therefore they shouldn't
really count on this.
This is very often said with a very good purpose. The purpose is
to get the Europeans to do more about their conventional defense
and to be less reluctant — I am thinking, for example, of the Feder-
al Republic of Germany — about the basing of new theater nuclear
weapons. But even though the intention is good, the result is to
make the Europeans wonder about the credibility of the American
deterrent.
The only thing that reassures me is that even though the Euro-
peans have repeatedly been told over the last 18 years actually,
that our strategic force is no longer credible and even though many
Europeans have believed it, the Soviets have never quite believed
it, because it is they who have to take the initiatives for a world-
wide disaster, and they can never be sure that whatever these
Americans say is really likely in a test, in a crisis, to be the policy
of the U.S. Government. They cannot be sure that we will indeed
let ourselves be, so to speak, dismantled piecemeal.
This is one of the reasons why I am not so worried.
Senator Percy. Thank you for your answer.
SOVIET COMBAT FORCES IN CUBA
The last week has been devoted to an issue that dominated the
news, the presence of Soviet combat forces in Cuba. Over the
weekend, there have many been arguments and analyses presented
on all sides by journalists. The administration has attempted to de-
escalate this, and, in their terms, put it back into perspective.
From the perspective of Europe, how would you look at this from
that side of your own personality and background? Could you give
us your view as to the importance of those forces and how you
perceive a scenario unfolding where we do not get into a position
where we have made it literally impossible for the Soviets to do
anything, and we in the Senate have boxed ourselves into a point
where we can't back off.
Mr. Hoffmann. Well, first of all, I am sure, and I have already
seen evidence of this in recent European press analyses that the
Europeans see a great difference between the Cuban missile crisis
288
of 1962 and the presence of one combat brigade which may or may
not have been there for a very long time, so there is a kind of
general hope— both on substantive grounds and because nobody
wants to go through the nervewracking experience of October
1962— that the United States will manage this reasonably and
coolly.
Second, I have seen very few comments in Europe suggestmg
that anybody ought to link SALT to this. This is not seen as quite
comparable or as in anybody's interest. Third, I think that we
should negotiate this with the Soviet Union, and I think we have
some arguments or some weapons at our disposal.
First of all, it is quite clear that the chances of this treaty have
not exactly been improved by the discovery. The Soviets, I think,
are quite keen on getting the treaty through for reasons of their
own, and I think that the point certainly can be made by the
Secretary of State in his negotiations with the Soviets that even
though there is no explicit linkage, there is an implicit one.
Second, if this incident should lead to some kind of modus Vi-
vendi which would make it clear once and for all, first of all, what
margin of maneuver the Soviets are allowed to have in Cuba, and
second, how close to each superpower's borders forces of the other
are allowed to stand, it would not be a bad thing. We can point out
to them that even though we have, of course, both listening devices
close to their borders and troops in NATO at the edge of the Iron
Curtain, we don't have, as far as I know, ground combat forces that
close to the Soviet Union itself.
We could point out that some reciprocity is not a bad idea. If all
of this fails, I think we have probably means of pressure within the
Caribbean which do not have to escalate to blockade and so on, but
I would hope this would be resolved diplomatically and quietly, and
I would personally say— although I know this is not the view of
many of your colleagues — without too much of a sense of hurry, I
don't think there should be ultimata or anything of that sort.
The situation has existed for many years. If the Soviets are
mainly there to man listening devices, well, it is difficult for us to
object to listening devices. They are part of the system of SALT,
strange as it seems, and if they are in excess of this then I think
we should negotiate their exit, but I don't see any reason to get
terribly excited.
Senator Percy. Thank you, Professor.
SOVIET PRESSURE AND EXPANSION THROUGH BLACKMAIL
In your testimony, you say that the Soviet goal may be, and I
will quote, "to pressure and expand but not through the use of
conventional weapons but through blackmail." I wonder if you
could elaborate on that very important observation, and also com-
ment on whether their strategy is feasible.
Mr. Hoffmann. I think whether their strategy is feasible really
depends very much on not only our resolve but also on our skill. I
think one of the reasons why they accumulate military force in an
area like Europe is not because they believe that some day they
will be able to grab Europe by war— I think they know they would
mainly grab ruins, after which they would have to feed and admin-
ister the people, and it is already not that easy to keep the Poles,
289
Hungarians, Czechs, et cetera, under control — but because they
believe that sooner or later perhaps the Americans will go home,
and the Europeans, faced with an enormous mass of Soviet troops
there, will indeed let themselves be intimidated.
I do not like to use the term "Finlandization" because I think it
is an insult to the Finns, and also because the situation of Western
Europe and that of Finland is not comparable. The choice for
Finland was between Finlandization and should we say "Czechlan-
dization." The choice in Western Europe is between independence
protected by us and Finlandization. So it is not the same. I think
this may be the Soviet calculation, and in that situation, if you go
back to Europe, the way of thwarting this kind of expectation is
simply to see to it that we do not pull out all our troops, and that
we have a reasonable balance of tactical nuclear forces.
There is no evidence whatsoever of Finlandization of Western
Europe in the last 10 or 15 years even though every 6 months
somebody comes and says that they are already beginning to be
Finlandized. The latest that we have heard, in fact, during these
meetings, has been a really quite extraordinary argument. It is the
idea that the European Governments' failure to oppose SALT II is
evidence of their being Finlandized. Well, you can't win.
It is a combination of diplomatic skill and military presence that
can prevent this from happening.
Senator Percy. Thank you very kindly. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
The Chairman. Thank you. Professor.
[Professor Hoffmann's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Prof. Stanley Hoffmann
I would like to address myself to two different issues. The first is the SALT II
agreement itself (by which I mean the treaty, protocol, and joint statement). How
good a treaty is it, from the (sometimes conflicting) viewpoints of American security
and of arrns control? This should be our primary concern. But the agreement does
not exist in a vacuum, and many members of the Senate, along v/ith many wit-
nesses, have made it clear that their assessment of the agreement depends on their
view of the military and political environment of SALT: What are Russia's and
America's positions in the world at present, and what are the trends for the 1980's?
I shall examine this environment in the second part of my testimony.
I
The SALT agreement, negotiated by three American administrations, has some
flaws, and many advantages.
A. I find three flaws, none of which is fatal.
1. From the viewpoint of arms control, it has often been pointed out that the
treaty, while imposing a number of numerical ceilings and, for the first time,
qualitative restrictions on the arms race, actually allows for a vast increase in the
number of warheads, for the development of new launchers (new ICBM, air-
launched cruise missiles), and for the modernization of existing forces. Once more, it
has become clear that arms control and arms reduction are not the same thing. One
of the most frequent arguments of those who, like Secretary Brown in his remark-
able and forceful testimony, defend the agreement against the charge that it is
dangerous for U.S. security, is that SALT II allows the U.S. to pursue all of its
defense plans for the 1980's — an argument which has cost the treaty some support
on the side of those for whom arms limitations should be the first priority, once the
capabilities for mutual assured destruction exist in both superpowers.
It is true that the treaty is a modest step on the road to arms control— more
modest than the Carter Administration would have liked. But it is also true, first,
that the restrictions imposed by SALT II are more comprehensive than those of
SALT I, and, while allowing the nuclear arms race to continue, will constrain and
regulate it more than did SALT I. (Between SALT I and II, there was in fact a
290
formidable acceleration of the arms race on both sides, partly because of the
deployment of new weapons systems, partly because of the failure to limit or ban
MIRV; a failure which blots the record of the American negotiations in particular —
we were ahead then — and which is largely responsible for the Minuteman vulner-
ability problem.) Secondly, the carefully balanced limits imposed by SALT II should
make future reductions possible, and can be seen as a prerequisite. Thirdly, the
alternative to this agreement is most likely to be, not a better one, with deep cuts,
but tension and no agreement for a long time.
2. From the viewpoint of U.S. security, opponents of the agreement have pointed
out that it allows the Soviets to keep their heavy missiles (for which we have and
plan no equivalent) and that it leaves our land-based missile force vulnerable to a
Soviet first strike in the early or middle 1980's. But this vulnerability (whose
importance will be discussed below) was not created by SALT II, and the agreement
leaves us free to take steps to try to reduce it, by making present and future U.S.
land-based missiles mobile. Moreover, with or without the MX, Soviet land-based
missiles (a component of the Soviet nuclear force much larger than U.S. land-based
missiles in our arsenal) will become vulnerable also, given the increasing accuracy
and power of penetration of our warheads. And while the heavy missiles give the
U.S.S.R. a throvv^weight advantage, the number of warheads capable of hitting
missiles is a far more significant measure. Precisely, the treaty puts limits on the
numbers of Soviet warheads, and, in the long run, places the heavy Soviet missiles
in jeopardy, since it bans mobile heavy missiles. It has been pointed out that the
threat to our ICBM force would exist even if the SS-18 did not. Soviet willingness to
dismantle part of their SS-18 arsenal (as requested by the Carter Administration in
March, 1977) would have undoubtedly made this threat less ominous. But if this
agreement is not a mutual disarmament treaty, it is hard to imagine either side
letting it be unilateral (even partial) disarmament treaty. The Soviets had good
reasons to see our March 1977 offer in this light: we were asking them to give up
part of what they had, with no comparable cuts by us, only promises of future
restraint.
3. From both the viewpoints of security and arms control, the provision of the
Protocol which temporarily bans ground and sea launched cruise missiles of a range
superior to 600 Km., but imposes no restriction on the SS-20 and no other restric-
tion on the Backfire bomber than Mr. Brezhnev's promise not to produce more than
30 a year leaves much to be desired. Soviets weapons systems aimed at our allies in
Western Europe have not been curbed, even though they have serious strategic
implications (they deprive us of the advantage we had in theater nuclear weapons
as long as the Soviets disposed only of long-range strategic weapons against West
European targets; we have only a small number of planes based in Europe, capable
of hitting objectives in the U.S.S.R.). We have, however, accepted to place restric-
tions on systems that could give us a matching ability.
It is, of course, true that the duration of the Protocol is short and there is merit
in the suggestion made by Henry Kissinger, of an amendment that would subordi-
nate post-1981 limitations on U.S. theater weapons to Moscow's acceptance of simi-
lar limitations on "Soviet weapons performing comparable missions." We must
remember, however, that the Soviets may look at the matter quite differently. It
was our allies who insisted on keeping American Forward Based Systems (and
consequently Soviet systems aimed at Europe but not at the United States) out of
SALT. And the American concession on ground and sea launched cruise missiles —
our only planned weapons systems that we have accepted to curtail, if only tempo-
rarily— is likely to be seen by the Soviets as having already been paid for, i.e. by
Soviet acceptance of various bans (such as that of the SS-16) and limitations in the
agreement. Their willingness to pay twice may not be very great.
This, however, is no reason to repudiate the protocol as it now stands: we could
not deploy such cruise missiles before 1981 anyhow, nor is it at all certain that they
are the answer to the problem of the "Eurostrategic" balance. It is, indeed, clear
that at least ground-launched cruise missiles are not. And the protocol allows the
United States and its allies full freedom to deploy a new middle range mobile land
based missile capable of reaching Soviet targets from positions in Western Europe.
Thus, this third flaw can be reduced to small proportions: a question mark about
the ease with which our SALT III negotiators will be able either to negotiate Soviet
restrictions on their theater weapons in exchange for prolonging the ban on sea-
based cruise missiles, or else to get the Soviets to accept an end to the ban — and a
hope that the American willingness to give up, even temporarily, one type of
weapon of interest to our allies, in exchange for Soviet restrictions on weapons
capable of hitting the United States but none on weapons capable of hitting them (a
move of greater symbolic than military meaning) will not be repeated. I have not
291
mentioned the non-circumvention provision of the treaty, for it is not likely to turn
out to be troublesome in our relations with our allies.
B. The advantages of SALT far exceed the disadvantages.
1. From the viewpoint of security, it is important to stress, as Secretaries Vance
and Brown have done, that the Soviets have accepted a number of major restrictions
that blunt their throwweight advantage, slow down the threat to Minuteman, make
a mobile land-based missile system more survivable, and attainment of overall
Soviet strategic superiority less possible. Secretary Brown and General Seignious
have provided this Committee with figures and examples. It is true that quantita-
tive limits on launchers are not the most significant measure. But SALT II goes
much beyond this, by limiting the number of warheads that can be placed on each
type of launcher, and by limiting quite strictly the number and type of new ICBM
systems or the conversion of existing launchers. It is clear that without SALT, the
problems which the Soviet buildup and the gallop of technology have created for us
would not only persist but worsen, since the Soviets could have many more launch-
ers, and particular MIRVed launchers, many thousand more warheads on these,
more heavy missiles, more new types of ICBM, more Backfire bombers, and more
methods of concealment. Those who worry about verification would have to prove
how an uncontained arms race would improve our ability to detect what our
adversary does, and to prove that under the agreement a Soviet violation could
remain undetected long enough to upset the balance of forces. Those who argue that
the Soviets aim at strategic superiority, and at its political exploitation, still have to
explain why the U.S.S.R. has accepted the handicaps created by the agreement; and
if the tentative answer is that, in exchange for some limits, the Soviets obtain an
end to the American lead in technology, there remains a need to explain why, in
exchange for these limits, the Soviets did not obtain a ban on air-borne cruise
missiles, on the Trident submarine, or on the MX, or on more accurate warheads.
2. From the viewpoint of arms control, despite the permissiveness of the agree-
ment, it will constrain the arms race, as indicated above, and above all— thanks in
part to the articles on verificaton— provide both sides with a modicum of
predictability. This, to be sure, helps defense planners, but it also helps arms
control, especially in providing both a comprehensive baseline for reductions and
the foundations for new efforts in areas other than those covered by SALT: a
comprehensive test ban, a non-proliferation strategy, efforts at limiting conventional
or theater nuclear arms races. Each of these efforts has to overcome formidable
obstacles of its own. Each one would be underminded or set back by a failure to eo
through with SALT II.
3. From the viewpoints of security and arms control, SALT II is important
because it provides the main— almost the exclusive— cooperative element in Soviet-
American relations at present. There are two main reasons why this link has to be
preserved. First, our common interest in avoiding nuclear war does in fact create a
common bond. I will discuss its limits later; but both sides have an interest in
managing their unavoidable competition in such a way as (i) to leave them with a
considerable margin of maneuver and error before having to reach fateful decisions
about military confrontation or threats, (ii) to make it easier for them to protect
their common concern with survival and with avoiding the kind of spread of nuclear
weapons that might be uncontrollable by the superpowers. These two goals can
obviously be met more easily if arms control agreements provide an underpinning of
predictability, a reassurance against worst-case hypotheses, and a basis for joint
anti-proliferation policies. It is absurd to invoke lack of trust and fundamental
differences as arguments against a balanced SALT agreement. In the nuclear age
especially, it is between adversaries that such an agreement is indispensable: if
trust and a common code of behavior existed, the elaborate network of formal deals
could be replaced by informal understandings and parallel unilateral moves.
Second, our allies— Western Europe but also Japan— are keen on preserving
whatever has been accomplished through detente. Since they have no, or practically
no, arms control agreements with the Soviets, they have built a network of cultural
and economic relations, and political consultations. We have no comparable net-
work. For our allies, the preservation and pursuit of SALT are evidence of continu-
ing convergence between their course and ours. They want both security and de-
tente; both major parties in West Germany, for instance, emphasize both the need
for NATO to deal with the issues of theater nuclear imbalance, and the need to
continue reaping whatever benefits have been obtained through detente— they
range all the way from humane contacts between Germans from East and West, to
business involvements in Eastern Europe, to the kind of protection against any
further erosion of America's strategic nuclear sword (or shield) which SALT II
entails. Our allies are worried, not only when they suspect us of neglecting the
European balance of forces for the global strategic one, but also when they hear us
292
arguing about security versus detente. This fear is not evidence of their "Finlandiza-
tion"— unless one applies this sillv term (insulting to the Finns) to every concern for
improved and mutually beneficial relations between East and West. For the United
States to reject the SALT agreement, after 7 years of bargaining, would weaken our
allies' confidence in America's ability to follow a steady and responsible course. This
faith has already been eroded by a series of disagreements over economic and non-
proliferation policies. 'Those who worry about the decline of American power should
remember that some of the worst wounds are self-inflicted.
II
Opposition to SALT II has concentrated less on the agreement than on the
international strategic and political environment. It has been said that our strategic
situation has seriously deteriorated: both the intercontinental and the European
theater nuclear balances have been shifting to the advantage of the Soviets, their
capacity to intervene far from their borders has increased while ours has declined,
and they have launched an "unprecedented geopolitical offensive." SALT II, insofar
as it ratifies "a dangerous shift," is therefore viewed by such critics either as a
symbol of our decline, or, at best, as a harmless snapshot of an uncomfortable
moment: let us not tear it up, but let us do all we can to reverse the trend. I will try
to address myself briefly to the strategic and to the political aspects of the problem.
A. Two strategic issues are worth mentioning: Soviet strategic conceptions, and the
growing vulnerability of our land-based missiles. It is these two issues which are
said to put us in grave danger, exposing us to blackmail and to the risks of
escalation control by a foe determined to use its growing military capabilities in
order to reach its political goals.
1. It has been said that the United States has put all its eggs in the basket of
deterrence, more specifically the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (M.A.D.),
whereas the Soviets are following a war-winning strategy. This strikes me as a
distortion of reality. First, it is true that we have, in the 1960's, proclaimed the
virtues of M.A.D. There were good reasons for this: if the main thing was the
possession of a "survivable" second strike force capable of devastating the enemy's
population and economic centers so as to deprive him of any reason for a surprise
attack, if wisdom also suggested leaving one's own country exposed so as to leave
oneself with no hope of getting away with such an attack, the quest for security and
for arms control would merge, and stability would be achieved. However, the more
the Soviets succeeded in reducing our erstwhile huge superiority, the less credible a
strategy of massive retaliation for occasions became; and the more warheads we
had, the more opportunities appeared for selective and accurate targeting. As a
result, the idea of a limited counterforce strategy — not a first-strike force aimed at
disarming our enemy, but the targeting of other military objectives — reappeared in
the Nixon Administration and has been confirmed by Secretary Brown. It may not
be a war-winning strategy (nobody has yet explained how nuclear war can be won),
it certainly is a war-fighting strategy.
Second, Soviet strategy is not a simple war-winning strategy that treats nuclear
weapons like ordinary ones. Soviet leaders have repeatedly acknowledged the folly
of nuclear war or nuclear superiority. On the other hand, Soviet conceptions differ
from ours. In Moscow, deterrence is seen, not as the opposite of war, nor as sharply
distinct from defense, as we tend to do, but as part of the science (or art) of war, and
inseparable from defense; not, I think, because the Soviets' objective is victory in the
classical sense, but because they assume that war is still possible, and must, if it
comes, aim as before above all at the destruction of the enemy's forces. To them,
therefore, deterrence means being capable of deterring us from striking first; and
this is best done, by having the ability not only to bust cities, but also to destroy a
sizable fraction of our nuclear forces — preemptively if necessary (not, as Professor
Pipes rightly points out, out of the blue, but at the height of a crisis). And since war
may come, the Soviets believe they have an interest in limiting damage to them-
selves: both the development of heavy missiles capable of destroying part of the
American striking force, and the civil defense efforts, correspond to this concern.
Clearly, such a conception is not an endorsement of M.A.D. (Soviet acceptance of
the ban on ABM, which was sometimes interpreted as one, was probably due to the
fact that our technological superiority might have made it easier for us to protect
our forces, thus thwarting the Soviets' ambition to be able to destroy part of them.)
Nor is it an assent to our notion of stability: given their conception, it made sense
for them to keep expanding their ICBM force even after they had caught up with
ours. The reasons for their adoption of this design are multiple, they do have a
profound sense of technological inferiority, they see us as setting the direction of the
arms race and therefore define their mission as being able to intimidate the intimi-
293
dator. Therefore, insofar as they have a notion of stability, it is not ours (i.e. neither
side should be able to threaten the other's retaliatory force), it is the idea of
stopping the development of new weapons systems once they have caught up with
us. Russia's traditional emphasis on defense, and the major role of the military in
strategic thinking and decision-making also account for this.
Now, the question raised by the difference in conceptions is: does it matter? It has
not prevented pragmatic, incremental bargaining on arms control, with each side
succeeding in blunting what it considered the most threatening new developments
of the rival. Indeed, the difference makes arms control more rather then less
necessary (if both sides embraced M.A.D., one wouldn't need such elaborate "struc-
tures of peace"), while also making it more difficult. The problem with the differ-
ence is that it allows for wide divergences in the assessment of Soviet strategic
purposes: does the design aim at winning a nuclear war, or only at deterring us
from resorting to nuclear weapons and at limiting damage to Soviet society if such
deterrence fails? A "war-fighting" strategy can aim either at both, or at either one
of these goals. My own assessment is that it aims at the latter: the Soviets are fully
aware of the enormity of our capabilities (hence their determination to be able to
reduce them!) and the limitations they have accepted in SALT II are far more
compatible with the second interpretation than with the first.
However, even the second presents serious problems for us. For there is still
another alternative. Is the Soviet conception of deterrence essentially defensive (i.e.
"intimidate the intimidator so he can't pressure you"), or is it primarily offensive,
aimed at winning without resort to nuclear weapons ("intimidate him so as to be
able to pressure him and to expand")? The Soviet build-up of the SS-20 and
Backfire bombers allows one to suspect that the latter may well be the goal (to be
sure, they are first-strike weapons that could be used against military objectives,
including American FBS, in Western Europe, but despite their precision, they would
create such vast civilian casualities that a war that began with such an attack could
not remain "limited" easily: it could trigger the U.S. strategic forces. The new
Soviet weapons seem much more apt at deterring our inferior theater nuclear
weapons from being used to stop a Soviet conventional thrust, while the Soviet
strategic force would deter our strategic force. As long as we had superiority in
theater forces, it would have been risky for the Soviets to begin a conventional
strike and to believe that no nuclear weapons would be used). Indeed, the Soviet
goal may be to pressure and expand, not through the use of conventional weapons,
but through blackmail, by exploiting politically Soviet advantages in regional bal-
ances and in the composition of nuclear forces.
2. This is where the issue of Minuteman vulnerability comes in. For many months
now, we have been almost obsessed by a nightmarish scenario: at the height of a
political crisis, we would let ourselves be intimidated by the Soviet ability to destroy
our ICBM force, leaving us with no alternative to capitulation other than mutual
destruction. It is in order to escape from this dilemma that we are planning a
mobile MX— which won't be ready until after our Minutemen have become vulner-
able. This scenario strikes me as perverse, and as an extraordinary instance of self-
intimidation and self-scare. First, in purely military terms, it is hard to believe that
the Soviets could ever be sure than an attack on all our land-based forces— which
would cause considerable civilian casualties would not trigger our remaining retali-
atory force (ca. 75 percent of our arsenal!) into devastating the U.S.S.R. For the
Soviets, it would be a cosmic roll of dice, expecting perfect success on their side and
cool, rational control on ours. As for selective Soviet strikes against our land-based
missiles, they would leave us with enough ICBM to retaliate against their land-
based forces, and the scenario of a nuclear war of attrition is highly dubious. The
gradual destruction of the enemy's first-strike forces, and even of his military
installations, is not sufficient to give one "victory," as long as his second strike force
is intact: one would win only if the "loser" spared the "winner's" own cities. The
ultimate threat, in the nuclear age, remains the menace of city destruction, and
counterforce nuclear war can "succeed" only if it deters the loser from carrying out
the supreme threat. This is independent of the momentary military balance, since
the ability to hit the other side's cities instead of (or in addition to) his forces exists
whether one is superior or inferior in first-strike forces.
T/^DA*;°?'^' ^^^^" ^" military terms, after a Soviet first strike aimed at our whole
ICBM force, if we chose not to retaliate against their cities, we would have another
alternative to capitulation: given our advantages in bombers and ALCM, we would
have huge residual means of hitting military targets, including the remaining
Soviet land-based missiles (assuming they wait for our counter-blows; but if they
don t wait, and aim at ports, factories, airfields, the civilian casualties might be
enough to provoke radical escalation); and we would still have enough warheads left
294
to be able to hit Soviet cities later. In other words, there is no decisive Soviet
advantage in striking first.
Third, as I have pointed out before, the vulnerability of land-based forces is not an
American problem only. Indeed, it is not clear that any of the mobile basing systems
discussed until now (other than those which would, in effect, turn land into sea-
based missiles) would guarantee invulnerability, given the vast numbers of war-
heads available to each side. And yet, precisely because there is no decisive Soviet
advantage to striking first, and even with the planned MX, we could probably not
destroy the whole Soviet ICBM arsenal in a first strike, not be sure to escape Soviet
massive retaliation if we did; the balance of terror is much less delicate than Albert
Wohlstetter had suggested.
Fourth, it is impossible to prove that the outcome of political conflicts has been
determined by the exact ratio of strategic military forces. Both sides — not just the
U.S.S.R.— refrained from the use of force during the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1968-
61, despite our nuclear superiority; and if we prevailed, it was because we had
shown resolve and demonstrated the importance of the stake to us. In the Cuban
missile crisis, the local advantage we had, and the same demonstration of resolve,
plus (again) our ability to put on the Soviets the burden of having to risk initiating
the use of force, gave us our victory, rather than the imbalance of strategic forces. It
is the relative importance of the stake to each side, that is decisive. To be sure, we
may try to fortify our resolve, and to make that importance more manifest, by
having "essential equivalence" in nuclear forces, as defined by Secretary Brown.
But nuclear equivalence or superiority did not help us in Vietnam, and there are
other ways to bolster one's resolve and to demonstrate one's commitment.
3. I come to the conclusion that the seriousness of our strategic situation vis-a-vis
the U.S.S.R. has been much exaggerated. What would deter us, in a crisis, from
attacking Soviet cities, is not the new phenomenon of Soviet heavy missiles and
throwweight superiority, it is the old fear of retaliation against our cities— it is
mutual vulnerability. On the other hand, scenarios of protracted counterforce nucle-
ar war sparing cities are inherently dangerous: the more accurate each side's
missiles become, the greater the enemy's incentive to preempt. To develop one's
counterforce capability may well, however, be ultimately irrelevant, except as a
waste of money: because of the uncertainty of fighting such an unprecedented war,
of the problems of command and control, of the fact that city-busting is always in
reserve, the enemy may never be sure that we actually mean to fight a limited
nuclear war, and he may therefore be quite unwilling to test, try and see.
If "essential equivalence" means that we must be perceived by others, and per-
ceive ourselves, as able to do whatever the Soviets are technically able to do — i.e.
destroy part of the enemy force — then a limited deployment of the M-X is justified
(even through we could probably achieve the same result with our existing forces). If
however one concludes, as I do, that there is nothing to be gained by having a first-
strike ability against land-based missiles, it becomes much more difficult to justify
the M-X (as opposed to merely giving a mobile basing system to Minuteman).
Ultimately, the choice for both superpowers will be between expensive mobile
systems that may not guarantee invulnerability anyhow, and could seriously compli-
cate the verification of arms control, and gradually phasing out ICBM altogether.
Since the Soviet arsenal consists so largely of ICBM, the coming predicament will
hit them much more than us.
In the meantime, our main military effort ought to be aimed at shoring up
regional balances. None of the scenarios that entail the use of strategic nuclear
weapons really makes sense — neither massive retaliation, not limited counterforce.
The function of these weapons is likely to remain deterrence from their use: even if
both sides don't endorse it as their common strategy, mutual assured destruction is
sufficiently possible to perpetuate, as Churchill saw it, safety as the sturdy child of
terror, and survival as the twin brother of annihilation. This means that the real
danger lies in the problems of regional instability, in a world strategically fragment-
ed under a stable superpower nuclear umbrella. In the specific case of Western
Europe, what is needed is both modernization of conventional forces, and an effort
at restoring the theater nuclear balance in such a way (a) as to deprive the Soviets
of any reason to believe that their advantage in this respect could allow them to
exploit their conventional superiority and to keep a conventional war from escalat-
ing to the nuclear level, (b) as to provide an incentive for mutual limitations and
reductions in theater nuclear forces.
However, regional balances depend decisively on underlying political and econom-
ic factors. We must end with some remarks about the "geopolitical" situation.
295
B. Two issues must be addressed separately: that of Soviet behavior, that of Ameri-
can power.
1. It has been asserted that the Soviets have launched a "geopolitical offensive,"
precisely because military might is the only dimension in which they are a super-
power; it has been stated that the combination of internal tensions (due to economic
inefficiency, nationalities' claims and succession troubles) and strategic advantages
in the early 80's might lead them to take greater risks and act more aggressively
than in the past.
I believe that this view imposes far more coherence and design on Soviet policy
than is warranted by reality. I agree with Robert Legvold, certainly one of our most
balanced and knowledgeable analysts of Soviet behavior, that military power has
never been quite the central and blunt instrument of Soviet foreign policy which so
many tell us it is. Surely, without such power the U.S.S.R. would neither have won
the Second World War (after the disasters of 1941-early 1942), nor have obtained
territorial gains and superpower status after the war. Nor would the Soviet empire
in Eastern Europe survive without the Red Army. However, rather than as a
deliberate, planned and masterly march toward world domination, Soviet policy is
easier to interpret as (a) a relentless attempt at achieving equality with the United
States, i.e. at breaking the American monopoly of control of the high seas or of
means to intervene all over the world, and at imposing Soviet participation in the
settlement of all major disputes, whether in the Middle East or in Southern Africa,
(b) the skillful exploitation of opportunities, many of which arise either without
having been created by the U.S.S.R., or through the independent action of a Soviet
client or ally. The U.S.S.R. has moved, but with considerable caution. Its presence in
the Arab-Israeli conflict has led to its expulsion by Egypt, and to increasing ambiva-
lence on the part of Syria and Iraq. The litany of Angola, the Horn of Africa, South
Yemen, Afghanistan, Vietnam, throws together disparate events, tied only by two
threads: low risks and opportunities provided by previous Western mistakes or
defeats or (in the case of Afghanistan) indifference.
To be sure, Soviet successes such as these are profoundly irritating to Americans.
But the idea of linking explicitly arms control agreements to Soviet "Good" behav-
ior does not deserve being revived. It suggests that such agreements must somehow
be in the Soviets' interest more than in ours, which is false. It also suggests that
they are so much in the Soviets' interest that we could use them as a level and
shortcut to obtain Soviet acquiescence to our idea of international stability and
moderation — a very static idea which looks at every change of regime in "our" parts
of the world with suspicion. Not only it is hard to believe that a power that has
never given up the effort to tilt the "correlation of forces" in the world in its
direction, would do so in exchange for mutually beneficial arms restraints. But we
must reflect that (a) we ourselves would not like to have to give up the pursuit of
unilateral advantages (banned by the fatuous language of the 1972 Soviet-American
agreement): for instance in the Middle East peace process, or in relations with
China, (b) we would object violently to any Soviet attempt to subordinate strategic
arms control, or Soviet cooperation in non-proliferation efforts, to our behaving the
way they would like us to behave in every part of the world. Henry Kissinger, who
had come to office with firm ideas about linkage, later became the most convincing
exponent of the view that our mutual interest in arms control precluded any effort
to link SALT to other matters. There is, in any case, an implicit linkage: if the
Soviets rock the boat too vigorously, they will find it impossible to get the American
Senate and public opinion to endorse arms agreements that seem incompatible with
such behavior.
If it is military might only that bolsters the Soviet claim to world power, then the
appropriate strategy for us is (a) to constrain that might through SALT and other
arms control bargains, (b) to match it, and help others match or deter it in those
areas where it is already deployed, (c) to see to it that third party conflicts do not
provide the U.S.S.R. with opportunities to project and inject its power in a manner
detrimental to our interests. Our competition with the U.S.S.R. will continue. But
competition can take many forms: from outright confrontation, to cooperative con-
tests. It is, in the long run, in our interest to move more toward the latter end of
the spectrum — both because there are indeed many vital issues that cannot be
handled without some participation of the U.S.S.R., and because only if there is
some density of cooperative relations in which the Soviets have a stake, may
consideration of linkage be effective (for instance, between economic help from the
West and Soviet external behavior; explicit linkage to domestic behavior is not
likely to work). Strategic arms control agreements should not be explicitly "linked"
to anything. But their own progress will depend on the superpowers' ability to
manage their contest in a less antagonistic way.
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2. Those who speak of the retreat of American power lump together very different
factors. One is an inevitable comparative decline. The preponderance of military
and economic power enjoyed by the United States in 1945 could not last; it was clear
that the U.S.S.R. would want to close the gap (and even if we have often been wrong
in expecting less of a Soviet nuclear build-up than took place, our own massive
program of 1961, plus the humiliation inflicted on the Soviets during the Cuban
missile crisis, gave them two powerful jolts and incentives). The economic recovery
of our allies, as well as the economic integration of Western Europe, were our own
objectives. The rise of OPEC is another element in that comparative decline; ironi-
cally, what has given OPEC its power is the very spectacular economic growth of
the advanced capitalist states, based on cheap energy.
A second factor is quite different. It consists of recent American defeats; see the
litany above, and add Iran, or the disintegration of our position in Turkey or in
Pakistan. But on the one hand, in practically every instance, we find that our
failure was due, not to a lack of material power, but to a deficiency in political
analysis and skill — in the use of our power, in our capacity to control the outcomes,
in our ability to anticipate events and to either exploit opportunities, or get out of
hopeless situations in time, or align ourselves with the forces that were destined to
prevail (not in order to capitulate to them but in order to influence them). This has
to do not with muscle but with brain. On the other hand, the world as seen from
Moscow is not rosier than the world as seen from here. China's drive for develop-
ment, its rapprochement with Japan (largely because of Soviet bungling), at least
partial peace, under U.S. auspices, in the Middle East, continuing negotiations,
under Western auspices, about Zimbabwe and Namibia, the consolidation and en-
largement of the EEC, the cooling of relations with India, and continuing discontent
in Eastern Europe — not to mention quagmires in Erithrea and Afghanistan: all of
this shows that growing might is not a perfect answer on the other side either.
A third factor in the alleged "retreat" is lack of will or resolve. But will, resolve,
taking a stand, become all too easily grandstanding, show without substance, and
empty rhetoric — or, as in Vietnam, recipes for disaster. The key problem here is
that the instruments of control on which we have been used to rely: the application
of military force or assistance, and the provision of economic aid, are simply inap-
propriate or insufficient in three kinds of issues that dominate today's agenda:
economic problems such as the energy crisis or the questions of inflation and
recession that plague us and our allies, disputes between states both of which
happen to be our friends or allies, internal disorder in friendly countries whose
troubles are too deep to be "resolved" by covert action. Thus the real drama lies in
the divorce between an expectation of control and the difficulties of influence; it lies
not in the absence but in a kind of impotence of power — in a world in which
America's own preponderance and position as guardian of the status quo make it
the inevitable target of all the discontented, of all the efforts at rewriting the rules
of every game.
3. In concluding, let me say that although there are more than enough reasons to
worry about the future of America's role in the world, if one looks at trends in the
world economy, or at world population figures, or at political and social conditions
in developing countries, or at racial issues and festering conflicts in most areas, or
at productivity figures in the United States, I am more disturbed by some conceptu-
al or perceptual deficiencies that mark the way in which Americans look at the
world. The recent debate on the Panama Canal as well as the current one on SALT
have thrown alarming light on these flaws (and also on serious institutional prob-
lems concerning the ability of a system of checks and balances to work effectively at
a time when isolation is impossible but patriotic mobilization around an imperial
President is also ruled out, and when one observes both a weakening of parties and
a rise of single-issue pressure groups).
A first deficiency is the tough-guy approach to international affairs. The number
of problems that are likely to be resolved or even just improved by displays of force
and dramatic acts of commitment is limited. Such acts are often useful, in a crisis.
But they are no substitute for political skill, before, even during, and after the crisis
(or so as to avoid one). And yet there is, in the land, a nostalgia for big sticks and
heroic strikes, for a kind of High Noon version of international diplomacy, for a
world policed by America's sheriffs or marshals, for the superiority of American
might and simplicity of moral division between good and evil which such a world
entailed. The Carter administration has been good at resisting these pressures, but
one doesn't win much support by pointing out what mistakes one has not made,
what follies one has avoided — especially not when the official voice is as hesitant
and cacophonous as has been the case in the past three years.
There is a second manifestation of the same flight from the imperatives of
political analysis and skill: the obsession, criticized above, with calculations of
297
strategic nuclear equivalance, and in particular of Minuteman vulnerability. It is as
if numbers of warheads or launchers, figures of throwweight and potential destruc-
tion, provided one with a gruesome but welcome certainty, with a firm and measur-
able handle over the messy uncertainties of international relations. The overempha-
sis of politically very improbably doomsday military scenarios is, like the recurrent
belief in dominoes, proof of a never-abandoned quest for precision and predictability.
But not only is this a misplaced quest, it is also dangerous insofar as it takes
attention and money away from the indispensable study of the myriad of complex
economic, social and political forces that criss-cross in more than 150 countries, and
that we desperately need to understand if we want to be able, not to control them,
for this is beyond any single nation's reach, but to affect them, and to prevent them
from pushing us into the decline we seem to fear so much. For there are many ways
in which great powers fall into decadence. Military ineptitude is only one of them,
and certainly not the one that threatens us most. Getting out of touch with what is
happening outside is another way of failing. Arms control agreements such as SALT
II, which do not lull us into complacency about the military balance, at least
provide us with more leeway to turn to what really counts, I won't say "ultimately,"
in order not to offend those who believe that military might remains decisive in the
last resort, but certainly in the daily contests of world politics. A rejection of SALT,
or amendments that would in effect destroy the agreements, would encourage the
national obsession with numbers of weapons, concentrate attention on the arms
race, and divert if from all the rest.
The Chairman. Our next witnesses are representatives from the
North Atlantic Assembly, and they are to come forward as a panel.
We have Mr. Paul Thyness, President, from Norway, Patrick
Wall from the United Kingdom, Chairman of the Military Commit-
tee, Klaas G. de Vries of the Netherlands, Rapporteur of the Mili-
tary Committee and Peter Corterier, of Germany, who is the Rap-
porteur of the Political Committee.
As we now begin with this delegation from the North Atlantic
Assembly, I would just like to emphasize how very important I
consider this testimony to be. It is a common practice in this
country to describe congressional participation in interparliamen-
tary organizations as mere junketing, and perhaps in some in-
stances the Congress may be guilty of that. But it certainly does
not apply to our participation in the North Atlantic Assembly,
which I consider to be an important institution serving the valua-
ble purpose of facilitating communication between elected repre-
sentatives of all the NATO countries. Moreover, I believe that
today's hearings graphically illustrate that purpose by allowing the
Foreign Relations Committee an opportunity to hear firsthand a
balanced presentation of opinion of American allies on this most
important issue.
Gentlemen, once again, I welcome you and look forward to your
testimony.
I yield to Senator Church, who would like to make a comment.
Senator Church. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join in welcoming this distinguished panel to the com-
mittee. It is very unusual for the committee, if not unprecedented,
to hear testimony from foreign citizens. We thought that in this
case the committee should bury its former practice, because you
gentlemen are representatives of the North Atlantic Assembly. We
have our own membership in that Assembly, and it is an arm of
the NATO alliance.
Furthermore, the attitude taken by our NATO allies toward the
SALT II Treaty is highly relevant to the Senate's consideration of
the treaty, and bears upon the final judgment that the Senate will
298
reach. For that additional reason we thought that it would be
advantageous to this committee to hear your testimony.
So, we welcome you here cordially, and I want to say that this
particular testimony is being given to the Subcommittee on Euro-
pean Affairs and that its chairman, Senator Biden, within the past
few months, has completed a trip to Western Europe, has visited
with our allies in the NATO alliance at very high levels, and that
the trip was well received.
All of us on the committee were proud of the work that Senator
Biden did on that trip, and we felt that it had a most productive
effect.
With that. Senator Biden, I commend you for your own trip, your
own efforts in connection with NATO and its relationship to this
treaty, and I join with you in welcoming these distinguished wit-
nesses this morning.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Church, and
thank you for putting into focus just how important the testimony
is, for if each or any of your countries were in firm opposition to
this treaty, I doubt very much if any of us would want it to go
forward.
Mr. Thyness, I would suggest that you and the panel proceed in
any v/ay that is most comfortable for you.
STATEMENT OF PAUL THYNESS, NORWAY, PRESIDENT, NORTH
ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY '
Mr. Thyness. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator.
Let me first of all say that we really are very grateful for the
invitation to testify before this committee, because we see it as an
appreciation of the concern of the alliance in connection with the
SALT II Treaty.
Let me also say that I appreciate on behalf of the North Atlantic
Assembly the kind words that Senator Church directed toward the
assembly. I hope I can take that as a sign that Senate attendance
will increase in the future, and that the Senate will not be discour-
aged by comments on foreign junketing, which is absolutely not the
case at the North Atlantic Assembly.
Now, with your permission I would now like to turn to my views
and impressions on the substance of the matter before us, that is,
European reaction to SALT II. I think it is correct to say that
broadly speaking, both detente and arms control measures have
over the years been more popular issues with European politicians
and voters than with their North American counterparts.
There are a number of historical, cultural, and geographical
reasons for this which are not necessary to go into here, but I
would like to warn particularly against any confusion of this atti-
tude with any tendency toward appeasement or defeatism.
For instance, in Norway, one of your smallest allies and one of
the two with a common border with the Soviet Union, recent polls
have shown 84 percent of the people support our military defense
and 65 percent actively support our membership in NATO. There
is absolutely no tendency to uncritical accommodation to Soviet
wishes, but the perspective is somewhat different from the one
commonly found on this side of the Atlantic.
' See page 302 for Mr. Thyness's prepared statement.
299
For Europeans, a normalization of East-West relations and a
dialog between the superpowers is viewed more pragmatically and
has a somewhat deeper and more immediate significance than
perhaps is felt by most Americans.
On this background, Europeans welcomed the SALT process from
the start, and European reactions to the SALT II Treaty as it has
emerged have been markedly favorable. There are, of course, criti-
cal voices to be heard, but they are few. For the most part, Europe-
an support of SALT II has been overwhelming.
The more generalized criticism that the treaty does not directly
and specifically enhance the security of Western Europe overlooks
the fact that the primary impulse behind the SALT process has
been to secure limitations on intercontinental nuclear systems, and
that the negotiations have not until the very last stage involved
systems of direct and specific relevance to the European theater.
It will be remembered that the United States consistently and
with full concurrence of our European allies has rejected Soviet
efforts to include U.S. systems based in Europe. It will inevitably
distort the picture if this historic perspective on the SALT II
Treaty is forgotten.
That is not to say, however, that the central nuclear balance is
not a relevant European concern, because it is. These systems
represent the final and indispensable guarantee for the security of
Western Europe, and agreement that affects this balance also af-
fects European security, but it is extremely difficult to see how, as
some critics assert, the United States is moving into a position of
strategic inferiority as a result of SALT II.
On the contrary, I think it can be argued that without SALT II
the prospects for continued essential equivalence in the 1980's is
more, not less in doubt. Nor have I seen it substantiated that the
treaty in any way undermines or diminishes the U.S. guarantee to
Europe. That guarantee has always been a question of trust, un-
knowable and unprovable, to us and to the Warsaw Pact, and
nothing in the treaty challenges that basic trust.
I would like very much to go on record here as one who feels this
trust, and I know that my belief is shared by an overwhelming
majority of my countrymen.
I think it must be accepted that over the last decade the military
balance has tilted significantly in favor of the Warsaw Pact, lead-
ing to considerable uneasiness is most Western European countries.
In Norway, our worry is mainly concerned with the Soviet naval
buildup. In other countries, the focus is more on Soviet superiority
in armor, and more recently on superiority in theater nuclear
forces. The need to redress the balance has become pressing before
the gap creates a situation in which Western Europe becomes
highly vulnerable to Soviet pressure. This means that there is a
need for costly modernization of conventional and theater nuclear
forces in Europe, but hopefully kept within reasonable bounds by
substantial arms control measures, MBFR and SALT III. But the
gateway to SALT III is obviously SALT II, and it is difficult also to
believe that MBFR could continue in the wake of a defeat of the
SALT II Treaty.
Without SALT II, the watch will be put back several years and
the climate for negotiations will inevitably deteriorate to a point
48-260 0-79 Pt.4 - 20
300
where we in fact will only be left with one option, of matching
Soviet buildup at all levels, strategic, theater nuclear, tactical,
conventional.
This in a no-SALT environment may prove to be a very difficult
task, and much more than with a SALT II Treaty in the back-
ground. I seriously question the possibility of persuading European
public opinion to back nuclear and conventional modernization if
the United States rejects the SALT II Treaty. In my opinion, an
acceptance of SALT II would not create a climate in Europe that
would undermine military vigilance.
Rather, it would signify a willingness on the part of the western
world to go along with serious arms control measures and the
reluctance to participate in an unrestrained arms race that could
erode public support for maintaining adequate defense postures.
Meeting the Euro-strategic requirements would require active
participation on the part of the United States. Except for the
British and French nuclear forces, it is the United States that
holds the nuclear umbrella over Western Europe. This, of course, is
of crucial importance to prevent the total defeat for our civiliza-
tion. But central systems are last resort forces and not forces that
directly counterbalance the kind of pressure that the Soviet Union
can exert on Western Europe on the basis of conventional superior-
ity backed by a superior theater nuclear capability.
That balance can only be achieved with American participation
at all levels. Without SALT II, Europeans may have reason to fear
that the United States would have to pour so much money and
effort into the strategic arms race that the contribution to the
defense of Western Europe will suffer. Seen through European
eyes, it is obviously a much more attractive alternative to get some
measure of stability into the strategic balance through SALT II
and at the same time preserve the United States as an active
participant in those fields which are more in need of concern in
Western Europe. I do believe that this also makes good sense in the
context of American security and global policies.
Now, in order to save time, I shall not go into the two points on
which there has been some anxiety in Europe, the noncircumven-
tion clause and the question of the duration of the protocol. I refer
here to my written statement and to my colleagues, particularly
Mr. de Vries and Mr. Corterier, with whom I believe I am in full
agreement.
Let me, however, comment on the rather frequent statements
heard on this side of the Atlantic that the United States did not
consult with her European Allies during the negotiation process,
that what was called consultations were more like briefings. The
facts are that the American administration deserves high praise
for the frequency with which it has informed the allies of develop-
ments throughout the negotiation process.
In matters that have been of particular concern to Europeans,
the Allies have been given every opportunity to express their views
fully before the United States committed herself vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union. Undoubtedly, there have been situations during the 7 years
of negotiations when the consultation process did not function at
its optimum. Progress in such negotiations is not always orderly
and evenly spaced. Sometimes there has been little time for real
301
negotiations, and sometimes sensitivity of the issues has worked
against the ideal form of consultation.
On the other hand, the European Allies have not always earned
full marks for their active participation. I believe it can be argued
that a consistently greater response from the Allies, particularly
during the first half of the negotiations, would have triggered
improvements in the consultations, generally.
What is of importance is two things. First, that it is very rare to
meet anyone who really feels that European interests have been
neglected during the negotiations, and second, when we hopefully
start on the SALT III negotiations, direct European interests will
be much more concretely affected.
Here, the consultations must be broadened compared to what
was natural and necessary during SALT IL If the criticism aimed
at SALT II consultations has served to sharpen the awareness in
this respect, it will have been of real service to the alliance as such,
I believe.
I would like to end my statement on the point which I believe is
perhaps the single most important one, namely, the results to be
expected in Europe if the treaty should not meet with the approval
of the Senate. For a variety of reasons, foreign affairs have always
in all countries been the particular province of the executive
power. Foreigners will always have difficulties in evaluating the
internal policies of another country.
We have witnessed the total incomprehension on the part of the
Soviet Union of the role of the Senate in shaping American foreign
policy. Here, of course, we are faced with a combination of a
general problem and a specific problem reflecting the vastly differ-
ent Soviet system, but the Europeans are not immune either to this
compound problem. In Europe, the parliamentary system of gov-
ernment implies that the government will have to resign if it is
voted down in Parliament on a major issue, and the system has
evolved in a way that imposes great restraints on the individual
member of Parliament. European members of Parliament very
rarely have that freedom to exercise an independent and personal
judgment which is a matter of course here in the U.S. Senate.
I am very much afraid that an adverse vote in the Senate will
never really be understood in Europe, and when people do not
understand something, they become suspicious, and the explana-
tions they make up are usually rather ungenerous, if not outright
hostile and accusatory.
If I had no other reason to support the treaty, this would have
been enough. Previous witnesses before this committee have under-
lined that Allied expressions of support for the treaty have been
influenced, among other things, by European domestic pressures. I
believe this to be true, but it would be wrong to ascribe this
pressure to European political leaders' fear of losing the next elec-
tion. Few elections are lost on questions of foreign policy anyhow,
and SALT II is not an issue of that kind. The pressure felt by
political leaders in Europe stems from a recognition of the vital
necessity of insuring public support at all times for the NATO
alliance and for a national defense posture and of the devastating
effect nonratification is likely to have on the credibility of both
302
United States leadership of the Alliance and the aims and the
purposes of the Alliance as such.
We in Europe will be faced with a public opinion problem of
staggering proportions, and no doubt the Soviet Union will work
that for all it is worth.
I quite realize that this is only one of the many points the Senate
will have to consider, and perhaps not a major one seen from this
side of the Atlantic. By the Constitution of the United States, it is
the right and the duty of the Senate to work the will of the
American people and of the Europeans, but in the same way I as a
European politician must try to persuade you of the case for
Europe, and this I have tried to do.
Fortunately, I have been aided in this by my firm conviction that
in the long term there is no conflict of interest between us, that
nothing which harms the one can serve the other, and that no
dividing influence will ever serve either. Thank you.
[Mr. Thyness' prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul Thyness
The North Atlantic Assembly is a semi-official organization of parliamentarians
that was started 25 years ago — five years after the signing of the NATO Treaty — by
a number of European and Canadian members of parliament soon joined by a
number of prominent Senators and Congressmen from the United States, who felt
that parliamentarians in a modern democracy have an increasingly important role
to play in questions of foreign policy and defence as intermediaries between govern-
ments and people. To discharge these duties members of parliament needed a forum
to provide a greater active involvement in the affairs of the Alliance, independent
sources of information and broad contact with their colleagues from Allied nations.
The organization was first known as "The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference"
and grew from an annual meeting to a permanent body that assumed the name of
the North Atlantic Assembly in 1966. It has a bureau consisting of a President,
three Vice Presidents and a Treasurer, one of whom must always be a North
American. The bureau is supported by a Standing Committee of one representative
of each national delegation, and an international secretariat situated in Brussels.
The Assembly works through five main committees: Political, Military, Economic,
Scientific and Technical, and Education, Cultural Affairs and Information Commit-
tees. These committees in turn may establish subcommittees for dealing with specif-
ic issues.
The group meeting with you today has been called — for want of a better name — a
Presidential Working Group. It has for various reasons not been set up a subcom-
mittee by the ordinary procedure, and it cannot speak for the North Atlantic
Assembly as such. Its main task is to coordinate preparations for the discussions on
strategic arms limitations and theatre nuclear modernization at the Assembly's
annual plenary session in Ottawa in late October this year.
While it cannot speak for the Assembly it is, however, a singularly representative
group comprising the Chairman and General Rapporteur of the Military Committee,
the General Rapporteur of the Political Committee and the President of the Assem-
bly. These four people come from two of the greater European Allies, United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, and two small Allies, the Nether-
lands and Norway. Two are Conservative, two are Social Democrats. One Conserva-
tive and one Social Democrat belong to parties in government and one of each of
parties in opposition. And we are all four of us deeply concerned with politico-
military affairs in our respective parliaments.
With the Committee's permission I would now like to turn to my views and
impressions of the substance of the matter before us, i.e. European reactions to
SALT II.
I think it is correct to say that broadly speaking both detente and arms control
measures have over the years been more popular issues with European politicians
and voters than with their North American counterparts. There are a number of
reasons for this. One of that the European nations individually cannot match the
Soviet Union militarily. The United States can, and NATO collectively can, but
dependence on others will never breed that deep sense of self-reliance that comes
from a knowledge of being able to go it alone if necessary. No European nation can
303
do that, and this fact naturally colours European thinking. Another reason is that
the European nations are very much aware that they would be the first casualties
in any armed conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. And Western Europe,
with its small, densely populated territory, has been engulfed in devastating wars
twice already in this century.
This attitude must not be confused with appeasement or defeatism. For instance
in Norway — one of your smallest Allies and one of the two with a common border
with the Soviet Union — recent polls have shown 84 percent of the people to support
our military defence and 65 percent actively to support our membership in NATO.
There is no tendency to uncritical accommodation to Soviet wishes. But the perspec-
tive is somewhat different from one commonly found on this side of the Atlantic.
For Europeans a normalisation of East-West relations and a dialogue between the
super-powers is viewed more pragmatically and has a somewhat deeper and more
immediate significance than is felt by most Americans.
On this background Europeans welcomed the SALT process from the start, and
European reactions to the SALT II treaty as it has emerged have been markedly
favourable. There are of course critical voices to be heard, but they are few. For the
most part European support for SALT II has been overwhelming.
The more generalised criticism that surfaces from time to time is directed against
the treaty for not being what it was never intended to be, viz. a treaty designed to
enhance the security of Western Europe specifically and directly. The primary
impulse behind the SALT process has been to secure limitations on the interconti-
nental nuclear systems, traditionally termed "strategic" systems. This dividing of
nuclear weapons systems into "strategic" and "tactical" is imprecise and generally
unsatisfactory, in that it leaves out nuclear systems aimed at Western Europe. For
that reason and with considerable merit it has lately become fashionable to speak of
"Eurostrategic" systems. But this is a fairly recent development, and the fact
remains that the negotiations have not, until the very last stage, involved systems
of direct and specific relevance to the European theatre. It will be remembered that
the United States consistently, and with full concurrence of her European Allies,
has rejected Soviet efforts to include U.S. systems based in Europe. It will inevitably
distort the picture if this historic perspective on the SALT II treaty is forgotten.
This is not to say, however, that the central nuclear balance is not a relevant
European concern. These systems represent the final and indispensable guarantee
for the security of Western Europe, and an agreement that affects this balance also
effects European security. But apart from the tiny minority that specialises in the
somewhat arcane world of strategic theory where the conclusions one reaches fairly
often are of doubtful relevance to the affairs of living and breathing men, most
Europeans are content to study the treaty in its broadest terms. These appear to
indicate that SALT II does establish a position of "essential equivalence ' where
advantages for one side in certain areas are balanced by concessions in others. It is
extremely difficult to see how, as some critics assert, the United States is moving
into a position of strategic inferiority. Nor have I seen it substantiated that the
treaty in any way undermines or diminishes the U.S. guarantee to Europe. That
guarantee has always been a question of trust, unknowable and unprovable, to us
and to the Warsaw Pact, and nothing in the treaty challenges that basic trust. I
would like to go on record as one who feels this trust, and I know that my belief is
shared by the overwhelming majority of my countrymen.
I think it must be accepted that over the last decade the military balance has
tilted significantly in favour of the Warsaw Pact, leading to considerable uneasiness
in most Western European countries. In Norway our worry is mainly concerned
with the Soviet naval build-up, in other countries the focus is more on Soviet
superiority in armour and more recently on superiority in theatre nuclear forces.
The need to redress the balance has become pressing before the gap creates a
situation in which Western Europe becomes highly vulnerable to Soviet pressure.
This means that there is a need for a costly modernisation of conventional and
theatre nuclear forces in Europe, but hopefully kept within reasonable bounds by
substantial arms control measures — MBFR and SALT III. But the gateway to SALT
III is obviously SALT II, and it is difficult to believe that MBFR could continue in
the wake of a defeat of SALT II. Without SALT II the watch will be put back
several years and the climate for negotiations will inevitably deteriorate to a point
where we in fact will only be left with the one option of matching the Soviet build-
up at all levels, strategic, theatre nuclear or Eurostrategic and conventional.
This in a no-SALT environment may prove to be a very difficult task, and much
more than with a SALT II treaty in the background. I seriously question the
possibility of persuading European public opinion to back nuclear and conventional
modernisation if the United States rejects the SALT II treaty. In my opinion the
acceptance of SALT II would not produce a climate in Western Europe that would
304
undermine military vigilance; rather, it would signify a willingness on the part of
the Western World to go along with serious arms control measures and a reluctance
to participate in an unrestrained arms race that could erode public support for
maintaining an adequate defence posture.
Meeting the Eurostrategic requirements will also require active participation on
the part of the United States. Except for the British and French nuclear forces it is
the United States that holds the nuclear umbrella over Western Europe. This of
course is of crucial importance to prevent a total defeat for our civilisation. But the
strategic nuclear systems are last resort forces, and not forces that directly counter-
balance the kind of pressure that the Soviet Union can exert on Western Europe on
the basis of conventional superiority backed by a superior theatre nuclear capabili-
ty. That balance can only be achieved with American participation at all levels.
Without SALT II Europeans may have reason to fear that the United States will
have to pour so much money and effort into the strategic arms race that the
contribution to the defence of Western Europe will suffer.
Seen through European eyes it is obviously a much more attractive alternative to
get some measure of stability in the strategic balance through SALT II, and at the
same time preserve the United States as an active participant in those fields which
are of more immediate concern to Western Europe. And I believe that this also
makes good sense in the context of the American security and global policies.
At the outset of the debate in Europe some anxiety was expressed concerning the
ambiguity of the non-circumvention clause. If it could involve the American assist-
ance to the United Kingdom in the modernisation of its strategic force or the
deployment to Europe of cruise missiles for use in the theatre role it would indeed
have put a different complexion on the treaty, and might very well have had a
serious negative effect on European attitudes. In fact I believe that before clarifica-
tion on this point was obtained some skepticism was created that has not been
completely dissolved. It is a fairly common phenomenon which we politicians have
to live with that initial impressions die hard.
However, the Administration has repeatedly stressed, and has indeed formally
stated in a letter to the NATO Council, that not only has the United States
consistently rejected the inclusion of a non-transfer provision in the SALT II agree-
ment, but it has made it clear that the transfer of weapons and technology to the
Allies will continue and cannot ipso facto constitute circumvention. In the light of
this statement and the testimony of Administration witnesses before this Committee
I believe that any serious question on this point has been satisfactorily answered.
Another point of a similar character was the initial debate over the question of
the duration of the protocol to the treaty, although this was not only a specific
European concern. In my opinion critics of the treaty were quite right in pointing
out the danger of the protocol being extended beyond 1981. We all know how easily
such provisions become an integral part of an established order. The Administration
might very well find itself in the position either having to prolong the protocol, and
thereby further postponing the possible deployment of ground and sea launched
cruise missiles, or refusing to prolong the protocol, and thereby appear to under-
mine ongoing negotiations. But that situation cannot arise when the possible exten-
tion of the protocol has been extensively debated and decided against beforehand.
Witnesses for the Administration have repeatedly stressed that the protocol will end
in 1981, and have also intimated that the Soviet Union has accepted this. Under
these circumstances it is the prolongation of the protocol that would constitute a
major new departure. Thus one of the weaker spots in the whole package has been
effectively dealt with.
It has been said that the United States did not consult with her European Allies
during the negotiation process, that what was called consultations was more like
briefings on a take it or leave it basis.
To my mind this is largely a question of semantics. Consultations is a point on a
scale that ranges from the European Allies dictating to the United States on the
one side, to the Europeans being told flatly what the United States has decided at
the other extreme.
The facts as I have understood them are that the Administration deserves high
praise for the frequency with which it has informed the Allies of developments
throughout the negotiation process. In matters that have been of particular concern
to the Europeans, for instance the non-circumvention question and the questions
relating to the protocol issue, the Allies have been given every opportunity to
express their views fully before the United States committed herself vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. Undoubtedly there have been situations during seven years of negoti-
ation when the consultation process did not function at its optimum. Progress in
such negotiations is not always orderly and evenly spaced, sometimes there has
305
been little time for real consultations, sometimes the sensitivity of the issues has
worked against the ideal form of consultations.
On the Other hand, the European Allies have not always earned full marks for
active participation. I believe it can be argued that a consistently greater response
from the Allies would have triggered improvements in the consultations generally.
What is of particular importance is two things. First, that it is very rare to meet
anyone who really feels that European interests have been neglected during the
negotiations. Secondly, when we hopefully start on the SALT III negotiations, direct
European interests will be much more concretely affected. Here the consultations
must be broadened compared to what was natural and necessary during SALT IL If
the criticism aimed at the SALT II consultations has served to sharpen the aware-
ness in this respect it will have been of real service to the Alliance as such.
I would like to end my statement on the point which I believe is perhaps the
single most important one, namely the results to be expected in Europe if the treaty
should not meet with the approval of the Senate.
We all know that the role of the legislature is much smaller in foreign affairs
than in domestic affairs. For a variety of reasons foreign affairs has always and in
all countries been the particular province of the executive power. The corollary is
that when it comes to other countries all of us tend to look to a President, a Prime
Minister or a Foreign Secretary to speak legitimately and responsibly for their
country's interests. Foreigners will always have difficulties in understanding major
differences of opinion between Government and Parliament.
We have witnessed the total incomprehension on the part of the Soviet Union of
the role of the Senate in shaping foreign policy. Here we were faced with a
combination of the general problem and a specific problem that has its roots in the
vastly different Soviet system. But the Europeans are not immune either to this
compound problem. In Europe the parliamentary system of government is preva-
lent, and since this implies that the government will have to resign if it is voted
down in parliament on a major issue, the system has evolved in a way that has
imposed great restraints on the individual member of parliament. European mem-
bers of parliament very rarely have that freedom to exercise an independent and
personal judgment which is a matter of course in the United States Senate.
I am very much afraid that an adverse vote in the Senate will never really be
understood in Europe. And when people do not understand something they become
suspicious, and the explanations they make up are usually rather ungenerous if not
outright hostile and accusatory.
If I had no other reason to support the treaty, this would have been enough.
Previous witnesses before this Committee have underlined that Allied expressions of
support for the treaty have been influenced among other things by European
domestic pressures. This I believe is true. But it would be wrong to ascribe this
pressure to European political leaders' fear of losing the next election. Few elections
are lost on questions of foreign policy, and SALT II is not an issue of that kind. The
pressure felt by political leaders stems from a recognition of the vital necessity of
ensuring public support at all times for the NATO Alliance and the national
defence posture, and of the devastating effect non-ratification is likely to have on
the credibility of both the United States' leadership and the aims and purposes of
the Alliance. We in Europe will be faced with a public opinion problem of stagger-
ing proportions, and no doubt the Soviet Union will work that for all it is worth.
I quite realise that this is only one of the many points the Senate will have to
consider, and perhaps not a major one seen from this side of the Atlantic. By the
Constitution of the United States it is the right and the duty of the Senate to work
the will of the American people, not the Europeans. But in the same way I as a
European politician must try to persuade you of the case for Europe. Fortunately I
am aided in this by a firm conviction that in the long term there is no conflict of
interest between us, and that nothing which harms the one can serve the other and
that no dividing influence can serve either.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Church has a full schedule,
so I will yield to him to ask some questions of you, Mr. Thyness,
and then we will, with the permission of my colleagues, go down
the line for your other statements. Then we, the remainder, will
ask the panel questions, if that is all right.
Senator Church. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for that
courtesy.
306
EUROPEAN ENDORSEMENT SO NOT TO OFFEND UNITED STATES
Mr. Thyness, you have made a very strong statement of support
for the SALT Treaty. It is a well-reasoned statement. We have
heard opponents of this treaty who testified before the committee
say that although the European governments have formally en-
dorsed the treaty, the primary reason they have done so is not to
offend the United States. They have said that actually there were
serious doubts about the treaty, at least in European military
circles.
What is your response to that argument?
Mr. Thyness. Well, Senator, it is, of course, practically impossi-
ble to speak for several thousand political leaders in 13 countries
in Europe, and of course there are dissenting voices to be heard.
That is beyond doubt. But my personal impression from speaking
to political leaders in my own country and in most of the other
countries of the European side of the alliance is that their expres-
sions of support for the treaty are absolutely genuine, and that
most political leaders see, as I do, that there are grave problenis
with which European political leaders will be confronted if this
treaty is rejected.
My impression is that most of the criticism of SALT II is not
particularly directed against the treaty as such, although of course
it is pegged to one or two specific questions, but that it is more or
less directed against what some people see as a trend in European
and alliance policies going against a reasonable defense effort.
No doubt our expenditure on defense has been going down for 20
years, I believe, and the Soviet Union has gone up, but this trend is
not a consequence of the SALT Treaty and will not be influenced
by the SALT Treaty. As a matter of fact, I believe that the trends
are straightening out, and partly perhaps as a result of the debate
on the treaty as such.
rejection could reverse defense spending
Senator Church. But you say reversal of increased defense
spending direction in your testimony:
I seriously question the possibility of persuading European public opinion to back
nuclear and conventional modernization if the United States rejects the SALT II
Treaty.
In other words, you feel that the trend which is now in the
direction of increased defense spending in Europe as well as in the
United States, could be reversed in the event that the Senate were
to reject this treaty.
Mr. Thyness. Yes, sir, I do. I think that most Europeans will go
for a reasonable increase in the defense expenditure, provided they
are convinced that their leaders are doing what is necessary and
not what is superfluous. They want to see their leaders do every-
thing reasonable to get more balance into the East- West relation-
ship in the military field, and this, of course, can be achieved in
two ways, either by hiking our own expenditure or by getting the
other side to back down a bit.
Senator Church. So would it be accurate for me to conclude on
the basis of your testimony that the adverse balance in Europe
between conventional and nuclear forces in Western Europe and
307
Eastern Europe, is less likely to be redressed in the event the
Senate were to reject this treaty than otherwise.
Mr. Thyness. Very much so, Senator. I spent 14 years in the
Norwegian parliament defending the Alliance and our military
establishment's requirements. I see very little prospect of being
heard any more if the SALT II Treaty, representing a serious
attempt to get some balance into the picture through arms control,
is rejected. I think it would be a hopeless situation.
Senator Church. I think your testimony is very important, be-
cause what you are saying very clearly here, and I have ap-
proached the matter in three directions, or at least have ap-
proached it three times, perhaps from the same direction, is we can
anticipate a weakened NATO should the Senate reject this treaty.
Mr. Thyness. Yes, sir.
Senator Church. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senators, may we go on?
Sentor Hayakawa. That would be fine.
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF PATRICK WALL, UNITED KINGDOM, CHAIRMAN,
MILITARY COMMITTEE, NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY '
Mr. Wall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
May I say what a privilege it is for us to be asked to give
testimony to this important committee, and may I also say that as
our President, Mr. Thyness, has emphasized, we are not speaking
as representatives of our respective governments, but as individual
members of the North Atlantic Assembly.
In this alliance, Mr. Chairman, the United States, as we all
know, is the leader and the strongest Nation, and unless there is
some fundamental disagreement, it would be quite wrong for your
allies not to give you their full support. We must therefore hope
that the treaty will be ratified.
Indeed, the price of failure of these long negotiations would be
high. I suggest that it is not for us to question your views as to the
question of nuclear balance between the two superpowers. That is
your responsibility. But as a European, there are certain issues
which directly concern me.
First if I may speak as a politician of some 25 years' standing, I
am concerned that such matters of international strategy have to
some extent become a matter of domestic political controversy.
Obviously, the Administration has a great deal to gain politically
with ratification of the treaty.
May I say that such a situation is certainly not unknown in
Europe?
Second, there are powerful Soviet weapons which today threaten
Europe but not the United States of America. Should at a later
date an American administration be voted into office which, unlike
previous administrations, would be deterred from using its strate-
gic force to retaliate after a limited theater nuclear attack against
Europe, this factor could have the gravest consequences.
I refer, of course, to the SS-20 and the Backfire. At present and
in the immediate future, Europe's main protection certainly
against the SS-20 is the American strategic nuclear deterrent. The
' See page 309 for Mr. Wall's prepared statement.
308
counter to this weapon may lie in the cruise missile. It is therefore
essential in my submission that the protocol to the treaty should
not be renewed after its expiration date on the 31st of December,
1981.
Mr. Chairman, my Government believes in the importance of a
continued British nuclear deterrent. The Nassau Agreement al-
lowed us to purchase your Polaris A3 and to fit them with our own
nuclear warheads. One of the options for replacing these A3's in
the future could be a similar purchase of your Trident I's, or cruise
missiles, or a mixture of both. It is therefore of primary importance
that the noncircumvention clause of the treaty is clearly under-
stood not to prohibit such a purchase should this be desired by our
two countries.
It is, of course, possible for us in Britain to produce our own
complete missiles, but this would be more expensive and could
mean less would be spent on other forms of mutual defense hard-
ware.
Third, while these hearings are a magnificent exercise in democ-
racy, and an education to all our peoples, they are taking a long
time. The question of the Alliance's solution to the problem of
theater nuclear weapons is pressing, and as the Senators well
know, we are all hoping to get a positive answer in December.
Now, my question is this. Will this decision on arms sale of
theater nuclear weapons be held up if the SALT II debate is not
completed by then? In some ways, it might be advantageous if the
decision on allied theater nuclear weapons policy was made before
the treaty was ratified, as it would then be quite clear that such an
agreement in no way interfered with SALT II.
But as I have said, such a decision is urgently needed if the SS-
20 is not to assume a potentially commanding position in Europe.
Now, sir, I understand that the administration has given firm
assurances on these questions during these hearings, but they are
of such importance to Great Britain that I would like to repeat
them.
First, will it be made clear to the Soviets that the protocol will
not be extended under any circumstances?
Second, that the transfer of cruise missile and other technology
be authorized; for example, that it be made clear by Senate resolu-
tion that there is nothing in the treaty to prevent Britain from
purchasing the Trident I should this be desired by the U.S. Govern-
ment.
Third, that every effort should be made to speed up the Alli-
ance's decision on theater nuclear weapons.
Finally, there is the whole question of the East-West balance.
The U.S.S.R. has been outbuilding NATO for many years, and the
balance is tilting dangerously against us. In my own country,
during the periods from 1964 to 1970 and from 1974 to 1977 our
defense forces have been cut to the bone. The new British Govern-
ment is doing it best to repair this damage. It is not for nothing I
suggest that Mrs. Thatcher has been christened the Iron Maiden by
the Russians.
It would appear that President Carter's important initiative in
1977 has caused NATO to wake up.
309
In my view, ratification of the SALT II Treaty, which I hope will
take place, should be accompanied by a rearmament program by
all the NATO allies, and especially by our leader, the United
States of America.
Mr. Chairman, may I conclude by saying that members of this
committee have in their possession a written statement amplifying
my short oral statement, and also dealing with an important ques-
tion of East-West balance which I believe is often overlooked by the
general public, and I refer to Western Europe's extreme depend-
ence on imported oil from the Gulf and vital minerals from South-
ern Africa, which could well prove to be our Achilles' heel, had we
ever had to fight not a hot war or even a limited war, but a battle
for resources. Thank you.
[Mr. Wall's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Patrick Wall
In this prepared statement I propose to amplify certain specific issues, namely the
strategic nuclear balance, domestic political controversy, and the Euro-strategic and
theatre nuclear balance made in my verbal presentation as well as dealing with
some points on the East-West balance that we may have to face in the next few
years.
the nuclear balance
The balance since SALT I
The SALT I Agreement in 1972 was justified by some as an Agreement that
codified strategic parity. It has also been stated that, in fact, it allowed the U.S.S.R.
some 50 percent more ICBM Launchers and 45 percent more SLBM Launchers than
the U.S.A. The throw-weight of the deployed Soviet ICBM's was also considerably
more than that of the U.S. ICBM's. However, it was claimed that because of
superior MIRV technology, and its lead in heavy bombers, the United States could
afford the Soviet advantage in the number of ICBM Launchers.
In fact, the U.S.S.R. caught up with MIRV technology within two years. In 1974
the Vladivostock understanding prolonged SALT I and was based on essential
equivalence in launchers; 2,400 each including 1,320 MIRV Launchers; freedom to
detemine the mix of weapons and no restrictions on the number of warheads in
each MIRV, but there was no reference to advanced technology weapons such as the
Cruise Missile. It formed the framework of SALT II.
The net result of the failure of SALT I to restrict modernisation and replacement
has been an unprecedented buildup of the Soviet strategic nuclear capability, with
no corresponding American increase.
In fact, since 1975 the U.S.S.R. has deployed the SS-17, 18, 19 and 20. The SS-18
having a throw-weight exceeding twice that of any U.S. missile.
By 1980 the total Soviet throw-weight will be almost double that of the U.S.A. and
the number of warheads multiplied by 4 or 5. But the U.S.A. will still have a lead in
the total number of warheads.
In contrast the U.S.A. has deployed no new ICBM since 1972 and has only
modernised existing Minutemen Ill's roughly doubling the present 170 kilo ton yield
compared to the 2 megaton yield of the SS-18. The United States missiles are still
more accurate but the Soviet Union is catching up.
Much the same story can be told about SLBM's in which the SSN8 has now been
deployed in some 29 Delta class submarines, thus permitting them to hit the U.S.A.
from the Barents Sea. Whereas the first USN equivalent, U.S.S. Ohio, armed with
the Trident I, will not be operational until at least 1980, and the 6,000 mile range
Trident II is not expected to be available until the mid-1980s when only 10 Ohios
will be deployed. However the MIRVed SSNX-18 is now becoming operational in
the Delta III submarines.
In 1972, the U.S. had some 400 heavy bombers compared to 140 in the Soviet Air
Force, The ratio is now nearer to 350 to 135, but the U.S. bombers are mainly B52s,
the Bl having been cancelled. On the other hand the U.S.S.R. has so far built some
100 Backfire medium bombers and is expected to have some 300 by 1985.
These figures are taken from various United States and British sources and may
not be 100 percent accurate, but they do clearly show the trend since 1972, which
has been wholly in favour of the Soviet Union.
310
The same overall trend can be found in conventional forces, a trend which, if
continued, will put the U.S.S.R. in a commanding position to impose its will on most
of the continents of the earth.
The strategic balance today and in 1985
The ratification of the SALT II agreement would limit the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.
to a total of 2,250 ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers, of which 1,320 can be
MIRVed, ICBM's and SLBM's and heavy bombers carrying ALCM's of intermediate
range. Within the limits of 1,320 MIRVed launchers a sublimit of 1,200 is placed on
MIRVed ICBM's and SLBM's and a further sublimit of 820 is placed on MIRVed
ICBM's. It is estimated that these limits will have the following results by 1985:
(a) MIRVed ICBM's — The Minuteman III production line is now closed down and
the new MX delayed and cannot now be operational by 1985. The 550 Minuteman
Ill's can be upgraded in accuracy but the aggregate useful payload or throw-weight
of the U.S. MIRVed ICBM force in 1985 will not exceed IVi million pounds and
1,650 RV's (1,650).
The U.S.S.R. can deploy 300 plus SS-18's (308) and some 500 (512) SS-17's and
19's, giving an estimated aggregate throw-weight for the Soviet Union ICBM Force
of 8 to 9 million pounds, and 6,000 (5,662) RV's.'
It has thus been estimated that in a first strike the U.S.S.R. could eliminate from
70 to 90 percent of U.S. silos whereas the U.S.A. would have the capability of
destroying 65 percent of the Soviet ICBM silos.
(b) Un-MIRVed ICBM's— The U.S. 450 Minuteman II and 54 Titan has an estimat-
ed 1 million pounds (1.5 million) throw-weight and 1,000 megatons (936) of yield. The
Soviet may substitute 360 SSII's by a new ICBM as permitted under the agreement
which could produce an estimated throw-weight of 2V2 million pounds and some
6,000 megatons yield.
(c) MIRVed SLBM's — The U.S. is expected to have 21 Poseidon submarines, 10
Trident I backfitted submarines, and 7 (10) new Trident I submarines by 1985,
giving a total of 38 (41) nuclear-propelled MIRVed SLBM submarines with some 664
(650) MIRVed tubes with some 5,300 (5,700) RV's.
The Soviet Union could, under the agreement, deploy some 400 MIRV missile
launchers. It is expected that the new Soviet Typhoon submarines will carry 20 to
24 missiles with up to 14 RV's. The SSN18 is expected to have some 7 MIRV's. The
U.S. therefore, will continue to lead in SLBM MIRVed tubes and RV's.
(d) Un-MIRVed SLBM's— The U.S. is expected to retain only some 80 SLBM's and
the Soviet some 600.
(e) ALCM Bombers — The U.S. plans a possible deployment of 120 such aircraft
with cruise missiles of over 600 kilometers range.
If these figures are approximately correct it will be seen that the U.S. inferiority
in all categories of strategic power except accuracy, SLBM's and heavy bombers has
been frozen for the duration of the agreement. The argument, therefore, rests on
whether the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent will remain credible during the dura-
tion of the treaty. This question together with that of verification, has been debated
during the hearings and must remain an American decision, but already the bal-
ance is tilting against the U.S.A.
In addition the virtual deadlock of the MBFR negotiations for so long does not
appear to indicate a Soviet desire for a balance but rather a drive for further
superiority.
DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTROVERSY
It has always been a matter for concern when the international strategic balance
or, for that matter, national defense, becomes a domestic political issue.
To the outsider the U.S. administration has fallen over backwards to commend
this agreement. There are many arguments in its favour, but the briefing of foreign
Members of Parliament by U.S. Embassy staff, the knowledge that the Administra-
tion is in trouble over other national issues and badly needs successful ratification,
makes an experienced politician wonder about the political as opposed to the mili-
tary need for an Agreement.
This, I fear, is not unusual as opposing party lines on defense issues are current
both in my own country and in Europe as a whole.
' The figures in the text are drawn from U.S. sources and the figures in parentheses from non-
Government British sources.
311
THE EURO-STRATEGIC AND THEATRE NUCLEAR WAR BALANCE
As currently constituted, the SALT II Treaty affects only missiles and heavy
bombers of intercontinental range. This has meant the exclusion of a number of
systems whose characteristics make them difficult to define but which are of great
relevance to Europe. There can be no question that the U.S. authorities have kept
their allies fully informed during all the SALT discussions. However, Europe is
menaced by two major new weapons systems that are not included in SALT II — the
Backfire bomber and SS-20. On the other hand, restrictions on the deployment of
cruise missiles are included in the treaty.
It has already been stated that the strategic balance has tilted against the United
States. As far as Europe is concerned the shift in theatre nuclear capabilities in
favour of the Warsaw Pact has been even more dramatic.
In January 1978 the U.S.S.R. had about 700 I/MRBM's, 430 medium bombers and
20 plus SLBM's targeted on high priority European targets. By 1985 it has been
estimated that there will be some 275 SS-20 missiles and 250 Backfire bombers
deployed against European targets, plus 700 I/MRBM's (some targeted on China),
430 medium bombers and 20 SLBM's.
NATO Europe can produce 150 British and French IRBM's and SLBM's and some
200 nuclear capable aircraft, which is a deterrent but no real answer to the scale of
the Warsaw Pact threat, even when backed by the USAF's Fill's and other aircraft
and the USN's SLBM's allocated to SACEUR.
Anti-Backfire defences can be improved with the advent of the British Air De-
fence Tornado and new types of U.S. aircraft based in Britain. But the SS-20, which
is mobile and has a range of some 3,000 miles can, therefore, be targeted on
European ports and airfields from inside Russia, it can, therefore only be attacked
by aircraft which would inevitably suffer appalling losses.
The counter to the SS-20 may be a new long-range theatre nuclear ballistic
missile, an extended-range Pershing or a Cruise Missile, or a mix of all three. The
new theatre ballistic missile cannot be operational by 1985. A stretched Pershing is
unlikely to have a range of more than 1,000 miles, and aircraft equipped with
intermediate range Cruise Missiles are counted as heavy bombers and included in
the SALT numerical aggregates.
They are also limited to an average of 28 missiles, with not more than 20 carried
in each existing B-52 Bomber. Even more important, ground and sea-launch Cruise
Missiles are restricted to a range of 600 kilometres (350 miles) by the Protocol to the
Agreement, which expires on the 31st of December, 1981.
If Cruise Missiles are to have a limited range for the next few years why are not
certain specific restrictions on range applied to the Backfire and the SS-20?
However, there is nothing in the Agreement to prevent new theatre ballistic
missiles being developed by the Allies and the United States will not be ready to
deploy longer-range ground and sea-launched Cruise Missiles until after 1981.
'Two factors of primary importance to Europe therefore emerge: (i) the Protocol
MUST NOT BE extended beyond its expiry date whatever the Soviet Union may
demand, and (ii) it must be made plain that Article XII the "noncircumvention '
clause will not only permit the transference of Cruise Missile technology from the
U.S.A. to her Allies but will also permit the sale, for example of Tomahawk and
Trident I, should this be desired.
Administration assurances have been given during these hearings, but it is hoped
that the Senate will insist on these two clarifications being written into the Treaty
in such a way as there can later be no misunderstanding.
The Soviet aim may well be the decoupUng of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent
from the defence of Western Europe together with the creation of an overwhelming
nuclear and conventional advantage against NATO forces in Europe.
The problem of the theatre nuclear weapons is separate from the Euro-strategic
balance, but is related to it. The overall balance in theatre nuclear capability
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is roughly equal to the number of warheads
in their respective nuclear stockpiles, but in delivery systems the Warsaw Pact has
a considerable advantage and the balance is tilting further in their favour.
It is to be hoped that should the Senate not complete its discussion of SALT II
this year that this will not delay a NATO decision on TNW which is due to take
place in December. Indeed, it might be an advantage that the theatre nuclear
decision be taken before the SALT ratification so as to make it clear that such a
decision is in fact within the terms of the treaty.
It must be borne in mind that the balance of conventional Forces in Europe is
continuing to shift against NATO and is now approximately 2.8.1 in armour, 2.2:1 in
tactical aircraft, 2.7:1 in artillery, and 1.2:1 in men. Also that the Soviet forces have
been reorganised in recent years for offensive rather than defensive operations and
are fully capable of repeating Hitler's Blitzkrieg.
312
EAST-WEST BALANCE
It is now obvious that the balance is tilting against the West both in the nuclear
and in the conventional fields.
It must, however, be borne in mind that the Leaders of the U.S.S.R. may hope to
take over Asia, Africa and South America, followed by Europe, without running the
risk of a nuclear or even a conventional war.
The key to the industrialized West lies in supplies of energy and raw materials.
Should the U.S.S.R. secure the dominating influence over the Gulf or over Southern
Africa she will control directly, or indirectly, the West's major supplies of oil and
key minerals (platinum, chrome, manganese, gold, vanadium, fluorspar, asbestos,
uranium, titanium, industrial diamonds etc).
Her growing influence in the Third World and in the countries of the Middle East
and Africa could enable her to cut off Western supplies at the source or on passage,
or, in the case of Southern Africa, to create so much chaos that minerals could not
be exported. Industrial Europe, starved of raw materials or energy could then be
faced with capitulation or resorting to nuclear war.
The writing is on the wall — in the 1930's the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, the U.S.S.R. In the 1970's Afghanistan, Iran, the Horn of Africa, Aden— and
then who knows, Kuwait? Saudi Arabia? Turkey? In southern Africa, Angola,
Mozambique, followed by Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, Namibia, Zaire, Zambia, and finally
South Africa. Thus, the U.S.A. could become isolated in a hostile world.
This is, of course, an extreme concept but the fact remains that countries friendly
to the West are being rapidly reduced in numbers and the West takes no action.
Western influence, quite recently supreme in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the
South Atlantic, is disappearing and with it the freedom for which we fought two
World Wars.
Surely detente means something quite different in the West than in the U.S.S.R.
Does SALT also have different connotations? If so, there is little hope for SALT III
or, from our concept, of detente.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Corterier?
STATEMENT OF PETER CORTERIER, GERMANY, RAPPORTEUR,
POLITICAL COMMITTEE, NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY •
Dr. Corterier. Mr. Chairman, let me first say that it is a great
pleasure and honor for me to appear here before your subcommit-
tee. I know that there have been many views and arguments
regarding the treaty now before the Senate that concern or deal
with the European view. The European view obviously plays an
important role in the debate on SALT, and therefore I wish to
congratulate you personally, Mr. Chairman, for having taken the
trouble to invite this group of parliamentarians from the North
Atlantic Assembly to testify.
The invitation itself is a vivid example of the Alliance's solidar-
ity and it proves that you indeed recognize the international di-
mension of the treaty. The treaty now before you is not merely a
domestic American affair. It is an element of world peace, and no
country would be more seriously affected by a failure to ratify than
my own country, the Federal Republic of Germany.
German approval of the treaty now before the Senate results
from our own basic interests, from the geopolitical and strategic
situation, from the vital interests in the stability and continuity of
the detente policy, as well as from the need to preserve and safe-
guard a stable military balance between East and West.
Those here in the United States who want to ignore not only the
German but the widescale support for the treaty throughout the
Alliance on the grounds that it is insincere or the result of pres-
sure assess the European interests wrongly.
' See page 314 for Dr. Corterier's prepared statement.
313
There have been, of course, mainly two European criticisms of
the treaty in the past, as it was still being negotiated, one concern-
ing the protocol, the other the noncircumvention clause. However,
I must say that the assurances, clarifications, and interpretations
that we have received from the American Government are satisfac-
tory on both counts, and protect European security interests ade-
quately.
Concerning the noncircumvention clause, it has been made clear
that the existing forms and structures of cooperation and policy are
not prejudiced by the treaty. It has also been made clear that after
the expiration of the protocol, U.S. options will again be open to
contribute to European defense with cruise missiles or to incorpo-
rate cruise missiles in arms control negotiations, but because of the
importance of keeping alliance options open, I would welcome a
Senate understanding in support of this position.
An important reason for Europeans to support the ratification of
SALT II is that we believe this treaty is an essential precondition
for dealing with nuclear weapons systems now threatening West-
ern Europe and the alliance as a whole. I hope this will be
achieved in the SALT III negotiations. We must be careful that
after SALT II the arms race not be shifted to Europe. All the issues
of middle-range weapons which are to be the subject of the SALT
III negotiations are currently being discussed within the alliance
both from the aspect of defense policy in the high level group and
from the aspect of arms control policy in the special group.
The intention is to elaborate within the alliance a concept for
SALT III, as far as the theater nuclear balance is concerned,
aiming at a stable balance and at closing any gaps in our deterrent
capability in Europe. Where this can be achieved with arms control
arrangements, this should take priority over the introduction of
new weapons systems. This depends, of course, on whether or not
the Soviet Union is prepared to effect corresponding limitations or
reductions of its own medium-range nuclear weapons.
In other words, when the Atlantic alliance takes a position on
the deployment of American medium-range weapons in Europe, it
must remain clear that this position in its implementation will also
depend on progress or nonprogress in the arms control negotiations
with the Soviet Union.
The forthcoming decisions must be taken by the alliance as a
whole, and the coherence of the alliance also is a decisive factor in
determining the success of future arms control negotiations.
When these decisions are made, it must be absolutely clear that
the security within the alliance is indivisible. There is only one
security in the alliance, and this covers the territory of all the
alliance states. For the same reason, there can be no isolated TNF
arms control in Europe. Rather, when adopting a joint strategy to
curb the escalation of arms, and when reaching arms control agree-
ments, the link with the overall strategic balance of power must be
preserved.
Let me sum up, then, what in my opinion would be the implica-
tions of rejection or ratification of the SALT Treaty by the Senate.
Without the SALT II Treaty, the prospects of a political and mili-
tary stabilization in East-West relations are absolutely minimal. In
314
such a case, it must be feared that the arms buildup will continue
unchecked, if not forever, certainly for a very long time.
The policy of detente and ongoing arms control efforts will suffer
setbacks. From the European viewpoint, this applies particularly to
the negotiations that are of vital importance to European security
such as MBFR and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe]. The political leadership and those political forces in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe advocating reconciliation and
rapprochement with the West will be weakened. The political con-
sensus on defense and detente policy existing within the alliance
for over 10 years as a result of the so-called Harmel Report will be
weakened. The trust placed in the United States as the leading
power within the alliance will be undermined. The Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty will be less credible, and might ultimately even fail.
On the other hand, a successful conclusion of SALT will help to
safeguard the West's capability to preserve a stable balance; pro-
vide a sound basis in terms of armaments and arms control policy
for a strategy of military balance; create the prerequisites for
progress at the MBFR talks and the CSCE follow-up conference in
Madrid; make it possible to limit nuclear weapons in Europe, espe-
cially medium-range weapons systems; create the prerequisites for
further arms control and disarmament negotiations, for example,
with regard to a complete ban on nuclear weapons tests or a ban
on killer satellites, radiation weapons, and chemical weapons; and
ensure the continuation and hopefully the successful conclusion of
talks on the limitation of conventional arms exports.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again
for this opportunity to give you my reflections on the SALT II
Treaty.
[Dr. Corterier's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Peter Corterier
salt ii and german security interests
The decision on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty is the responsibiUty of the
U.S. Senate alone— a responsibility that weighs heavily. For with this Treaty an
attempt has been made in the face of rapid arms technology developments to solve
the complicated and controversial problem of stabilizing the strategic nuclear bal-
ance. Consequently, it is no exaggeration to state that the SALT II Treaty touches
upon the problem of peace in our time. For the same reason this Treaty is not
merely a domestic American affair. It is also— since we belong to the Atlantic
Security community— a decisive bearing on European security. No country would be
more seriously affected by its failure than the Federal Republic of Germany. The
German approval of the Treaty now before the Senate results from our own basic
interests: from the geo-political and strategic situation, from the vital interest in the
stability and continuity of the detente policy, as well as from the need to preserve
and safeguard a stable military balance between East and West. Those here in the
United States who want to ignore the wide-scale support for the Treaty on the
grounds that it is insincere or the result of pressure assess the European interests
wrongly.
There are many reasons for our supporting the SALT II Treaty. One of the main
reasons is that with the policy of detente we have achieved many improvements and
we hope that the ratification of the SALT II Treaty will lead to this detente policy
continued and consolidated; if the SALT II Treaty were to fail, we would have to
fear for the results achieved so far. Especially from the German viewpoint the
policy of detente has yielded many improvements in the humanitarian field. In
Berlin, a city which for decades suffered particularly severely from the division of
Germany, many people are now able to see each other again. Traffic to and from
Berlin now flows virtually unimpeded. The position of Berlin has become more
secure. Millions of Germans take advantage of the opportunity to visit their rela-
315
tives in the GDR, and Germans from the GDR — albeit a limited number — can also
travel to the West. In the context of the reunification of families, hundreds of
thousands of Germans living in Eastern European countries are now able to join
their families in the Federal Republic. We do not want to jeopardize these signifi-
cant results of Ostpolitik and detente policy. Nor should we forget the many people
in Eastern Europe for whom the detente policy has resulted in definite improve-
ments in their situation and who hope that this policy will be continued.
Furthermore, from the European viewpoint the preservation of a stable military
balance is equally the prerequisite for a continuation of the process of detente.
Without the SALT II Treaty the prospects of a political and military stablilization
in East- West relations are absolutely minimal. In such a case it must be feared that:
The arms build-up will continue unchecked, if not forever certainly for a very
long time;
The policy of detente and on-going arms control efforts will suffer setbacks;
The political leaderships and political forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe advocating reconciliation and rapprochement with the West will be weak-
ened;
The political consensus on defence and detente policy existing within the Alliance
for over ten years now as a result of the Harmel Report will be weakened;
The trust placed in the United States as the leading power within the Alliance
will be undermined.
The non-proliferation policy will be less credible and might fail ultimately.
On the other hand, a successful conclusion of SALT II will help to:
Safeguard the West's capability to preserve a stable balance;
Provide a sound basis in terms of armaments and arms control policy for a
strategy of military balance;
Create the prerequisites for progress at the MBFR talks and the CSCE follow-up
conference in Madrid;
Make it possible to limit nuclear weapons in Europe, especially medium-range
weapons systems;
Create the prerequisites for further arms control and disarmament negotiations,
for example with regard to a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests or a ban on
killer satellites, radiation weapons and chemical weapons;
Ensure the continuation and the successful conclusion of talks on the limitation of
conventional arms exports.
If the Senate does not consider itself in a position to ratify the SALT II Treaty,
this will have serious adverse effects on other arms control efforts between East and
West. This applies, from the European viewpoint, particularly to the negotiations
that are of vital importance to European security, such as MBFR and CSCE. Here,
too, the American leadership role is indispensable to progress at the negotiations.
The SALT II Treaty is a matter of political common sense. Individual provisions
may give some American and European observers cause for a critical assessment of
the Treaty from the military and/or arms control aspects, but despite these possible
objections the overall assessment is, from the German viewpoint, a positive one. You
can draft an ideal treaty unilaterally but you cannot negotiate it. The SALT II
Treaty should therefore not be measured in terms of theoretical possibilities but of
political reality. In this respect it represents an important step along the path
towards more stability and security in international relations and a mile-stone
along the difficult path of co-operative arms control and limitation. It has not
attained the objective of comprehensive reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, but
has nevertheless led to quantitative and qualitative limitations of the nuclear
weapons systems of the two superpowers, who have committed themselves in the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to pursue negotiations on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear
disarmament under effective international control. The SALT II Treaty is of consid-
erable importance for a successful non-proliferation policy. Although it does not
compensate the conceivable vulnerability of the land-based American ICBM's, it
obliges the contracting parties to undertake "in the near future negotiations further
to limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms". Finally, the Treaty does not
contain any provisions on behaviour in other geographical regions of the world, but
it ensures the continuity of the SALT process and thus of the dialogue on strategic
arms.
The SALT II Treaty opens up substantial new prospects for the future, which
should be preserved through ratification by the U.S. Senate in the interest of stable
international relations. The military parity of the Soviet Union is the result of
many years of Soviet arms efforts and American restraint. This is a fact which
cannot be eliminated even through arms control. In other words, the renunciation
of military superiority has become an integral part of strategic policy. However,
48-260 0-79 Pt . 4 - 21
316
parity or rough equivalence in the strategic nuclear field does not imply neutraliza-
tion. The composition and size of the nuclear systems permitted under the Treaty
and the total number of existing or permitted warheads appear adequate at present
to maintain the deterrent. The limitations agreed on in the SALT II Treaty do not
give grounds for adopting alarmist attitudes. The agreed maximum numbers of
MIRV's also guarantee that a programme such as the MX programme can be
carried out without forgoing other MIRV launchers. Thus, the second strike capabil-
ity of the United States, on which our security also depends, appears to be guaran-
teed in future, too. The difficulties and problems of Western defence would be
immeasurably greater without a SALT II agreement because the Soviet Union could
then deploy by 1985 numerous strategic systems which would be a far greater threat
to the West.
The SALT II Treaty makes for greater predictability and transparency of strate-
gic developments and accordingly facilitates arms planning. But the possibilities of
arms growth afforded by the Treaty should be used with moderation and with a
view to the negotiating possibilities during the SALT III round. However, consider-
ing the rapid Soviet arms build-up of the last ten years it will not be easy during
the SALT III negotiations to incorporate into a treaty the principles contained in
the Joint Statement on subsequent negotiations. From the European viewpoint the
main problems will be those resulting from the existing situation in the field of
nuclear medium-range weapons. They will certainly not be the sole subject of the
negotiations, but the disparities existing in this field, made especially acute by the
deployment of the SS-20 and the Backfire, will make this subject particularly
important at future SALT negotiations. The aim of the talks must be to ensure an
overall strategic balance and to preserve the strategic unity within the Alliance.
Schematic parity at all individual levels cannot, however, be our objective because
that would not be conducive to the strategic unity of the Alliance, in fact it would
be counter-productive.
European critics of the SALT II Treaty refer to two of its provisions in particular
which they consider disadvantageous to Europe. The first of these is Article II,
Paragraph 1, of the Protocol of the treaty:
"Each Party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles capable of a range in excess
of 600 kilometers on sea-based launchers or on land-based launchers."
The Protocol will remain in force until 31 December 1981, unless replaced earlier
by an agreement on further measures limiting strategic offensive arms. The misgiv-
ings about this provision are due less to the provision itself than its prejudicial
effect. It is feared that the cruise missile limitation might be extended without a
genuine Soviet concession in return. It is true that the concession of Article II,
paragraph 1, is hardly offset by a parallel Soviet concession but it will depend
primarily on our own political will whether or not this fear is realized. The limita-
tion of this provision of the Protocol should not be treated as a self-fulfilling
prophecy but be understood as being what it is: as a measure of a precisely defined
duration and thus as a challenge to the Soviet Union to negotiate this matter with
us. The following should therefore be emphasized:
1. As of 1982 the United States will be able to decide freely on the deployment of
cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
2. Other arms options are left open.
However, to preclude any possible doubts still existing on this matter it would be
welcomed in Europe if the Senate followed the example of the U.S. Government and
made it clear that, when the protocol expires, U.S. options will again be open to
both contributing to European defence with cruise missiles or incorporating cruise
missiles in arms control negotiations.
We Europeans have an interest in the nuclear weapons systems threatening
Europe also being limited in the SALT III negotiations. The arms race must not be
shifted to Europe. All the issues of middle range nuclear weapons which are subject
of the SALT III negotiations are currently being discussed within the Alliance, both
from the aspect of defence policy (in the High-Level Group) and from the aspect of
arms control policy (in the Special Group). The intention is to elaborate within the
Alliance a concept for SALT III aiming at a stable nuclear balance of power and at
closing any gaps in our deterrent capability in Europe.
Where this can be achieved with arms control arrangements, the latter should
take priority over the introduction of new weapons systems. This depends on wheth-
er or not the Soviet Union is prepared to effect corresponding limitations or reduc-
tions of its own medium-range nuclear weapons. This issue must be discussed with
the Soviet Union.
On 4 July of this year. Federal Chancellor Schmidt said before the German
Bundestag: "That the Western Alliance must undertake all measures necessary to
preserve its security. The extent to which we can restrict the scale of concrete
317
measures aimed at adjusting to the continuous armament effort within the Warsaw
Pact will depend on the degree of success in achieving an effective limitation of
continental strategic systems in the East and West through arms control negotia-
tions, for instance in SALT III."
This quote makes it very clear that we in Europe must also attempt to make
progress in arms control negotiations. In other words, when the Atlantic Alliance
takes a decision on the deployment of American medium-range weapons in Europe,
it must remain clear that their decision on its implementation will also depend on
progress or non-progress on the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.
The Federal Republic of Germany is not a nuclear weapons State. Therefore, it
must not create the impression of striving to participate in deciding on the produc-
tion of nuclear weapons. Such a decision must remain the responsibility of the
United States. We continue to set store by not being forced into any special role
within the Alliance. The forthcoming decisions must be taken by the Alliance as a
whole. The coherence of the Alliance is also a decisive factor determining the
success of arms control negotiations. On the basis of the Harmel Report a broad
consensus on detente policy has developed within the Alliance over the last ten
years. This consensus must now be extended with intensified efforts to all fields of
arms control policy and be brought to bear the SALT III negotiations. Our joint
objective must be to curb the increase of Soviet systems in the field of nuclear
medium-range missiles and reduce the disparities in the Euro-strategic field. In this
connection, a limitation of the existing modern Soviet systems — SS-20 — and Back-
fire— could be useful as in initial concrete objective. However, we should not at-
tempt to deploy an equal capability in Europe specifically against the SS-20 because
in the final analysis we can counter the resultant threat only within the entire
range of systems available for deterrence, including American strategic arms. Tech-
nological developments on the substrategic level have rendered the differentiation
between strategic weapons of international and continental range useless and even
politically dangerous. Security within the Alliance is indivisable. It should not be
measured on the issue whether a weapon system has a range of more than 5000 km
or not. There is only one security within the Alliance and this covers the territory
of all Alliance states. There should not be any zone of different security. For the
same reason, there can be no isolated TNF arms control in Europe. Rather, when
adopting a joint strategy to curb the escalation of arms and when reaching arms
control agreements, the link with the overall strategic balance of power must be
preserved. The Chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, Herr Herbert Wehner,
formulated the objective of our efforts as follows:
"Of course we must not simply trivialize or accept any gap in the system of
deterrence which might lead to a miscalculation by the other side. The deterrent
must continue to make it impossible to wage war. That involves our reacting to
challenges and taking the necessary decisions jointly. At the same time, we must
ensure that all — I repeat: all — possible forms of arms control are used to prevent
armament and counterarmament resulting in a new arms race. After all we are
already in the midst of such an arms race, and we should try to do everything
within our power to stop it from assuming immeasurable dimensions.
"In other words, we must render unto the Alliance all that it requires to remain
capable of defence, which is our defence too; that is perhaps the soundest basis for
peace and for our objective of consolidating peace through detente. For us, for our
policies, and for the existence of our people there can be nothing more important
than to undertake all efforts to preserve and safeguard peace, which again means
that together with our Allies we should take advantage of every opportunity for
further agreements on detente."
We must therefore undertake a two-fold interactive effort, that of harmonizing
our defence efforts with the requirements of arms control.
The second provision of the SALT Treaty which has been criticized by some
people in Europe is Article XII that reads as follows:
"In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party
undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, through any other state
or states, or in any other manner."
In this connection some European commentators quote Soviet remarks to prove
that the so-called non-circumvention clause jeopardizes both the transfer of cruise
missile technology and American assistance in the modernization of the French and
British nuclear armed forces. It may be true that the Soviet Union is attempting to
interpret the non-circumvention clause in a manner unfavourable to the West, but
it would be more than foolish if here in the West of all places we gave more credit
to the "Pravda" than the U.S. Secretary of State and thus promoted the Soviet
interpretation. The Secretary of State delivered a detailed statement on the inter-
pretation of the non-circumvention clause before the Senate on 10 July of this year.
318
From the European viewpoint this statement is entirely satisfactory. We support
the efforts of the Senate itself to clarify the interpretation of the non-circumvention
clause. It should be noted that, according to the principles of international law, a
State is obliged not to circumvent the international agreements it has concluded.
Furthermore, a bilateral treaty cannot impose obligations on third States, unless
such state expressly accepts such obligations. Therefore, according to the principles
of international law, the non-circumvention clause does not permit any obligations
or interpretations exceeding the scope of the Treaty itself. As a result, the existing
forms and structures of participation and cooperation are not prejudiced by the non-
circumvention clause. In other words, the modernization of the nuclear weapons
systems existing in Europe and the continuous cooperation in the nuclear and
conventional fields within the Alliance are not affected. Nor is cooperation in
research, development and production jeopardized as regards cruise missiles. There-
fore, the non-circumvention clause cannot and should not be interpreted as a non-
transfer clause.
The SALT III negotiations on nuclear medium-range weapons represent a very
complex problem. They will doubtless require closer consultations than has been the
case until now with SALT II. In the case of SALT II, the Allies were consulted
adequately and comprehensively, but for SALT III two parallel efforts are neverthe-
less necessary in order to:
(a) Make possible further reductions of the strategic intercontinental capability of
the United States and the Soviet Union, and
(6) Reduce disparities in the field of continental nuclear weapons in Europe.
It is to be welcomed that in future there will be no more unilateral U.S. arms
limitations in the TNF field, as there are in the present Protocol. The statement
which was delivered on behalf of the U.S. Government at the session of the NATO
Council on 29 June in connection with the statement of intent of the SALT II
Treaty and which Secretary of State Vance quoted at the hearing of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Affairs on 9 July, represents a step in this direction and
guarantees strict reciprocity in the future limitation of non-central systems.
On this point, too, it would be desirable from the European viewpoint if in its
ratifying resolution the Senate reaffirmed the position of the U.S. Government.
SALT II would then represent a suitable basis for reducing at the SALT III negotia-
tions also the Soviet superiority in the medium-range field which is a threat to the
European members of NATO in particular.
The Alliance will also have to adapt organizationally and technically to the
political and military requirements arising in this context. The experience gained so
far with the High-Level Group and the Special Group is most positive. The impor-
tance of the political, military and strategic issues arising in connection with SALT
III justifies new organizational and technical efforts. SALT III negotiations will
affect matters relating to European security to a far greater extent than SALT II
did. They will continue to be basically bilateral negotiations between the United
States and the Soviet Union, but the consultation will naturally have to be much
more intensive than has been necessary until now. The consultations will have to
include the elaboration of negotiating positions. We need suitable arrangements for
the Allies to be able to have a say in the negotiations, which is not the same as
participating in them. A new institution along the lines of the Special Group might
be a solution to this problem.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. de Vries?
STATEMENT OF KLAAS G. de VRIES, NETHERLANDS, RAPPORTEUR,
MILITARY COMMITTEE, NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY »
Mr. DE Vries. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I join my colleagues in expressing my gratitude at being invited
to appear before your subcommittee.
May I also say that I am deeply impressed by the way the
subcommittee and committee have devoted attention to European
attitudes and alliance needs during the discussion and considera-
tion of the treaty that is before you.
' See page 321 for Mr. de Vries' prepared statement.
319
The Chairman. Excuse me, but if anything has come out of the
debate on this treaty, it has been an overwhelming reaffirmation
both from the left, right, and center of this body, and this country,
of our view of the essential necessity for us to maintain strength in
the NATO alliance. I hope that message is crystal clear.
Mr. DE Vries. I think it has not gone unnoticed. Senator.
In the course of the Senate's hearings on the proposed SALT II
Treaty, the question of European attitudes, as I said, has emerged
as a pivotal issue. While administration officials have forcefully
characterized allied support of ratification as unequivocal and
broad-based, some witnesses have advanced a number of rationales
which, if true, would significantly depreciate the value of official
endorsements of SALT II by European governments.
In brief, the Senate has been warned that it can draw little
comfort from public expressions of European support, indeed, that
these declarations may even have been proffered under duress.
Let me begin by observing that there can be no disputing the
fact that Europe has overwhelming declared its clear support for
the treaty. To be sure a few isolated and not entirely unpredictable
objections have been heard, but they have been drowned in the
flood tide of public European support for the treaty.
The North Atlantic Council, individual national governments,
prestigious centers of security and foreign policy research, leading
newspapers have all gone on record endorsing treaty ratification.
Thus, it seems astonishing to have to respond to the suggestion
that at worst Europeans do not really mean what they say or at
best that what we have said should be discounted. To suggest that
European governments would knowingly and deliberately prevari-
cate on an issue of such single importance as strategic arms limita-
tions is tantamount to declaring that there is no basis for trust
between the nations of the Atlantic Alliance.
SALT II is not a partisan issue in Europe. Indeed, support for
SALT may be one of the few issues on 1979 on which European
leaders, conservatives. Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and
others find themselves in basic agreement. The theory that there is
disparity between official and private European views usually
relies on one or two of the following arguments: one, that the
administration has arm-twisted European governments into ex-
pressing support in order to save the prestige of the presidency,
and two, that public sentiment in favor of detente and arms control
runs so strongly in Europe that no public figure can prudently
speak out in favor of vigilance and defense.
I cannot accept the suggestion that the administration has pres-
sured European governments into endorsing SALT II against their
will. Of course, Europe recognizes the importance to Alliance cohe-
sion of a strong American Presidency. This should not suggest that
Europe would support SALT II against its better judgment for the
sake of helping a particular President's standing in public opinion
polls.
Europe is vitally interested in American leadership. It is, by the
same token, not interested in helping to create the illusion of
American leadership.
Second, to claim that disarmament euphoria is so rampant on
the European continent that no one can prudently speak out for
320
military preparedness simply cannot be reconciled with the facts. I
mentioned the 3 percent increase in defense spending, the Long-
Term Defense Program, the AW ACS program, procurement of F-
16's, Tornado aircraft, and Leopard tanks — all events which signify
that Europe is prepared to share its burden in the defense efforts
of the Alliance.
Some SALT critics would have us believe it both ways, that
Europe publicly supports the treaty out of a lack of will to stand up
to the Soviets yet privately opposes the agreement because the
protocol allegedly denies them the hardware needed to stand up to
the Soviets. I don't think you can have it both ways.
Let me now turn to the line of argument that approval of the
terms of the treaty themselves is not a primary factor accounting
for European support. In other words, that European disappoint-
ment with the terms of the treaty yielded to a higher priority;
European interest in preserving progress toward detente.
I wonder if anyone, American or European or Soviet, can actual-
ly declare himself totally satisfied with the terms of the treaty.
Even the administration acknowledges that it is disappointed with
the height of the ceilings and the degree of strategic force modern-
ization permitted both parties under the accord.
The question then is not whether Europe approves 100 percent
with the provisions of the agreement. The queiStion is whether
these provisions on balance are acceptable and whether no treaty
or a reopened negotiation would not be worse.
Of course, European support of SALT II reflects a desire to
promote a lessening of East-West tensions, and a certain anxiety
that rejection of the treaty might occasion a new cold war. No one
denies that, but what is not to be accepted is the view that Eu-
rope's interest in detente is so preeminent that we are blinded
from the recognition that arms, vigilance, and the will to defend
ourselves are still required in this 30th year of the alliance.
Maintaining military security while simultaneously pursuing de-
tente have long been the twin pillars of alliance strategy. They
have not suddenly become mutually exclusive in 1979.
This leads me to a second point.
Europeans are intimately familiar with the terms of the treaty.
Ambassador Earle's testimony to your committee underscores the
unprecedented degree of consultation and coordination within the
Alliance on SALT II. The much appreciated and publicly applauded
effort of three successive administrations to inform and consult
with its allies has found its deserved reward in that all the Europe-
an allies became intimately familiar with the treaty and were able
to support its final version.
I believe that the SALT II Treaty will make a positive contribu-
tion to the future security of the Alliance. Failure to ratify this
agreement would represent a reversal in the efforts to secure a
more stable relationship between East and West. The SALT process
has provided an important framework for the communication and
exchange of information necessary for the building of mutual confi-
dence.
Such confidence is a prerequisite if stability is to be assured.
One great American once said that your country would never
negotiate out of fear and never fear to negotiate. Successive admin-
321
istrations have conducted the SALT negotiations in this spirit. I
sincerely believe that the treaty that is now before you serves the
security interests of the nations and peoples of our alliance. At the
same time, this treaty is a true expression of Western determina-
tion to contribute to restraining weapons systems that if used
would destroy civilization itself.
Thank you very much.
[Mr. de Vries' prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Klaas G. de Vries
Mr. Chairman, in the course of the Senate's hearings on the proposed SALT II
Treaty, the question of European attitudes toward the Treaty has emerged as a
pivotal issue in the debate. While Administration officials have forcefully character-
ised Allied support of ratification as unequivocal and broad-based, other witnesses
have advanced a number of rationales which, if true, would significantly depreciate
the value of official endorsements of SALT II by European governments. In brief,
the Senate has been warned that it can draw little comfort from public expressions
of European support; indeed that these declarations may even have been proffered
under duress.
I appreciate that you felt it important to clarify this question of European
assessments by inviting four Europeans representing different countries, different
parties and different political perspectives to present you with their views first
hand.
I would like to divide my remarks into two areas. First, I want to address head-on
this crucial issue of the credibility of European support for SALT II. In the second
part of my testimony, I will explain why I personally support approval of the
Treaty.
Let me begin by observing that there can be no disputing the fact that Europe has
overwhelmingly declared its clear support for the Treaty. To be sure a few isolated,
and not entirely unpredictable, objections have been heard. But they have been
drowned in the flood tide of public European support for the Treaty. The North
Atlantic Council, individual national governments, prestigious centres of security
and foreign policy research, and leading newspapers have all gone on record endors-
ing Treaty ratification.
Thus, it seems astonishing to have to respond to the suggestion that, at worst, we
do not really mean what we say, or, at best, that what we have said should be
discounted.
To suggest the European governments would knowingly and deliberately prevari-
cate on an issue of such signal importance as strategic arms limitation is tanta-
mount to declaring that there is no basis for trust in relations between the proud
nations of the Atlantic Alliance. SALT is not a partisan issue in Europe. Indeed,
support for SALT may be one of the few issues in 1979 on which European leaders —
Conservative, Social Democratic, Christian Democratic and others — find themselves
in basic agreement.
The theory that there is a disparity between official and private European views
usually relies on one or the other of two lines of argument:
One, that the Administration has "arm-twisted' European governments into ex-
pressing support in order to save the prestige of the Presidency; and
Two, that public sentiment in favour of detente and arms control runs so strongly
in Europe that no public figure can prudently speak out in favour of vigilance and
defence.
Lest these theories gain credence through unrefuted repetition, I feel that I must
challenge each of them in turn. First, I cannot accept the suggestion that the
Administration has pressured European governments into endorsing SALT II
against their will. Of course Europe recognises the importance to Alliance cohesion
of a strong American Presidency. But this should not suggest that Europe would
support SALT II against its better judgment for the sake of helping a particular
President's standing in public opinion polls. Europe is vitally interested in Ameri-
can leadership. It is not interested in helping to create the illusion of American
leadership.
Second, the claim that pro-disarmament euphoria is so rampant on the European
continent that no one can prudently speak out for military preparedness simply
cannot be reconciled with the facts. The NATO Allies have agreed to a 3 percent
increase in defence spending and committed themselves to the Long Term Defence
Programme. The French Government has just announced a 15 percent increase in
its defence budget. The United Kingdom Government has declared that it intends to
322
undertake greater defence expenditures. NATO has held to a firm position in the
MBFR talks and has just bought the expensive AWACS programme. NATO coun-
tries are re-equipping their forces with F-16s, Tornado aircraft, and Leopard tanks.
Why did NATO insist on preserving technology transfer and cruise missile deploy-
ment options under SALT II? Some SALT critics would have us believe it both ways:
that Europe publicly supports the Treaty out of a lack of will to stand up to the
Soviets, yet privately opposes the agreement because it allegedly denies them the
hardware needed to stand up to the Soviets. You cannot have it both ways.
Let me turn now to the line of argument that approval of the terms of the Treaty
themselves is not a primary factor accounting for European support, in other words,
that European disappointment with the terms of the Treaty yielded to a higher
priority: European interest in preserving progress toward detente.
I wonder if anyone — European or American or Soviet — can actually declare him-
self totally satisfied with the terms of the Treaty? Even the Administration ac-
knowledges that it is disappointed with the height of the ceilings and the degree of
strategic force modernisation permitted both Parties under the accord. By definition
this negotiation required some compromises to be made on both sides or else there
would have been no agreement. Disappointment over certain negotiating outcomes
cannot stand in isolation from other considerations and be allowed to constitute a
basis for rejecting the Treaty.
The question is not whether Europe approves 100 percent with the provisions of
the agreement. The question is whether these provisions on balance are acceptable
and whether this Treaty, now laid on the table for rejection or acceptance, is better
than no Treaty or a reopened negotiation. And in making that assessment obviously
judgments about the provisions of SALT II must be weighed along with other
considerations, including the value of SALT II as one step in the long-term process
of SALT and within the overall framework of detente.
Of course European support of SALT II reflects a desire to promote a lessening of
East-West tensions and a certain anxiety that rejection of the Treaty might occasion
a new Cold War. No one denies this. But what is not to be accepted is the view that
Europe's interest in detente is so pre-eminent that we are blinded from the recogni-
tion that arms, vigilance, and the will to defend ourselves are still required in this,
the 30th year of the Alliance. Maintaining military security while simultaneously
pursuing detente have long been the twin pillars of Alliance strategy. They have not
suddenly become mutually exclusive in 1979.
This leads me to a second point. Europeans are intimately familiar with the terms
of the Treaty. The degree of co-ordination and consultation has been extraordinary
and unprecedented. SALT II is not something that has suddenly been thrust upon
the Europeans for approval or disapproval. It is an agreement that was methodical-
ly worked out under three American administrations in concert with the European
Allies. Europe has every opportunity to express reservations about provisions con-
sidered during the course of formulating negotiating positions, and in those cases
where Europe did insist on measures to protect certain interests more stringently —
for example, on technology transfer — the United States accommodated European
recommendations. Ambassador Earle's testimony to your Committee underscores
the unprecedented degree of consultation and co-ordination within the Alliance on
SALT II. The much appreciated and publicly applauded effort of three successive
Administrations to inform and consult its Allies has found its deserved reward in
that all European Allies became intimately familiar with the Treaty and were able
to support its final version.
Turning now from the subject of European attitudes generally, I would like to put
forward some personal views on the merits of this Treaty. In explaining the basis
for my strong support of SALT II, I want to touch on four main themes: (1) SALT II
and the credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrent, (2) SALT II and European defence
options, (3) European interests in SALT III, and (4) SALT as an element in a
broader framework of East-West relations.
SALT II AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC DETERRENT
The question of whether SALT II entails negative implications for the credibility
of the U.S. strategic deterrent has centered on the fact that the Soviet Union is
allowed to maintain 308 heavy missiles (SS-9's now being replaced by SS-18's) while
the United States is permitted none. It is argued that this permanent advantage in
throw-weight when married to the inevitable irnprovements in accuracy will give
the Soviet Union a convincing first strike capability, that is, Soviet leaders will have
a high confidence possibility of taking out 90 percent of United States land-based
missiles with only a small proportion of their own land-based systems. With only
the bomber and submarine proportion of the United States deterrent force remain-
ing, a United States President would allegedly be deterred from retaliatory action.
323
The critics do not actually believe that such a scenario will take place but rather
that the perception of superiority that this situation will create will be manipulated
by Soviet leaders to obtain their political objectives. This superiority will, it is
alleged, be used for nuclear blackmail. The critics argue that under this situation
nuclear weapons retain considerable political utility.
It is my belief that this strategic superiority argument is based on a highly
selective and inadequate interpretation of weapons criteria. The current asymmetry
in United States and Soviet force levels is the result of differences in force structure
and military planning. The United States has developed smaller, more accurate
missiles, while the Soviet Union has, largely because of technological restraints,
developed larger missiles with heavier throw-weights. It must be noted that throw-
weight is only one of a number of criteria that can be used to measure strategic
power. Accuracy is far more important in terms of destructive capability since very
large warheads tend to be less efficient than smaller warheads. In terms of accuracy
and the numbers of warheads, the United States has a decided lead over the Soviet
Union.
It is therefore unreasonable and distortive to single out one element of the
strategic picture in order to prove a picture of United States inferiority. Asymme-
tries in one area should be measured against advantages in others. In fact, the
composition of the two strategic arsenals is very different. The Soviet Union has
placed a very heavy emphasis on its land-based forces. It has relatively small
bomber forces (none on permanent alert as with Strategic Air Command) and while
it has a large number of submarines, only 15 percent of these are on station at any
one time. The United States on the other hand has fewer than 25 percent of its
warheads in Minuteman silos, and by the 1980's with the deployment of Trident and
the cruise missile this proportion will be even lower. It has a formidable bomber
force a proportion of which will shortly be equipped with air-launched cruise mis-
siles and a substantial force of Poseidon /Polaris submarines, 60 percent of which
are permanently on station. It is estimated, for example, that owing to higher alert
rates and multiple warhead advantages, approximately 2,446 United States as
against 140 Soviet SLBM warheads are at sea. As these characteristics indicate, a
direct comparison of the effectiveness of either strategic force is to say the least
complex. It is for this reason that the term "essential equivalence" has come to
describe the current balance.
With regard to the specific disparity in heavy missiles it is necessary ask whether
given the opportunity the United States would seek to construct an equivalent
number of heavy missiles. The answer would be certainly negative because it has no
need of them.
Finally, the question of Minuteman vulnerability: the suggestion that the Soviet
Union will in the 1980's have the capacity to destroy United States land-based
forces may be mathematically provable but such action would depend on so many
uncertain variables as to be beyond rational comprehension. Such variables include
human error, equipment failures, the effect of atmospheric turbulance caused by
the first explosion on incoming warheads, and also the "fratricidal" effect on these
warheads. In addition to these uncertainties, a Soviet leader would have to gamble
that a United States President would not launch his ICBMs as soon as he knew
Soviet missiles had been dispatched, and that he would not retaliate with his
rernaining force of submarines and bombers. Such risks may seem reasonable in the
artificial vacuum of theoretical strategic planning and force exchange calculations
but they have little to do with the choices that face political leaders in the real
world. If the vulnerability argument is without military logic then the political
advantage that is said to accrue from it is likewise without foundation.
It is therefore unfortunate that when based on so many questionable assumptions
the concept of Minuteman vulnerability has been allowed to become an established
truth, almost an article of faith on which critics of the SALT process base their
arguments. The effect of their criticisms could be to weaken our self-confidence,
create doubts in the minds of friends and neutrals, and suggest to Soviet leaders
possibilities that do not actually exist. Thus, the final result of their arguments is to
undermine deterrence. The eventual theoretical vulnerability of fixed land-based
systems was inevitable once MIRVed warheads entered the strategic arsenals, and
had nothing to do with the SALT process. In the words of Secretary of Defence
Brown, "Minuteman vulnerability was not a problem created by SALT, nor is it a
problem we can solve with a SALT agreement ... we would have the same problem
without such an agreement, only in that case we would have other problems as
well". It is not a question of establishing that a number of fixed points can in theory
be hit by a certain number of missiles, but of deciding whether in the realm of
practical politics this paper certainty would translate into a tangible political ad-
vantage.
324
If the United States Administration is concerned that this is a weakness that
should be fixed than it has the MX mobile missile under development. Currently,
the Administration is strdying the basing problem in order to establish a mode that
will give the necessary mobility and yet be verifiable under a future arms control
agreement. However, it should be noted that in discussing the vulnerability of land-
based systems the Soviet Union has far more to fear than the United States. She
places a far greater reliance on her land-based missiles than the United States and
does not possess an equivalent Triad of forces.
SALT II AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE OPTIONS
It has been argued that while the Treaty places no limits on Soviet theatre
systems such as the SS-20 and Backfire bomber, thus allowing the Soviet Union a
substantial advantage in the theatre field, it imposes limitations on the develop-
ment of ground and sea launched cruise missiles which could be used to offset this
advantage. Thus, some analysts have worried that, over time, many Europeans
might conclude that the United States — in order to reach an agreement — has mort-
gaged systems that are most likely to serve Western, rather than American, inter-
ests.
While acknowledging that the restrictions on GLCM's and SLCM's are for the
duration of the protocol and tTierefore officially temporary, nevertheless critics
assert that under a SALT III climate these limitations will be extended. Some have
suggested that it is hopelessly naive to believe the West will be able to turn back
the clock 'on "temporary" arms limitations and plunge ahead with new and previ-
ously banned weapons as though they had never been prohibited.
The Allies' access to cruise missile technology is also linked to the provision in
the Treaty which bars circumvention of the Treaty provisions through third coun-
tries. Critics believe that the wording of this provision is so vague that the Soviet
Union will be able to use it to prevent the United States sharing certain crucial
military technologies with its Allies.
The argument that SALT excludes Soviet medium range systems represents a
curious approach since it was the firm position of the United States, with complete
Alliance support and approval, to keep forward based systems and medium range
theatre systems out of the negotiations. Thus having successfully resisted Soviet
pressure to include these systems it is slightly distortive to complain that SALT II
will fail to constrain them. Moreover, it should be noted that the Alliance has
exactly the same freedom as the Soviets to augment its theatre systems if it sees the
need.
On the question of the restrictions on cruise missiles contained in the Protocol,
the Administration has made it clear that the availability of options for theatre
nuclear forces is unaffected by the Protocol. Specifically, testing of ground and sea
launched missiles can go forward to unlimited ranges. The prohibition against
deployment of ground and sea launchers of cruise missiles with a range in excess of
600km will expire well before such systems could in fact be deployed. Thus the
decision on the utilization of cruise missiles within NATO will be decided through
consultation within the Alliance, most likely at the Ministerial meetings in Decem-
ber. Administration officials stress that the Protocol was a compromise to settle a
bargaining impasse and to leave time for more definitive negotiation while not
imposing, in the meantime, any practical limits on the United States or NATO.
They stress that the Soviets have indicated that they recognise that the Protocol
will expire according to its terms.
Concerning the issue of non-circumvention, it is evident that the Soviet Union
pressed hard for a very restrictive ban on transfers of technology and equipment
covered in any way by the agreement. The United States however did not agree to
such a clause. The non-circumvention clause is therefore very general and does no
more than state an obligation which the United States would be under in any event.
In testimony before this Committee, Administration officials have affirmed in the
most explicit language that the non-circumvention clause will not affect existing
patterns of collaboration and co-operation with America's allies, nor will it preclude
co-operation in modernisation or continued nuclear or conventional co-operation
with the Allies.
I will not comment at length here on the relationship between strategic and
theatre forces except to emphasise that while the Protocol has ensured that a
number of options remain open to the Alliance, close consultation will be necessary
to decide whether these options are actually needed, under what circumstances and
how they will fit into future arms control negotiations. In particular, it will be
necessary to consider whether a decision to deploy these new options in Europe and
thus provide Europe with a more substantial regional capability could be interpret-
ed as a serious step to loosening the United States strategic commitment.
325
EUROPEAN INTERESTS IN SALT III
It is already accepted that once SALT II is signed the United States and the
Soviet Union will proceed with negotiations on further limitations on strategic
arms. SALT II includes a statement of principles and guidelines concerning a SALT
III negotiation. While the United States originally wanted the statement of princi-
ples to set fairly explicit and ambitious targets regarding further reductions and
modernisation restraints, it accepted the Soviet position of a fairly generalised
statement. The Soviet Union is expected in SALT III to argue again that United
States and Allied theatre nuclear weapons capable of reaching the Soviet Union
must be taken into account in arriving at new ceilings.
It has always been difficult to restrict the negotiations to strictly bilateral issues
since from the earliest days the Soviet Union raised the issue of the French and
British nuclear forces and of American nuclear-capable aircraft stationed in Europe
and capable of striking Soviet territory. Now, with the development of the strategic
cruise missile, the controversy over the Backfire bomber and the emergence of the
SS-20, attention has been focused on a number of systems whose characteristics
defy precise definition and which will complicate any further negotiations.
Since these "grey area" or theatre systems have particular significance for
Europe, it is evident that European interests must in some way be represented.
However, several complex issues remain to be settled: namely, what sort of negotiat-
ing forum would be set for what particular weapons and for which particular
participants?
The most realistic formula of the various proposals that have been circulated
would be a continuation of the bilateral dialogue between the United States and the
Soviet Union with consideration of those theatre systems under United States or
Soviet control. It is difficult to see any multilateral negotiation making much
progress and several countries are opposed to dealing with theatre systems in
isolation from strategic systems. Furthermore, the French have refused to partici-
pate in any negotiations on their nuclear forces and while the United Kingdom has
not made its position clear on its willingness to see restraints placed on its strategic
force is doubtful. This would inevitably mean that the Soviet Union will ask to be
given compensation for the French and British nuclear forces. It will also mean
continuing the present system of Alliance consultation as a means of securing
European involvement. However, it may be possible to secure more permanent
involvement through a new institutional mechanism. Whatever the mechanism, it
must be made clear that Alliance participation means all members or at least those
who participate in the basing or ownership of nuclear weapons.
As long as a satisfactory consultation mechanism could be established a continu-
ation of the bilateral approach would certainly be the most likely to achieve prog-
ress. This approach would have the advantage of maintaining the essential continu-
ity of nuclear systems and counteracting the tendency to try to separate the theatre
and strategic levels. It would also facilitate matching constraints as, for example.
United States constraint on the ground launched cruise missile in return for Soviet
restraint on the SS-20.
SALT II AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Some critics have suggested that United States conduct in the SALT negotiations
should have been linked to Soviet behaviour in other areas, in other words, a SALT
agreement would have been conditional upon Soviet actions in areas such as devel-
oping countries, human rights, etc.
It is clear that SALT is one component of many that constitute the East-West
relationship, and as an effort to establish understanding and a mutually acceptable
framework in nuclear armaments it is clearly an important component. SALT
therefore forms part of overall United States defence and foreign policy and just as
it is influenced by developments in other areas so it will itself contribute to the
general climate of East-West relations. Thus while SALT cannot be separated by
developments in other areas it cannot be made responsible for them and cannot be
used as a mechanism to influence them. It would have been wrong for the United
States to have made concessions in SALT II in order to influence Soviet actions and
it would have been wrong to have suspended SALT II in order to punish the Soviet
Union. Above all, it must be stressed that SALT II is of substantial interest to both
sides and must be judged on the basis of its own merits.
CONCLUSION
While re-emphasising my support for the Treaty, I wish to endorse the criticism
voiced by several observers that not only are the levels too high but that the Treaty
does too little in checking the momentum of armaments development. As has been
326
pointed out by opponents and supporters of the Treaty alike, the Treaty does
nothing to constrain the development of planned United States strategic systems,
including the MX, Trident submarine and missile, and cruise missiles, as well as
new generations of Soviet strategic systems. I join those who urge that the next
round of negotiations seriously tackle the unnecessarily high levels and potentially
destabilising qualitative developments.
Despite this criticism, I support the current Treaty because it is an essential
element of the East-West relationship and because it establishes a framework of
mutual understanding and confidence which will permit the eventual acceptance of
lower levels of forces. The Treaty provides a number of important steps in this
direction:
It reinforces the perception and reality of balance by establishing equal levels of
intercontinental nuclear delivery systems;
For the first time it requires actual reductions of about 250 Soviet (and no United
States) strategic delivery systems;
It will limit Soviet MIRVd ICBM's, the most threatening part of their force, to
820'
It will prevent increases in the maximum number of warheads deployed in
ICBM's, thus limiting Soviet ability to exploit their throw-weight advantage;
It will channel Soviet activity into certain areas and thus simplify United States
planning, and it will constrain the deployment of Soviet strategic nuclear forces
well below the levels which could be deployed in the absence of an agreement.
I believe that the SALT II Treaty will make a positive contribution to the future
security of the Alliance. Failure to ratify this agreement would represent a reversal
in the efforts to secure a more stable relationship between East and West. The
SALT process has provided an important framework for the communication and
exchange of information necessary for the building of mutual confidence. Such
confidence is a prerequisite if stability is to be assured.
One great American once said that your country would never negotiate out of
fear and not fear to negotiate. Successive administrations have conducted the SALT
negotiations in this spirit. I sincerely believe that the Treaty that is now before you
serves the security interest of the nations and peoples of our Alliance. At the same
time, this Treaty is a true expression of Western determination to contribute to
restraining weapons systems that, if used, could destroy civilisation itself.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. I will yield in just a
moment to Senator Hayakawa and let him begin the questioning,
but I would like to underscore both to my colleagues and to the
media two points which I think are very important. One is that we
not only have a panel of four distinguished persons, but the four
persons are evenly divided in terms of how they are viewed as
representing conservative and liberal points of view in Europe. So
we don't have a unified political philosophy being represented here.
Second, you do not represent your governments, but rather you
speak individually as members of the North Atlantic Assembly.
I can say that I have personally spoken with the heads of state in
two of your governments, to the Secretaries of Defense and the
Foreign Ministers in three of your countries, and to a wide spec-
trum of elected leaders in Germany — from the CDU to what is
viewed as the left of the SPD. And I would say that absolutely,
officially, unofficially, equivocally, unequivocally, any way you
want to characterize it, your governments have reflected the point
of view that each of you have put forward.
And I would just add, Mr. de Vries, that you are rightfully
startled and maybe somewhat offended by the doubts expressed by
some as to the worth of the statements made by significant leaders
in Europe and whether or not we should be able to believe them —
doubts suggested by some who have testified before this committee,
and some on this committee, that we should take it with a grain of
salt, that it is really not meant. These doubts, of course, go to the
very heart of the question of trust and the value of leadership.
327
Nor has our own Government been spared. We have had witness
after witness come forward and tell us essentially, don't believe the
President, don't believe the military, don't believe anybody who
holds public office or has any significant public position, whether it
be in the military or out of the military. The only ones you can
really believe are those who no longer hold office, those who no
longer have any responsibility, those who no longer have access to
information.
Mr. DE Vries. And who don't want to be named.
The Chairman. That's right. There was a very staggering presen-
tation made by a retired Admiral and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff the other day that I just found absolutely incredible. None-
theless, he made that statement. So, don't feel badly. Our own
Government has not been spared that criticism. I will now yield to
Senator Hayakawa for questioning.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join with others in thanking all of you for being here and
in making your presentations. It is an act of international coopera-
tion which we deeply, deeply appreciate. Again, thank you.
I would like to address my first question to Mr. Thyness, and I
hope I pronounce the name correctly.
Mr. Thyness. Astonishingly correctly, sir.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you.
CANCELLATION OF NATO MANEUVERS UNDER SOVIET PRESSURE
Is it not true that about a year ago the planned movement to
Norway of German troops for NATO manuevers had to be canceled
because of Soviet pressure? Would you care to comment on that?
Mr. Thyness. Yes, sir, I will comment on that. I believe that the
government had planned over a prolonged period of time to inte-
grate the whole of the German component into the ACE Mobile
Force step-by-step. Whether this time schedule was a little bit out
of order or not is a matter for dispute, but most of the German
contingent is in this ACE Mobile Force by now. Currently there is
only one component lacking. Of course the question of German
troops in Norway has always been a very critical point between
Norway and the Soviet Union, presumably because of Norwegian
proximity to Soviet territory.
Senator Hayakawa. Was it something of a humiliation to
Norway or to Germany to have to do this?
Mr. Thyness. We have never considered this to be any kind of
humiliation to Norway. It simply affected Norway, positioned as it
is on the map. We have always felt that we have a certain respon-
sibility not to act in a way which legitimately could be said to be
provocative by the Soviet Union.
Senator Hayakawa. I see. Thank you. Another question I have is
for Dr. Corterier.
VULNERABILITY OF ICBM's
I believe your statement was security within the Alliance is
indivisible. I believe that is a very important statement that you
have made, but since security is indivisible, how do you feel about
the fact that in a few years the Soviet Union, striking first, will be
328
able to destroy most of our land-based strategic missiles because
the M-X will not be deployed until about 1986?
Dr. CoRTERiER. Well, that is a difficult question. On the one
hand, of course, I agree with what you say. Senator, that our
security in Europe depends on the viability of the strategic U.S.
deterrent, but on the other hand it is quite difficult for us to judge
what the viability really is or is going to be over the next 10 years
or so. I have only read the statement by Secretary Brown that he
made to this committee and that he believes it is going to remain
viable even if during a certain period of time the land-based sys-
tems will be a little bit less viable than they probably should be
before the M-X is going to be deployed, but of course he has said
also that the sea-based systems and the bombers will remain credi-
ble, and in that respect the strategic systems will remain a credible
deterrent. I have had no information really to contradict that
statement.
Senator Hayakawa. I must say, Dr. Corterier, that this real
vulnerability between 1983 or 1982 and 1986 is something that
concerns many of us very, very much. This is why I asked the
question. Thank you.
There is one other question which I would like to address to the
panel as a whole. I will invite the comment of any one of you.
NONLINKAGE CONSIDERATION OF SALT
One of the important points about SALT upon which we have
the insistence both of the Soviet Union and of our own administra-
tion is the nonlinkage, that we must consider the treaty within its
own terms and not in connection with Soviet adventurism in Africa
or the Near East or Latin America, that we must not think about
those things, but must think only about the treaty.
In light of this injunction from both the Soviet and our own
Government, I have tried to consider the treaty by itself, apart
from all the other things that trouble us in our relations with the
Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I just find it impossible to maintain
this nonlinkage, especially as a result of the revelations of the last
few days about the Soviet combat troops in Cuba.
I would like to ask to what degree must we maintain this non-
linkage, because after all, the fact of Soviet troops in Cuba is only
one more example of Soviet adventurism in different parts of the
world. It has been going on ever since the signing of SALT I.
So, I guess I have to ask you what would be a rational reaction to
this, on top of all of the other provocations that we are asked to
ignore as we contemplate this treaty?
Mr. Thyness. Perhaps, Senator, I might begin. The SALT II
Treaty as I see it is not a unilateral gift by the United States to the
Soviet Union. By throwing out the SALT II Treaty we would in
fact in many aspects be punishing ourselves as much as we punish
the Russians for their misbehavior in other places. I do think it is
important that we give up this unrealistic concept of detente; that
is, that it is ushering in a millenium of good behavior on the part
of the Russians. Obviously, it is not going to work that way. It is
going to be a case-by-case situation, and we will have to meet
Soviet challenges in all fields, and we will constantly be pressed on
our will and determination to stand up to them. In my thinking.
329
that is not any case for throwing out the treaty which in one field
stabilizes the relationship and controls it.
Perhaps some of my colleagues would like to comment, too.
Senator Hayakawa. Mr. Wall?
Mr. Wall. It is a difficult question to answer, Senator, because it
covers both the military and the political field. The SALT II Treaty
is a military treaty and is desired by the Russians. I think that is
fairly obvious, but you can never separate completely the military
and the political. I do believe there is some degree of linkage,
because the Soviets want SALT II and all four of us have said that
as far as the Europeans are concerned, we will back you in getting
SALT II, subject to certain amendments and resolutions, but we
also believe that it is about time that all of us collectively stood up
to Russian imperialism.
I personally believe that Cuba is a try-on. If they get away with
this one, they may try it in Nicaragua or somewhere else. I believe
the situation, as I said in my testimony, in Africa is extremely
dangerous, because if chaos was created through Soviet surrogates
in Southern Africa, Europe would not get vital minerals and that
would create massive unemployment in the industrial centers in
Europe. This would have military effects.
Therefore, I would agree with Mr. Thyness that SALT II is a
military problem which should be considered on its merits. You
can't altogether divorce it from the political situation, and I believe
all of us in the West have got to stand up to the Russians who are
probing all over the place but always respond to strength, which
we haven't very often used.
Senator Hayakawa. Do you mean that we should consider SALT
independent in any case but at the same time also take action in
response to these provocations?
Mr. Wall. That is correct, Senator. For example, with regard to
the Berlin blockade, we responded with strength and the Russians
responded to the West's standing up, but unfortunately, as with my
country and other countries in the alliance, you haven't stood up to
the Soviets prodding quickly enough in recent years, perhaps. I
think that is what I am stating.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Wall. Mr. Chairman, my
time is up. Might I have a reply from the rest of the panel?
The Chairman. Of course.
Mr. CoRTERiER. I think we have to make the difference between a
formal linkage and what I would call a de facto linkage. If you
would make it formal, I think you would allow the Russians to do
the same in reverse, and they might link SALT II to good Ameri-
can behavior in China or an3rwhere else in the world, I think that
would lead us nowhere.
But a de facto linkage is, of course, there. It is obvious that the
Senate, while considering this important treaty, will watch very
carefully what the Soviets are doing, if they have a policy of
restraint or of a lack of restraint. In that respect, I think what
they are doing in Cuba is ominous and is a matter of concern to all
of us. On the other hand, and I am basing myself only on the
immediate information that I have so far, and I am not sure that
we have all the information to really make a final judgment on
this, on the other hand, what I know so far wouldn't warrant in my
330
opinion to really let SALT fall through because of what has hap-
pened in Cuba.
I think there are other options open to the U.S. Government to
use in order to make the Russians — to lead the Russians to a more
restrained policy in Cuba, and these options have, for instance,
been explained this morning very eloquently, I think, by Professor
Hoffmann.
Senator Hayakawa. What makes me so nervous is the fact that
we have not achieved restraint on the part of the Russians at any
time, in all their adventures in Africa and the Middle East as well.
Mr. de Vries, did you have a comment, please?
Mr. DE Vries. Could I just briefly add to what my colleagues
have been saying. Senator, that I feel in this time in which every-
one is concerned with leadership and who is providing leadership
and what kind of leadership do we need, probably what we need
most is to be able to distinguish between what is vital to our own
interests and what is not vital, and to cope with these issues on the
appropriate levels.
As far as I have been able to read from your newspapers, it
might not be a vital threat, that is, the Cuban situation. I don't
think anyone has stated that. And I think you should be careful in
linking it to something that I think is vital to our security inter-
ests. There are different levels and different means with which you
can cope with different problems, and I think that the action your
administration has taken by trying to solve this problem through
diplomatic means is appropriate.
If you are going to go from event to event and move from the
main course that we have to settle on, we are really in bad shape.
As Mr. Thyness has said, the Soviets are going to pose problems for
many more years. They will range from small incidents to perhaps
large provocations, let's say perhaps from ballerinas to Cuba.
. If we are always going to let that confuse us and take us away
from the course on which we ought to embark, which is to pursue
our own interests and to pursue the interests of the world as we
see them, then we really are in trouble.
We have a saying in our country that someone who does not
know where to sail will never have favorable wind. I think we
ought to decide where we want to sail.
Senator Hayakawa. Gentlemen, thank you all very much, and
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the extension of time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.
Senator Percy.
Senator Percy. Gentlemen, I would like to thank you all for the
time you have given us. We deeply appreciate it. You give us a
perspective we could not otherwise get.
We also appreciate your service to the North Atlantic Assembly.
I have looked on this body through the years as having made a
tremendous contribution to the strength and cohesion of the alli-
ance. The broad scope of the assembly's work has emphasized the
importance not only of NATO's military strength but also of the
political and economic stability it can contribute to the entire free
world.
We are very grateful to you in many respects.
331
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS ON SALT
Mr. Thyness, starting with you, I will ask this question. You
indicated for the most part that European support for SALT II has
been overwhelming. I would ask each of you to comment.
With respect to the military in NATO, it has been said that
there is a difference between the political leadership in Europe and
the military. Taking into account that there will always be excep-
tions, would you say that, for the most part, those members of the
military establishment in NATO countries generally support SALT
II?
Mr. Thyness. Well, Senator, I readily confess that the critical
voices one hears are mainly from military people, perhaps prefer-
ably retired military people. This is not surprising since their view
will always be focused on hardware and will not take into consider-
ation what is to us here more important, namely, the long-term
political considerations of the treaty.
You cannot divide the treaty between those two sides. It must be
taken as an entity. Still, I would say that from my experience in
my many conversations with military leaders both in my own
country and within the alliance, it is also in these circles that a
basic support for the SALT II Treaty is very, very high.
Senator Percy. I would say that my question would have to be
based on the assumption that we are able to totally satisfy military
concerns about the nontransfer provision and the extension of the
protocol. Those two things, we concur with you, must be laid in
cement.
Mr. Wall. Yes, Senator, I would fully agree with what you just
said, provided these two matters are absolutely clear. Then I be-
lieve the military in my country would certainly support SALT II.
But I think they would also like to see a reversal of adverse trends
and more military and political strength in the alliance's dealing
with some of the problems we have discussed just now.
Mr. Corterier. I think the concerns that the military may have
had. Senator, are mainly concerns that they have had in the past
during the negotiations. At that time there was a feeling for a
while that maybe you would limit yourselves too much as far as
cruise missiles are concerned and that there would be problems as
far as transfer of technology is concerned, and so on and so forth.
But as the process of consultation between your Government and
the NATO governments went along, our experts and our govern-
ments have been able to put in their desiderata and their concerns,
and now I think there is a general feeling also on the part of our
military experts that this input has been taken care of, has been
taken seriously by you. And with the assurances you have given us,
we feel that our concerns have been satisfied.
So I think there has been a change from some time when the
negotiations were going along and the present situation.
Senator Percy. Thank you.
Mr. de Vries.
Mr. DE Vries. Let me give you a footnote. As rapporteur of the
Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, I have never
let an occasion go by in recent years to ask the military in differ-
ent countries we have visited about their attitude on SALT. And I
must say that Mr. Corterier is right in his assessment.
1+8-260 0-79 Pt.4 - 22
332
Of course, during the course of the negotiations, people have
been studying it carefully and have brought up concerns, but I
think they are satisfied with the debate as to SALT. Of course, one
of the problems which is on the military mind as well as on the
political mind in Europe is how will we proceed from here.
I think Europe is far more concerned with the future than with
the past in SALT II and will be satisfied with the result of the
negotiations.
Senator Percy. Mr. President, in your statement you say you
have put on record your trust that the United States will stand
behind its guarantees to Europe. I hope that you can carry back to
Europe the judgment that the American public, the Congress of the
United States and the President of the United States stands behind
those guarantees without any equivocation whatsover.
You just have to take my State of Illinois. There are only a few
relatives of my constituents in Vietnam. There was a lot of dissen-
sion in my State about that war. It was not in our national security
interest. We shouldn't have committed ourselves so strongly. We
committed about 3 percent of our GNP to the war effort in Viet-
nam and about 40 percent our GNP to the war effort in World War
II.
Virtually everyone in my State has roots in Europe. They all
came from European nations. We all did. You are a part of us and
we are a part of you. We cannot separate our own national security
from your security interests. Because wars are started through
miscalculation, I hope the Soviets would never miscalculate the
devotion we have to those guarantees, which are absolute and
complete.
GATEWAY TO SALT III OBVIOUSLY SALT II
You mention that the gateway to SALT III is obviously SALT II.
In other words, those who feel that this treaty does not go far
enough in the way of real disarmament or bilateral reductions in
armaments, that is really an answer to them, isn't it? You cannot
get to SALT III and go any further — and many on this committee
on both sides of the aisle have evidenced a desire to move forward
and that this treaty does not go far enough— if you don't ratify
SALT II. You can't get there unless you ratify SALT II, is that
correct?
Mr. Thyness. Yes, Senator. First let me say that I am very
grateful for your statement about American intentions. But I can
assure you that very few people in Norway feel a need of assur-
ances of that kind.
Second, on the first question, of course SALT II is a very limited
thing. There are a number of other areas where we need to move
forward in order to create a more stable world. But I think most
Europeans will agree with the statement that if SALT II is defeat-
ed, the whole atmosphere, the climate for negotiations, will be set
back many years and that our present concerns with theater nucle-
ar weapons, et cetera, would simply not be in the pale of any kind
of arms control measure.
333
AGREEMENT WITH DR. KISSINGER's ASSESSMENT
Senator Percy. Mr. Wall, I went through your written statement
and did not find in there a statement that you supported ratifica-
tion of SALT II. In your verbal statement you did say it, but your
statement is the most pessimistic.
Would you characterize it as something akin to statements made
by Secretary Kissinger, that coupled with adequate defense expend-
itures, you would then support SALT II?
Mr. Wall. First, Senator, may I say that I understood wrongly, I
believe, that the oral statement would be circulated with the writ-
ten statement. In my view it is essential that both should be taken
together because, as you pointed out, they are somewhat different
in balance.
The Chairman. Both, of course, will appear in the record.
Mr. Wall. Thank you.
I fully support SALT II but, as I said, I think a lot depends on
reversing the trend, both militarily and in political will. Therefore,
I do to quite a large extent agree with Dr. Kissinger that the two
need to come together.
minuteman vulnerability
Senator Percy. There is one other thing I would like to clarify in
your statement. You discuss Minuteman vulnerability. You men-
tion that the Soviets could conceivably knock out 70 to 90 percent
of our ICBM force with a first strike, whereas we could only hope
to destroy 65 percent of theirs.
Could you amplify that by commenting on, however, the fact that
their strategic force is primarily land based and is therefore more
vulnerable, where ours is primarily under water or in the air
where it is highly invulnerable.
Mr. Wall. Yes, Senator, I will accept that. I put a lot of figures
in my paper which are drawn from many different sources and, in
some respects, contradict each other. On the other hand, I think
that the statement is probably at the moment true, but of course
American weapons are still much more accurate.
As you say, the United States depends on a triad of weapons,
whereas the Soviets concentrate on land-based ICBM's. So on that
point of view we are fairly happy. I really put it in my statement
to show that in recent years, in fact since SALT I, the Soviets have
deployed SS-17, 18, 19, 20. They are developing the SS-22, 23, 24
and 25 and have had SSN's 6, 8, 17 and 18.
During the whole of that period, the Americans have only been
talking about the M-X cruise missiles and the Trident. That is the
only reason I put it in. The trend is working against us. That is
why in supporting SALT II, I do believe that this trend has to be
reversed.
Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. May I ask
another question, please?
The Chairman. Certainly, Senator. We have some time.
Senator Percy. Thank you.
The question has been raised here before in the committee. We
feel the debate so far has focused on many, many aspects of our
overall foreign and military policy and has helped public under-
334
standing. My question is whether or not we should try to televise
the debate on the floor of the Senate. The British Parliament is not
televised, as I understand it, but the Dutch, and German Parlia-
ments are. And I am not sure about Norway.
Could you comment very briefly as to whether you feel that the
experiment would be worthwhile here? We have never televised
the Senate floor debate of the United States but we had public
radio coverage of the debate on the Panama Canal.
Gentlemen, would you care to give us the benefit of your advice
on that as parliamentarians? We would appreciate it. What are the
plusses and what are the minuses?
Mr. DE Vries. Senator, we have had television in our chamber for
more than 10 years now. We leave it to the networks what they
want to broadcast and what not. I think it may have an effect in
the short term, maybe on people having to appear on TV and
making their speeches far more beautiful than they usually are.
But that wears off. And I think in the long run, it is just
coverage that our discussions ought to have anyway. I do not think
we are uncomfortable with it. As a matter of fact, we think it is
quite natural nowadays.
Mr. CoRTERiER. Senator, let me say that I agree with my col-
league that probably when you have it all the time, people don't
care that much any more. But we have a system where we mostly
have television when we have important debates. I must say that
we very often find that our voters watch these debates, and I think
a debate on SALT II would probably be a good occasion to have
such coverage from our experience.
Senator Percy. So you would support it. I am sure we are not
going to open up all floor debate to television coverage and it is
only a question of this particular debate. How do you feel about
that then?
Mr. DE Vries. I think you should.
Mr. CoRTERiER. So do I.
Mr. Wall. As I said, Senator, the majority are against television
in our chamber. I continue to be against it. On the other hand, we
do occasionally televise the opening of Parliament by the Queen. So
there are exceptions. I would have thought there was quite a
strong case to make in this debate which is so important on your
country and to the alliance, an exception by televising it.
Of course, since you ask my advice, I give it, but it is really a
problem for you to solve.
Mr. Thyness. Senator, in Norway we have debates in our Parlia-
ment which are considered interesting by our network and these
are carried on live television. Whether or not this is an advantage
politically and gives information to the public, I really could not
say. I do believe that television perhaps is slightly overrated as a
means of information through debate because the viewers have a
tendency more to see your tie than to listen to what you are
saying.
The Chairman. I noticed the networks turned off their cameras
when you said that. [Laughter.]
Mr. Thyness. They are here to stay. Sooner or later they are
going to come in, so why not now?
Senator Percy. I want to thank you all very much indeed.
335
Senator Biden, because I may not otherwise have an occasion to
do so, let me join Senator Church in commending you on what I
consider to be an extremely important trip that you took to the
Soviet Union. It was hardworking, and from my conversations with
other members of the delegation, it was an extraordinary experi-
ence for all of them and added immeasurably to their understand-
ing of some of the problems that were discussed.
But also I hope the understanding of those whom you visited was
improved, if only to get at this one deeply perplexing problem that
you have referred to, the role of the U.S. Senate in foreign policy.
It is so hard for foreigners to really understand it. We want no
misunderstanding on the Soviet Union's part, and I think you have
helped emphasize that very much indeed.
I hope that they will look upon the understandings that we
intend to accept as essential and really as reaffirming and making
more binding some of the understandings they have already had
with the executive branch of Government. It will bind future
administrations.
I think Jack McCloy, whom all of you know, probably gave the
best, most thorough explanation as a scholar and lawyer of the role
of the Senate of the United States in making foreign policy. I will
see that each of you gets a copy of that paper. He did a thorough
research job, going back to the founding fathers and their inten-
tions.
He described the executive branch, the President, as an agent in
making foreign policy and certainly in making treaties. So we do
recognize our responsibility. I hope we will carry it out in a very
responsible manner because it must not be done capriciously. It is
a grave responsibility. I think this vote will be the most important
vote I will have cast in 13 years in the Senate, and your contribu-
tion in being here and in helping us is very deeply appreciated.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Percy.
Senator Percy, I thank you most sincerely for your fme compli-
ment.
SENATE ACTION ON EXTENSION OF THE PROTOCOL
Mr. Thyness, you appear to be the one who seemed very satisfied
by the administration's present statements on noncircumyention
and nonextension of the protocol. Would you be satisfied with the
U.S. Senate taking no formal action on that other than what the
administration has already stated?
Mr. Thyness. Senator, I have no objections to anything being
written into the ratification resolution, but for my own part I think
that the clarifications and the understandings given as of now are
sufficient and I see no particular need for going further in that
respect. I do, however, believe that some of my colleagues disagree
with me in that.
Mr. Wall. May I take a rather different view? Administrations
change and their policies change and public opinions change; but
as I understand it. Senate resolutions do not change. They have the
effect of law. Therefore, I would like to see the two particular
issues I raised, noncircumvention and the transfer of technology,
written into a Senate resolution if this is possible.
336
The Chairman. Mr. Wall, I expect that your wish will be carried
forth. We have all introduced various resolutions on the same
subject.
Mr. CoRTERiER. Mr. Chairman, as I have said, I think the assur-
ances that have been given by the administration are satisfactory,
but at the same time, I think it will certainly be useful if the
Senate adopts a resolution that more or less goes in the same
direction as the administration had done.
In addition to that, perhaps I am not familiar enough with your
procedure, but as far as the protocol goes, the Senate has a very
special responsibility. Therefore, I think it would be important that
the Senate too states that the protocol is only there until the date
of expiration that is written in.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, you have all referred to the concern
on the part of our European allies about theater force moderniza-
tion.
Several times in my conversations with Chancellor Schmidt, he
called it Euro-strategic. He kept pointing out to me that although
Bonn may be my theater, it is his home.
I believe there is unanimity in the view that we will not get to
SALT III, which most assuredly will deal with some of the issues
relating to TNF, unless we get through SALT II.
PROPOSAL FOR TNF MODERNIZATION
Now, if we may turn to something about which I have had a
growing concern and which seems, in my opinion, to have gotten a
bit out of hand. There seems to be an almost absolute adherence to
the idea that December is the crucial time for all of NATO to
arrive at the form that TNF modernization will take.
It seems somehow that we have set our own standard again, and
if the high level group and the special group fail to reach a recom-
mendation agreeable to all by December, somehow that will be
viewed as a lack of solidarity by the Alliance.
Would you all individually comment? Perhaps we could begin
with Mr. de Vries.
Mr. DE Vries. Senator, it is good procedure to set a deadline for
the procedures that you are developing, but it looks a bit like the
tail is wagging the dog at the moment. I feel that where these
issues of theater nuclear modernization in some countries of the
Alliance, especially in my own, are so difficult and have to be
discussed so thoroughly, that it would be rather dumb to let the
calendar dictate when a decision is going to be on the table.
The Chairman. There seems to be a blind optimism that some-
how the country of your eminent colleague on to your left — the
FRG — will be able to reconcile its nonsingularity doctrine with the
aversion that your country — Holland — has to deploy nuclear weap-
ons. Everywhere I speak, they say they hope they will work it out.
But, you know, "which weapons and where" is not an easy ques-
tion. What truly is the prospect of us arriving at a unified NATO
position?
Mr. de Vries. Sir, it is a bit difficult to comment on that. I know
the discussions of the Government are very difficult for me as a
parliamentarian who will have to look at what comes on the table.
It is a bit difficult to pay the bill in advance.
337
But I think our government will have a very difficult decision to
make and probably a very difficult time, if it comes to a positive
decision, to convince our Parliament that it has done what was
necessary, although I don't know the outcome. I really don't want
to speculate on it.
But I think our public opinion is not prepared to accept at this
very moment the introduction of long-range TNF in our own coun-
try.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, please continue down the hne.
Mr. CoRTERiER. Senator, we have had some talks last week with
European governments and with NATO in Brussels. My impression
is that on the technical level, they are making good progress. The
high level group and the special group will be ready each before
December.
The Chairman. Do you think both groups will be ready?
Mr. Corterier. Yes. But as far as my government's opinions go,
Chancellor Schmidt has said on several occasions that he will not
let himself be pressured too much by that date. He has said that
only if we are politically ready, if our consultations have gone far
enough, if we have really been able to come up with a viable
solution, would he be ready to make a final decision in December.
On the other hand, I think we want to get into SALT III as
quickly as possible. In that respect I think we have an interest to
not delay the decision for too long, but I don't think we should let
ourselves be pressured by that December date too much.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, please use your judgment not to
answer if you think it is most appropriate. I will not be offended.
Do you see any prospect of the Federal Republic of Germany back-
ing off its nonsingularity doctrine in the event that the Alliance
cannot convince others to participate in the placement of long-
range nuclear weapons of this sort?
Mr. Corterier. Well, sir, that is a very difficult question because
I think there are very good reasons for us to take that stand. I
think it would be very bad for the Alliance if this important
position would not be taken by all its members, if not all its
members would share in the responsibilities that go with it.
I am quite happy with a statement the Foreign Minister of
Belgium made just a few days ago. Unfortunately, I have it here in
French and it is a bit difficult to translate, but the gist of what he
is saying is really that he feels as a Belgian it would be bad for the
Alliance to have this kind Sf division.
I think some of the Alliance members like Holland or Belgium
would be relegated almost to a kind of second class status. Of
course, in addition to that you have to have in mind that Germany
is probably the most exposed member of the Alliance and would
have to suffer most from a propaganda campaign from the Soviet
Union, from pressure from the Soviet Union and its allies.
I think also on that score it would be unfair to let Germany bear
this burden alone.
Then there is another concern that I have that may not be as
well understood here in the United States as it is understood in
Western Europe, and that is that Germany's history is still there.
There are still quite a few Eastern Europeans and Western Europe-
ans, as well, who do not want Germany to be too strong.
338
If the impression that would be created that we in one way or
another would be associated with nuclear weapons, and Germany
alone, not the Alliance, I think it would not only hurt us in the
East; it would hurt us in the West as well.
So these are very important considerations. Senator, and I think
it would be very difficult for us to have almost a kind of bilateral
solution to this problem. I think it must be an Alliance solution.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wall.
Mr. Wall. Well, Senator, being a nuclear power, we do not face
the problems that some of my European colleagues face. On the
other hand, we have to realize that really, Europeans have no
theater arms such as the SS-20, and therefore the sooner we can
have an agreement to modernize NATO's theater nuclear forces
the better. I believe the date of December is very important indeed.
I hope very much the Council of Ministers will be able to reach a
definite decision, bearing in mind that whenever the decision is
reached, it will be some considerable period before it can be imple-
mented.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thyness.
Mr. Thyness. Senator, I believe that December is not simply set
as a deadline. It is part of the internal NATO procedure. There is a
ministerial meeting in December, and the next one would be in
May. May would mean that the possible programs would be actual-
ly delayed.
I think we have up to January or February, actually, to make a
decision, and the delay will occur in the development and deploy-
ment of systems we might agree on. So December is not absolute.
The Chairman. With regard to the practical or technical effect of
a delay on the ability to deploy, I have spoken with our military
leaders in NATO, including General Rogers, and your military
leadership, specifically in Great Britain and Germany, and I think
the idea that technologically we would be seriously hampered in
terms of deploying unless the decision were made by December is a
bit of a red herring.
importance of throw-weight in superpower balance
I will ask one final question and will then yield to Senator
Javits, who in my opinion is probably the most knowledgeable man
in the Senate on questions relating to the Atlantic Alliance
Mr. de Vries, you and others have mentioned that throw-weight
is only one of a number of criteria that can be used to measure
strategic power.
How much importance do each of you gentleman believe that
people in your countries and Europeans generally tend to attach to
throw-weight as they assess the superpower balance?
It is argued by some that because the Soviets have a throw-
weight advantage and because Europeans are obviously looking,
they will say, my God, the superpower balance is obviously tipped
and we should place less faith and reliance on the United States.
How much significance to you believe either your governments,
your parliaments, and/ or Europeans generally actually attach to
throw-weight as they assess the superpower balance?
339
Mr. DE Vries. Senator, I would not dare to comment on behalf of
all Europeans, but from the discussions in which I have been
involved, I do not think people perceive throw-weight as something
very special. I think people are very practical and very cool in
thinking about the different criteria by which one has to measure
strategic power.
I think we would basically agree with the judgment made earlier
by previous administrations in your country that if you deploy
nuclear weapons, you have first of all to determine what you are
going to do with them. If you can do that with lower throw-weights
and higher accuracy, for instance, then you are probably better off
than by just trying to buy something very big and a bit dumb and
clumsy.
I don't think in public opinion it plays any role whatsoever. I
don't think very many people know what throw-weight is, actually.
If they know, I don't think at the same time they will be able to
analyze what it would mean. So I do not attach very much value to
it in terms of public opinion.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wall.
Mr. Wall. I think, as you say, it is part of the general scenario. I
don't think it is really relevant how much overkill there is on each
side. I believe what is more important than throw-weight is accura-
cy. Of course, your missiles are considerably more accurate than
the Soviets, but they seem to be catching up.
Mr. Thyness. Senator, may I just say that it is at least my
understanding that the United States has deliberately not devel-
oped those gigantic weapons simply because they put more store in
accuracy. I think most people who are apt to have a view on these
questions are apt also to accept that policy of the United States.
The Chairman. We have a common failing in this country. We
tend to double argue every issue using it both ways. Present and
retired military leaders have sat at that table and told us about the
throw-weight problem. We then ask, do you want to build heavy
missiles if we amend the treaty? And they say no.
I will yield to Senator Javits.
Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I dashed down as quickly as I could. I had a speaking
engagement in New York of long standing. I want to welcome you
as brothers in arms with whom I have served for so many years in
the North Atlantic Assembly, and to especially welcome you be-
cause it is rather an innovation for us to have witnesses who are
from out of our country.
I cannot think of a finer set of witnesses to have on this subject,
and I shall read avidly everjd:hing that you have said on this
subject. I am sure, knowing my colleagues as I do, that there isn't
anything that I could ask that you have not already been asked,
but I would like the privilege, without interfering with Senator
Biden's lunch because I will only take a minute, to ask you one
question.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SALT II AND SALT III
It relates to the relationship between SALT II and SALT III.
Senator Biden made a very gracious reference to me. I don't de-
serve it. I have served in this field a long time and I have always
340
considered Europe the linchpin of our hope for retaining peace,
social justice, and prosperity in the world.
I have always felt that Western Europe, the United States, and
Japan, if we ever were really working hand and glove, would find
no problem, really, that we couldn't very readily handle. But, of
course, we don't. Our main problem is ourselves. But, I have confi-
dence in Europe's confidence in us because I have comparable
confidence in Europe.
Therefore, I believe the greatest question you can answer for us
is the relationship between SALT II and SALT III. We will unques-
tionably, gentlemen, give some instruction of a binding character
to our negotiators about SALT III. The present indications are that
we will want them, before they bring back SALT III, to have
effected a real limitation in nuclear armaments. Otherwise, they
should not bring it back; and to serve notice on the Russians that
without a real limitation, there will be no SALT III.
Now, as Europe — and when I use the word "Europe," I mean
you, our allies — has favored SALT II because it counted on that as
the condition precedent to SALT III. There may be something else
that you could suggest to us that we could look forward to and
provide for respecting SALT III, which is of the most burning
interest to Europe. That, to me, would be the single most critical
factor.
I would like to recall for you gentlemen that in the debate
between Senator Jackson and me before the North Atlantic Assem-
bly in Lisbon last December, that was the issue. Jackson argued
that we were leaving you vulnerable and that there might not even
be a SALT III, and I argued that SALT II made SALT III inevita-
ble and that without SALT II it was not inevitable, just the con-
trary.
My view prevailed overwhelmingly, and it was very heartening.
Is that still the case, and how do you look at it? That is my
question.
Mr. Thyness. Senator, I would just like to say that since I
represent the country that has taken the decision not to have
nuclear weapons stationed on its soil in peacetime, I always find it
a little bit difficult to argue these matters because, on the one
hand, I can be shown up as someone who wants others to do the
dirty job and still stay out of it; on the other hand, from time to
time I can be shown to be more ferocious than really I have any
background for being.
So I would very much like my colleagues, particularly from
Germany and the Netherlands, who are more in the picture here to
give views which I do believe from present and past discussions will
be the same as mine on this issue.
Peter, would you begin?
Mr. CoRTERiER. Thank you. I would be happy to.
Senator, I think I am safe in saying that support for your posi-
tion has not diminished, and I think it may be even greater on that
issue in the assembly, and I am sure we will see that in October at
our next meeting.
I am very gratified that not only you but your colleagues as well
seem to realize our ardent desire that we move as much and as
quickly as possible from SALT II into SALT III and that it should
341
be possible to deal there with those issues that are of particular
concern for us in Europe and that have not been resolved so far in
SALT II or in any of the negotiations.
I think there is a real danger that if we don't do that very
quickly, the arms race might move more and more into that area,
because I think the Soviets have started to move into that area to
exploit this gap that there is between the SALT II negotiations, on
the one hand, and MBFR, on the other hand. They really have
exploited that opportunity, in my opinion.
So I think it is important, particularly for Americans, to realize
that you should not only deal with the central systems in SALT III
but you should deal with the theater nuclear forces, particularly
the long-range nuclear forces that are of so much concern to us in
Europe.
I think it is also important that we should not make an artificial
difference between central systems and theater nuclear systems. As
Senator Biden has so well put it, for us in Bonn, for instance, it
really is a strategic system when it comes to being able to wipe out
not only Bonn but the whole surrounding area, for example by an
SS-20.
We feel we must not allow the Russians to get away with their
idea of strategic, because they call strategic whatever can hit them
and they don t admit the same criteria for their systems that can
hit Western Europe.
We believe that the alliance territory must have the same secu-
rity criteria. Therefore, we hope that this difference is not going to
be continued to be made between central systems and theater
nuclear forces.
We would certainly appreciate very much if the Senate would
make it very clear that it wants these systems to be included in the
next round of negotiations between you and the Soviet Union.
NEED FOR REDUCTIONS IN SALT III
Senator Javits. The other part of my question is: Suppose we put
the firm condition on that that there must be a real reduction?
Now, I have one-half of the answer. You would feel a real reduc-
tion has to be not only in what the Russians define as strategic, to
wit, intercontinental, but also any nuclear use in any place within
the NATO area.
Mr. CoRTERiER. Yes, that is exactly how I feel. If you would have
a real reduction only in central systems and would leave the
medium-range systems untouched, I think the problem would be
even bigger for us in Europe.
Senator Javits. The converse of the proposition is this. We set
that condition and our negotiators start. Therefore, we run the risk
that there will be no SALT III. Do you believe Europe would be
willing to run that risk, that the next time out there has to be a
real reduction?
Mr. CoRTERiER. Well, I think after so many years of negotiations,
it is obvious that you have to go further now than you have been
able to go in SALT II. This is something I have not been able to
consult with my friends back home on, but I think there would be
a general support for the idea that now the time has come where
we need to go much further than we have been able to do so far.
342
Mr. Thyness. Senator, I would like to say that although, of
course, the aim should always be a real reduction in nuclear arma-
ments of all systems of all kinds, I think perhaps it will be going a
bit far to make that a precondition for entering into the negotia-
tions.
After all, although we prefer a real reduction, a stabilization at
an acceptable level would also be something that would be valuable
in curbing an aspiring arms race.
Mr. Wall. Senator, let me say that we all want to see a limita-
tion of arms, both nuclear and conventional, but obviously SALT II
must come before SALT III, and without SALT II, SALT III will
not get off the ground. I believe SALT III is important for reasons
to which I have already testified. The SS-20 and the Backfire are
the two weapons to which Europe is most vulnerable and are not
included in SALT II.
Also there is the problem of the British and the French strategic
nuclear deterrents. So after SALT II must come SALT III, but
because of the reasons I have given, there must be very full consul-
tations.
I am not suggesting that there haven't been such consultations
in SALT II. Indeed I have testified that consultations in SALT II
were excellent. But I think the Europeans will be much more
intimately affected by SALT III for the reasons that I have given,
such as the existence of the British and French nuclear deterrent
and possible Soviet weapons directed at Europe.
I think it will therefore require much closer consultation than
has been necessary in SALT II.
Senator Javits. And would you agree with Mr. Thyness as to the
fact that it should accommodate also a stabilization even though an
absolute reduction, a material reduction cannot be obtained.
Mr. Wall. Yes, sir, I would. What worries me is the background
to the whole problem. The debate we have been having over the
years has shown that the trend, both politically and militarily, has
been to the advantage of the Soviet Union and I believe that this
trend has to be reversed if we are going to obtain a proper balance
and proper and lasting SALT II, III, IV, and so forth.
Mr. DE Vries. Senator, regarding your first question, I think we
all remember in the North Atlantic Assembly the intervention you
made in Lisbon. I think people are still very supportive of that. If
you ask whether we would want to run the risk of having no SALT
III by asking for deep cuts, I think my answer would be that I
think a little risk-taking in addressing this problem could do no
harm.
I think it is extremely important that after the preliminary
exercises that we have had in SALT I, and hopefully in SALT II,
that we address the real problem and try to not only restrain and
channel the arms race, but achieve some real progress by making
deep cuts.
Of course, if the price for that would be the loss of stability, I
think we would have to have a close look at that again. But I think
that our aims and our goals should be to pursue a strategy which
would lead to dramatic cuts in the arsenals which have been built
up.
343
Senator Javits. Gentlemen, thank you very much. I have greatly
appreciated your responses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Javits.
SENATE REQUIREMENT FOR DEEP CUTS IN SALT III
Gentlemen, if we go to deep cuts in SALT III and if the Senate
requires the negotiators for the administration to do that, isn't that
going to raise other problems?
If we accomplish deep cuts in the strategic and theater nuclear
areas, what happens with the Soviets advantage in conventional
force capability? Hasn't the fact that we have relied so long on the
nuclear deterrent a^ the essential part of the overall deterrent
allowed us not to have to respond inkind to conventional capabili-
ty? We had this trip wire, this nuclear deterrent? But if we codify
an equivalence in both the theater and the central systems, what
does that do to European security, given the disparity in conven-
tional capability?
Mr. Thyness. Senator, I think we should not forget that there is
another set of negotiations underway between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact, and that is the MBFR negotiations.
MBFR W^ITHOUT SALT
The Chairman. It is essential that we arrive at an MBFR conclu-
sion? Can we have one without the other?
Mr. Corterier. The question is will the Soviets after the failure
of SALT II trust you to ratify an MBFR Treaty?
The Chairman. I am assuming for the sake of my question that
we have ratified SALT II and that we are on the way to negotiat-
ing SALT III. But part of the command that has been issued from
the Senate to the President, whomever that may be at the time,
would be, "You must come back with deep cuts or else the Senate
will not entertain a SALT III agreement."
What happens with that conventional disparity? Does not that,
when we look at overall military capability, give the Soviets a
decisive advantage unless we have at the same time arrived at
some resolution at MBFR that fits in? That is my question.
That is what scares me about deep cut requirements.
ROLE OF TNF IN THE ALLIANCE
Mr. DE Vries. I think it is a very difficult question which one has
to ponder, and I would not presume to be able to answer it fully.
But as to the role of theater nuclear weapons in the inventory of
the alliance, there has always been a great confusion. I think what
strategic parity might mean is — of course, we have to deal with the
theater level, also— mainly that we want to have a closer look at
the conventional area.
We have always looked at theater forces as forces which would
indicate to a possible aggressor that there is an ultimate deterrent.
And of course there are many distinctions to be made in the
battlefield in theater systems and so forth.
But basically a better definition of the role of those systems has
never been given. I think theater nuclear warfare in Europe means
344
total warfare in Europe, and to prevent total warfare in Europe, I
think the conventional balance might be the one we want to look
at, as well in arms control as in our defense posture.
Mr. Wall. Senator, in the scenario you have proposed, the deter-
rent is still there. Both sides have nuclear forces and can still use
them, but I don't believe either side will use them. Therefore, I
believe the deterrent will depend largely on our keeping our con-
ventional forces up to date. So I hope that if we do manage to
secure limitation on nuclear arms, we won't run away with the
idea it is going to save a lot of money. It isn't. You are going to
have to spend more on conventional forces.
But I do believe the scenario you have proposed would mean that
we would pay much more attention to flanks because you would
have a stalemate in nuclear forces in Europe. You would have a
Russian superiority in conventional. But they have that today. As
long as we keep a reasonable balance of modern conventional
forces whatever it is, I think you will continue to have a stalemate
in Europe and have to give more thought to the area outside the
NATO boundaries.
Mr. CoRTERiER. I would like to briefly comment on MBFR. At the
beginning of MBFR, they said that their superiority, which they
have had for many years, was good. It had contributed to maintain-
ing peace in Europe and they didn't want to change it.
One of the signs of progress we have made in MBFR is now they
have recognized the necessity to have parity there, too. Of course,
there is still the data question that has to be resolved, but I think
we have to take them up on this. What we want is parity not only
on the strategic nuclear level and the theater nuclear level, but
also so far as the conventional forces go. I think we have to pursue
that in MBFR.
The Chairman. Mr. President.
Mr. Thyness. I would just like to say that it is very difficult to
answer the question because it all depends on how the SALT III
Treaty eventually will come out. It is an immensely complicated
thing, and you really need to go from weapons system to weapons
system and balance them all against each other to see what sort of
package you end up with before you can really give an answer to
the question.
But I would say in general that I cannot see it being more
dangerous to have a kind of parity on theater nuclear forces and
inferiority in conventional forces as more dangerous than being
inferior in both fields.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much. We have kept
you here for a very long time. You have earned your lunch and we
look forward to seeing you in just a few moments for luncheon.
This hearing is recessed until 2 o'clock this afternoon, when the
lead-off witness will be the Honorable Paul Warnke, former Direc-
tor of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Thank you all, gentlemen, very much.
[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon-
vene at 2 p.m. the same day.]
345
Afternoon Session
Senator McGovern. If the witnesses will please come forward,
we will open the hearing. Other Senators will be joining us later
on.
opening statement
This afternoon we return to the theme of SALT and arms con-
trol. We have spent a great deal of time in our hearings on the
military balance, the impact of SALT on our programs, future
trends in Soviet programs and so on. We wanted to be sure we
looked at the consequences of the treaty for our national security.
We do not want to lose sight of the other side of SALT, its arms
control capability and impact. After all, the SALT process is also
about limiting strategic weapons. We want to assess this treaty in
two respects. From the arms control perspective, what contribution
does it make to limiting weapons? How effectively does it prepare
the way for more far reaching arms control in SALT III?
We also want to consider the possibilities and prospects for SALT
III assuming SALT II is ratified. Some have said SALT III is the
last chance for stopping the strategic arms race. Such a somber
prediction puts all the more weight on a careful and well thought
out approach to SALT III to enhance the prospects for success.
Today we welcome three eminent arms control experts to help us
in these considerations. They are Ambassador Warnke who has
been before this committee in an earlier hearing. We are glad to
have him again today. Dr. Panofsky is presently director of the
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center. He is a distinguished scientist
with a long history of involvement in arms control who has testi-
fied before this and other committees of the Congress on numerous
occasions. Dr. Brennan is well known as a strategist and student of
national security problems having written or collaborated in many
important publications on arms control. He is currently director of
National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute.
We welcome you, gentlemen, to this session of the committee to
comf)ile the record that we need for our further judgments on this
treaty. I think we will begin with Mr. Warnke and then we will
hear from Mr. Panofsky and Mr. Brennan in that order. We will
reserve questions until all three of the panelists have had a chance
to make an opening statement.
Mr. Warnke?
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WARNKE, FORMER DIRECTOR,
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY AND FORMER
CHIEF, SALT NEGOTIATIONS '
Ambassador Warnke. Thank you, Senator McGovern.
I have submitted a written statement which I assume will be put
into the record.
Senator McGovern. Your prepared statement will be inserted
into the record at the appropriate place.
Ambassador Warnke. I will just endeavor to highlight some of
my views with regard to SALT III.
' See page 349 for Ambassador Warnke's prepared statement.
346
The suggestions I would like to make are relatively primitive. I
hope they are practical. They are based on my experience in the
SALT negotiations and my expectations as to what will occur when
the two countries come back to the negotiating table.
As I have indicated in my previous testimony before this Com-
mittee, I see one of the major advantages of the SALT II Treaty as
providing a firm foundation for subsequent efforts. I do not think
we should view SALT III as being necessarily the same kind of
protracted exercise. I would certainly hope it would not require
something like 7 years in order to get further steps toward more
effective strategic nuclear arms control.
I think of the SALT II Treaty as providing the basis for a
continuing strategic arms control regime. As I have indicated in
my prepared statement, a great deal of the negotiations had to do
with the basic definitions. We had to establish the principles which
would permit us to control the various types of strategic nuclear
weapons. Another major part of the negotiating time was occupied
in working out the provisions on verification. I think perhaps that
was the single subject which occupied more time than anything
else.
I do not think in SALT III we have to reinvent the wheel. We
can start off with the proposition that this is a basic treaty that
can be continued. It can be continued with amendments.
I believe what we ought to do as a priority item in SALT III is to
try and shrink the SALT II limits, not only the overall aggregate
ceiling of strategic nuclear weapons but also the various subceil-
ings on the subcategories.
As you know, Senator, one of the major accomplishments of
SALT II is that for the first time it takes a selective approach to
arms control. It does not just set an overall aggregate but it sets a
subceiling of 1,200 on the number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic
missiles and then a lower subceiling of 820 on the launchers of
MIRVed ICBM's, the most dangerous and the most destabilizing of
the systems.
One of the items that ought to receive a great deal of attention
in SALT III in the very early stages is negotiation of a much lower
sublimit on the MIRVed ICBM launchers and of course also shrink-
ing the other ceilings in SALT.
In addition I believe a package of amendments can be developed
which would be further stabilizing measures. Such things for exam-
ple as limits on flight tests of ballistic missiles. If there are some
narrow limits on those flight tests this will very significantly
impede the possibility of development of new types of ballistic
missiles.
Another proposal that we did bring to the negotiating table quite
late in SALT II and really too late for it to receive much attention
was the idea of a ban on depressed trajectory testing of submarine
launched ballistic missiles — again a stabilizing measure because
that would prevent the development of a capability of the subma-
rine launched ballistic missiles to attack our strategic bomber force
with a very sharply reduced warning time.
Possible limits on antisubmarine warfare would preserve the
present invulnerability of our ballistic missile submarine force. In
addition I think we ought to be able to work out further limits on
347
changes in intercontinental range ballistic missiles. In SALT II we
have for the first time some limits on the amount of tinkering that
can be done with existing missiles. Limits for example on signifi-
cant changes in the dimensions and limits on changes in propul-
sion systems. As part of SALT III we ought to see if we cannot
develop further controls on modernization or modification of exist-
ing missile systems. In company with those further controls we
might need further verification measures, things that would permit
us to have a greater certainty.
If you put together these various possibilities, I think we can see
that there is in fact a prospect of being able to work out some sort
of a modification and restraint package. For example if we have a
limit on flight tests of ballistic missiles, we might then be able to
develop some additional or some supplemental verification proce-
dures that would enable us with a higher degree of confidence to
monitor that limited number of tests.
To a very real extent these are synergistic possibilities.
I think from the procedural standpoint we ought to regard SALT
III as being a process that can yield results in perhaps a series of
packages, a piecemeal approach, not necessarily all at once and
nothing first. One of the factors that led to the prolongation of the
SALT II negotiations was that we did not have a basic treaty to
start with and accordingly nothing could be settled until every-
thing was settled.
If we take that same approach to SALT III, then we will have to
look forward to a multiyear negotiation before any productive re-
sults can be reached. I would not like to see that happen. Instead I
would prefer to see an approach under which, when a particular
package of amendments has been agreed upon, they then could be
signed and presented to the U.S. Senate for ratification.
One of the reasons I feel that this approach is necessary is that
we will have one new item of immense complexity on the SALT III
negotiating agenda and that is the treatment of the theater nucle-
ar forces.
We felt in SALT II that we had to avoid getting into the theater
nuclear forces because that would prevent the continuation of the
negotiations on a primarily bilateral basis. Because obviously when
you get into the theater nuclear forces, that intimately engages the
interest of our Western European allies and we would require some
kind of a continuing consultative mechanism to permit their views
to become a part of the SALT negotiations.
President Ford at Vladivostok was able to get the Soviets to
agree that SALT II would not include theater nuclear forces. How-
ever it seems to be almost inevitable that theater nuclear force
issues will come up in SALT III. They will for one thing because of
the fact that the protocol expires at the end of 1981. At the end of
that time there will be no controls over the ground-launched and
sea-launched cruise missiles.
I think it is also inescapable because of the grave concern that
our Western European allies have about the development of such
gray area systems as the SS-20, a mobile medium range ballistic
missile launcher and the Backfire bomber. Because of that fact,
they see the possibilities that rather than the nuclear arms compe-
48-260 0-79 Pt . 4 - 23
348
tition being stopped or retarded, it may instead focus just on the-
ater nuclear forces.
Presently we are trying to work out with our allies a dual
approach to the problem of theater nuclear forces. We are discuss-
ing modernization of our own theater nuclear forces perhaps by
extended range Pershing missiles or perhaps by long-range ground-
launched and sea-launched cruise missiles, but at the same time we
and our allies feel it is important to try and pursue the possibilities
of some arms control constraints on theater nuclear forces.
The complexity of the issue is such that I would very much
dislike to see all progress on SALT II halted while we try and work
out the details of some controls over the gray area systems and the
theater nuclear forces.
We ought to be able to agree bilaterally with the Soviets on
further reductions in the aggregate and further reductions in the
subceilings while pursuing the question of control of the theater
nuclear forces.
As I have mentioned in my prepared statement, I think it will be
necessary to develop some kind of continuing consultative mecha-
nism at a minimum to deal with the theater nuclear force issue.
Although we consulted on a very frequent basis with our allies
during the development of SALT II, when we get into the theater
nuclear forces, I think we will need a more formal method of
consultation so their views will be reflected because of the fact that
these issues are not primarily and certainly not exclusively bilater-
al issues.
I have also stated in my prepared comments that I think we
ought to pursue other arms control initiatives as being complemen-
tary to SALT. I believe for example that we ought to pursue the
possibility of a cutoff on the production of fissionable material.
That would complement SALT because it would further impede the
development of new types of nuclear weapons.
I feel very strongly that we ought to pursue the completion of
the current negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. Again that
complements SALT because it again impedes the development of
new types of strategic nuclear weapons.
Based on my experience as head of the American delegation to
the comprehensive test ban talks, I believe the way is now clear to
solve the major problems that have prevented the completion of a
comprehensive test ban for so many years and this is in my view a
matter of great importance to the security of the United States.
I think we should not underemphasize the risks of proliferation
of nuclear weapons. I think it is quite clear that we are never
going to be able to bring to bear the maximum pressure on other
countries to prevent them from getting into the nuclear weapons
business as long as we consider it necessary to continue to test
nuclear explosive devices.
I recommend that the comprehensive test ban negotiations be
pursued as a priority item in conjunction with SALT III.
I would like to make my own plea that the Senate act rapidly on
SALT II. The time is not running in our favor. As we wait, techno-
logical developments make arms control ever more difficult.
349
I think we need the SALT II Treaty as the firm foundation that
will permit us to get ahead with the process and to achieve signifi-
cant and prompt results.
Thank you very much.
[Ambassador Warnke's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Paul C. Warnke
arms control and salt iii objectives
«
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, as the Members of the Committee
know, I left my government responsibilities with regard to the strategic arms limits
negotiations over ten months ago. Accordingly, my comment today on possible
approaches to SALT III must be considered to be those of a private citizen. They
are, of course, based on my close personal observation of the SALT process.
In my opinion, it is imperative that the ratification of the SALT II Treaty take
place as soon as possible so that this process may go ahead without further loss of
time. Experience shows that, as SALT plods along, the unimpeded advance of
nuclear technology puts ever greater obstacles in the path of sound and effective
nuclear arms control.
As I testified before this Committee last July, I see one of the main advantages of
the SALT II Treaty as being the creation of a firm foundation on which further
quantitative reductions, qualitative constraints and other limits on nuclear weapons
development may be based. Accordingly, I do not see as the goal of the SALT III
negotiations the creation of a whole new replacement treaty. With the entry into
force of the SALT II Treaty, we will have the basic structure for a continuing
nuclear arms control regime. Much, if not most, of the SALT II negotiations cen-
tered around such fundamental issues as the definitions of the particular nuclear
weapons systems to be covered and the provisions on verification. These issues need
not and should not be renegotiated. They may, of course, be supplemented.
Nor, as was the case with the SALT II Treaty, need there be agreement on the
entire congeries of complicated issues before agreement can be reached on any
individual item or related set of items. In SALT II, nothing could come into effect
until everything was settled. Now, it would facilitate the negotiations and yield
much more rapid progress if SALT III is conceived as a set of separable packages.
Thus, President Carter has made it clear that he places very high priority on
substantial reductions in both the overall aggregate of nuclear weapons delivery
systems and the subceilings on the more dangerous and destabilizing of these
weapons systems. These subceilings are among the more useful precedents created
by the SALT II treaty. At an early stage, it should be possible to agree, for example,
that when the reduced ceiling of 2,250 is reached by the end of 1981, further
reductions will be made to bring the aggregate strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
total to a figure well below that level by the end of 1985. At the same time, and as
part of the same package, agreement should be reached to cut, by that same end
date and to a significant extent, the subceilings of 1,200 MIRVed ballistic missile
launchers and 820 launchers of MIRVed intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Associated with this package of quantitative cuts, there should be an agreement
to extend the term of the SALT II treaty, at least through 1990.
This relatively simple package would, of course, require Senate ratification before
it came into effect. It could, however, be presented to the Senate as soon as it has
been negotiated and it should not, I think, prove to be controversial.
Another set of related proposals could be those that are designed to have a
further inhibiting effect on the development of new types of strategic nuclear
weapons capability. One such measure would be a limit on the number of interconti-
nental and submarine-launched ballistic missile tests that can be conducted in any
one year. Either the limit of six which was part of the March 1977 proposal might
be considered or perhaps some separate ceiling applicable only to ICBM's.
Another such limit, which could be associated with that on test firings, could be a
ban on any testing of submarine-launched ballistic missiles in depressed trajectories,
a development which would lessen the warning time for attacks on our strategic
bomber force. The limits on changes in existing missiles should be tightened to the
extent that verification considerations permit. Specific inhibitions on any new stra-
tegic weapons in the early concept stage could also be included in this particular
package of SALT III amendments to the basic SALT II treaty.
My preference for this separate package approach to SALT III is grounded in
large part by the next set of SALT III issues that I would like to discuss. These
involve the so-called grey area systems — the theatre nuclear weapons that come in
between the tactical battlefield classification and those of strategic intercontinental
350
range Obviously, these longer range weapons in the theatre nuclear forces create
negotiating and political problems of great complexity. Their direct relationship to
alliance force structure decisions means that their disposition in treaty provisions
cannot be an exclusively bilateral process. Our recognition of the sensitivities that
these theatre nuclear forces evoke was reflected in our insistence in SALT II that
only weapons of intercontinental range would be covered. At the Vladivostok meet-
ing between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev, the Soviets accepted
our position that forward-based systems in Europe would not be included.
There is, as the members of the Committee know, not complete consonance of
views among the NATO allies as to the inclusion of theatre nuclear forces in SALT
III. At the same time, it is clear that alliance decisions on the upgrading of NATO s
theatre nuclear forces can only be made in the context of developments in Soviet
nuclear forces of comparable range. Moreover, the only restraints on long-range
ground launched and sea launched cruise missiles are those contained in the Proto-
col, which inhibits only the deployment but not the testing of such weapons through
198L It seems very likely that the Soviet negotiators will propose, as part of SALT
III new restrictions on cruise missiles on ground or sea launchers that could reach
the Soviet Union from Western Europe. We, however, have made it very clear to
the Soviets that no such restrictions could be accepted unless there are comparable
restrictions on such long-range theatre systems as the Soviet SS-20 and the Backfire
bomber. . ^ r j
Any decisions as to what theatre nuclear weapons we are prepared to torego, and
in return for what limits on Soviet theatre nuclear forces, must be made in close
consultation with our Western European allies. These decisions will require careful
analysis of the implications for NATO's security of going ahead or holding back.
Will, for example, a surprise attack on Western Europe be less or more feasible if
both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have uncountable numbers of long-range cruise
missiles deployed on ground and sea launchers? Splendid as our verification capabil-
ity is, I know of no way that we could tell or the Soviet Union could tell how many
such 'missiles are in fact deployed, against what targets they are aimed, or even
whether they are armed with nuclear or conventional warheads or a mix of both.
Moreover, even if the other NATO countries are willing to have questions of
theatre nuclear forces negotiated in bilateral meetings between the United States
and the Soviet Union, it seems certain that this part of SALT III could only go
ahead with some more formal and more continuous consultative mechanism, where-
by we would have constantly to renew the proxy given to us by our allies. We
would, I am certain, be completely unwilling to decide issues basic to NATO s
nuclear military forces except on the basis of full agreement and understanding
within the alliance.
But, as I see it, there is no reason why this set of issues, which raise such
troubling political, military and negotiating problems, should hold up further bi-
lateral agreement on deep cuts and new qualitative restraints on strategic range
nuclear weapons systems. There is, I recognize, a temptation to find a relationship
among all of the questions that can arise as the SALT negotiations continue. The
breaking down of these issues into separate packages, that might be negotiated,
signed and ratified as separate amendments to the basic SALT II treaty, foregoes
some opportunity for trade-offs. But, to take one simple instance, we would certainly
have preferred to see lower figures than 2,250, 1,200 and 820 as part of SALT II. We
in fact proposed, unsuccessuUy, limits on flight tests and the testing of submarine
launched ballistic missiles in depressed trajectories. If and when we can secure
agreement on these further cuts and these new restraints, I can see no reason why
they should not promptly be brought into force as amendments of the basic treaty.
As for the relationship between SALT and other arms control initiatives, I would
support Dr. Panofsky's suggestion that the SALT forum might be used to agree with
the Soviet Union on a cutoff of production of fissionable material for military
purposes. The United States has repeatedly supported such a cutoff in the past and
its coming into being would be consistent with our attempts to improve security and
lessen the risk of nuclear war by limiting further the development of new nuclear
weapons. In addition, I think the speedy completion of a comprehensive ban on the
testing of nuclear explosive devices is both possible and highly desirable. Again,
such a ban would impede the creation of new and even more destructive nuclear
weapons systems. Having headed our delegation to these Comprehensive Test Ban
negotiations until last November, I am confident that what once appeared as the
major problems can now be readily resolved.
Moreover, the cessation of testing of nuclear explosive devices is, as I see it, an
indispensable part of a realistic policy against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
So long as we and the Soviet Union insist on our need for further tests of nuclear
weaponry, our pleas that other sovereign states forego any such testing are destined
351
to fall on deaf ears. Whatever national security arguments might be made for
continued testing are, I am convinced, dwarfed by the national security detriment of
encouraging other countries to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.
Finally, I would like to make my own plea for the assigning of a higher priority to
the completion of new limitations on strategic nuclear weapons. The process, as I
see it, is inescapably a slow and cautious one. We can't afford to speed it up at the
sacrifice of thorough consideration and full exploration of the possibilities. But
neither, in my opinion, can we afford to draw it out artificially and unnecessarily by
holding SALT hostage to every swing in United States/Soviet relations.
SALT, as I have said repeatedly, is not a favor that we are doing to the Soviets,
one that we can withhold as a punishment or proffer as a bribe. SALT is instead a
responsibility that history, our scientific genius and our position of world leadership
have placed upon us. Confident as I am that the SALT II Treaty is a major step
forward to nuclear sanity, I am equally convinced that we must go further and go
faster It is for these reasons that I recommend strongly that we get ahead with it,
that the SALT II Treaty be ratified promptly, and that it be used as the firm
foundation for a series of additional and separable improvements that can be
considered and accepted as amendments to the basic treaty.
Such an approach can mean more rapid and substantial progress, and permit the
consideration of SALT issues in an atmosphere less politically charged. It affords a
means whereby the more complex and controversial issues will not prevent the
prompt entry into force of simpler but no less significant steps in nuclear arms
control.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Ambassador Warnke. We
will proceed with the testimony of Dr. Panofsky.
STATEMENT OF DR. WOLFGANG PANOFSKY, DIRECTOR,
STANFORD LINEAR ACCELERATOR CENTER*
Dr. Panofsky. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
I am pleased to have the privilege again of testifying before this
committee. I am currently a member of the General Advisory
Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the Executive
Branch and I would like to emphasize that I am here testifying as
an individual citizen giving my personal views.
I continue to be persuaded that ratification of SALT II is strong-
ly in the national security interest of the United States.
This committee has heard many witnesses from within and with-
out the administration enumerating how the provisions in SALT II
place limits on the threat against which this country has to be
prepared and how several of the other provisions assure integrity
of our intelligence collection assets.
It has been amply demonstrated that the level of strategic nu-
clear weapons in the absence of SALT on both sides would be
substantially higher than with SALT enacted. Moreover, witnesses
have been persuasive in demonstrating that SALT II places more
substantial restraints at this stage of nuclear weapons developnient
and deployment on the Soviet Union than it does on the United
States.
I will not repeat these arguments here in further detail.
You have also heard numerous criticisms of SALT. Yet I have
heard no criticisms to which an easier remedy can be found
through repudiation of SALT II. You have heard numerous criti-
cisms of our military posture. Yet I have heard no proposed meas-
ure to improve that posture which is easier to achieve by repudi-
ation of SALT II.
Most, if not all, of these criticisms deal with questions outside
provisions of the SALT agreements themselves but involve issues
' See page 357 for Dr. Panofsky's prepared statement.
352
which the critics believe will be affected adversely through political
linkages if SALT were enacted.
I find it interesting to note that many of these arguments are in
opposing directions. There are those who argue that enactment of
SALT will lull us into a false sense of security and therefore will
impair the willingness of this country to provide adequately for its
own defense.
To argue against an arms control treaty which demonstrably, m
terms of its intrinsic content, will enhance our security by claiming
that it will make future administrations and Congresses be less
than diligent in providing for the national defense is at variance
with the basic tenets of our system.
There are also those who argue that the price for ratification in
terms of additional armaments is too high. In other words, they
maintain that SALT II will increase military spending beyond
what would have been justified in the absence of the treaty.
I note that these two criticisms are paired in their consequences
and I do not believe that either is valid. I have confidence that
future elected officials of this Nation can establish national prior-
ities wisely.
It is essential to refocus the debate on the fundamental issues of
the content of the treaty and protocol and not to be swayed unduly
by the perceived linkages between SALT and other political or
military issues. This conclusion is particularly important in the
SALT III context. The progress from SALT II to SALT III to which
both the United States and the Soviet Union are committed, can
hardly continue if the process is burdened with the politically
perceived linkages of critics with a wide variety of views.
Let me specifically comment on the linkage between ratification
of SALT II and a commitment on the part of the administration for
increased defense spending, either in terms of a rate of growth of
the U.S. defense budget for several years or in terms of procure-
ment of specific military hardware.
I find this concept extremely troublesome. Requiring as a price
for ratification increased military spending in the name of arms
control would destroy the very purpose of that process. It would
contradict the key conclusion which I believe has been presented
persuasively to this committee by the majority of witnesses,
namely that the security of this Nation will be greater, albeit by a
small measure, with enactment of SALT than without.
Therefore however threatening one evaluates the Soviet military
buildup to be, the defense spending required to counter that threat
would be lower with SALT enacted. Note that this comment does
not specify how large defense expenditures should actually be. I am
only saying that the effect of SALT should tend to decrease that
burden. . r oATrr
To maintain exactly the opposite, that ratification of SALT
should be held hostage to a commitment for increased military
spending, lacks any logical connection, irrespective of Soviet con-
duct or threat.
If as part of the duty of the Senate to pass on ratification of a
treaty negotiated by the executive the Senate would precommit
itself on defense expenditure levels or approval of specific military
353
systems, this would be a disservice to another constitutional role of
the executive and legislative branches.
The Congress through both the Senate and the House has the
responsibility of examining critically any public spending, be it
military or civilian, and of passing upon the merit of specific
military systems through the annual authorization and appropri-
ation processes.
If ratification of SALT II in essence predetermines such deci-
sions, then the power of both Houses and also of the executive
branch in setting the budget is weakened.
If SALT II is held hostage until this year's authorizing and
appropriating processes have been completed or until supplemen-
tary appropriations have been procured, then SALT II bears a
burden through delays and linkage with other issues which would
augur badly for the future of SALT III.
This leads me directly to the matter which concerns me most
about SALT and that is its slow rate of progress. SALT was initiat-
ed in 1967 at the meeting of President Johnson with Premier
Kosygin at Glassboro, N.J.
It has hence proceeded through four administrations, through a
treaty and several agreements and protocols and has now led to
the signature of SALT II.
This process was initiated by the realization that apparently
inexorably the world has been accumulating nuclear warheads.
Their number is now greater than 30,000, the great majority of
which are more powerful than the two weapons which killed one-
quarter of a million people in Japan. It appeared to both nations to
be a pressing matter to reverse this evolution.
Since well over 99 percent of the world inventory of nuclear
weapons was and still is in the hands of the Soviet Union and the
United States, a bilateral negotiation with its expectation of rela-
tive simplicity appeared to be the best focus. Now 12 years later
although SALT I has had the beneficial effect in assuring the
penetration of our deterrent warheads and despite the fact that
SALT II in itself is a clear asset to our national security, we find
that technology has outstripped the pace of diplomacy and political
decisionmaking.
In other words, the arms limitation which the SALT process has
so far achieved is of lesser magnitude than the evolution of new
military technical systems which has occurred in the interim
period during which these limitations have been achieved.
Such items as the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber as well
as most long range weapon systems which have theater warfare
roles were not in the picture when the SALT process commenced
and their emergence greatly complicates future negotiations.
The quality of strategic weapons has greatly improved while
SALT was in the process of negotiation. Therefore such problems
as the vulnerability of the land-based deterrents of both sides and
the consequent deterioration of strategic stability have grown
during that period.
It is therefore my belief that SALT III offers possibly the last
opportunity to convert the important but relatively modest
achievements of SALT II into a true halt and possible reversal of
the dangerous and burdensome competition in nuclear weapons.
354
There is currently a substantial division of opinion on the role of
SALT III. Some believe that the function of SALT III should be
primarily to settle the unfinished business of SALT II. There are
others and I count myself among them who believe SALT III must
achieve what colloquially is designated as "deep cuts." I would
rather use the term, "incisive arms control" to signify that a great
deal more must be involved than major numerical reduction in
military systems.
I recommend strongly that highly ambitious goals be set for
SALT III since I see the SALT process as the only avenue in view
which has any hope of reversing the threatening rise in nuclear
weaponry which we are experiencing and I see the race between
SALT and nuclear weapons evolution lost unless the SALT process
can be accelerated.
Let me now turn to SALT III in the "incisive arms control"
context. Deep numerical cuts in nuclear weapons systems in them-
selves may or may not add to our security depending on their
detailed nature.
For instance, a formula for annual reduction of the aggregate
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with complete "freedom to mix"
among them could have destabilizing consequences.
For example, one or the other of the two nations might under
such a formula choose to eliminate first those deterrent strategic
nuclear delivery systems which are unsuitable for a counterforce
role but would retain those which have the largest potential to
preempt through a first strike the deterrent forces of the opponent.
If such a choice was made we would face an even more dangerous
world.
Therefore I see no escaping the conclusion, however much one
would like to see a treaty as complex as SALT II to be followed by
the high simplicity of a simple reduction scheme, that such an
agreement would not be in the United State's security interest.
SALT III is likely to be a complex undertaking and will again
require careful attention to details and definitions as was the case
with SALT II, although I do agree with Mr. Warnke that much of
the base of definitions which has been established so carefully in
SALT II can be capitalized on in pursuing SALT III.
This does not mean that the details of the process under which
SALT II was negotiated must be repeated again. On the contrary, I
hope means will be found to accelerate the negotiation and ratifica-
tion processes.
Starting from the premise that SALT III will have to be an arms
control package containing both mutual reductions and qualitative
limits on technology I would like to enumerate several candidate
provisions for such an agreement.
I am talking here only about candidate provisions because at this
time no one can reasonably give detailed prescriptions for each
element or the totality of such a total package.
While I would encourage the Senate to adopt a resolution urging
"incisive arms control" and an increase in the pace of arms control
negotiations, I strongly counsel against being too specific or con-
straining in such a resolution. Not only are the necessary basic
studies within the Government in formulating specific provisions
incomplete, but there is also a danger that a Senate resolution
355
which constitutes a "de facto" instruction to the SALT III negotia-
tors will impair the negotiating flexibility of U.S. negotiators which
may prove necessary under future circumstances.
Too specific a resolution might even increase Soviet intransi-
gence because it would give the appearance of denying them the
opportunity of negotiating SALT III on a balanced basis. Numerical
targets, specifically the delineation of systems to be controlled,
schedules for reduction or restraint, these are all proper subjects
for negotiation, not prior determinations.
With your permission I would like to turn to a brief listing of
candidate examples for inclusion in the SALT III negotiations. I
have elaborated on these items in considerably more detail in my
prepared statement and would therefore like to only enumerate
them here with one exception which I would like to describe in
further detail.
Naturally, SALT III must face the unfinished business of the
protocol of SALT II, the question of controls on ground-launched
and sea-launched cruise missiles, GLCM's and SLCM's and on land
mobile ICBM's.
Substantial reductions of central nuclear weapon systems must
remain of course the cornerstone of any incisive arms control
agreement. Within this aggregate cut, I would recommend that the
number of MIRVed land based ICBM's be further reduced dispro-
portionately.
I would recommend that consideration be given to reduce the
number of land based MIRVed ICBM's substantially below 550.
The second major component for an incisive arms control propos-
al should be a limit on the annual rate of permitted ICBM and
SLBM test firings. Such a missile test firing quota was incorporat-
ed by in the United States in the March 1977 proposal relating to
ICBM's only. A rate of six per year for both parties was suggested.
I consider this number to be a reasonable goal for phased reduction
of annually permitted firings.
A limit on annual permitted rates of test firings is the most
powerful verifiable restraint at our command for limiting the rate
of growth in technology in the missile arts.
More importantly the confidence which each side can acquire
under such a restrictive test regime, that missiles will perform
with high reliability and high accuracy will be low. Accordingly, a
decisionmaker of either side will most likely be dissuaded from
considering a preemptive or first strike attack under all circum-
stances.
Let me give another example. Deployment but not development
and testing of land-mobile ICBM's is prohibited in the protocol of
SALT II. This provision in no way inhibits any U.S. programs
including the M-X.
Competition in mobile land based ICBM's is an area of contest
between the United States and the Soviet Union unfavorable to
U.S. interests, as Soviet assets are clearly superior to ours. They
have larger land areas which can be dedicated solely to military
use. They are less constrained by environmental impact factors and
successful concealment and deceptive moves are more easily car-
ried out in a closed society.
356
I, therefore believe that other means of protective basing of
ICBM's other than land mobility is superior. I will not discuss this
matter here further but I conclude that superior and practical
alternatives do exist and therefore I recommend for serious consid-
eration that the ban on deployment of land-mobile ICBM's be con-
tinued as a result of the SALT III negotiations.
I would also like to join Mr. Warnke in that an SLBM standoff
and a ban on depressed trajectories of SLBM's be considered for
inclusion in a SALT III package.
I also agree that it will, as a practical matter, be unavoidable
and in effect necessary and desirable to include gray area systems
in the SALT III total deliberations.
This raises the question as to how in detail our European allies
shall be included in the consultative process of negotiation. If gray
area systems and central strategic systems are to be considered in
completely different forums then it would raise the specter of
"decoupling"; this means removing our nuclear umbrella from our
European allies. Therefore the tight relationship between negotia-
tion of gray area systems and central systems must be preserved.
This can only be done if the consultative process with our allies
will be tightened relative to that which prevailed during the SALT
II process.
I would like to comment in more detail on the matter of cutoff of
production of fissionable material for military purposes.
This is a clear candidate for inclusion in SALT III or as a side
negotiation parallel to SALT III.
This proposal has been previously endorsed by the United States
and has never been withdrawn by the United States. The current
inventories of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons of both
sides are large. Any further production can of course feed fabrica-
tion of additional nuclear warheads. Such increases can support
further fractionation of MIRV's, additional cruise missile war-
heads, stockpiles of weapons for reload of delivery systems or can
be used for defensive warheads.
By cutting off the production of fissionable materials for military
purposes you would force each side into the posture of having to
balance these various applications.
In this connection I would like to stress that ratification of SALT
II has a major impact on the efforts to limit proliferation of nucle-
ar weapons to other nations. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
signed in 1968 and ratified in 1970 contains an explicit declaration
that the nuclear weapons states intend "to achieve at the earliest
possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take
effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament."
Failure to ratify SALT II would contribute to the growing cyni-
cism of the nonnuclear weapons states regarding sincerity and good
faith of the Soviet Union and the United States in implementing
their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In addition I cannot think of any more powerful incentive toward
nuclear nonproliferation than for the nuclear weapon states, the
Soviet Union and the United States, to place their production
plants of fissionable materials under the safeguards program of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and thereby remove that par-
ticular inequity which exists between the have and have not states.
357
Let me close with some comments on the larger difference be-
tween perception which pertains to nuclear weapons and the physi-
cal reality which relates to them and their potential use.
The above discussions have emphasized the technical content of
possible SALT III provisions and this has been done deliberately.
There has been in the discussions of the merit of SALT II a great
overemphasis on the perceptions which might flow from the SALT
process and from the Soviet and United States strategic military
posture to the detriment of considerations of the actual provisions
of SALT II and the physical realities which would befall mankind
should nuclear weapons in part or in their totality actually be used
in war.
As a member of the technical community, I feel a strong obliga-
tion to continue to remind the political leaders and decisionmakers
of this country that there is a great danger in considering nuclear
weapons primarily as political symbols and only secondarily as
tools which might actually be used.
I am hardly alone in raising this issue. Let me remind you of the
words of Andrei Sakharov, the eminent and frequently dissident
Soviet nuclear physicist, "I believe that the problem of lessening
the danger of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an
absolute priority over all other considerations."
We must continue to examine the consequences of actual use of
such weapons and how they would affect the true outcome of a
conflict. If we permit nuclear weapons to enter the decisionmaking
processes primarily as symbols of national strength and resolve,
then we deny ourselves any rational means to decide when enough
is enough.
In this regard, let me reemphasize two salient facts. One, if
nuclear weapons are actually used in any theater, against any set
of targets, for any purpose, by any nation, under any military
doctrine, then large fractions of the populations of both the United
States and the Soviet Union and their neighbors are at the gravest
risk.
Two, the number of nuclear weapons in the possession of the
United States and the Soviet Union is now so large that a very
large fraction of these weapons is aimed against targets of relative-
ly minor economic, political or military importance.
Under these circumstances many of the arguments which have
been presented to this committee on the details of the relative
military standing of the two nations become relatively less signifi-
cant when compared to the overarching danger of nuclear war.
Let me close with the expressed hope that it is consideration of
the physical realities rather than political perceptions pertaining
to strategic nuclear weapons which will remain in the forefront of
deliberations of the Senate in considering the question of ratifica-
tion of SALT II.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Dr. Panofsky's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky
approaches to salt iii
I am pleased to have the privilege of testifying before your Committee again, this
time in connection with the pending ratification of the SALT 11 Treaty. I have been
interested and involved in Arms Control since World War II, and I am currently a
358
member of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament.
However, I am testifying here as an individual citizen, giving my personal views.
SALT III in the context of SALT II
I am speaking about approaches to SALT III in the context that SALT II will be
ratified without amendments. I will assume that any concurrent resolutions would
deepen the legal commitment to the provisions of SALT II, but would not change its
substance or basic intent. I continue to be persuaded that ratification of SALT II is
strongly in the net security interest of the United States. This Committee has heard
many witnesses from within and without the Administration enumerating how the
provisions in SALT II place limits on the threat against which this country has to
be prepared, and how several of the other provisions assure the integrity of our
intelligence collection assets. It has been amply demonstrated that the level of
strategic nuclear weapons in the absence of SALT on both sides would be substan-
tially higher than with SALT enacted. Moreover, witnesses have been persuasive in
demonstrating that SALT II places more substantial restraints at this stage of
nuclear weapons development and deployment on the Soviet Union than it does on
the United States. I will not repeat these arguments here in further detail.
You have also heard numerous criticisms of SALT. Yet I have heard no criticisms
to which an easier remedy can be found through repudiation of SALT II. You have
heard numerous criticisms of our military posture. Yet I have heard no proposed
measure to improve that posture which is easier to achieve by repudiation of SALT
n. Most, if not all, of these criticisms deal with questions outside the provisions of
the SALT agreements themselves, but involve issues which the critics believe will
be affected adversely through political linkages if SALT were enacted. I find it
interesting that many of these arguments are in opposing directions: There are
those who argue that enactment of SALT II will lull us into a false sense of security
and therefore will impair the willingness of this country to provide adequately for
its own defense. To argue against an arms control treaty which demonstrably in
terms of its intrinsic content will enhance our security by claiming that it will make
future Administrations and Congresses be less than diligent in providing for the
national defense, is at variance with the basic tenets of our system.
There are also those who argue that the price for ratification in terms of addition-
al armaments is too high; in other words that SALT II will increase military
spending beyond what could have been justified in the absence of the Treaty.
I note that these two criticisms are paired in their consequences, and I do not
believe that either is valid. I have confidence that future elected officials of this
nation can establish national priorities wisely.
It is essential to refocus the debate on the fundamental issues of the content of
the Treaty and Protocol and not to be swayed unduly by the perceived linkage
between SALT and other political or military issues. This conclusion is particularly
important in the SALT III context: the progress from SALT II to SALT III, to which
both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are committed, can hardly continue if the process is
burdened with the politically perceived linkages of critics with a wide variety of
views.
SALT II versus defense spending
Let me specifically comment on the linkage between ratification of SALT II and a
commitment on the part of the Administration for increased defense spending,
either in terms of a rate of growth of the U.S. defense budget for several years, or in
terms of procurement of specific military hardware. I find this concept extremely
troublesome. Requiring as a price for ratification increased military spending in the
name of arms control would destroy the very purpose of that process. Moreover, it
would contradict the key conclusion which I believe has been presented persuasively
to this Committee by the majority of witnesses, namely, that the security of this
nation will be greater, albeit by a small measure, with enactment of SALT than
without. Therefore however threatening one evaluates the Soviet military build-up
to be, the defense spending required to counter that threat would be lower with
SALT enacted. Note that this comment does not specify how large defense expendi-
tures should actually be; I am only saying that the effect of SALT should tend to
decrease that burden. To maintain exactly the opposite, that ratification of SALT
should be held hostage to a commitment for increased military spending, lacks any
logical connection, irrespective of Soviet conduct or threat.
If, as part of the duty of the Senate to pass on ratification of a treaty negotiated
by the Executive, the Senate would pre-commit itself on defense expenditure levels
or approval of specific military systems, this would be a disservice to another
constitutional role of the Executive and Legislative branches. The Congress through
both the Senate and the House has the responsibility of examining critically and
public spending, be it military or civilian, and of passing upon the merit of specific
359
military systems through the annual authorization and appropriation processes.
Such decisions determine our national priorities and are traditionally decided by a
majority of both houses, not by one third of the Senate. If ratification of SALT II in
essense pre-determines such decisions, then the power of both houses and also of the
Executive branch in seting the budget is weakened. If SALT II is held hostage until
this years' authorizing and appropriating processes have been completed, or until
supplementary appropriations have been procured, then SALT II bears a burden
through delays and linkage which would augur badly for the future of SALT III.
Arms control versus technology
This leads me directly to the matter which concerns me most about SALT and
that is its slow rate of progress. SALT was initiated in 1967 at the meeting of
President Johnson with Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, N.J. It has thence proceeded
through four administrations, through a Treaty and several Agreements and Proto-
cols, and has now led to the signature of SALT II. This process was initiated by the
realization that, apparently inexorably, the world was accumulating nuclear war-
heads. Their number is now near 30,000, the great majority of which are more
powerful than the two weapons which killed one-quarter of a million people in
Japan. It appeared to both nations to be a pressing matter to reverse this evolution.
Since well over 99% of the world inventory of nuclear weapons was (and still is) in
the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States, a bilateral negotiation with its
expectation of relative simplicity appeared to be the best forum. Now, 12 years
later, although SALT I has had a beneficial effect in assuring the penetration of our
deterrent warheads, and despite the fact that SALT II in itself is a clear asset to our
national security, we find that technology has outstripped the pace of diplomacy
and political decision making. In other words, the arms limitation which the SALT
process has so far achieved is of lesser magnitude than the evolution of new
military technical systems which has occurred in the interim period during which
these limitations have been achieved. Such items as the Cruise Missile and the
Backfire Bomber, as well as most long-range weapons systems which have theatre-
warfare roles, were not in the picture when the SALT process commenced, and their
emergence greatly complicates future negotiations. Moreover, the quality of strate-
gic weapons has greatly improved while SALT was in the process of negotiation.
Therefore, such problems as the vulnerability of the land-based deterrents of both
sides and the consequent deterioration of strategic stability have grown during that
period. It is therefore my belief that SALT III offers possibly the last opportunity to
convert the important but relatively modest achievements of SALT II into a true
halt and possible reversal of the dangerous and burdensome competition in nuclear
weapons.
SALT III: limited or ambitious objectives?
There is currently a substantial division of opinion on the role of SALT III. Some
believe that the function of SALT III should be primarily to settle the unfinished
business of SALT II. The reason why SALT II has such a complex structure is that
it represents different levels of agreement. The Treaty deals with items on which
definite long-term agreement was possible. The Protocol covers items which are
being put on a limited time "hold" because these issues could not be resolved to the
satisfaction of the negotiating parties. The Backfire letter deals with a military area
which had been excluded by mutual agreement from the SALT process but on
which the U.S. demanded assurance. All these instruments are binding legally but
cover a different stage of decision making. Considering the difficult negotiations of
the past, it therefore appears natural for some to view SALT III as a vehicle to
complete negotiations on these items, and to deepen the mutual constraints of SALT
II.
There are others, and I count myself among them, who believe that SALT III
must achieve what colloquially is designated as "deep cuts." I would rather use the
term "incisive arms control" to signify that a great deal more must be involved
than major numerical reduction in military systems. I recommend strongly that
highly ambitious goals be set for SALT III since I see the SALT process as the only
avenue in view which has any hope of reversing the threatening rise in nuclear
weaponry which we are experiencing, and I see the race between SALT and nuclear
weapons evolution lost unless the SALT process can be accelerated.
SALT III: simple formula or complex package?
Let me now turn to SALT III in the "incisive arms control" context. Deep
numerical cuts in nuclear weapons systems in themselves may or may not add to
our security, depending on their detailed nature. For instance, a formula of annual
reduction of the aggregate strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with complete 'free-
dom to mix" among them could have destabilizing consequences. For example, one
360
or the other of the two nations might under such a formula choose to eliminate first
those deterrent strategic nuclear delivery systems which are unsuitable for a coun-
terforce role, but would retain those which have the largest potential to preempt
through a first strike the deterrent forces of the opponent. If such a choice were
made, we would face an even more dangerous world. Therefore I see no escaping the
conclusion, however much one would like to see a treaty a complex as SALT II be
followed by the high simplicity of a simple reduction scheme, that such an agree-
ment would not be in the U.S. security interest. SALT III is likely again to be a
complex undertaking and will again require careful attention to details and defini-
tions, as was the case with SALT II. This does not mean that the details of the
process under which SALT II was negotiated must be perpetuated; on the contrary,
I hope means will be found to accelerate the negotiation and ratification processes.
Starting from the premise that SALT III will have to be an arms control package
containing both mutual reductions and qualitative limits on technology, I would like
to enumerate several candidate provisions for such an agreement. I am talking here
only about candidate provisions because at this time no one can reasonably give
detailed prescriptions for each element or the totality of such a package. While I
would encourage the Senate to adopt a resolution urging "incisive arms control
and an increase in the pace of arms control negotiations, I strongly counsel against
being too specific or constraining in such a resolution. Not only are the necessary
basic studies within the government in formulating specific provisions incomplete,
but there is also a danger that a Senate resolution which constitutes a de facto
instruction to the SALT III negotiators will impair the negotiating flexibility of U.S.
negotiators which may prove necessary under future circumstances. Too specific a
resolution might even increase Soviet intransigence, because it would give the
appearance of denying them the opportunity of negotiating SALT III on a balanced
basis. Numerical targets, delineation of systems to be controlled, schedules for
reduction or restraint— these are all proper subjects for negotiation, not prior deter-
minations.
EXAMPLES OF SALT III CONTENT
(a) Reduction in central systems
Naturally, SALT III must face the unfinished business of the Protocol of SALT II:
these are the questions of controls on ground-launched and sea-launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs), and on land-mobile ICBMs. I will discuss these items
as candidates for inclusion in the total SALT III agenda.
Substantial reductions of central nuclear weapons systems must remain, of
course, the cornerstone of any incisive arms control agreement. I would recommend
for the reasons mentioned above that U.S. proposals for reductions apply separately
to each category of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles already identified in SALT II,
as well as to overall aggregates. I would recommend that the United States push for
phased reductions with a target of about 50% in overall aggregate. Even an eventu-
al reduction as large as that should not induce the Soviet Union to be excessively
concerned with the threat they are facing from other unfriendly borders, although
this concern can by no means be neglected. Within this aggregate cut I would
recommend that the number of MIRVed land-based ICBMs be further reduced
disproportionately. I note that in the ill-fated March 1977 proposal the U.S. moved
to reduce this number to 550, with a number of 820 finally arrived at in SALT II.
The number 550 proved difficult to negotiate because it corresponds precisely to the
number of Minuteman III launchers. Therefore that number, if adopted, would have
forced the Soviets to substantial reduction of land-based MIRVed ICBMs, while it
would have implied no reduction whatever on our side; clearly not a negotiable
position unless compensating concessions are made elsewhere. I would recommend
that consideration be given to reduce the number of land based MIRVed ICBMs
substantially below 550.
The history of proposals for deep reduction in land-based MIRVs or even a zero
MIRV provision is checkered. There have been objections by specific interests
within this country, and the Soviets opposed reductions in this category initially
because they did not wish to be frozen in a position of inferior technology. At this
time, with Soviet MIRV technology approaching U.S. performance, particularly with
respect to accuracy, and with growing Soviet concern about the vulnerability of
their land-based deterrent, I v/ould recommend a serious effort for a very drastic
reduction in the land-based MIRVed ICBMs.
Verification of such a provision would, of course, be a very serious issue. At this
time the only available means of verifying the number of MIRVed land-based
ICBMs rests on the counting rule which makes any launcher capable of launching a
tested MIRVed ICBM count as a MIRVed ICBM launcher. Therefore, single war-
head launchers would have to have credible distinguishable characteristics for this
361
counting rule to be effective. It is this consideration which would have to be
carefully studied as part of the foundation of the American position for SALT III.
(b) Quota on permitted missile test firings
A second major component for an incisive arms control proposal should be a limit
on the annual rate of permitted ICBM and SLBM test firings. Test firmgs can serve
development, troop training, and proof test purposes. If there were a permitted
quota, each side would have to divide its number of firings among these objectives.
Present test practices are asymmetrical due to the larger diversity of Soviet de-
ployed systems and their missile firings for troop training from operational silos.
Due to its geographic constraints, this is not feasible for the U.S. Accordingly, an
equal quota for both sides would have a dissimilar impact on current practice. Such
a missile test firing quota was incorporated in the U.S. March 1977 proposal relat-
ing to ICBMs only; a rate of 6 per year for both parties was suggested. I consider
this number to be a reasonable goal for a phased reduction of annually permitted
firings. -r- 1 ]
A limit on annual permitted rates of test firings is the most powerful veritiabie
restraint at our command for limiting the rate of growth in technology in the
missile arts. Traditionally each new generation of missiles has required 10-30 or so
test launches and therefore a stringent limitation of the testing rate would impact
drastically the evolution of new generations of missile systems. There is no question
that a test ban quota as low as 6 per year would severely constrain modernization.
More important, the confidence which each side can acquire under such a restricted
test regime, that missiles will perform with high reliability and high accuracy will
be low. Accordingly a decision maker of either side will most likely be dissuaded
from considering a preemptive or first strike attack. Thus a limitation on the rate of
permitted missile firings would be a substantial factor in increasing strategic stabil-
ity.
A measure parallel to a restriction on the rate of firing of ICBMs and SLBMs
would be a total prohibition on test firings for development of any new system of
MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs. Such a prohibition would be a useful additional step to
prevent an increase in the threat to the fixed land-based deterrents of the two sides,
and would be a significant impediment to the deployment of SLBMs with accuracy
contributing to the threat to land-based ICBMs of both sides.
(c) Ban on deployment of mobile land-based ICBM's
Deployment, but not development and test, of land-mobile ICBMs is prohibited in
the Protocol of SALT II; this provision in no way inhibits U.S. programs. Note that
deployment of the already developed Soviet land-mobile SS-16 is explicitly prohibit-
ed in the Treaty. This leaves the question of control of mobile ICBMs definitely on
the agenda for SALT III. Definition of a U.S. position is to some extent linked to the
total SALT III package. If the matter of vulnerability of the land-based ICBMs is
dealt with by the provisions just mentioned (large reduction of the number of
MIRVed missiles, and limits of the rate of missile test firings) then there is no
question that U.S. security will be served by negotiating a total ban on mobile land-
based ICBMs. The Senate should note that this was at an earlier time the U.S.
position in SALT I. Competition in mobile land-based ICBMs is an area of contest
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. where Soviet assets are clearly superior to ours.
They have larger land areas which can be dedicated solely to military use; they are
less constrained by environmental impact factors; successful concealment and decep-
tive moves are more easily carried out in a closed society. Thus only if we are
willing to give overriding priority to the matter of preserving land-based ICBMs,
and if this problem cannot be solved by other measures in arms control, can a
mobile land-based system offer a possible strategic advantage. I will not discuss here
the complex issue of protective basing of ICBMs in a manner other than land-
mobile, but I conclude that superior and practical alternatives do exist.
(dJ SLBM standoff and ban on depressed trajectories
I would suggest for inclusion in a package for SALT III two specific measures
relating to the survivability of the air-borne component of the triad of strategic
systems. The first is a ban on testing and development of depressed trajectories
from submarines and the second is a minimum standoff distance from shore for
submarines capable of launching SLBMs.
Currently there exists a technical possibility that Soviet submarines could ap-
proach U.S. coasts and launch SLBMs on trajectories which assure a minimum
flight time to U.S. air fields. This could make the time for U.S. bombers to escape
marginal. Although the principal counter-measure against such a possibility would
be to base an increasing number of bombers further inland, an arms control meas-
ure to remedy this threat would be to ban the testing of submarine-launched
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missiles in short flight time, so-called depressed, trajectories. In addition, agreement
on a forbidden zone of approach of submarines capable of launching SLBMs would
be a further measure to decrease this threat to both sides.
(e) Gray area systems
The above examples, which are by no means exhaustive, all relate to central
strategic systems and do not touch upon control of the so-called gray area systems,
that is those systems which can have both a theater-warfare and a long-range
capability. Few believe that the discussion of gray area systems can be excluded
from SALT III. It is anticipated that the Soviets will insist on the inclusion of
foward-based systems in SALT III because they will maintain, with some merit, that
"incisive arms control" leading to substantial cuts in central strategic systems
increases the relative importance of the U.S. controlled forward-based systems. In
turn, inclusion of forward-based systems, reinforced by the technical developments
which blur the border between strategic and theatre-warfare systems, will make
consideration of the Euro-strategic balance an unavoidable issue also from the
NATO and U.S. points of view. Note that the need to include consideration of
GLCMs and SLCMs as "unfinished business" from the SALT II Protocol will also
contribute to the pressure to consider European theatre-warfare systems compre-
hensively.
These issues raised the question of the details of the negotiating format for SALT
III, which as a minimum will require a more intensive consultative process with
NATO as part of policy formulation. Separating the consideration of gray area
systems from SALT and placing it into a separate negotiating forum appears inad-
visable, since such a move would be viewed by NATO as an effort to decouple
consideration of the Euro-strategic balance from consideration of the overall U.S./
U.S.S.R. strategic situation. Such decoupling, in turn, would further detract from
the credibility of the U.S. central strategic nuclear forces as an element in deterring
Soviet incursion into Europe.
(f) Cut-off of production of fissionable material for military purposes
An additional element of a SALT III package might well be a renewal of a
proposal, previously endorsed by the United States, for the cutoff of production of
fissionable materials for military purposes. The current inventories of fissionable
materials for nuclear weapons of both sides are large. Any further production can,
of course, feed fabrication of additional nuclear warheads. Such increases can sup-
port further fractionation of MIRVs, additional cruise missile warheads, or stock-
piles of weapons for reload of delivery systems. Moreover, such growth can provide
additional warheads for defensive weapons, in particular should ABM deployment
again become permissible. A production cut-off would limit these activities on both
sides, with a substantial gain in overall strategic stability. Under such an arms
control regime there could, of course, be conversion of nuclear weapons inventories
among a diversity of military weapons without increased production. Moreover,
some increase in total weapons inventory could be advanced through improved
economies in the use of fissile materials. A production cut-off agreement would have
to permit maintenance of the existing nuclear device stockpile through certain
exceptions to a total production prohibition.
In this connection I would like to stress that ratification of SALT II has a major
impact on the efforts to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations. The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed in 1968 and ratified in 1970 contains an
explicit declaration that the nuclear weapons states Intend "to achieve at the
earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective
measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament," as well as a specific article
constituting a good faith obligation to pursue negotiations toward terminating the
nuclear arms race. Failure to ratify SALT II would contribute to the growing
cynicism of the non-nuclear weapons states regarding the sincerity and good faith of
the Soviet Union and the United States in implementing their obligations under the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Quite apart from the important arms control impact of a
provision to terminate production of fissionable material for weapons purposes on
its own merit, such a cutoff would demonstrate dramatically to the non-nuclear
weapons states a good faith in adherence to the provisions of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
Let me repeat that the above listing of possible inclusions in a SALT III package
is given only on a "for instance" basis, and each item requires detailed analysis both
as to specific substance and optimum negotiating tactics. However, it is my deep
conviction that if a maximum number of such provisions were introduced and
proved negotiable with the Soviet Union, then incisive arms control would indeed
result, and the SALT process would have fulfilled its promise of having not only
limited but also reversed the competition in nuclear weapons between the United
363
States and the Soviet Union. Yet I see no way in which this expectation, which
would greatly increase the security of this Nation, can be fulfilled without prompt
ratification of SALT II.
SALT: perception versus reality
The above discussions have emphasized the technical content of possible SALT III
provisions and refrained from commenting on the future political context and the
general question of linkage of the SALT process to Soviet conduct and attitudes.
This has been done deliberately. There has been in the discussions of the merit of
SALT II a great overemphasis on the perceptions which might flow from the SALT
process and from the Soviet and the United States strategic military posture, to the
detriment of considerations of the actual provisions of SALT II and the physical
realities which would befall mankind should nuclear weapons in part or in their
totality actually be used in war.
As a member of the technical community I feel a strong obligation to continue
reminding the political leaders and decision makers of this country that there is a
great danger in considering nuclear weapons primarily as political symbols, and
only secondarily as tools which might actually be used. I am hardly alone in raising
this issue. Let me remind you of the words of Andrei Sakharov, the eminent and
frequently dissident Soviet nuclear physicist: "I believe that the problem of lessen-
ing the danger of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an absolute
priority over all over considerations."
We must continue to examine the consequences of actual use of such weapons and
how they would affect the true outcome of a conflict. If we permit nuclear weapons
to enter the decision making processes primarily as symbols of national strength
and resolve, then we deny ourselves any rational means to decide when enough is
enough.
In this regard let me'reemphasize two salient facts:
(1) If nuclear weapons are actually used in any theater, against any set of targets,
for any purpose, by any nation, under any military doctrine, then large fractions of
the populations of both the United States and the Soviet Union and their neighbors
are at the gravest risk.
(2) The number of nuclear weapons in the possession of the United States and the
Soviet Union is now so large that a very large fraction of these weapons is aimed
against targets of relatively minor economic, political, or military importance.
Under those circumstances, many of the arguments which have been presented to
this Committee on the details of the relative military standing of the two nations
become relatively less significant when compared to the overarching danger of
nuclear war.
Let me close with the expressed hope that it is consideration of the physical
realities rather than political perceptions pertaining to strategic nuclear weapons
which will remain in the forefront of deliberations of the Senate when considering
the question of ratification of SALT II.
Senator Stone. Thank you, Dr. Panofsky.
Mr. Brennan?
STATEMENT OF DONALD BRENNAN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
SECURITY STUDIES, HUDSON INSTITUTE >
Mr. Brennan. Thank you, Senator Stone.
I am pleased to be able to testify before you. I shall summarize
my prepared statement very rapidly.
I should state at the outset that I oppose SALT II and believe the
Senate should not consent to its ratification.
My first serious involvement with arms control was in connec-
tion with a small summer study in 1958 in Cambridge, Mass., of
which I was one of the organizers.
I was an organizer and codirector of a much larger summer
study on arms control held in 1960, again in Cambridge, and con-
currently served as guest editor of a special issue on arms control,
published in the fall, 1960 issue of the journal Daedalus of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
' See page 369 for Mr. Brennan's prepared statement.
48-260 0-79 Pt.i4 - 2U
364
This volume, of which Senator Hubert Humphrey was one of the
authors, was later published as a book in the spring of 1961 under
the title "Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security" and
was widely described as the bible of arms control. It was endorsed
by Senator Fulbright and by President Kennedy, among others.
In the early summer of 1961, as a consultant to John McCloy, I
helped to draft the statute that created the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.
My first interaction with this committee came in August of 1961,
in connection with the hearings on the creation of ACDA, which I
supported with a statement submitted for the record. I first testi-
fied to this committee in person in August of 1963 in support of
ratification of the partial nuclear test ban, and have been here on
several occasions since including the ratification hearings for the
Geneva protocol on chemical warfare and for SALT I.
I supported, and indeed helped to create, mechanisms for serious
private American-Soviet discussions of arms control as a supple-
ment to governmental negotiations.
With the exceptions of the agreements signed in May of 1972 and
June of 1979 on SALT, I have supported in one way or another
every arms control agreement adopted by our Government since
World War II. This history should make it very clear that my
opposition to SALT II does not derive from an opposition to arms
control in general — indeed, quite the contrary.
I oppose SALT II because it is bad arms control. The traditional
major objectives of arms control have long been understood to be to
reduce the likelihood of war and to reduce the scope and violence
of war if it occurs. I judge that SALT II is more likely to increase
the chance of war than to reduce it, and it most certainly will do
very little to reduce the scope and violence of war if it occurs.
The most basic difficulty is as follows. A highly plausible means
by which the United States may become involved in a war is for a
prospective opponent to decide that the United States will not
react to some move, which the opponent thereupon undertakes,
only to discover that the move was beyond the limit of our tolera-
tion.
The Korean war, for example, clearly resulted from this mecha-
nism. If a American-Soviet war ever arises, it is most likely to
involve this means, in which the Soviets underestimate American
willingness to respond to some adverse Soviet move. That Soviet
judgment will relate to their beliefs about comparative Soviet and
American military strength among other factors.
The plausible role of SALT II in such a crisis is that it will
contribute to Soviet beliefs both in their military superiority and in
our lack of willingness to stand up to them, even at the level of
maintaining military forces on a par with theirs. I judge that such
a role is more likely than any major constructive results from the
treaty. Of course such a role would be highly dangerous.
There has been a pronounced slide in American military
strength since the 1960's especially in the strategic nuclear area. I
believe this has chiefly been the result of a SALT-related euphoria.
Within the projected lifetime of SALT II, there may well be
additional SALT-related euphoria, but there will certainly be con-
tributions from the specific details of SALT II.
365
Let me next discuss some of these. First, on asymmetries in
terms. A major defect of SALT II resides in the fact that the
Soviets are allowed 308 "heavy" ICBM's while the United States is
allowed none, and there is no compensating capability that is
asymmetrically in our favor.
The absolute maximum MIRVed ICBM payload or throw-weight
that would thereby be allowed the Soviets under SALT II would
give the Soviets roughly 40 percent more MIRVed ICBM payload
than the maximum allowed the United States.
This guaranteed margin would be of political significance even if
its military significance were doubtful, which it is not, as I shall
show below. That the United States should sign a treaty with its
principal opponent in which that opponent is allowed by our agree-
ment any capability— however trifling— we are denied, while there
is no counterbalancing capability allowed to us but denied to them,
would widely and accurately be read as a political statement of
weakness on the part of the United States.
This interpretation would be particularly strong and important
in the Soviet Union. It would be a contributing factor to the risk-of-
war mechanism I mentioned above.
The significance of these heavy ICBM's is considerable, even
allowing for the 10-warhead-per-missile limit imposed by SALT II.
The warheads on a 10-warhead "heavy" of 16,000 pounds payload
might have yields twice those of a maximum light missile with 10
warheads.
The major significance of the larger yield weapons resides in the
additional fallout fatalities they would produce. The extra yield
would probably be in the neighborhood of 2,000 megatons, which
would be certain to produce many extra fatalities.
Exactly how many additional Americans would be killed by 2,000
megatons additional yield would depend upon many factors, includ-
ing many details of the attack and the extent of civil defense
preparations made before the attack.
A plausible range of added fallout fatalities would be from a few
million to a few tens of millions.
The ICBM asymmetries seem to me to be clearly against the
spirit of the Jackson Amendment embodied in Public Law 92-448.
The Senate at the time of adopting this in 1972 understood it to
mean that we should not be limited to levels of strategic forces
inferior to those of the Soviet Union in payload. This is manifestly
clear from its legislative history.
As to asymmetry in coverage of the agreement, the extra ICBM
payload in the 308 heavies and the extra ICBM's, 344, allowed the
Soviets result from explicit provisions of SALT II. A different
major difficulty of SALT II resides in the fact that a Soviet weapon
system that appears to be of major potential strategic significance,
namely, the Backfire bomber, is excluded altogether from the
SALT II Treaty ceilings, while American bombers that apparently
are closely comparable in capabilities, specifically our B-52's, must
be counted.
As in the case of the heavy ICBM's, there is no offsetting capabil-
ity that we are allowed but the Soviets are not.
Western estimates of Backfire capabilities are imprecise. For a 5-
ton bomb load, representative Backfire estimates give it a combat
366
radius of 3,074 nautical miles or 10,600 kilometers one way unre-
fueled range. The corresponding unrefueled combat radius for a B-
52D with a 5-ton bomb load is 3,012 nautical miles, less than this
widely accepted Backfire estimate.
While lower estimates of Backfire capabilities can be found,
these comparisons show that it would be impossible to have confi-
dence that Backfire performance is significantly less than the B-
52D, which must be counted under SALT II ceilings.
Another topic I should like to turn to is effects on vulnerabilities.
The way in which the limits in SALT II are formulated contributes
to the vulnerabilities of our strategic forces. These limits are for-
mulated in such a way as to encourage the deployment of a small
number of large systems rather than a large number of small
systems, and this constitutes a major contribution to the future
vulnerability of our forces.
On the matter of possible gains of SALT II, I should point out
that while the potential gains of SALT II seem to me to be much
outweighed by its drawbacks, there are some potential gains.
There are only two unambiguous gains I can see and these are
both modest. One is that ratification of SALT II should result in
better information about Soviet forces than we would otherwise be
likely to have.
The other is that we shall probably have slightly more influence
over Soviet decisions in non-SALT policy areas if the treaty is
ratified than if it is not. This influence, which would never be
large, would be greatest on the eve of or during ratification de-
bates. It would likely be near zero at other times. That we could
exploit this influence to enforce anything like specific Soviet re-
straints in non-SALT areas seems to me virtually impossible.
Several other gains have been claimed for SALT II which seem
to me to range from negligible at best through highly contingent in
the middle to wrong at worst. Some of these are discussed in my
prepared statement.
I should mention here that the claimed gain for SALT II that
seems to me most mistaken is that it would reduce the likelihood
of war. There is very little reason to believe this claim. I believe, as
I pointed out before, that SALT II is much more likely to increase
the likelihood of war. This is related to the most important reason
for rejecting SALT II.
This brings me to my recommendations concerning SALT II.
Some of the leading critics of SALT II apparently oppose it
primarily because of the relationship of the SALT to American
euphoria about strategic forces. This opposition seems to me entire-
ly reasonable.
There can be no doubt that three successive administrations
have, in some collective sense, believed that SALT would enable us
to have strategic nuclear security "on the cheap," in the slang
phrase, and that this belief has been a major factor in the evolu-
tion of our greatly weakened strategic posture. There is therefore
something to be said for imposing a major pause on the process of
the SALT, not particularly related to the specific terms of SALT II,
while — it is hoped — we regain our strategic wits.
367
I was struck by Paul Nitze's quotation in his July 12 statement
of Lincoln's celebrated phrase that "First we must disenthrall our-
selves, and then we shall save the country."
Yet there is no doubt that it requires a certain degree of opti-
mism— from my perspective — about the American administration
coming to power in January of 1981 in order to believe that our
strategic posture will be adequately repaired, whatever happens to
SALT II in the meanwhile.
As a matter of realistic politics, it is not obvious that my opti-
mism should improve substantially as a result of rejection of SALT
II. Even my most preferred candidate administrations would be
unlikely to accomplish many strategic repairs before 1986 that
would be prohibited by SALT II.
Nevertheless, I believe that the case for rejecting SALT II is
something close to overwhelming. The lesser, but nevertheless sig-
nificant, part of this case resides in the fact that some potentially
desirable specific repairs would be much less likely to be adequate-
ly studied, still less developed under constraints that would prohib-
it their deployment and which might be continued beyond SALT II.
The major part of the case for rejection resides in the necessity
to make it manifest to the Soviets and to some degree to the rest of
the world, that the American body politic will simply not accept
further one-sided constraints that allow the Soviets a guaranteed
margin of superiority.
This treaty will strengthen Soviet beliefs — already too strong —
that they constitute the wave of the future, that they have increas-
ing military preponderance, and that the tjnited States is increas-
ingly unwilling to stand up to them, even at the level of insisting
on a mere paper equality of allowed forces. The extent of these
effects may be argued, but surely the direction cannot. And the
direction is dangerous. It is the route to war.
I believe the best way of minimizing that danger is to reject
SALT II outright. If I were asked what modifications in the treaty
would make it minimally acceptable, I have suggested two in my
prepared statement.
If these suggested changes were made, I should be willing to
ignore certain remaining disadvantages and, with reluctance, could
support ratification of SALT II as so modified.
Mr. Chairman, I was asked to address the subject of arms control
and SALT III objectives and I will turn to them. I shall indicate
what I believe is a suitable avenue to pursue in the next negotia-
tions whether they be called SALT III or SALT II prime or what-
ever, and whether SALT II is ratified or not.
The best approach to such next negotiations is to use a scheme
for limiting and reducing strategic nuclear offensive forces that is
based on— or closely related— to the payload or "throw-weight" of
such forces. Schemes of this general type have been suggested to
the Soviets in the past but, at least in recent official negotiations,
the Soviets have rejected such an approach. I believe we should
persevere in this approach.
An illustrative comprehensive scheme is shown in table 1 of my
prepared statement, to which you should turn if you have a copy
within reach.
[The table referred to appears on page 374.]
368
The basic idea of this scheme is as follows: Nuclear delivery
systems of various kinds are grouped in the categories listed in the
first column. In each category, the initial Soviet and American
capabilities measured in tons of payload— or throw-weight— esti-
mated for 1985 are given. An initial ceiling for each category is
then selected basically as the larger of the Soviet or American
capabilities in each category, in some cases rounded upward.
The symbol that is an upside down "v" appearing in the initial
ceiling for the bottom category means "greater of," so that initial
ceiling is the greater of X or Y. These ceilings are then decreased
over time, not necessarily at the same rate for each category, and
not necessarily by the same factor in each 5-year period.
Each force, Soviet and American, must not exceed the ceilings on
each category imposed at points 5 and 10 years after the initial
ceilings.
For example, in this illustrative scheme, the ICBM ceiling is cut
in half in the first 5-year period and cut in third in the following 5-
year period. The SLBM ceilings are decreased by smaller factors so
that the allowed SLBM forces at the end of 10 years would consti-
tute a larger fraction of the then-allowed total of strategic forces
than they did at the beginning.
Different aggregations within categories would be possible and
may well be desirable. For example, it might be desirable to lump
together ICBM's and SLBM's in a single category, and allow each
side to choose its own mix of such missiles, subject to the overall
ceiling for this category.
It might also be desirable to split up the cruise-missile category
into two or more categories depending on range. It should be noted
that there is no need for separate subcategories of MIRVed and un-
MIRVed missiles. Each side should be free to choose the nature
and details of its allowed forces within each category.
Lower ceilings would be desirable if they would be compatible
with verification capabilities and with nuclear forces in the posses-
sion of other countries.
It should be noticed that the scheme includes shorter range
missiles and aircraft. Even systems of still shorter range might be
included. I believe this provides a sensible way of including the so-
called gray-area systems; the quantity of such systems allowed each
side in inventory would be limited by this SALT like scheme but
where they would be deployed— for example, in Western Europe or
in the United States— would not be a matter for negotiation in this
framework.
Verification issues associated with such reductions are touched
upon in my prepared statement.
Of course, the Soviets are most unlikely to agree to any scheme
of this general form within the near future. It would impose genu-
ine general parity in the allowed ceilings, and I believe the Soviets
have little if any foreseeable interest in such a result. They will
come to have such an interest, I fear, only when they perceive that
the alternative would be worse for them. This perception will come
to them only when they see credible American defense programs
that promise to leave them behind.
So, Mr. Chairman, my recommendation for achieving a satisfac-
tory outcome in SALT II prime or III or whatever, in the form of
369
the scheme above or any other, is to begin a vigorous program to
restore our nuclear forces to the relative health they had in the
past. The Soviets do not seem to understand any other language.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be pleased to reply to ques-
tions.
[Mr. Brennan's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donald Brennan
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee. I am pleased to be able to testify
before you. I should state at the outset that I oppose SALT II, and believe the
Senate should not consent to its ratification. Before explaining why, let me tell you
something of my background; a biographical sketch is at the end of my statement,
but it will be appropriate to mention here some details relating to arms control. I
shall then sketch my objections to SALT II, and then take up how the next round of
negotiations might better be structured.
My first serious involvement with the subject was in connection with a small
summer study in 1958 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, of which I was one of the
organizers. I was an organizer and co-director of a much larger summer study on
arms control held in 1960, again in Cambridge, and concurrently served as guest
editor of a special issue on arms control, published in Fall 1960, of the journal
"Daedalus" of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. This volume, of which
Senator Hubert Humphrey was one of the authors, was later published as a book in
the Spring of 1961 under the title "Arms Control, Disarmament, and National
Security," and was widely described as the "bible" of arms control. It was endorsed
by Senator Fulbright and by President Kennedy, among others. In the early
summer of 1961, as a consultant to John McCloy, I helped to draft the statute that
created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. My first interaction with this
Committee came in August 1961, in connection with the hearings on the creation of
ACDA, which I supported with a statement submitted for the record.' I first testi-
fied to this Committee in person in August 1963, in support of ratification of the
partial nuclear test ban, and have been here on several occasions since, including
the ratification hearings for the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Warfare and for
SALT I. I supported, and indeed helped to create, mechanisms for serious private
Soviet-American discussions of arms control as a supplement to governmental nego-
tiations. I have visited the Soviet Union in this connection on three occasions. With
the exceptions of the agreements signed in May 1972 and June 1979 in the SALT, I
have supported, in one way or another, every arms-control agreement adopted by
our Government since World War II. This history should make it very clear that my
opposition to SALT II does not derive from an opposition to arms control in gener-
al— indeed, quite the contrary.
I oppose SALT II because it is bad arms control. The traditional major objectives
of arms control have long been understood to be to reduce the likelihood of war, and
to reduce the scope and violence of war if it occurs. For reasons I shall explain, I
judge that SALT II is more -Kkely to increase the chance of war than to reduce it,
and it most certainly will do very little to reduce the scope and violence of war if it
occurs. It also has other disadvantages, of which I shall mention some. It should
therefore be rejected as unsound arms control.
The most basic difficulty is as follows. A highly plausible means by which the
United States may become involved in a war is for a prospective opponent to decide
that the United States will not react to some move, which the opponent thereupon
undertakes, only to discover that the move was beyond the limit of our toleration.
The Korean war, for example, clearly resulted from this mechanism. If a Soviet-
American war ever arises, it is most likely to involve this means, in which the
Soviets underestimate American willingness to respond to some adverse Soviet
move. And that Soviet judgment will relate to their beliefs about comparative Soviet
and American military strengths, among other factors.
The plausible role of SALT II in such a crisis is that it will contribute to Soviet
beliefs both in their military superiority and in our lack of willingness to stand up
to them, even at the level of maintaining military forces on a par with theirs. I
judge that such a role is more likely than any major constructive results from the
Treaty. Of course, such a role would be highly dangerous.
The slide in American military strength since the 1960s (in comparison to that of
the Soviets), especially in the strategic nuclear area, has been discussed by many
' Disarmament Agency, Hearings before the Ck)mmittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, on
S. 2180. August 14, 15, and 16, 1961. (Brennan statement at pp. 328-329.)
370
witnesses in the SALT II hearings, and need not be detailed here. (See, for example,
Annexes III and IV in the statement of Paul Nitze submitted to this Committee on
July 12.) Up to the present, I believe this has chiefly been the result of a SALT-
related euphoria since the late 1960's, although the specific terms of SALT I contrib-
uted their share. Within the projected lifetime of SALT II, there may well be
additional SALT-related euphoria, but there will certainly be contributions from the
specific details of SALT II. Let me next discuss some of these; I shall then take up
some suggestions for subsequent negotiations.
Asymmetries in terms
A maior defect of SALT II resides in the fact that the Soviets are allowed 308
"heavy ICBM's, while the United States is allowed none, and there is no compen-
sating capability that is asymmetrically in our favor. The absolute maximum
MIRVed ICBM payload (or "throw-weight") that would be allowed the United States
under SALT II would result from deploying 820 new "light" ICBM's with 8,000
pounds payload each; the Soviets would be allowed 820 MIRVed ICBM's of which
308 could have 16,000 pounds and the other 512 could have 8,000 pounds. This would
give the Soviets roughly 40 percent more MIRVed ICBM payload than the maxi-
mum allowed the United States.
In actuality, it would be virtually impossible for us to deploy that maximum
MIRVed ICBM force within the lifetime of SALT II, and the actual Soviet MIRVed
ICBM payload by the end of 1985 is likely to exceed ours by a factor of 6 or more,=
not a "mere" 40 percent. However, under reasonably plausible circumstances, the 40
percent figure is illustrative of what might obtain under SALT III, e.g., if the SALT
II limits are simply extended, and in any event it is unambiguously the minimum
margin of MIRVed ICBM payload superiority guaranteed to the Soviets under SALT
II.
This guaranteed margin would be of political significance even if its military
significance were doubtfull (which it is not, as I shall show below). That the United
States should sign a treaty with its principal opponent in which that opponent is
allowed, by our agreement, any capability (however trifling) we are denied, while
there is no counterbalancing capability allowed to us but denied to them, would
widely (and accurately) be read as a political statement of weakness on the part of
the United States. This interpretation would be particularly strong, and important,
in the Soviet Union; it would be a contributing factor to the risk-of-war mechanism
I mentioned above.
Some of the proponents of SALT II have tried to disparage the signficance of the
"heavy" ICBM s. However, their signficance is considerable, even allowing for the
10-warhead-per-missle limit imposed by SALT II. If we consider for comparison a 10-
warhead "light" ICBM of 8,000 pounds payload, the warheads on a 10-warhead
"heavy" of 16,000 pounds payload might have yields twice those of the "light"
missile. For a given accuracy, the higher-yield weapons would be of some signifi-
cance for attacking "hardened" American targets such as missile silos. However, the
larger significance of the larger yield weapons resides in the additional fallout
fatalities they would produce. The extra yield of 308 "heavy" ICBM's (with 10
warheads each), as compared to 308 maximum "light" ICBM's (also with 10 war-
heads each), would probably be in the neighborhood of 2,000 MT; the maximum
plausible difference might be perhaps 2,400 MT, and a difference of less than 1,500
MT would be unlikely. A total of 2,000 MT extra yield used in an attack on the
United States would be certain to produce many extra fatalities.
Exactly how many additional Americans would be killed by 2,000 MT additional
yield would depend on many factors, including many details of the attack and the
extent of civil-defense preparations made before the attack. However, a plausible
range of added fallout fatalities would be from a few million to a few tens of
millions.^ Under some (not implausible) conditions, American fallout fatalities could
be doubled or even tripled.
Another asymmetry in the terms of SALT II, though of much less importance, is
that the Soviets are allowed more ICBM's than are we, specifically 1,398 against our
1,054 — 344 more. These Soviet ICBM's must, of course be counted under the overall
ceilings, and if they wish to have more bombers or more SLBM's, they must reduce
their ICBM's accordingly. However, they are allowed the option of up to 1,398
ICBM's, and we are not. This gives them more flexibility in their strategic posture,
e.g., in choosing to have even more ICBM payload if they wish.
'See Nitze, July 12 statement, Annex III, chart 19, "1985— U.S./U.S.S.R. ICBMs", or chart 6,
"The Balance in Throw-Weight".
'Some fallout-fatality curves recently calculated by Earl V. Sager of the System Planning
Corp. are useful for such estimates.
371
These asymmetries seem to me to be clearly against the spirit of the "Jackson
Amendment" embodied in Public Law 92-448, which states: The Congress recog-
nizes the principle of United States-Soviet Union equality reflected in the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, and urges and requests the President to seek a future
treaty that, inter alia, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinen-
tal strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union; * ' *". The
Senate, at the time of adopting this in 1972, understood it to mean that the United
States should not be limited (by agreement) to levels of strategic forces inferior to
those of the Soviet Union in payload; this is manifestly clear from the legislative
history of the Jackson Amendment. If, in the face of this language, the Senate now
accepts SALT H, then Public Law 92-448 should be pickled.
Asymmetry in coverage
The extra ICBM payload (in the 308 "heavies") and the extra number of ICBM's
(344) allowed the Soviets result from explicit provisions of SALT IL a different
major difficulty of SALT II resides in the fact that a Soviet weapon system that
appears to be of major potential strategic significance, namely the "Backfire" (TU-
22M) bomber, is excluded altogether from the SALT II Treaty ceilings, while Ameri-
can bombers that apparently are closely comparable in capabilities— specifically our
B-52's— must be counted. As in the case of the "heavy" ICBMs, there is no offset-
ting capability that we are allowed but the Soviets are not.
Western estimates of Backfire capabilities are imprecise. It is estimated in Jane's
that, with a 10-ton bomb load. Backfire has a maximum unrefueled combat radius
(for a two-way mission) of 3,100 nautical miles (nm)." I understand that a somewhat
lower estimate of 2,900 nm is widely accepted in the Government for a 10-ton bomb
load, which would correspond to 5,400 nm or 10,000 Km one-way range. For a 5-ton
bomb load, for comparison with readily available B-52 data, these latter values
should increase at least 6 percent, to 3,074 nm radius or 10,600 Km one-way range.
(Compare this with the SALT range criterion for ICBM's of 5,500 Km.) The corre-
sponding unrefueled combat radius for a B-52D with a 5-ton bomb load is 3,012 nm,=
less than these widely accepted Backfire estimates, still less than the Jane's esti-
mate.
While lower estimates of Backfire capabilities can undoubtedly be found, these
comparisons show that it would be impossible to have confidence that Backfire
performance is significantly less than the B-52D, of which we have about 80 in
current active inventory, all of which must be counted under SALT II ceilings. Of
all the B-52's produced, only the G and H models, about one third of the total, have
an unrefueled range capability somewhat in excess of the Jane's Backfire estimate.
Backfire has a supersonic capability not matched by any of the B-52's.
By the projected expiration date of SALT II, the Soviets could have 30 percent or
more of their total strategic payload in Backfire (which is a very substantial incre-
ment). They have said that they do not intend to use Backfire in a strategic nuclear
role against the American homeland, but, as an ACDA statement accurately put it,
"* * * there are no assurances that will ensure that Backfires would not be used
against the continental United States in time of war." « It is as if the United States
were to refuse to include all of the Poseidon launchers under the SNDV ceilings
because some are assigned to SACEUR for theater targets. Note that the omission of
Backfire from the aggregate counts means that the often-repeated assertion of
"equal aggregate ceilings' under SALT II is untrue even as concerns simple num-
bers of strategic delivery vehicles.
Effects on vulnerabilities
'The way in which the limits in SALT II are formulated— basically in numbers of
delivery vehicles, at least in intention, with some refinements— contributes to the
vulnerabilities of our strategic forces. In principle, this is a symmetric effect, but
the Soviet forces threaten ours much more than ours do theirs, now and for at least
the lifetime of SALT II, so it is not symmetric in practice.
Consider, for example, a proposed American MX deployment of 200 missiles with
10 warheads each, in comparison to a hypothetical deployment— let us call it MY—
of the same total number (2,000) of the identical warheads, but on 2,000 individual
boosters with one warhead each. The MX deployment would give the Soviets only
200 real targets to "shoot" at, either before launch, during launch, or for a short
time after launch, while the MY deployment would give the Soviets 2,000 real
' Jane's "All the World's Aircraft, 1977/78," p. 463; "All the World's Aircraft, 1978/79," p. 202.
» U.S.A.F. publication "Standard Aircraft Characteristics."
• Quoted in "SALT II: An Interim Assessment," Report of the Panel on the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of the Committee on Armed Services.
U.S. House of Representatives, December 23, 1978 (H.A.S.C. No. 95-95) p 11
372
targets in each of these phases. The MY deployment would therefore be easier to
protect, by any of several means, i.e., it would therefore be more secure, and hence
more reliably stable in a crisis, than would be the MX force. The MY force would
also allow improved and/or simplified command and control. However, the MY
force would be precluded by the terms of SALT II, because it would exceed the total
of allowed ICBM's— 1,054 for the United States and 1,398 for the Soviet Union. The
fact that the proposed SALT II limits are formulated in such a way as to encourage
the deployment of a small number of large systems, rather than a large number of
small systems, constitutes a major contribution to the future vulnerability of our
forces. This need not have been so.
Another problem of SALT II in this connection is that some of the means that
might have been used to protect our strategic retaliatory capability, specifically air-
to-surface ballistic missiles and mobile ICBM's, are precluded by the SALT II
Protocol, which may or may not prove to be only temporary. Finally, one of the
potentially best means of protecting our ICBM forces, as many of the proponents of
SALT agree, is the use of active defense, specifically ABM, and this means is
substantially precluded by the ABM Treaty of SALT I.
Limited gains
It is conceivable in principle that SALT II might achieve sufficient potential gains
to offset its drawbacks. However, I do not believe this would be true in practice.
There are only two unambiguous gains I can see, and these are both modest. One
is that ratification of SALT II should result in better information about Soviet
forces than we would otherwise be likely to have. Since I do not believe that we
shall be significantly restraining our own forces during the lifetime of SALT II on
the basis of promised Soviet restraint,' this implies that verification problems
should not directly be an obstacle to ratification, even though some Treaty prohibi-
tions almost certainly cannot be verified by national technical means, such as
production of SS-16 warheads ' or cruise missile range limits.
The other unambiguous gain I can see is that we shall probably have slightly
more influence over Soviet decisions in non-SALT policy areas if the Treaty is
ratified than if it is not. This influence, which would never be large, would be
greatest on the eve of, or during, ratification debates; it would likely be near zero at
other times. That we could exploit this influence to enforce anything like specific
Soviet restraints in non-SALT areas seems to me virtually impossible.
Several other gains have been claimed for SALT II that seem to me to range from
negligible at best, through highly contingent in the middle, to wrong at worst.
At the negligible end is the point that the Soviets will be required to destroy some
actual weapons. This is true, but the capabilities destroyed will be small in compari-
son to those added, resulting in substantial net increases in every other important
parameter of their ICBM force (warheads, megatons, equivalent MT, counter-mili-
tary potential, and payload), while reducing the total number of ICBM's by slightly
over 200.«
The warhead fractionation limits may prove useful if continued well beyond 1985,
but are of little significance within the projected lifetime of SALT II. Indeed, it is
not expected that the Soviets will even build up to the maximum warhead count
allowed them under the Treaty within its lifetime.'" Whether these limits are
significant is therefore contingent on continuing them in effect for at least several
additional years, a contingency that is nothing but a hope.
This is closely related to the issue of saving costs, a gain promised by many
proponents. I have already noted my belief that we shall not be significantly
restraining our own forces during the lifetime of SALT II on the basis of promised
Soviet restraint, a belief strengthened by the estimate just mentioned that the
Soviets will not even build up to the levels allowed them under SALT II. This,
however, is to say that there is probably nothing substantial that we shall not be
doing because of SALT II that we should be doing without it, i.e., there is probably
no significant saving within SALT II itself. Assertions to the contrary would depend
on highly convenient estimates. Major savings in the future would be contingent on
continuing (or strengthening) the restraints of SALT II, again, nothing but a hope.
This subject of costs should be considered in the light of the fact that major
increases in American strategic-force expenditures are probably vital in any event.
' A point that suggests that promised cost savings of SALT II are illusory, if not wholly
fictitious, as I shall point out below.
' See the Common Understanding to Paragraph 8 of Article IV.
' Compare Charts 13 and 19 of Nitze's Annex III.
'" Nitze, Annex III, Charts 19 and 20. (I omit some obvious interpretive remarks here.)
373
Somewhat incidentally, it should be noted that anyone who would argue for major
cost savings under SALT II would have a correspondingly major burden in verifying
the putative Soviet restraint that permitted the savings.
The claimed gain for SALT II that seems to me most mistaken is that it would
reduce the likelihood of war. There is very little reason to believe this claim. I
believe, as I pointed out near the beginning of this statement, that SALT II is much
more likely to increase the likelihood of war. This is related to the most important
reason for rejecting SALT II.
Recommendations concerning SALT II
Some of the leading critics of SALT II apparently oppose it primarily because of
the relationship of the SALT to American euphoria about strategic forces. This
opposition seems to me entirely reasonable. There can be no doubt that three
successive Administrations have, in some collective sense, believed that the SALT
would enable us to have strategic nuclear security "on the cheap", in the slang
phrase, and that this belief has been a major factor in the evolution of our greatly
weakened strategic posture. There is therefore something to be said for imposing a
major pause on the process of the SALT, not particularly related to the specific
terms of SALT II, while — it is hoped — we regain our strategic wits. I was struck by
Paul Nitze's quotation (in his July 12 statement) of Lincoln's celebrated phrase that:
"First we must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save the country."
Yet there is no doubt that it requires a certain degree of optimism — from my
perspective — about the American Administration coming to power in January 1981
in order to believe that our strategic posture will be adequately repaired, whatever
happens to SALT II in the meanwhile. As a matter of realistic politics, it is not
obvious that my optimism should improve substantially as a result of rejection of
SALT II. And even my most preferred candidate Administrations would be unlikely
to accomplish many strategic repairs before 1986 that would be prohibited by SALT
Nevertheless, I believe that the case for rejecting S./^LT II is something close to
overwhelming. The lesser, but nevertheless significant, part of this case resides in
the fact that some potentially desirable specific repairs — such as the MY missile
force — would be much less likely to be adequately studied, still less developed, under
constraints that would prohibit their deployment and which might be continued
beyond SALT II.
The major part of the case for rejection resides in the necessity to make it
manifest to the Soviets, and to some degree to the rest of the world, that the
American body politic will simply not accept further one-sided constraints that
allow the Soviets a guaranteed margin of superiority, whatever efforts we may
make within the Treaty limits. This Treaty will strengthen Soviet beliefs— already
too strong — that they constitute the wave of the future, that they have increasing
military preponderance, and that the United States is increasingly unwilling to
stand up to them, even at the level of insisting on a mere paper quality of allowed
forces. The extent of these effects may be argued, but surely the direction cannot.
And the direction is dangerous. It is the route to war.
I believe the best way of minimizing that danger is to reject SALT II outright. In
this, I seem to differ with many of my fellow critics. However, if I were asked what
modifications in the Treaty would make it minimally acceptable, I should suggest
two.
First, the "heavy" ICBM's should be counted as two each. Thus, if the Soviets
wish to retain 308 SS-18's, these would count as 616 against their allowance of 820
MIRVed ICBM's (and similarly for other limits and sublimits), so they could then
have only 204 "light" MIRVed ICBM's. Under this condition, the Soviets might
reasonably be allowed 20 warheads each on the "heavy" missiles, rather than the 10
now allowed.
Second, our B-52's should be omitted from the Treaty (simply by omitting refer-
ences to the B-52 in paragraph 3 of Article II, and related common understandings).
Because of the apparently close similiarity of Backfires and B-52's in unrefueled
range-payload characteristics, and their comparable numbers, this would be the
appropriate counter to the Soviet refusal to include Backfire. The Soviets could then
reasonably be relieved of the restrictions (other than on production rate) contained
in thier unilateral Backfire statement at the Vienna Summit.
If these two changes were made, I should be willing to ignore the matter of the
extra Soviet ICBM's, and, with reluctance, could support the ratification of SALT II
as so modified. But there is very little chance, in my view, that the Soviets would
accept these changes under current circumstances, and rather than seem to be
taking refuge in such devices, I believe the forthright and proper action for the
United States is to reject the Treaty outright. I therefore recommend that the
Senate withhold its consent to ratification.
374
Future limitations
Mr. Chairman, you asked me to address the subject of arms control and SALT III
objectives. It will be clear to you from the foregoing that I hope SALT II will be
defeated, and, therefore, I shall not assume that the next negotiations will be
preceded by ratification. The second paragraph of your letter of August 10 men-
tioned specifically the "direction, pace an scope" we should pursue "in future
negotiations on strategic armaments," apparently not necessarily assuming the
ratification of SALT II, and I shall therefore assume that acceptance of SALT II is
not necessarily a prerequisite to these "future negotiations". I shall indicate what I
believe is a suitable avenue to pursue in the next negotiations, whether they be
called SALT III or SALT II, or whatever, and whether II is ratified or not.
The best approach to such next negotiations is to use a scheme for limiting and
reducing strategic nuclear offensive forces that is based on (or closely related to) the
payload (or "throw-weight") of such forces. Schemes of this general type have been
suggested to the Soviets in the past, but, at least in recent official negotiations, the
Soviets have rejected such an approach. I believe we should persevere in this
approach.
An illustrative comprehensive scheme is shown in Table 1. The basic idea of this
is as follows. Nuclear delivery systems of various kinds are grouped in the catego-
ries listed in the first column. In each category, the initial Soviet and American
capabilities measured in tons of payload (or throw weight") estimated for 1985 are
given." An "Initial Ceiling" for each category is then selected, basically as the
larger of the Soviet or American capabilities in each category, in some cases
rounded upward to a round number. The symbol that is a \" appearing in the
initial ceiling for the bottom category means "greater of, so that initial ceiling is
the greater of X or Y. These ceilings are then decreased over time, not necessarily
at the same rate for each category, and not necessarily by the same factor in each 5-
year period. Each force (Soviet and American) must not exceed the ceilings each
category imposed at points 5 years and 10 years after the initial ceilings.
For example, in this illustrative scheme, the ICBM ceiling is cut in half in the
first 5-year period, and cut in third in the following 5-year period. The SLBM
ceilings are reduced by smaller factors, so that the allowed SLBM forces at the end
of 10 years would consititute a larger fraction of the then-allowed total of strategic
forces than they did at the beginning.
TABLE l.-SAMPLE LIMITATION SCHEME FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES
[Tons of payload]
Initial Initial Initial 5-yr 10-yr
Category U.S. U.S.S.R, ceiling ceiling ceiling
ICBM
M/IRBM
SLBM
Cruise missiles
Heavy bombers....
Medium bombers.
NucTacAir
1,230
5,670
6,000
3,000
1,000
0
1,000
1,000
500
250
1.075
1,195
1,200
800
500
300
1,000
1,000
750
500
1,660
360
2,000
1,000
500
1,000
4,000
4,000
2,000
1,000
X
Y
(XvY)
(XvY)/2
(XvY)/4
Different aggregations within categories would be possible and may well be desir-
able. For example, it might be desirable to lump together ICBM's and SLBM's in a
single category, and allow each side to choose its own "mix" of such missiles, subject
to the overall ceiling for this category. It might also be desirable to split up the
cruise-missile category into two or more categories, depending on range. It should be
noted that there is no need for separate sub-categories of MIRVed and un-MIRVed
missiles. Each side should be free to choose the nature and details of its allowed
forces within each category; e.g., the 1,000-ton ceiling on ICBM payload at the end of
ten years could be deployed as 100 missiles of 10 tons each, or 1,000 missiles of 1 ton
each, or 10,000 missiles with 200 pounds each (roughly the maximum number of
warheads that could be fitted into 1,000 tons), or some combination of such missiles
"Initial U.S. and U.S.S.R. payload capabilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers are
taken from the 1985 columns of Chart 6, "The Balance in Throw-Weight", of Annex III of Paul
Nitze's statement, converted into tons. (Nitze's estimate for Soviet heavy bombers did not
include the Backfire, which I have therefore included under medium bombers.) Other initial
estimates in the table should be thought of only as selected to illustrate the scheme; they have
no pretense whatever to accuracy.
375
not exceeding 1,000 tons total payload. Lower ceilings would be desirable if they
would be compatible with verification capabilities and with nuclear forces in the
possession of other countries.
I have discussed this scheme in terms of payload, because that is conceptually
simple and (in some sense) the real parameter of interest, but the scheme might
actually be formulated (at least for the missile categories) in terms of the total gross
volume of the missiles, which is of course more readily verifiable than payload, but
closely related. Different parameters could be used for different categories.
It should be noticed that the scheme includes shorter-range missiles and aircraft.
Even systems of still shorter range might be included. I believe this provides a
sensible way of including the so-called gray-area systems; the quantity of such
systems allowed each side in inventory would be limited by this SALT-like scheme,
but where they would be deployed (e.g., in Western Europe or in the United States)
would not be a matter for negotiation in this framework.
Any system requiring substantial reductions in nuclear delivery systems will pose
correspondingly substantial verification problems, and this scheme is no exception.
While the specific verification issues of such a scheme have not been extensively
studied, as far as I know, there is no reason to believe that the scheme is worse
from this perspective than any other that would provide similar reductions. Particu-
lar problems will predictably arise with miniaturized systems, e.g., advanced cruise
missiles, and with dual-capable systems, e.g., tactical aircraft. Whether satisfactory
solutions to such verification issues can ultimately be found is not clear unless the
Soviets collaborate much more in providing verification than now seems likely.
Of course, the Soviets are most unlikely to agree to any scheme of this general
form within the near future, in any event. It would impose genuine parity in the
allowed ceilings, and I believe the Soviets have little if any foreseeable interest in
such a result. They will come to have such an interest, I fear, only when they
perceive that the alternative would be worse for them. And this perception will
come to them only when they see credible American defense programs that promise
to leave them behind.
So, Mr. Chairman, my recommendation for achieving a satisfactory outcome in
SALT II or III or whatever, in the form of the scheme above or any other, is to
begin a vigorous program to restore our nuclear forces to the relative health they
had in the past. The Soviets do not seem to understand any other language.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be pleased to reply to questions.
Biographical Sketch of Donald G. Brennan, Director of National Security
Studies, Hudson Institute
Donald G. Brennan is a strategist and student of national security problems. His
special interests are in arms control, alliance relationships in Europe, and advanced
military policy, such as policy issues relating to tactical and strategic nuclear forces.
Prior to joining Hudson Institute, of which he was President from July 1962 until
May 1964 and where he is now Director of National Security Studies, Dr. Brennan
worked for nine years as a research mathematician and communication theorist at
Lincoln Laboratory of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In addition to his
technical research there, he devoted substantial time to studies of arms control and
related national security problems.
Dr. Brennan's serious interest in arms control began in 1957, when he was
organizer of a group that led to the 1958 Summer Study on Arms Control held in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences. He was an organizer and co-director of the 1960 Summer Study on
Arms Control, again held in Cambridge under American Academy auspices. He was
chairman of the Academy's Committee on International Studies of Arms Control in
1961-62.
Dr. Brennan has served as a consultant to the Department of State, the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of
Energy (and its predecessors, the AEC and ERDA), the Executive Office of the
President, and to several research organizations. He is the editor of the well-known
anthology. Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York, George
Braziller, 1961), sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and
guest editor of its predecessor, the special (Fall 1960) issue of Daedalus on "Arms
Control". He has edited studies of future military technology and several publica-
tions on arms control, and is currently a member of the Editorial Board of the
journal International Security. He has contributed articles on national security
topics to a large number of books and journals, including Foreign Affairs, Orbis, the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, The New York Times, and publications of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies. He has lectured on national security
subjects at many universities, at the US. National, Air, and Naval War Colleges, at
376
the Canadian National Defence College, and at defense study centers in London,
Bonn, Paris, Rome, and Oslo, among others, and has given seminars on arms control
in the Soviet Union and China. He is a frequent witness at Congressional hearings
concerned with national security affairs.
Born in 1926 in Waterbury, Connecticut, Dr. Brennan received the B.S. (1955) and
Ph.D. (1959) degrees in mathematics from Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
where he was a Gerard Swope Fellow and received other graduate and undergrad-
uate prizes and awards. Prior to entering M.I.T., he was engaged in radio engineer-
ing as a registered professional engineer in the State of Connecticut. He is a
member of Sigma Xi, the American Mathematical Society, the Council on Foreign
Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Republican
National Committee's Advisory Council on National Security and International
Affairs, and is a member of the Board of Directors of the Committee on the Present
Danger.
Senator Stone. Thank you, Dr. Brennan.
Senator Javits?
HEAVY ICBM's COUNTED AS TWO EACH
Senator Javits. I am very interested, Dr. Brennan, in the two
things which would induce you to accept SALT II. You have men-
tioned them in your statement, first the heavy ICBM's should be
counted as two each.
Does that not guarantee rejection? Absolutely. It is generally
agreed that the heavy Soviet ICBM's were developed to compensate
for the Soviet deficiences in accuracy, and for which we may com-
pensate for by the retention of the right to produce a new MIRVed
ICBM.
As to the complete omission of the B-52's, is it not a fact that we
have satisfied ourselves that essentially the Backfire is a European
theater weapon designed for sea lanes around Europe. Also it is an
impractical weapon for attack against the United States, although
it could be forced to do it?
What is your comment on both of those points?
Mr. Brennan. To take the last one first, Senator Javits, I do not
understand that it is universally agreed that the Backfire is not a
capable strategic bomber. It is generally agreed, I believe, that the
Backfire has been primarily deployed by the Soviets and oriented
by the Soviets toward use as a theater weapon or toward naval
warfare, but it is not my understanding that it is generally agreed
that it is not a capable intercontinental weapon.
I believe even ACDA, at some time during the period when Mr.
Warnke headed it, made a statement to the effect that no assur-
ances given in peacetime would assure that the Backfire could not
be used in time of war. It has capabilities and range and payload
that are widely believed to be closely comparable to the B-52's.
The fact that the Soviets are presently intending to use it for
theater purposes would no more suggest to me that it should be
excluded from the ceilings than the fact that we have a certain
number of Poseidon missiles allocated to SACEUR would suggest
that we should claim some of the Poseidon missiles should not be
counted under the ceilings. They can be reassigned at any time and
on fairly short notice. I believe something closely similar is true of
the Backfire.
As far as any acceptability of the idea of counting the heavy
missiles as two each is concerned, I am sure the Soviets would not
accept that, because I believe they wish to preserve a degree of
377
superiority that is reflected in those ICBMs. I do not think it would
be generally agreed that it is impossible to achieve the same capa-
bilities such as accuracy, for example, with the heavy-payload mis-
siles as can be achieved with light payload missiles.
By reasonable measures of what the missiles can accomplish, the
heavy payload missiles are in effect twice what the maximum
allowed light missile would provide.
It therefore seems to me that an equitable way of counting them
would be to count them as two each. If you ask whether the Soviets
would be likely to accept this, I should say no, but I think we
should insist on some things that would be equitable whether the
Soviets accept them or not.
Senator Javits. I have one question of you and then I would like
the others to comment if they would on what you have said.
TWO LEGS OF U.S. TRIAD COMPLETELY DEPENDABLE
We noticed, or at least I have noticed in discussions in these
hearings almost the complete relegation to nothing of the sea and
air legs of the U.S. Triad. I noticed it in your testimony too.
We were told by Secretary of Defense that these two legs are
completely reliable and dependable, and we design our strategy to
have three legs instead of essentially one which the Soviets essen-
tially have.
We are faced constantly with the argument that you compare
the 30-percent U.S. dependence on our ICBM's with the 70 percent
Russian dependence. If you disregard the rest of our forces, the
balance seems all lopsided.
Should we disregard the rest of it? Could you briefly explain to
me your argument that for practical purposes we should junk our
air and sea based strategic forces and forget them?
Mr. Brennan. It was not my argument
Senator Javits. I understand, but it was implied.
Mr. Brennan. I should deny even that it is implied. Let me
address the point apart from what was or was not implied.
I think the American forces other than the ICBM's, the SLBM's
and the bomber forces primarily, are of considerable significance
and they are sufficient to insure that the Soviets will certainly not
undertake a nuclear attack against the United States frivolously.
There is no question in my mind about that.
If one asks a slightly different question, would a two-legged
Triad, possibly with one leg being severely threatened by the Sovi-
ets, be sufficient to give you political confidence in managing any
crisis which might come along, in the way in which we had this
confidence in the past or relative confidence in the past, then I
think the answer to that is "No." I think some of the witnesses
who have been before you have made this point fairly well.
Senator Javits. May we have your comment, Ambassador
Warnke? We will then have your comment. Professor Panofsky.
Ambassador Warnke. I will try to deal with them. Senator
Javits, in the same order.
Senator Javits. You may deal with them in any way you wish.
Ambassador Warnke. First, of course Backfire is exclusively de-
ployed as a theater bomber. It has never been exercised in a
378
strategic role and I think it is obvious that it is not adapted for a
strategic role. It is a very effective theater bomber.
Therefore I think that the restraints President Carter was able
to achieve should be regarded as frosting on the cake. We have a
limit on production. We have a prohibition against upgrade that
would give it a significant strategic capability.
With regard to heavy missiles, let me try to put this into perspec-
tive in terms of the negotiations. At the time I took over the
negotiations there was nothing that would have limited the size of
the M-X below the size of the SS-18. We could have made the M-X
just as big as the biggest Soviet missile. The M-X was intended to
be deployed as a mobile ICBM. Therefore, no limit on size existed
because the only control was on the size of the fixed silos in which
ICBM's are now deployed.
We negotiated the limit on the size of a mobile ICBM. We did so
at the request of the Pentagon because they had no intention of
making the M-X any bigger than the SS-19 and they were con-
cerned that if there was not a ban on heavy missiles on mobile
launchers that would work to the unilateral advantage of the
Soviet Union.
It was for our own military considerations that we proposed that
constraint.
Let me also point out, with respect to the idea that the heavy
missiles should count as two, that you can sell a dead horse just so
many times. We were able at Vladivostok to get the Soviets to
agree not to include our forward-based systems. Part of the quid
pro quo for that was that we would not insist on further reductions
of heavy Soviet missiles. We are not going to be able to sell it
again.
The proposal that the SS-18 should count as two would obviously
be countered by some such Soviet proposal as counting our Posei-
don missiles as two because they have twice as many RV's as the
only Soviet MIRVed SLBM.
I think again we have to look at this in the context of the
totality of the agreement. Obviously, there are some respects in
which the asymmetries in the present forces are in favor of the
Soviet Union, but it is not possible to negotiate an agreement that
strips off those asymmetries but leaves us with all of the respects
in which our strategic forces are superior to those of the Soviet
Union.
Senator Javits. You did not answer as to the other two legs of
the Triad, nor has Professor Panofsky. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I
ask unanimous consent if the other members do not ask these
questions or if I do not get to them on the second round, that the
witnesses be asked to reply in writing and that it be made part of
the record.
The Chairman. Without objection that will be as so ordered if it
is possible to order witnesses to reply in writing. That may exceed
my authority. It is so requested.
[The information referred to is contained in the response to
question 11 on pages 387, 392, and 396.]
Is it your turn. Senator McGovern?
Senator McGovern. I think it is unless you wish to ask questions
at this time.
379
The Chairman. I defer to you.
PERCENTAGE ANNUAL REDUCTION SCHEME
Senator McGovern. Dr. Panofsky, as you may or may not know,
I plan to offer a version of the percentage annual reduction ap-
proach as a declaration of policy for SALT III, not as an amend-
ment or reservation on SALT II but simply as an accompanying
policy statement that I hope the Senate will approve in considera-
tion of the resolution or ratification.
In your statement you state that a percentage annual reduction
scheme with complete freedom to mix it would be destabilizing. I
agree with that.
What I have in mind is to reduce annually not just the overall
aggregates of launchers and delivery vehicles but to reduce on a
percentage basis annually the various subcategories so that the
levels of 2,250 and 1,320 and 1,200 and 820 and so on down to the
308 heavy systems of the Soviet Union, would have to be reduced
by a certain percentage whether it is 5 percent or 10 percent or
whatever the Senate would agree on.
I am wondering if you would still oppose the so-called PAR or
percentage annual reduction principle if the reductions had to
apply to each of the SALT II ceilings and subceilings?
Mr. Panofsky. Senator McGovern, I am still somewhat uncom-
fortable, not with the idea of annual reduction per se, but with too
specific a prescription to have exact proportionality in the various
subcategories because I believe it may be preferable to have a
disproportionately large annual reduction required for MIRVed
ICBM's in order to achieve larger stability.
I am simply somewhat uncomfortable, not with the concept as
such but that our negotiators will enter the negotiating table with
a preannounced predetermined negotiating position. I feel that just
because of the necessity of trading things off in the asymmetric
situation which we and the Soviets are facing that it may turn out
to be an undue constraint on our negotiators to be quite as specific
as this.
I have no objection at all to a negotiated scheme of planned
reductions as long as the freedom to mix provision in the reduction
is not insisted on.
It is a relatively minor point from my point of view.
Senator McGovern. Ambassador Warnke, what is your view of
the principle of percentage annual reduction? It occurred to me
listening to your statement that it does address one of the concerns
you expressed, that we not reinvent the wheel, that we begin with
SALT II. This has the advantage of taking those levels that we
have ratified in SALT II, assuming we are ever going to get to that,
and then building on that base with a percentage cutback in SALT
III on an annual basis with each side being required to make
substantial cutbacks.
Ambassador Warnke. I would feel. Senator McGovern, that this
could be a useful approach provided it did apply to the various
subcategories as well as the overall categories.
Senator McGovern. That is the way it is going to be offered.
Ambassador Warnke. I would not want to see a situation in
which the only arms control was to cut back on the total number,
48-260 0-79 Pt . 4 - 25
380
then one side or the other might maximize the number, for exam-
ple, of MIRVed ICBM's.
Senator McGovern. I fully agree.
Ambassador Warnke. I would agree with Dr. Panofsky that the
important thing is to try to bring about a very substantial cutback
in the number of launchers of MIRVed ICBM's. I think PAR or
percentage annual reduction is part of an overall approach that
could be useful.
Senator McGovern. Mr. Brennan, do you have any comment?
Mr. Brennan. No, sir. I should not inherently object to a pro-
gram of that kind at all. It could be easily compatible with the
kind of program that is envisioned in the table in my prepared
statement.
While I have the microphone I would like to make a very brief
remark about one point Mr. Warnke made in responding to the
question about my earlier remark in which he said part of the quid
pro quo of Vladivostok for omitting the forward based systems in
Europe was allowing the Soviets to have the large ICBM's.
I wanted to point out that General Rowny who was one of the
negotiators during that era, denied on the record at an earlier
session of these hearings that any such linkage was present. I have
heard a similar denial from other people not on the record but who
were concerned with this issue at that time. General Rowny's
testimony is on the record.
Ambassador Warnke. If I may point out. Senator McGovern, of
course those records would be available to the Senate and they can
determine from the facts whether I am correct or General Rowny. I
am content to rest on that.
[The following information was subsequently supplied by Mr.
Brennan:]
Passage From General Rowny's Prepared Statement
[Supplied by Donald Brennan]
[Mr. Brennan later submitted the following passage from General Rowny's pre-
pared statement of July 12, with a request that it be inserted at this point in the
record: "It has been stated that we accepted this inequality in a trade for the
Soviets not counting our so-called 'forward-based systems' (FBS) and the nuclear
systems of our Allies. Evidence of such a trade is not supported by the record. I
clearly recall the days just before Vladivostok when the Soviets sent us signals in
Geneva that they would drop their FBS arguments. Once told that by insisting on
including our FBS, the Soviets would be required to count their more numerous
systems (which could strike our systems and our troops in Europe, and our NATO
partners), the Soviets realized it was to their advantage to drop the FBS argu-
ment."]
SALT PROCESS MEANS FOR ACHIEVING REAL ARMS LIMITATION
Senator McGovern. Thank you, gentlemen.
Do any of you really expect the SALT process or the ratification
process in SALT III to move along more rapidly and more satisfac-
torily in terms of achieving real arms limitation and hopefully
arms reduction?
Are you optimistic based on what has happened in the last few
years that we can do better in SALT III if we ratify SALT II?
Ambassador Warnke. I would be quite optimistic. Senator Mc-
Govern, that the ratification process could proceed with more expe-
dition provided that what we did as I indicated in my prepared
381
statement— that is to utilize SALT 11 as the basic treaty to which a
series of amendments could be made. Some of those amendments
could be in my opinion noncontroversial.
An example would be the shrinking of the totals in SALT II;
further reductions; further substantial reductions both in the over-
all categories and in the subcategories and primarily the total of
MIRVed ICBM's.
I do not see why that should present anything of a controversial
nature. I think there are also some other refinements that could
occur during the SALT III negotiations that again would not give
the members of the Senate any major concern.
Obviously some other types of changes would raise questions of
greater complexity and on which there may be difference of opin-
ions.
I think if we take the approach that when we have reached
agreement on perhaps a related set of provisions these should then
be put into effect, this would allow us to make more rapid progress.
Senator McGovern. Professor Panofsky?
Mr. Panofsky. I am guardedly optimistic, just from the experi-
ence of these hearings, that the Senate will be persuaded that the
arguments which are now swirling around the ratification process
deal with issues which are relatively marginal in comparison to the
major issue, namely trying to make the political process more
adequate to get ahead of the technological evolution. I agree with
Mr. Warnke that some future steps will deal with relatively uncon-
troversial amendments, and that therefore the ratification process
will proceed more expeditiously.
My main concern about the relative rate of the political process
to the technological process is not so much focused on the ratifica-
tion process of the Senate but on the negotiating and instructing
process.
Senator McGovern. I meant the whole process.
Mr. Panofsky. On the overall negotiating process. Again there I
hope, at least with faith in our system, that the lessons learned
here of the necessity of not being diverted by relatively minor
Soviet moves will be learned and the process will go more rapidly.
I am guardedly optimistic. It is certainly quite possible that it
will not happen that way.
Senator McGovern. Mr. Brennan?
Mr. Brennan. I am not sure whether I should describe my
attitude as optimistic or pessimistic. I think it very unlikely that
the Soviets will be more rapidly moved toward reasonable looking
postures in SALT III than they were in SALT II.
It is very difficult for me to project that belief into a comment on
ratification. It is hard to know what will emerge from the negotiat-
ing process, which will depend enormously on what administration
is in power, and I have no crystal ball for that.
Senator McGovern. Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator McGovern. We have a roll-
call vote. I think this is a good place to break so the Senators may
vote. We will reconvene in about 15 minutes.
[The committee recessed for a vote on the floor.]
The Chairman. I understand we have another vote to come but
rather than to keep you gentlemen longer, I thought we would
382
commence the proceedings again; then perhaps we can take turns
voting and we can complete this hearing.
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES FOR SALT III
I would like to explore during my round of questioning what the
possibilities really are for SALT III. There seems to be a consensus
emerging that perhaps the best argument going for SALT II is it
leaves the gate open for SALT III.
I would like to ask the panel beginning perhaps with Ambassa-
dor Warnke, for an appraisal of what he believes is realistic to
anticipate in the way of reductions of these nuclear weapons that
have become so redundant, so costly and so dangerous to both
sides.
You know a number of formulas have been suggested. Some of
them are very ambitious ones.
You have negotiated with the Russians and you have had a good
deal of experience, about as much as anyone in this field.
I would like to ask for your assessment. Up to now, none of these
so-called arms control treaties except the ABM Treaty and the
Limited Test Ban Treaty, and I might say even that treaty may not
have posed any meaningful limitation on the nuclear arms race
since both sides were able to proceed with underground testing to
their heart's desire and what was adequate to the military's needs.
I would think that perhaps only the ABM Treaty actually put a
stop to the development of a nuclear weapons system and to the
expansion of that system. Everything else we have had has permit-
ted both sides really to proceed with a continuing buildup of nucle-
ar warheads.
What can we expect realistically in the light of that history as
we look ahead to SALT III?
Ambassador Warnke. Of course my crystal ball, Mr. Chairman,
is probably just as clouded as that of anybody else. It does seem to
be we can be quite ambitious in SALT III.
I think one of the reasons why we were not able to get sharper
reductions in SALT II is explained by the Soviet decisionmaking
process. When we went to Moscow in March of 1977, as you will
recall we had quite an ambitious comprehensive proposal that
would have involved sharper cuts.
It became apparent that the Vladivostok figures were something
that had become of such political importance to Mr. Brezhnev that
he had to get a Vladivostok type treaty out of his system before he
could go onto something that was more ambitious.
We had the greatest difficulty even getting down from 2,400 to
2,250. As a matter of fact it was necessary to write the 2,400 figure
into the treaty as the immediate figure with the 2,250 being some-
thing that would be accomplished at the end of 1981.
Similarly with the 1,320. That again had to appear someplace in
the treaty which is why we were able to come up with this com-
plex, and very favorable to the United States, combined ceiling of
1,320 for the total of strategic bombers with long-range cruise
missiles plus MIRVed ballistic missiles. Both of those figures as a
matter of an imperative had to be in the SALT II Treaty.
My feeling is once we have that SALT II Treaty we will be able
to get the Soviets to concentrate on substantially greater reduc-
383
tions as a part of SALT III, not only in the overall aggregate but in
the subceilings.
As you know in the Joint Statement of Principles, there is an
agreement on the part of both sides to negotiate significant reduc-
tions. At one point we considered putting figures into that Joint
Statement of Principles. It was then decided that those figures
would become not only new ceilings but also floors, that if we had
specific figures put in the Joint Statement of Principles that would
substantially eliminate any possibility of getting further down and
we were better off holding our options open.
For that reason I would hope that any resolution that the Senate
might pass with respect to SALT III would not be too specific and
would instead indicate a general direction on the part of the
Senate that we go for substantial reductions but not set a figure
which will become not only a new ceiling but also a new floor.
I think also as part of SALT III that it will be possible to get
some further qualitative restraints. For example I mentioned in my
opening statement that I would hope, as Professor Panofsky has
proposed, that we could get a ban on the testing of submarine
launched ballistic missiles in depressed trajectories. This was
brought up fairly late in the SALT II negotiations. The Soviets
were not able to deal with it at that point. The negotiations had
been going on for too long.
It is therefore my hope that with the prompt ratification of
SALT II we will have the foundation from which we can proceed.
I would like to give my own view, Mr. Chairman, that SALT II is
important not just in holding the gate open for SALT III but it is
important in itself. Compared with the alternative, if there were no
SALT II constraints our best estimate is that the Soviets would
have by the end of 1985 some 3,000 strategic nuclear weapon sys-
tems. With SALT II, they are held at 2,250. That is a difference of
just about 25 percent if you go from the 3,000 figure.
The Chairman. I agree that the treaty contains provisions that
are beneficial. I did not mean to suggest that the treaty was totally
without substance. It also establishes a ceiling for the first time on
the number of warheads which I think is a very important achieve-
ment, as well as the requirement that the Russians demolish and
dismantle 250 intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The principle of equal ceilings is also an important principle
looking to the future.
What we both want and I certainly know that to be your feeling
from our previous conversations, is some substantial reduction in
these force levels, even the ones that have been established under
SALT II are much too high.
Ambassador Warnke. I would certainly agree with that, Mr.
Chairman, and I certainly think a priority objective ought to be to
reduce the overall total of MIRVed ICBM launchers because that is
where the greatest instability resides.
The Chairman. Mr. Brennan?
Mr. Brennan. It is very difficult for me to have any confidence
in what might happen in the next round of negotiations. As I
earlier remarked I am not sure whether the next round of negotia-
tions will be called SALT III or SALT II prime or something else.
384
I am sure there will be future negotiations with the Soviets even
if SALT II should be rejected. Sooner or later there will be negotia-
tions with the Soviets on these issues again. The question would be
how soon and under what kind of framework and for what objec-
tives and over what time scale.
Assuming SALT II would be ratified in the relatively near
future, which of course I do not recommend, but if it were to
happen, then I would suppose the negotiations would start fairly
early, but my best guess about the Soviets is that they will be very
reluctant to scale down their forces substantially, and I suspect
they will be even more reluctant to scale them down with what
would seem to me sufficient symmetry.
In other words, I think they will be likely to be determined to
retain some advantages, such as some fraction of the heavy pay-
load ICBM's, for example, or precluding American systems that
would seem especially attractive to us while not precluding any
systems of their own that they are particularly interested in.
If the Soviets behave in this way and they are confronting an
American administration that is determined not to allow the Sovi-
ets to retain one-sided advantages, then I suspect those negotia-
tions may go on for quite a long while. If one supposes that the
next administration may be a continuation of the present adminis-
tration, or a new administration that may be willing to continue
those kinds of Soviet advantages as the price for getting an early
agreement, then we may have an earlier agreement.
My sense is that even some people in the administration who
have been the architects of SALT II, and who are favorable to it
and are promoting it as best they can, are very pessimistic about
early major achievements in the next round of negotiations.
The Chairman. Mr. Panofsky?
Mr. Panofsky. I have confidence that both substantial numerical
reductions will be negotiable and also that limitations on the rate
of test firing of missiles will be negotiable. I consider the latter to
be probably the most powerful tool in terms of dampening down
the concern of vulnerability of the land-based deterrent.
I have much less confidence at what point of reduction of central
systems the Soviets will insist on coupling any reduction with gray
area systems. I believe it would be a great advantage if we could
continue to negotiate reduction of central systems by 20, 30, or 40
percent before also fully negotiating the gray area question because
the gray area question negotiations would surely complicate the
negotiation process and stretch it out.
I am more concerned with when and how that transition will
occur rather than whether reductions will become negotiable. I
believe, in the next decade, reductions possibly as much as 50
percent will become negotiable.
The Chairman. There is another vote, gentlemen. I am going to
have to call the hearing to a close.
BASING MODE OF THE M-X
Could we have a very brief answer before I have to leave on the
President's decision with respect to the basing mode of the M-X?
Do any of you have any strong feelings about that one way or the
other?
385
Mr. Brennan. Not I.
Ambassador Warnke. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that I beheve
the M-X has to be considered on its military merits. It has to be
considered in terms of whether this is the best way to improve the
survival of our forces. From the arms control standpoint it is
completely consistent with SALT.
I believe I was questioned in detail when I testified on July 16 as
to whether a particular type of mobile basing of the M-X would be
inconsistent with SALT. I can tell you and the committee that this
system conforms in every respect with the requirements of SALT
and conforms in every respect with what we told the Soviets would
be permitted under the terms of SALT.
[Additional questions submitted for the record follows:]
Ambassador Warnke's Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the
Record
Question 1. In your view, how do the Soviets view the SALT process? Is there any
mutuality of goals and interests between the United States and the Soviet Union in
SALT? If not, what does that imply about the prospects of desirable SALT out-
comes?
Answer. In my view, the Soviets view the SALT process as a means of lessening
the risk of strategic nuclear war and thus protecting their national security. There
is, I believe, a considerable mutuality of goals and interests between the United
States and the Soviet Union in SALT, including not only a common interest in
national survival but also a common concern about the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, which would be significantly encouraged by a failure of the United States
and the Soviet Union to take steps to bring their own nuclear arms under control.
In addition, it seems clear that the Soviets recognize that, although success in SALT
won't automatically bring about more useful relations between the two countries, it
is a prerequisite to any improvement in relations.
Question 2. What, in your view, will be the relative bargaining positions of the
two sides in SALT III as a consequence of the SALT II agreement, assuming the
Treaty is ratified along its current lines?
Answer. The ratification of the SALT II Treaty along its current lines will give
the United States a very strong relative bargaining position in SALT III. As stated
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff last July, SALT II contains "important restrictions
which operate primarily to our benefit", while at the same time "the specific limits
on the United States are quite nominal." Our ability to proceed with the moderniza-
tion of each part of our nuclear deterrent triad, the fact that we can test ground
launched and sea launched missiles at any range during the Protocol period and
that there are no restrictions on such cruise missiles after 1981, are among the
things that give us substantial bargaining leverage.
Question 3. What impact could ratification of the SALT II agreement have on
other arms control efforts, in particular the CTB and MBFR negotiations, and on
the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons?
Answer. The SALT II agreement is the cornerstone of our arms control efforts. If
after almost seven years of negotiations it were to be rejected, I see no possibility of
progress in the Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations and Mutual Balance Force
Reduction negotiations for the foreseeable future. Our rejection of SALT would also
contravene our commitment under Article VI of the Non-proliferation Treaty to
take prompt steps to control and reduce United States and Soviet nuclear arms. It
would deprive us of any effective moral suasion in discouraging other countries
from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. It could lead to wide-spread defections
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, when it comes up for review in June of next
year.
Question 4. What are likely Soviet goals and objectives for SALT III?
Answer. The likely Soviet goals and objectives for SALT III will be to persuade
the United States to accept restrictions on those developments that they regard as
most threatening, such as greater counterforce and the amplification of our long-
range theatre nuclear capability. These Soviets concerns are major reasons for the
strong relative bargaining position that we will have in SALT III. It will be impor-
tant to make it clear that we will accept such restrictions only in return for
significant reductions in the Soviet MIRVed ICBM force and such theatre nuclear
weapons as the SS-20 medium-range ballistic missile and the Backfire bomber.
386
Question 5. You support the idea of a Senate resolution setting goals for SALT III,
but you recommend that it be general and not tie the hands of the negotiators. In
view of past performance, why shouldn't the Senate make clear the specific arms
control goals against which it will evaluate a future agreement? What do you
believe the Senate should do to improve the prospects for real arms control in SALT
III?
Answer. I believe that a Senate resolution setting goals for SALT III should be
cast in quite general terms because I do not believe it is possible for the Senate to
pre-negotiate the major parts of SALT III. The attempt to do so would deprive the
U.S. negotiators of the necessary bargaining flexibility; any numerical ceilings
would, in effect, become floors and frustrate the chances of more significant reduc-
tions. In addition, such specificity would in all likelihood be regarded by the Soviets
as an attempt to prejudice arms-length bargaining and would thus provoke Soviet
intransigence and similar insistence on pre-determined positions.
As for past negotiating performance, I think the SALT process can be faulted not
in terms of the individual steps involved in SALT I and SALT II but rather in terms
of the time it has taken to complete these steps. The most effective action the
Senate could take to further progress toward arms control in SALT III would be the
speedy ratification of SALT II, accompanied by an expression of the Senate's feeling
of the urgency of achieving more substantial reductions and tighter qualitative
controls.
Question 6. Mr. Warnke, in the past you have said that the SALT process gives
each side a voice in the strategic force structure of the other. How has the United
States been able to influence Soviet force structure in SALT I? In SALT II? Haven't
the main deficiencies in the Soviet strategic force structure, such as their emphasis
on ICBMs over SLBM's retention of heavy missiles, development of counterforce
capabilities, buildup of throw-weight, persisted in spite of SALT?
Answer. The Interim Agreement on control of offensive arms which was a part of
SALT I consisted essentially of a freeze on launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's. Even
this limited agreement, however, affected the Soviet strategic force structure by
preventing the addition of substantially more ICBM silos which, according to our
estimates, would have been built in the absence of SALT I. Although the agreement
expired by its terms in October of 1977, the Soviet undertaking to abide by its
provisions pending SALT II entry into force has prevented additional Soviet ballistic
missile submarines from being placed on sea trials. The SALT II Treaty will more
significantly affect the Soviet strategic force structure by limiting all launchers of
MIRVed ICBM's to 820 and launchers of MIRVed heavy ICBM's to 308. If SALT II
were not to come into existence, our intelligence estimates are that there would be
at least 100 more Soviet launchers of MIRVed ICBM's.
Limitations on verification are such that improvements in counterforce capabili-
ties by both sides have not been considered susceptible to verifiable constraints in
SALT II. However, the counterforce threat is reduced by provisions of SALT II that
limit the number of reentry vehicles to the maximum tested on each type of ICBM
and SLBM and by the ban on more than one new type of ICBM per side through
1985.
We would not, of course, have been able to trim from the respective force struc-
tures only those asymmetries that favor the Soviets while retaining the many more
asymmetries that favor the United States.
Question 7. What do you think the Soviets would do if we sent the treaty back for
renegotiation? Would that mean the collapse of SALT, or would the Soviets be
compelled by their own stake in the process to renegotiate?
Answer. There is, I think, no chance that the Soviets would be willing to renegoti-
ate the SALT II treaty so as to make it tougher on them without compensating
additional restrictions on U.S. forces. Such an attempt unilaterally to renegotiate a
treaty that is the product of hard bargaining would, in my opinion, mean the
collapse of SALT. The Soviets, I am quite sure, would not be willing to concede,
explicitly or implicitly, that they have a greater interest in the SALT process than
we do.
Question 8. You have described SALT as a step-by-step process. What does this
incrementalist concept imply for SALT III? Doesn t it mean that SALT III will also
be another rather modest step, not a radical reversal of the arms race? Do you
think the SALT process can survive another agreement like SALT I and II?
Answer. As I see it, an "incrementalist concept" is the only realistic concept for
the SALT process. SALT I froze ICBM and SLBM launchers and paved the way for
SALT II. SALT II sets equal aggregates, imposes subceilings and the first qualitative
controls, and provides the basic definitions, procedures and verification measures for
a continuing strategic arms limitation regime. Neither side appears ready for a
SALT III agreement that would constitute a "radical reversal of the arms race."
387
The SALT process could not have survived without agreements like SALT I and
SALT IL SALT III will build on the foundation they have laid and can produce
deeper reductions and tighter controls.
Question 9. What was the negotiating history of the Joint Statement of Princi-
ples? Didn't the United States propose a rather specific set of goals for SALT III?
Why, in your view, did the Soviets reject specific goals in favor of the very general
objectives in the Joint Statement?
Answer. In proposing the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for
SALT III, the United States initially contemplated specific numerical limits and less
general goals. On reconsideration, it was decided that negotiation of specific ceilings
might actually limit the reductions that could be achieved and that the effort to
spell out goals in detail would unduly delay completion of SALT II and commence-
ment of SALT II negotiations.
Question 10. In your statement, you suggest that progress on central system issues
in SALT III not be linked to agreement on theater nuclear issues. In effect, you
argue that these two sets of issues should proceed independently within the overall
SALT framework. Do you believe this is feasible? Won't the Soviets attempt to link
resolution of TNF issues to central system issues, especially deep reductions wheth-
er we like it or not? Isn't your approach the equivalent of conducting separate
negotiations on TNF? Won't that lead to perceptions of a Eurostrategic balance,
with all the decoupling problems that implies?
Answer. My statement suggested that finalization of agreement on an important
issue or related set of issues should not be postponed because of the fact that not all
other items on the SALT III negotiating agenda had yet been resolved. I do not
argue that the various sets of issues should proceed at separate times and places
and hence do not advocate separate negotiations on TNF. For example, all theatre
nuclear issues need not necessarily be resolved in a single package. Some controls
over the longer-range gray area systems might in fact accompany further central
system reductions.
I do not believe it would be useful to try to decide in advance what breakdown of
issues might prove possible. What I do suggest is that we should seize the opportuni-
ty to put into effect further meaningful measures of strategic nuclear arms control
when and as the sides have been able to come to agreement on them.
Question 11. Why is there such stress on the land-based ICBM leg of the Triad?
Little mention is ever made of the sea-and airborne legs of the Triad. Should we just
disregard these other two legs in assessing whether we have a good deterrent force?
Answer. As I see it, there is such stress on the land-based ICBM leg of the Triad
because this is where the preponderance of Soviet strategic strength is concentrated.
Whereas we have diversified our strategic forces about equally among our land, sea
and air launchers, almost three-fourths of the Soviet strategic nuclear resources are
in their land-based force. Critics of SALT therefore score debating points by compar-
ing this three-fourths of the Soviet force with the less than one-third of our strategic
nuclear capability which resides in our land-based ICBM launchers.
In my opinion, the U.S. strategic decisions that led to our maintenance and
modernization of the sea and airborne legs as equally important parts of our Triad
were sound and gave us the more survivable deterrent force. The upgrading of these
two legs permitted by SALT II will further improve the least vulnerable components
of our deterrent. Our Trident missiles, with greatly increased range, will preclude
any ASW threat for the foreseeable future and will minimize command and control
problems. The unlimited range cruise missiles permitted on our strategic bomber
force will ensure the penetration capability of the airborne leg.
These two legs should not be disregarded. They, in fact, buttress the survivability
of our land-based ICBM leg by making it clear to a potential adversary that an
attempted preemptive first strike against our ICBM silos would be futile because of
our assuredly survivable retaliatory capability.
Dr. Wolfgang Pano^sky's Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for
THE Record
Question 1. In your view, how do the Soviets view the SALT process? Is there any
mutuality of goals and interests between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in SALT? If
not, what does that imply about the prospects of desirable SALT outcome?
Answer. I have no direct knowledge of "the Soviet view" on the SALT process or
on specific SALT issues. However, I am persuaded from personal contacts, the
negotiating record, and Soviet writings that the Soviets view SALT as a highly
desirable element of their future security. The Soviets clearly share the justified
concern with the United States on the increasing burdens and dangers of nuclear
weapons. The economic load on the Soviet budget of procuring and operating their
388
strategic nuclear systems is considerably higher than that on the United States.
Quite apart from the specific technical objectives of the SALT process the evolving
political context has made SALT a test of the viability of the continuing policies of
the Brezhnev administration.
Thus there is a mutuality of goals and interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union in respect to SALT as far as reducing the dangers and burdens of
nuclear armaments is concerned, but there remain conflicting interests between the
United States and Soviet Union in many other areas. There never has been explicit
agreement between the Soviets and the United States on strategic policies and
doctrine, although the recent gradual shift of emphasis from deterrent to counter-
force policies on the part of the United States gives the appearance of greater
similarity in this respect. However, as pointed out in my testimony, the physical
consequences of nuclear war fought under any doctrine are awesome and tend to be
similar. For this reason both nations have recognized that avoiding initiation of
nuclear war is a matter of overriding consideration. Thus the shared common
interests in progress of the SALT process take priority over the dissimilar goals and
objectives of the two nations; therefore a positive outcome of SALT serves the
interests of both.
Question 2. What, in your view, will be the relative bargaining positions of the
two sides in SALT III as a consequence of the SALT II agreement, assuming the
Treaty is ratified along its current lines?
Answer. If SALT II is not ratified along the current lines, then there will be no
SALT III in the predictable future. Therefore the inverse of the question, namely
what the relative bargaining position of the two sides would be if SALT II were not
ratified, has no answer. The terms of SALT II have indeed yielded a basis for a
better U.S. bargaining position for future arms control agreements than would
uncontrolled expansion in strategic weapons. SALT II will have significantly arrest-
ed the momentum of the current Soviet buildup. At the same time programs such as
deployment of the air-launched cruise missile, the Trident submarine, and various
modernization programs undertaken by the United States are in no way impeded by
SALT. MX and its "racetrack deployment" is compatible with SALT II. Although no
final decision to deploy MX has been made since the program is only in engineering
development, the future of MX is now unaffected by enactment of SALT II and will
depend on progress of that engineering development and the evaluation of the
Public, the Congress, and future Administrations of the merits of the program. In
view of all the above, I believe that ratification of SALT II will strengthen the
bargaining position of the United States in future arms control negotiations.
Question 3. What impact could ratification of the SALT II agreement have on
other arms control efforts, in particular the CTB and MBFR negotiations, and on
the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons?
Answer. I am answering this question in a one-sided manner: If SALT II is not
ratified, then negotiations on the CTB and MBFR in their present framework would
become hopeless for the foreseeable future. Discussions on these topics may continue
in such multilateral contexts as in the CCD in Geneva or in the United Nations, but
progress under these circumstances would be extremely unlikely. Similarly, I would
consider non-ratification of SALT II a very significant blow to the U.S. effort to
control the spread of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) imposes,
both in the Preamble and in specific provisions, a positive obligation on the United
States and the Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Non-ratification of
SALT II would thus contribute to the cynicism of non-nuclear weapons states on the
sincerity of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to live up to their part of the obligations
taken in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In a fundamental sense the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty aims to make a freeze of the non-nuclear weapons states in that status
acceptable by persuading them that the nuclear weapons states are willing to
reduce the inventories of the nuclear weapons and reduce the importance of nuclear
weapons in the conduct of foreign affairs. Non-ratification of SALT II would strong-
ly contravene that purpose.
Question 4- What are likely Soviet goals and objectives for SALT III?
Answer. I find it difficult to identify specific Soviet goals and objectives for SALT
III beyond those agreed on in the "Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guide-
lines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms." Stated
Soviet goals and objectives for SALT III include genuine and substantial reductions
of nuclear strategic systems. However, there is little question that the Soviet goals
and objectives also include reintroduction of the Forward Based Systems (FBS) of
the United States on the bargaining table. This, in turn, will lead to broadening of
the SALT III negotiations to consideration of other long-range nuclear delivery
systems designed for theatre use in Europe. I surmise, but have no definite evi-
dence, that the Soviets share a common interest with the U.S. in decreasing the
389
vulnerability of their land-based deterrent ICBMs, which comprise about three-
tourths of their retaliatory striking power.
Question 5. You recommend a goal of "phased reductions" of about 50 percent in
the overall aggregate for SALT III. What do you mean by "phased restrictions"?
Over what period would such reductions take place? Would reductions of this
magnitude be negotiable? How would such extensive reductions affect the credibility
ot the U.b. nuclear umbrella over our allies?
Answer. By phased reduction I mean a decrease in the number of strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) on an agreed-upon schedule. As emphasized in
my testimony I do not consider it feasible or desirable to establish the specific-
schedule desired by the United States before commencement of negotiations Howev-
er, I consider the goal of reducing the totality of SNDVs by, perhaps, 50 percent
^Vu^^^'^^u • °^ ^^^^ ^^^" ^^ y®^*"^ ^° ^^ reasonable and negotiable. I recommend-
ed that, m the interest of strategic stability, reductions be negotiated not only in the
overall aggregates but also in the subcategories of central strategic systems as now
Identified in SALT 11. I also specifically recommended that the "phasing", that is
the schedule of reduction, should not be the same for each of the SALT II catego-
ries. Specifically, the schedule of reductions for MIRVd land-based ICBMs should be
more rapid than that of the overall aggregate.
Such a scheme of phased reduction should be negotiable but divergent positions
are likely to be taken by the Soviet Union and the United States in entering
negotiations on the specific time table of reductions. Moreover, the Soviet Union
will take the position that once reductions have exceeded a specified amount, then
the United States Forward Based Systems must also become targets for reduction I
recommend, however that an object of U.S. negotiating strategy should be to agree
on the first steps of the reduction schedule before the entire matter of reductions in
long-range European theatre systems has been agreed upon. The reason for this
recomniendation is that the negotiating process would become unduly long and
involved if both the European theatre systems question and the initial phases of
reductions of SNDVs be tied into an indivisible package
The credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella is not as much affected by the
specific numbers of nuclear delivery systems, but by the faith of the Allies that the
U.b. has a credible potential to initiate a strategic nuclear attack against the Soviet
Union without incurring unacceptable risks. As has recently been pointed out by
many authors the credibility of the nuclear umbrella has already eroded substan-
tially since effective strategic parity has been reached by the Soviet Union, replac-
inK ^^^^..""q^estioned U.S. nuclear superiority of the 1960's. Once parity at any
fi^WH i?^^ "![ nuclear weapons is achieved, then the credibility of the nuclear
umbrella will erode. One should note again that currently the levels of strategic
l^ltll .^^^Prf- °" ^°/r ^'^^l '' ?.° ^^'■^^ *^^^ ^ ^^'■ge majority of them are targeted
K^fii V"^ i-^u°"^ of limited military or economic value. Therefore, reductions on
?riS;K-i f "^f /u^ maintain the relative parity of the two powers will not affect the
credibility of the nuclear deterrent significantly
..£"/*^'7 f. ^°" u^.^Yf.'^^t^' in the context of deep reductions and qualitative
constraints, the prohibition of mobile ICBMs. This could kill the MX program do
KvX'- Son^e would argue that mobiles, being more survivable, are^sSSing
S^d ICBMs?"^^" "" ' "^^"^ permitting the retention of a few hundred
st^^'tii^ohS^^ ijoS&is^^ t^Lf ss^'^rf sss
rrrt^orTt"ritntoti.H.t?.S^y ^'^ ^•'- ^" ^^^"^ ^^^^^ ^"^ ^" '^^'^^"
v^LWZ thf fi^.^'^'f^^'^ ^^^^\ "^'^^^ superficially be considered stabilizing and
based ICRM. it =n •*' ^^'w "^^ ^ "^l^""- *° ^^^^^^^ ^^e time during which land-
mobl^rRMf l^T'''^^^^i H^T''^^' ^^'^ V"ly t^"^ l>rov\ded the location of the
mobile ICBMs remains truly unknown to the enemy, and this in turn reauires
deception, concea ment, and use of large areas of land for military purpLs all of
WdSlvTnr^PdV^S '^ ^^^^d «°-^ty of the Soviet Union is'^sKor to ours
TTRMc ^^,'^ predict that in the long run a competition in land-based mobile
Sthat th7rSSt!° 'f" detriment of U.S. security. I therefore specifically ScSm
mend that the matter of vulnerability of the land-based deterrent be faced by other
reSc ions "of SaIT m h^ "^"^^V' ^^^^! ^"^ 'i"^' '^' qualitative constraints and
bSpH TTRm; t Ti i- ^^ specifically designed to improve survivability of land-
prograLTmy're^l} t^stSn^ la ^'""^'^^ ^' ^'^^ recommendation to^he M-X
Question 7. Deep reductions would, as you state, increase the relative significance
of gray area systems", which you believe should be involved in siff iff Won'twe
have to concede a great deal on gray area systems-FBS, cruise missiles, allied
390
systems — to get Soviet agreement to deep reductions? How would this affect NATO
security and our relations with the Allies? If we insist on linking our FBS and
cruise missiles to Soviet theatre systems, do you believe the Soviets will agree to
deep reductions in their central systems?
Answer. I believe it is unavoidable that consideration of gray area systems will
enter into SALT III. The expressed Soviet position, that deep reductions of central
strategic systems increase the relative military importance of U.S. controlled weap-
ons systems in Europe which can strike the Soviet Union, has merit. Therefore,
once such reductions are proposed, long-range European nuclear delivery systems
must be discussed in some context, be it SALT, MBFR, or some other forum.
Separating negotiations on long-range theatre nuclear systems from SALT would
raise the concern in NATO circles that the United States is considering the "Euro-
strategic balance" as an issue separate from U.S. strategic systems. This would raise
the spectre of decoupling the U.S./U.S.S.R. strategic balance from the European
theatre. In turn, this would lower European confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella
still further.
I see no reason why one should presume that the United States would make
excessive concessions in a negotiation of gray area systems. Indeed, FBS, ground-
launched, and sea-launched cruise missiles, and possibly other Allied systems, would
be on the bargaining table, but so would the Soviet SS-20, the Backfire, and Soviet
IRBMs now threatening Western Europe. Reduction in the overall level of these
combined forces would clearly be welcomed by the Allies. Even now it is proving
extremely difficult to persuade the Allies to permit on their soil U.S.-controlled
nuclear systems which can strike the Soviet Union. The Allies seem to be fully
aware of the fact that any use of nuclear weapons in Europe would imply enormous
collateral civilian deaths and other damage in Europe. Thus a limitation, and
hopefully balanced reduction in nuclear theatre weapons of both sides would be in
their interest.
The Soviets may well agree to deep reductions in their central strategic systems
in balance with deep reductions in U.S. central systems, provided the total level of
European theatre systems (including U.S. and Soviet systems) is also reduced. Here
again both parties share a common overriding interest in reducing the dangers
inherent in the continuing deployment of what are essentially unusable systems.
Needless to say, the Soviets will attempt to strike the best bargain in their favor in
the actual details of these negotiations, and we must do our best to strike the best
bargain in the interests of U.S. security. It is destructive and unsupported by the
negotiating history of SALT I and SALT II to personnel that U.S. negotiators will be
out-maneuvered in such a situation.
Question 8. Your notion of a cutoff of production of fissionable materials for
military purposes would be a completely new element in SALT. Would you elabo-
rate on how such a cutoff would work and the impact it might have on the forces
and programs of both sides?
Answer. A cutoff on the production of fissionable material for military purposes
has been a proposal made by the United States several times in the past. I suggest-
ed in my testimony that this proposal be re-introduced as part of the SALT III
framework. However, I would recommend that this item not be incorporated into a
SALT III "package" but be negotiated separately on its own merit, possibly as an
amendment or Protocol. A cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for
military purposes is a meaningful arms control step and would be relatively easy to
verify and put into action. Verification would consist of placing U.S. and Soviet
military production reactors under IAEA safeguards with due regard for the need
for specific materials required for the maintenance of the weapons stockpiles of the
two sides. Procedures have been studied in the past and found practical to take care
of this latter concern.
Such a cutoff would place a ceiling on the total stockpiles of fissionable materials
both sides would have available for configuring their nuclear strategic and tactical
forces, and both sides would be compelled to manage that limited stockpile in their
own military interests. As a practical matter, on the U.S. side, such a cutoff would
force some choices within the overall deployment of MIRVd strategic warheads on
land and sea, expansion of the total number of cruise missiles carried by aircraft,
and possible reintroduction of defensive nuclear warheads. On the Soviet side it is
believed that such a cutoff might force limits on increased fractionation of MIRVd
missiles (thus supplementing the controls of SALT II) as well as limiting the
number of defensive warheads (as limited in the case of ABM through SALT I, but
unlimited in the case of air defense missiles at present). As a result such a cutoff
would offer advantages to both sides by setting limits to the "worst case" projections
which an intelligence analyst could foresee. For obvious reasons I cannot discuss
391
here the details of the impact of such a cutoff on specific programs and forces of
both sides, but this matter has been extensively studied in the past.
Probably the greatest impact of a production cutoff of fissionable materials for
military purposes, combined with placing military production reactors under IAEA
safeguards would be in connection with proliferation of nuclear weapons. Placing
both military production and civilian power reactors under IAEA safeguards re-
moves one of the most onerous discriminatory provisions between the nuclear
weapons and non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT.
Question 9. You support the idea of a Senate resolution setting goals for SALT III,
but you recommend that it be general and not tie the hands of the negotiators. In
view of past performance, why shouldn't the Senate make clear the specific arms
control goals against which it will evaluate a future agreement? What do you
believe the Senate should do to improve the prospects for real arms control in SALT
III?
Answer. I recommended a Senate resolution setting goals for SALT III without
specific numerical targets in order not to tie the hands of our negotiators. This
recommendation was based on the realities of the negotiating process and the past
record of that process. An essential element of arms control negotiations is to allow
for flexibility in mutual concessions which do not profoundly affect the net security
interests of the two nations. A frequent criticism of SALT II, which I consider
merited, is that the Treaty, the preceding negotiations and the subsequent ratifica-
tion debate have given excessive emphasis to the detailed "numerology" of the
nuclear arms competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As has been
amply developed in testimony before this Committee, many factors are not easily
quantifiable such as geographic differences, the sturdiness of command and control,
the reliability and qualitative performance of strategic systems, and ultimately the
leadership and decision-making process and the national will of each side. Such
factors would control the outcome of a nuclear conflict, at least as much as the
numbers of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the contestants. Moreover, the total
number of nuclear systems is now so large that a large fraction of them are
targeted against installations of limited military and economic value.
All this adds up to the conclusion that the value of the specific numbers of
permitted systems in a negotiated arms control agreement has been highly exagger-
ated. If the Senate adopted specific numerical targets this would aggravate further
this already false public perception and would give such numerical targets a politi-
cal significance unwarranted by their military and other security importance.
I recommend that a Senate resolution designed to genuinely improve arms control
in SALT III should proclaim that the Senate will measure the merit of a future
agreement by evaluating whether the dangers and burdens of nuclear armaments
are greater or smaller after conclusion of a SALT III agreement than they were
prior to the inception of the SALT process.
Question 10. You have heard the President's decision on the "race-track" concept
for the mobile basing mode for M-X. Would you comment on the compatibility of
such a basing scheme with the provisions of SALT II, and the possible implications
of such a concept? What consequences do you think a mobile M-X along the lines
the President has chosen might have for the future of arms control?
Answer. I conclude that the basic scheme proposed by the President for the
mobile based M-X is compatible with SALT II. The President's proposal meets the
requirement of being verifiable in that the number of launchers in the system can
be counted by National Technical Means. I also conclude that the mobile based
mode proposed by the President, if deployed, would leave no ambiguity that the TEL
(Transporter-Erector-Launcher) is the launcher, while the missiles and decoys are
not the objects to be counted under the rules of SALT II. The M-X and its ten
warheads meet the SALT II limits on missile size and the fractionation limits on the
number of reentry vehicles.
The above comments certify to the compatibility of the M-X and its proposed
basing scheme with the provisions of SALT II. These comments are independent of
my views as to whether this scheme is a cost-effective solution to the problem of
Minuteman vulnerability, or in general is an optimal use of resources available to
augment the arsenal of strategic weapons for the United States. I believe that the
Senate has an obligation to examine that question through the regular military
authorization and appropriations processes and I would be pleased to offer testimo-
ny in that respect, if requested.
Engineering development of the mobile basing mode as such along the lines the
President has chosen does not have a substantial effect on the future of arms
control in itself. I do, however, believe that the choice of the size and accuracy of
the M-X system has a destabilizing effect in that it further enhances the incentive
to preempt in case of crisis.
392
I do not consider the specific M-X basing scheme to be the best choice for
providing a survivable basing mode for a follow-on system to Minuteman. The time
scale of deployment of M-X is such that it would not assure, even if it worked with
perfect security and performance, survival of the land-based component of the U.S.
strategic missile forces against the Soviet threat faced in the early 1980's until the
very end of that decade, several years after the expiration date of SALT II. During
that time other systems, superior to the proposed scheme, could be developed if
there were a decision to do so expediently.
Question 11. Why is there such stress on the land-based ICBM leg of the Triad?
Little mention is ever made of the sea and airborne legs of the Triad. Should we just
disregard these other two legs in assessing whether we have a good deterrent force?
Answer. I believe that the stress on the land-based ICBM leg of the triad which
has emerged during the testimony before this Committee is unwarranted. The main
reason such emphasis has been given is because the land-based leg is endangered on
both sides by the emergence of accurate, highly MIRVd missiles. I would like to
note that this vulnerability was envisaged well over a decade ago; when decisions
were made to deploy Minuteman it was not believed that the system would remain
forever an invulnerable part of the deterrent. Concern about the vulnerability of
the land-based leg of the deterrent should be shared between the United States and
the Soviet Union. It should be noted that the United States has about 25 percent of
its retaliatory warheads in land-based ICBMs, while the Soviet Union has about 75
percent of their retaliatory power so deployed. It is indeed true that calculations
predict that during the first few years of the next decade a very large fraction of the
U.S. land-based Minuteman force can be destroyed by Soviet preemptive attack. It
can be similarly shown that about one-half of the Soviet ICBM forces can be
destroyed. Although the entire land-based ICBM leg of the triad of the United
States will be at risk, while only one-half of the Soviet land-based ICBM component
is endangered, the latter represents destruction of a larger fraction of the total
megatonnage available for retaliation. For this reason both nations face this prob-
lem, but the Soviet concern will justifiably be heightened as U.S. deployment of
"silo killers" is increased, as will be the case through M-X.
On the U.S. side the threat against land-based ICBMs affects only 25 percent of
the deterrent and the survival of the balance of the SLBMs and airborne deterrent,
including ALCM, is, of course, very important. The matter of vulnerability of these
other components of the triad is a complex issue. It is generally believed, and I
concur, that no foreseeable threat against the SLBM leg of the triad exists during
the coming decade which would deny retaliation by more than a small fraction of
our submarines. The matter is more complex in respect to the retaliatory systems
depending on strategic aircraft. These face problems with pre-launch survivability,
should a substantial number of U.S.S.R. submarines approach our shore and fire
SLBMs on short flight time, depressed trajectories. It is for this reason that I
recommend serious consideration of a minimum standoff distance for SLBMs from
shore, and a ban on testing of SLBMs in depressed trajectories to become a part of
the SALT III negotiations. In addition I recommend rapid implementation of the
often proposed program to base a large fraction of strategic aircraft further inland.
It has been frequently pointed out that it is difficult even conceptually for an
enemy to attack both airfields and ICBM silos. The reason is that the missile flight
time from Soviet silos to U.S. ICBM sites is about half an hour, while the flight time
from enemy submarines to attack U.S. bombers successfully before almost all of
them can escape has to be well under 15 minutes. Accordingly, if enemy missiles
designed to destroy both airplanes and land-based ICBMs are to arrive simulta-
neously, then the longer flight time of attacking ICBMs will generate an additional
15 minutes of advance warning time, which permits all the U.S. aircraft to escape
safely. Conversely, if enemy SLBMs and ICBMs are being launched simultaneously,
then U.S. ICBMs can be launched in retaliation on receipt of information that a
substantial fraction of U.S. bombers has been destroyed by enemy attack. Thus
ICBMs and airplanes each constitute a symbiotic, mutually reinforcing arm of the
U.S. deterrent. In principle this mutually reinforcing relationship can be impaired
by a so-called pindown attack. A pindown attack consists of missiles from Soviet
submarines fired at U.S. ICBM fields creating a nuclear environment which makes
it impossible for U.S. ICBMs to survive during the launch phase. If such an environ-
ment is created for the 15-minute flight time differential referred to above, then in
principle both the airborne and land-based ICBM arm of the deterrent can be
successfully attacked together. However, such a combined threat is extremely diffi-
cult to manage even conceptually, let alone operationally. Moreover such a com-
bined attack would require the prior presence of a large number of Soviet subma-
rines offshore, which will surely not go undetected or unchalleged, leading to a
higher alert status of our bombers.
393
In addition to pre-launch survivability one is, of course, also concerned with
penetration. Due to the strictures of SALT I which ban any militarily significant
ABM system, there is little question that the reentry vehicles launched by the
SLBMs will penetrate into enemy territory. The bomber force can either operate as
penetrators or as a platform for air-launched cruise missiles. Currently the Air
Force has confidence that a large fraction of B-52's can pentrate enemy defenses. In
addition air-launched cruise missiles are assured penetration through present Soviet
defenses. I have confidence that should Soviet defenses be augmented further, that
in an offense/defense race between air-launched cruise missiles and increased air
defense the cruise missiles will prevail.
On the basis of the above discussion I conclude that even once the land-based
ICBM leg of the triad becomes vulnerable the other two arms constitute a formida-
ble deterrent. In fact, the Committee should be reminded that the very reason for
adopting a triad mode of deterrence was to permit possible failure of one of the legs
without unduly denying U.S. deterrent capability.
An argument is frequently made that it is absolutely essential to preserve the
land-based ICBM component of the triad because its specific characteristics are
essential and cannot be compensated for by increases in the other legs. This state-
ment is, to a limited extent, correct. The land-based ICBM force is characterized by
a number of assets as follows: (a) sturdy command and control; (h) long endurance;
(c) ability to hit "time-urgent" targets; (d) potential to develop high accuracy; (e)
independence from warning.
If it is deemed essential to maintain all these assets in a single weapons system,
then indeed the present ICBM's must be replaced by a similar system which is more
survivable. I disagree with this conclusion on two counts. The first is that it is not
clear that a confident replacement is physically possible. While the proposed M-X
basing mode assures survivability under certain assumptions, the associated disad-
vantages outweigh this gain. Moreover, other systems, for instance air-launched
ICBM s and augmentation of the submarine-based retaliatory forces by small, near-
shore submarines, can amply compensate in aggregate for the loss caused by the
unavoidable deterioration of the survivability of land-based ICBM's.
For all the above reasons I agree that the stress during testimony before this
Committee on the land-based ICBM leg of the triad has been excessive. At any rate
the vulnerability of land-based ICBM's is an issue not related at all to the merits of
ratification of SALT II, since none of the measures relating to compensating for the
increased vulnerability as discussed here are inhibited by SALT II.
Mr. Donald Brennan's Answers to Additional Questions Submitted for the
Record
Question 1. In vour view, how do the Soviets view the SALT process? Is there any
mutuality of goals and interests between the United States and the Soviet Union in
SALT? If not, what does that imply about the prospects of desirable SAL'T out-
comes?
Answer. The Soviets undoubtedly view the SALT process from a considerably
different perspective than that common in American arms-control circles. I believe
that the Soviets, at least so far, have been interested in the SALT process primarily
as a political tool to inhibit American strategic programs very substantially, while
interfering very little with their own strategic programs. It is, thus, a process for
helping them achieve an increasing degree of strategic superiority. So far as I can
see, conceptions of common interest play little role in the Soviet view of the SALT.
ITiere is thus very little mutuality of goals and interests between ourselves and the
Soviets, i'his implies that the prospects of desirable outcomes in the SALT are very
poor, unless and until Soviet views change substantially.
Question 2. What, in your view, will be the relative bargaining positions of the
two sides in SALT III as a consequence of the SALT 11 agreement, assuming the
treaty is ratified along its current lines?
Answer. The SALT II agreement, if ratified, will have cemented a number of
Soviet advantages, including their unilateral right to heavy-payload ICBM's, a po-
tentially important bomber force with strategic capabilities that is not counted
under the ceilings, and restriction on systems of much greater potential importance
to us than to the Soviets. There is utterly no reason to expect that the Soviet? will
give up such advantages except to return for an outcome that would appear even
more favorable to them. Since we have no programs in prospect during the lifetime
of SALT II, with the partial and limited exceptions of M-X and ALCM, that would
significantly worsen the circumstances for the Soviets, we shall have very little
bargaining power to persuade the Soviets to agree to programs that would provide
better balanced Soviet and American postures.
394
Question 3. What impact could ratification of the SALT II agreement have on
other arms control efforts, in particular the CTB and MBFR negotiations, and on
the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons?
Answer. There would be relatively little effect of the SALT II agreement on the
CTB, and what effect it would have would result primarily from domestic political
considerations in the United States. It appears that the Administration is reluctant
at this time to pursue a CTB while SALT II is under consideration in the Senate. So
far as ratification of SALT II would have an effect on the spread of nuclear
weapons, I believe the effect would most likely be bad. This is because the countries
most likely to be next into the nuclear "club" are candidates for admission primar-
ily because of security reasons, rather than prestige considerations. Such candidate
countries include Taiwan, South Korea, Pakistan, and Israel. The best way of
keeping these particular candidates from explicitly joining the "club" is to provide
them with a sense of security, while ratification of SALT II will be widely read in
these countries as further evolution of American weakness. In potential nuclear-
weapon states such as Brazil, where prestige and other political considerations
would likely dominate any decision for a national nuclear-weapon program, the
effect of ratifying SALT II would be likely to be wholly negligible. The MBFR
negotiations are most unlikely to produce significant results, whatever happens to
SALT II.
Question 4. What are likely Soviet goals and objectives for SALT III?
Answer. To consolidate, and if possible to strengthen, the dramatic improvement
in their strategic nuclear position, without stirring up the United States to a degree
that would result in the substantial weakening of their overall gain.
Question 5. You have heard the President's decision on the "racetrack" concept
for the mobile basing mode for M-X. Would you comment on the compatibility of
such a basing scheme with the provisions of SALT II, and the possible implications
of such a concept for SALT III? What consequences do you think a mobile M-X
along the lines the President has chosen might have for the future of arms control?
Answer. This concept has a kind of "Rube Goldberg" quality. However, it does
seem compatible with the provisions of SALT II. I know of no implications for SALT
III that are specific to the "racetrack" concept, although there are important
implications for SALT III in the development of any ICBM that can be launched
from a cannister. Soviet development of systems of this kind will pose severe and
possibly insuperable verification problems.
Question 6. You contend the 308 Soviet MLBMs give them a major advantage in
MIRVed ICBM payload. If this is of major military significance, why do you believe
the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided against building heavy missiles for the U.S.? The
Treaty also prohibits mobile heavy missiles, which suggests further lack of interest
by the Joint Chiefs in having a heavy ICBM. Do you believe the Chiefs are wrong,
and we should have retained the right to a mobile heavy ICBM?
Answer. As I pointed out in my prepared statement, "the larger significance of
the larger-yield weapons resides in the additional fallout fatalities they would
produce." By and large, it has not been an American strategic planning objective to
kill Russians with fallout radiation, and this fact alone would mean that the
military advantage I imputed to the heavy Soviet ICBM's would not loom as a major
attraction to American planners. However, two additional points should be noted.
First, since the signing of SALT I, it has not appeared that "heavy" ICBM's were
going to be allowed in the American strategic force, so little consideration has been
given to this possibility. Second, I observe that when the Defense Department did
decide to deploy a new ICBM, specifically the M-X, they chose approximately the
heaviest-payload ICBM that would be allowed to us under the SALT constraints.
There was indeed a lack of interest on the part of the Chiefs in a mobile heavy
ICBM, I presume in large degree because of the engineering difficulties of producing
and protecting such a system; the M-X is already a major engineering project as a
mobile ICBM. In connection with this question, I should recall the point made in my
statement (in connection with the 308 heavy ICBM's) that "this guaranteed margin
would be of political significance even if its military significance were doubtful",
and the major political significance is embodied in the point in my statement that:
"This Treaty will strengthen Soviet beliefs — already too strong — that they consti-
tute the wave of the future, that they have increasing military preponderance, and
that the United States is increasingly unwilling to stand up to them, even at the
level of insisting on a mere paper equality of allowed forces" (emphasis added).
Question 7. In your statement you say that a 200-missile M-X force would give the
Soviets only 200 "real" targets to shoot at. If we deploy M-X in a mobile basing
mode that proliferates aimpoints wouldn't the Soviets have to target all 4,600 or
more of the aimpoints?
395
Answer. Perhaps, perhaps not. Let me recall the point in my statement was that
"the M-X deployment would give the Soviets only 200 real targets to 'shoot' at,
either before launch, during launch, or for a short time after launch . . .". Taking
the later phases first, some active defense systems (ABM) may become feasible in
the future that would permit attacking an ICBM during its boost phase, or attack-
ing the bus shortly after boost before it had dispensed its several warheads, rather
than attacking the separate warheads in their terminal phase. It is obvious without
further explanation why the M-X system would provide only 200 "real" targets for
such defense systems to shoot at. An ICBM system with 2,000 boosters would greatly
complicate the problems of such a defense, which is not a remote possibility. As for
attacks before launch, many analysts are apprehensive of possible weaknesses in a
multiple-aimpoint mobile basing scheme. The Soviets may possibly find means of
identifying which shelter contains the ICBM, in any of these "shell-game" schemes,
by any of several possible techniques. It should be noted that these apprehensions
tend to be greatest for the physically largest missiles we might deploy, such as the
proposed M-X. Obviously, the Air Force and all others concerned with the M-X
project will work assiduously at making it difficult for the Soviets to identify which
shelters have real targets, but some doubt will always remain, and there will always
be the possibility that the Soviets will find some technical means for identifying the
real targets so that they alone could be attacked before launch.
Question 8. Your hypothetical force of 2,000 "M-Y" ICBM's would complicate
Soviet targeting by giving them 2,000 "real" targets to cover. Would your "M-Y" be
fixed or mobile? If it were mobile, why would it be preferable over 200 M-X with
2,000 RV's? If it were fixed, wouldn't it face exactly the same vulnerability problem
of the Minuteman force, but on a larger scale?
Answer. I did not discuss basing modes for the MY ICBM system in my statement.
One might, for example, use some form of multiple-aimpoint system such as that
envisaged for the M-X, in which, say, 20 shelters would be provided per booster.
This would provide 40,000 aimpoints. The unit costs of these would be considerably
cheaper and the systems for making the missiles mobile would be substantially
simpler (the missiles themselves being perhaps only one-tenth the weight and
volume of the M-X), and the real missiles would be more difficult to detect, other
things being equal. For the near future, it would probably not be necessary to use as
many as 20 aimpoints per missile. It is likely that some combination of active ABM
defense together with some form of mobility would probably provide the best overall
security, on a cost-effectiveness basis, but detailed studies to determine approxi-
mately what an "optimum" configuration would consist of have not been carried
out.
Question 9. You urge two modifications of the Treaty if it is to be ratified: Each
heavy ICBM should count as two (although the RV limit could be doubled to 20),
and our B-52's should not be counted, as an offset to Backfire's exclusion from the
aggregates.
(a) What would be the value of counting each heavy ICBM as two if it could
carry double the number of RV's? Isn't it the number of RV's and accuracy that
pose the threat — not the number of missiles?
(b) If we did not count our B-52's as compensation for Backfire, don't you
think the Soviets would at a minimum insist on dropping the 30 per year
production constraints? What else might they demand in exchange?
Answer, (a) It would reduce the maximum total payload of the Soviet MIRVed
ICBM force to that which would be allowed them if they could deploy only 820 light
ICBM's. In accordance with the discussion of this point in my statement, it would
reduce the maximum yield available in that force by perhaps 2,000 megatons (which
is over twice the total yield of our entire Minuteman force). The number and
accuracy of weapons are not the only significant parameters. Perhaps the most
important gain would consist of the elimination of the symbolic and political impor-
tance to the Soviets of those weapons. It is primarily for this reason that it is m.ost
unlikely that the Soviets would agree to this idea.
(b) If we were not constrained from producing additional B-52s, it would be
reasonable to abandon production constraints on the Backfire.
In relation to both parts of Question 9, I should recall the point in my statement
that "there is very little chance, in my view, that the Soviets would accept these
changes under current circumstances, and, rather than seem to be taking refuge in
such devices, I believe the forthright and proper action for the United States is to
reject the Treaty outright."
Question 10. How would your payload reduction scheme constrain the technologi-
cal competition? Wouldn't it simply channel the arms race into the direction of
warhead miniaturization, improved propellants, lightweight materials and improved
accuracy?
48-260 0-79 Pt.4 - 26
396
Answer. The payload reduction scheme per se would not constrain technological
competition. It would not "simply" channel the arms race into the direction indicat-
ed, first because such developments — other things being equal — would be taking
place anyway, and second, because the reduction scheme envisaged would provide a
very substantial reduction in capabilities in being, far more than could be compen-
sated for — at least with respect to most plausible strategic-force objectives — by tech-
nological developments. In this connection, it should be noted that further major
improvements in warhead miniaturization and yield beyond the level of technology
already achieved in, say, the Trident I warhead, are not to be expected. (This is, of
course, not to say that no improvements are possible.) I should point out that my
payload-reduction scheme was intended to be the centerpiece of the negotiations,
and I did not intend to suggest that other issues, such as constraints on some forms
of testing, could not be included. Broadly speaking, if any specific technological
constraints could sensibly be imposed in connection with any reduction scheme
whatever, they would be compatible with this one.
Question 11. You conclude that the Soviets are not likely to agree to your scheme,
nor to the modifications you believe necessary to make the SALT II Treaty accept-
able. Do you believe that SALT process should simply be abandoned? What do you
believe the strategic environment would be like without SALT?
Answer. To take the last question first, I lived through over twenty years of a
strategic nuclear environment without any SALT constraints, and have so far lived
through seven years of a strategic environment with some SALT constraints im-
posed, and my experience so far is that the latter environment has clearly been
worse. However, I do not favor abandoning the SALT process. (I do favor changing
the name and the acronym, but that is a minor matter.) I believe it remains true
that we and the Soviets have a common interest in reducing the likelihood of war,
most especially nuclear war, and in reducing the scope and violence of such a war if
it occurs. However, the Soviets plainly do not see their interest in such objectives as
comparable to their interest in maintaining a superior military position. I therefore
believe the Soviets are not likely to accept sound and genuinely balanced con-
straints until they perceive that the United States is embarked on programs that
may well return the Soviet Union to a position of inferiority. If this view of Soviet
attitudes is correct, the Soviets will become reasonably tractable in negotiations
only when they perceive alternatives — perhaps future alternatives, i.e., the forces
need not be fully in being — that will seem worse to them.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. I really have to leave. I
am sorry. I want to thank you all for your testimony. We appreci-
ate it very much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 2 p.m., September 11, 1979.]
SALT II TREATY
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1979
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m., in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Javits, Pell, Hayakawa, Lugar, and
Helms.
The Chairman. This afternoon the committee will consider the
issues in SALT II related to ICBM's. These issues can be grouped
into four broad categories— first, heavy missiles and throw-weight;
second, Minuteman vulnerability; third, mobile ICBM's and fourth,
the new type of ICBM limits.
Some of the major questions which the committee is seeking
answers to include, what are the implications of the right of the
Soviets to have 308 heavy throw-weight ICBM launchers while the
United States has no such right?
Will SALT II make solving the Minuteman vulnerability prob-
lem easier or more difficult?
Are the schemes devised to make the new U.S. M-X mobile
ICBM's system verifiable by the Soviets adequate?
Will the new types limitations of SALT II actually limit the
Soviets' fifth generation of ICBM's?
These are some difficult questions to which the committee must
find the correct answers.
We have before us three witnesses with excellent backgrounds
and long experience in areas related to the issues we are address-
ing. Mr. Jan Lodal worked with the Department of Defense Sys-
tems Analysis Group studying strategic systems. He was, from 1973
to 1975, Deputy for Program Analysis on the National Security
Council's staff where SALT was one of his primary responsibilities.
Dr. Michael May was formerly director of the Lawrence-Liver-
more Laboratory, one of the two U.S. nuclear weapon development
laboratories. He was, from 1974 to 1976, the Secretary of Defense
representative for the SALT delegation following Paul Nitze. Re-
cently he chaired the Defense Sciences Board's task force which
reviewed M-X basing concepts.
Mr. Paul Nitze we will remember as Secretary of the Navy,
Deputy Secretary of Defense and from 1969 to 1974, a member of
the SALT delegation. Since 1974 he has written and spoken often
on SALT and ICBM basing concepts.
Gentlemen, I would hope that you could each make a brief oral
statement as planned and then we will have questions.
(397)
398
Mr. Lodal?
STATEMENT OF JAN LODAL, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Mr. Lodal. Thank you, Senator.
I would like to comment briefly on our primary topic today, land-
based ICBM's and SALT IL
Our land-based ICBM's have important technical and military
characteristics not found in the other components of our strategic
forces. I believe that we should retain a land-based ICBM force and
that it would be unwise to abandon our present Triad of land-based
ICBM's, air-breathing bombers and cruise missiles and submarine
launched ballistic missiles.
This is true despite the emerging vulnerability of fixed land-
based ICBM's. Depending upon the nature of future United States-
Soviet arms control agreements one might be able to reduce the
numbers of our land-based ICBM's somewhat but I foresee no cir-
cumstances in which we could safely eliminate them altogether.
We need ICBM's to provide a capability to launch selective and
limited attacks against military targets and land-based forces pro-
vide an important hedge against possible breakdowns in the more
difficult command and control arrangements associated with bomb-
ers and submarines.
Our silo-based ICBM's have become an issue because we can now
see the day when they will be theoretically vulnerable to Soviet
attack. This vulnerability arises directly from two technological
advances; the advent of independently retargetable reentry vehi-
cles or MIRV's and the development of highly accurate ICBM
guidance systems. Without MIRV's it takes at least one missile to
destroy an opponent's missile.
Thus if the forces are of approximately equal size nothing can be
gained by an attack. MIRV's change this calculation, permitting
one missile to destroy several, provided the warheads have the
accuracy necessary to hit their targets. Accuracy and not the yield
or size of the warhead is the key to this capability. One cannot
make up for any significant lack in accuracy with larger warheads
or greater throw weight.
I can see no rationale for permitting the Soviets to maintain a
unilateral counterforce capability against our silo-based missiles.
One can make a theoretical argument that by increasing our own
counterforce capability we increase the incentive a Soviet leader
would have to launch a surprise attack. In practical terms I believe
the situation would be otherwise. A Soviet leader would be less
likely to risk escalating a political crisis in the first place if he
realized his own forces were as much at risk as ours. His belief
that he had a significant unilateral advantage could only fuel
adventurism.
I support U.S. development and deployment of an improved land-
based missile as well as the Mark 12A warhead on existing Minute-
man III missiles.
I also support efforts to develop a new and more survivable
basing mode for our land-based ICBM's. I do not believe that the
formidable technical problems associated with the development of
such a basing mode should delay proceeding with a new missile.
399
With respect to the missile itself I would have favored proceeding
with a joint Air Force/Navy program to provide a missile for use
either on the Trident submarine or on land, rather than with the
Air Force only M-X program. This is not the key point. The key
point is to develop the missile as opposed to doing nothing.
The best way to reduce the cost and uncertainties associated
with a mutual buildup of United States and Soviet land-based
forces would be to negotiate a significant reduction in land-based
MIRV's in SALT. Such a negotiation should be in the Soviet's own
interest since the emerging vulnerability of land-based ICBM's has
a much greater effect on the Soviet Union than it does on the
United States.
The Soviets have invested much more heavily in these systems.
They have placed roughly 75 percent of their strategic nuclear
capability in land-based ICBM s as compared to only about 25
percent for the United States.
Thus, unless the United States unilaterally abandons the ability
to attack these Soviet military targets a step which I would strong-
ly oppose, the Soviets should be willing to negotiate mutual reduc-
tions in land-based MIRVed forces in SALT IIL
With respect to the SALT II Treaty you are now considering, I
know of no way it harms the ability of the United States to
modernize its land-based ICBM force. The treaty does help our
military situation in several ways.
The sublimit of 820 on MIRVed land-based ICBM's eliminates
the worst case threats against which force planners would other-
wise have to prepare. Furthermore the limits on numbers of
reentry vehicles a missile can carry will considerably reduce the
cost and technical difficulty associated with deploying a survivable
multiple aim point land-based system assuming these limits are
carried forward into future SALT agreements.
In summary, the SALT II Treaty helps us with some of the
military problems we face related to our land-based missiles and to
my knowledge it makes none of our problems more difficult. We
should keep our land-based ICBM's and they should be modernized.
If we take reasonable steps to deploy a new survivable land-based
ICBM we should be able to improve the stability of the strategic
balance, increase the military options available to an American
President and provide a strong incentive to the Soviet Union to
negotiate more stringent limits in future agreements.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for your statement.
PRESERVATION OF THE TRIAD
I have a couple of questions I would like to put to you before we
go on to the rest of the panel.
You say, "In summary, the SALT II Treaty helps us with some of
the military problems we face related to our land-based missiles
and to my knowledge it makes none of our problems more diffi-
cult."
That has been the impression which has come across to me on
the basis of all of the testimony we have heard so far. I think our
hearings have put this full question into a much clearer perspec-
tive than we had before.
400
The weapon systems that these Chiefs of Staff have urged upon
us in order to maintain a nuclear balance are all permitted by the
treaty. The cruise missiles are permitted. The M-X mobile missile
is permitted. The Trident submarine is permitted. Those are the
three systems that we are told this country needs to maintain that
balance until such time as the treaty expires and hopefully this
would lay the basis for substantial reductions in numbers on both
sides as a result of the negotiations of SALT III.
You have spoken specifically to the M-X missile and. the need for
it. My question is I can understand your position as long as you
base it upon the premise that the Triad, this three legged stool on
which our nuclear deterrent rests, is the best form for our need
today and tomorrow.
Am I to believe that the Triad is some sort of permanent system
that we will have to preserve in the future in order to have an
adequate deterrent?
The question arises because in another place in your testimony
you say you would have preferred a missile that could have been
used both by the Navy and by the Air Force suggesting that a
missile can be developed that would be just as accurate and reli-
able which could be used on a submarine.
That makes me wonder if it is so necessary to keep ourselves as
the bull's-eye of the nuclear target by insisting on placing weapons
in the United States that would force the Russians to strike at us if
ever they were to decide to risk a nuclear war, to strike at the
heartland of America.
I have never understood the compulsion for making this country
or the heartland of this country the necessary target. If the mobile
missile, land missile is now needed to eventually replace our Min-
uteman force, the static force, if such a missile could be made
sufficiently accurate to be carried equally well by submarines, why
would we not be much better served to put that whole force out to
sea?
What is so magical about the Triad that must be preserved?
Mr. LoDAL. You have raised a series of important and provoca-
tive questions. Let me see if I can deal with them.
I do not think there is anything magic about the Triad. But I do
think that there are quite a few advantages associated with having
diversity in the characteristic of our forces, primarily because the
nature of these weapons is such that they are subject to a tremen-
dous degree of uncertainty.
Modern nuclear weapons have, thank goodness, never been used.
Therefore, they have never really been tested. Throughout history,
most military weapon systems have tended not to work as well as
people thought they would the first time they were used in actual
combat.
One tends not to know where vulnerabilities are and where
difficulties are likely to arise. But by having three different types
of basing modes, we make it considerably more difficult for the
Soviets to be able to mount an effective attack — not only because of
the general principle that they have to do more things, but because
in some cases what they have to do to attack one leg of the force
helps the other.
401
I am sure you are familiar with the arguments made about the
synergism of ICBM's and bombers; if the Soviets attack the ICBM's
first, the bombers have time to get off the ground; if they attack
the bombers first with their SLBM's, then the ICBM's can be
launched, since they will get some warning.
It is much harder to design an attack against three different
types of forces than it is against a single type. The forces are
therefore inherently more survivable.
I also have considered concern about command and control. Com-
mand and control is a difficult exercise in any event during a
nuclear attack, and it is particularly difficult with bombers and
submarines. But it is much less difficult on land. One can make
land-based communications and control systems much more redun-
dant, reliable, and survivable. Should an attack occur, it would be
crucial to have good command and control, and it is crucial that
the Soviets know we have it so that they make no mistake about
the strength of our deterrent retaliatory capability.
SURVIVABILITY OF LAND-BASED MISSILES AND BOMBERS
The Chairman. Surely you do not mean that our bombers and
our land-based missiles are today more survivable than our subma-
rines?
Mr. Lodal. No, sir. Our submarines are clearly the most surviva-
ble. I think they will remain the most survivable for the foresee-
able future. But they also have the weakest command and control
by their very nature. They are the hardest to communicate with.
Thus, while they are the best in one respect, they are the worst in
another respect. The ICBM's are the reverse: best in command and
control, worst in survivability.
Accuracy is also an issue. One can make a missile as accurate
whether it is on a submarine or on land; the trouble is that you do
not know exactly where the submarine is to start with when you
launch its missiles. Therefore the overall accuracy of a submarine-
based missile system is not as high as that of a land-based missile.
There are theoretical ways to improve SLBM accuracy, but I do not
believe they are available in the near term as practical deployment
options.
My belief that the single Air Force/Navy missile would have
been better was partially a cost consideration. The studies done by
the Congressional Budget Office, which I found to be quite thor-
ough, indicated that the overall cost of a multiple aim point system
would be somewhat less with the joint missile.
As important as anything else, is the fact that a joint missile
would give us a capability to go both ways. If we need to get
additional missile capability deployed quickly, we could put the
missile on the Trident submarines if we ran into technical prob-
lems with the M-X program.
PROBABILITY OF TOTAL SEA-BASED NUCLEAR FORCE
The Chairman. Senator Pell has often recited a little verse that I
have, because of his reference to it from time to time, committed to
my memory. It goes, "Put the missiles out to sea where the real
402
estate is free and far away from you and me." There seems to be a
lot of sense to that if it can be done.
Would you foresee a time when that might be done or when we
would no longer bull's eye the U.S. heartland the way the present
Triad system does and overcome these problems of command and
control?
Mr. LoDAL. Quite frankly, Senator, I would not. First of all, in
order to do that you have to get the bomber bases to sea as well, or
else give up the bombers. You end up with a monad so to speak, if
you really want to eliminate the Soviet threat to U.S. based mili-
tary targets.
Second of all, to rely so heavily on one type of system, the
submarines, which are purely 100 percent dependent upon decep-
tion for their survivability, seems to me to be an unnecessary risk.
While I understand and sympathize with the thought that it
would be helpful to remove any threat to our own society, as I have
said, I do not think that can be realistically done.
The Chairman. Senator Javits?
Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, I submit that normally we hear
the panel and then examine them. If the chairman would like to
proceed that way, I am sure we would not mind.
The Chairman. Very well. We will proceed that way. ]\5r. Nitze,
may we hear from you?
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL NITZE, FORMER DEPUTY SECRi;-
TARY OF DEFENSE AND FORMER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY >
Mr. Nitze. Rather than summarize my own prepared statement
it might be more helpful if I commented on the previous discussion,
Mr. Chairman.
You quoted Mr. Lodal as having said the SALT II Treaty makes
some of our missile problems easier and makes none more difficult.
I question the truth of that statement.
When one takes into consideration the fact that the treaty ex-
pires in 1985, I do not believe that the fractionalization limitations
for instance make our problem easier. I do not see anything in the
treaty, which expires in 1985, that makes more solid our anticipa-
tions with respect to the M-X missile and its basing mode. Full
operational capability of the M-X is not expected until 1989. That
all depends upon SALT III.
The provisions of SALT III will determine whether or not the
Russians are restrained or not restrained from further fractionat-
ing their large missiles in response to our ICBM basing mode and
whether they can add to the threat by that or other means.
I see nothing in SALT II which relieves our missile problems. In
fact I see the reverse. It is quite clear that the provisions of SALT
II permit the Soviets to do those things necessary from their stand-
point to create an intolerable threat to our Minutemen.
I think Harold Brown agrees that our Minuteman will become
vulnerable during the course of SALT II by virtue of systems that
the Soviets are permitted to have and are expected to deploy
during the period of the treaty.
' See page 403 for Mr. Nitze's prepared statement.
403
The more important question is whether it makes it more diffi-
cult meeting these problems. I believe it does make it more difficult
meeting the problems.
What I have in mind particularly is that if it had not been for
SALT II we would long ago have gone forward with what the Air
Force calls the multiple protective shelter [MPS] basing mode for
our Minuteman.
The President, however, laid down criteria for the basing mode
for the M-X in order to be sure the M-X basing will be consistent
with his interpretations of the provisions of SALT II and presump-
tively not interfere with SALT III provided SALT III is like SALT
II. The requirements he has laid down eliminate the possibility of
the multiple vertical protective shelter mode and make it neces-
sary to go to what they call the racetrack mode.
I believe the racetrack mode will be more expensive. In fact I
think the Pentagon estimates the cost of the racetrack mode will
be someplace between $33 billion and $34.5 billion for the initial
deployment apart from operational costs while their original esti-
mate of the cost of the multiple vertical protective shelter system
was $24.5 billion which I think they have now revised to $25.5
billion.
In any case I think those differences in cost are attributable to
an effort to meet the requirements of SALT II. Furthermore I
believe this racetrack mode of deployment is not necessarily as
secure and as useful as the multiple protective shelter mode would
have been. I think the incremental cost to add additional shelters
should the Soviets decide to fractionate more highly their missiles
after 1985 or should the SALT III Treaty, if there is one, not
provide for the same fractionalization limitations is significant;
under those circumstances I think it does make a difference what
the incremental cost of a shelter is.
I believe in the racetrack mode that incremental cost is estimat-
ed to be someplace between $2.1 million per shelter and $2.6 mil-
lion per shelter which is much higher than was estimated for
either the trench system, $150,000 or for the multiple protective
shelter system— $0.5 to $1 million. I think such differences make a
substantial difference in whether the Soviets would think it wise to
meet our new ICBM deployment mode by adding large numbers of
KV s.
I question the truth of the statement that the SALT II does not
niake protecting our ICBM's more difficult; I think it does make it
significantly more difficult.
The Chairman. Mr. Nitze, we have a vote. I think we should
take a 10-minute recess. We will then ask Mr. May to make his
statement and then the committee will proceed with questions
For the next 10 minutes, the committee will stand in recess
[The committee stood in short recess for a vote.]
[Mr. Nitze's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Paul H. Nitze
Assessment of deterrence depends significantly on our day-to-day alert forces Our
day-to-day alert forces must have adequate survivability in the face of any attack
which might be made against them. The surviving forces must be appropriate for
their mission responsive to command and control, able to penetrate defenses intend-
ed to blunt their effectiveness, and capable of putting out of action the targets that
must be eliminated if we are to pursue a rational strategy were war to come
404
In addition to these straightforward considerations, insurance against unforeseen
vulnerabilities can be provided by utilizing a diversity of forces.
The objective of diversity is to distribute our deterrent capability through differ-
ent forces having a variety of survival modes, defense penetration techniques, and
attack characteristics so that no single breakthrough by an opponent, either in
destroying our forces before launch, or in defense against our surviving and counter-
attacking forces, would significantly reduce our second strike and reserve capability.
Moreover, such variety would also lessen the vulnerability of our forces to a single
force-wide weakness.
A minimal approach to diversity is a triad of forces providing two different
survival modes and two different penetration modes for: (a) Time-urgent hard and
soft targets; (t) non-time-urgent hard and soft targets; and (c) targets enduring more
than a day. Both survivability and confidence in the ability of the force to penetrate
should be considered when matching specific systems to target classes, as shown in
table 1.
Table 1 divides targets into three classes; time-urgent, non-time-urgent, and en-
during, and each of these into hard and soft.
You will note that only our SLBM's can now be expected to have a capability to
endure more than one day, and they have little capability against hard targets.
TABLE 1
STRATEGIC FORCE EMPLOYMENT, SURVIVAL, AND PENETRATION CHARACTERISTICS
APPROPRIATE TARGET CLASS
SURVIVAL
MODE
PENETRATION
MODE
TIME-URGENT
(Within 15 to
40 mins)
NON-
TIME-URGENT
(Within 6 to
12 hrs)
ENDURING
(Within 1 to
30 days)
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
ICBMs
yes
yes
1/
3/
1/
1/
Hardened and
dispersed
Hyper-sonic reentry,
low radar cross-
section, chaff and
decoys masking real
versus false targets,
ABM Treaty limitation
on ABM defenses
SLBMs
2/
yes
y
yes
2/
yes
Concealed
mobile
Hyper-sonic reentry,
high arrival rates
BOMBERS
with
ALCMs
no
no
yes
yes
no
no
Take-off on
warning but
vulnerable if
not promptly
used
Low altitude flight,
reactive defensive
avionics, and
variety in penetra-
tion and defense
suppression modes
(SRAMs, ALCHs, etc.)
-''only if deployed in an MVPS or effective mobile (Racetrack?).
-''only if SLBMs are provided with ""Vs with a combination of higher yield and greater accuracy.
-''only if deployed in either an MVPS or effective ground or air mobile mode.
You will note that it is only the ICBM's that have a significant capability against
time-urgf?nt hard targets. i. i. i. ir , :f
Our bomber cruise missile capability is limited to non-time-urgent targets, l-ew, it
any, of our heavy bombers are expected to ensure more than a day or so. Ihey must
be used within the first few hours. Those that disperse or return suffer grave danger
of destruction on their bases. ^ x. t.\^
To achieve the capabilities to fight a war, and thus to deter one, we must both
give our SLBM's a greater hard target kill capability and give our ILBM s the
ability not only to survive for an immediate launch but to endure for more than a
The ICBM force has played a dominant role in determining the military capabili-
ty of our strategic forces. T/^tJu/r r ^
The central issue that must be considered is what to do about our ILBM torce to
restore the declining credibility of that leg of our deterrent. Some of the alterna-
tives are as follows:
405
a. Accept the intrinsic vulnerability of our fixed silo-based missiles and count on
only a small residual ICBM force surviving an attack, thus essentially being driven
to acceptance of a dyad.
b. As in (a), accept the vulnerabilitv of our ICBM silos but deploy a larger missile
in the silos to increase the power of those few ICBMs which might survive.
c. Adopt a launch-under-attack policy and perfect such a capability.
d. Provide dedicated ICBM silo defenses.
e. Re-base our ICBM's in a mode which maintains adequate ICBM survivability
and endurance, and thus satisfies our crisis stability and sufficiency requirements.
Alternative (a) results in a dyad and eventually a monad. A survivable and
enduring U.S. counterforce-capable ICBM system is required to ensure a diverse
enduring retaliatory capability against all types of targets. A dyad will not meet
that requirement.
Deployment of a larger missile in the Minuteman silos, alternative (b), does
nothing to solve the silo vulnerability problem and in addition has the negative
feature of a threatening, but vulnerable, U.S. first-strike counterforce capability.
Accordingly, it would increase crisis instability and the prospect that deterrence
would fail.
Alternative (c), launch-under-attack, refers to launching a threatened force once
unequivocal assessment is received that an attack on that force is in progress, and
before the attack reaches a point where it prevents a launch. It requires highly
reliable command, control, and communication systems and extremely rapid deci-
sion-making. The decision time projected to be available varies, from about 3 min-
utes in complex scenarios utilizing SLBM attacks on communication modes and
pindown of Minuteman, to about 15 to 20 minutes in a straightforward ICBM attack
on Minuteman. However, an important issue surrounding the launch-under-attack
option is "launch what against what Soviet targets — upon what degree of evidence
that an attack of what size is underway against what U.S. targets?" Extremely
difficult considerations are involved in answering those complex questions. Should
the President be asked to resolve them in the few minutes which may be available
to him, or should the anwers be preprogrammed into a computer? Neither alterna-
tive is without immense dangers.
Alternative (d), that dedicated ICBM silo defenses be deployed as a solution to our
current and future silo vulnerability problem, would require Soviet agreement to
modify the ABM Treaty so as to allow for the eventual deployment of dedicated
defenses.
Dedicated ICBM defenses can be of significant benefit when used as an overlay to
an already reasonably survivable ICBM system. Against a maximum threat, it
would be possible to complicate any Soviet attack with a preferential ABM defense
of missiles deployed in an effective dispersed deceptive basing mode.
A number of alternate basing concepts, alternative (e), have been proposed which
enhance ICBM survivability through a multiple vertical protective structure system
(MVPS),* air mobility, other forms of MAP employing transporter/erector/launchers
(including the Racetrack system) or by other deceptive actions. As stated in General
Allen's letter of December 29, 1978, over the last ten years about 30 alternate basing
modes have been investigated in detail; and after extensive reviews and evaluations,
the MVPS system was found to be the best technical solution that retains the
unique, positive characteristics of the ICBM force. The Racetrack system may, or
may not, be comparably effective but will certainly be more expensive.
Purely mobile concepts tend to rely on strategic and/or tactical warning both to
enhance survivability and to reduce operating costs. Air mobility has much the
same survival and durability vulnerabilities characteristic of the bomber force and
therefore does not contribute significantly to force diversity. Pure land mobiles are
dependent on warning, and are vulnerable to an area Soviet barrage attack.
Since the MVPS ICBM deployment concept achieves survivability through uncer-
tainty in location, its deployment may raise questions concerning verification. In
assessing this problem it should be emphasized that the advantages the MVPS
basing offers in increasing survivability and thus enhancing stability and deter-
rence, and thus reducing the risk of war, far outweigh the strategic significance of
uncertainty in verification. It should also be noted that all alternate basing concepts
currently under consideration raise some verification issues, but that cooperative
methods can reduce Soviet verification uncertainty to very low levels.
Two additional points should be made. It is wholly feasible for the U.S. to give the
U.S.S.R. high confidence that we are not deploying more than one canister contain-
ing a missile per MVPS launch complex. If the Soviet Union wished to give us
similar high confidence, if they developed an MVPS system, they also could do so. If
' A multiple protective structure (MPS) system employing vertical structures.
406
they wish to deny us verifiability of the number of ICBM's they deploy, they can do
so, whether they deploy an MVPS or not. It is unlikely they would wish to deploy a
mirror image of our Racetrack system.
It is reported that as a part of the current SALT II deliberations two demarches
were made by the U.S. side to the Soviets stating that we interpret the SALT II
provisions to permit the deployment of an MPS system after the expiration of the
Protocol.
The demarches referred not to multiple silos but to hardened launch points
(which, as phrased, could include not only vertical structures but also horizontal
structures). The Soviet side focused on the distinction between vertical structure
deployments and horizontal structures protecting mobile transporter/erector
launchers. They unambiguously stated that a vertical deployment mode would
involve additional fixed ICBM launchers which are prohibited by the Treaty. They
also implied, however, that the horizontal shelter deployment mode, if associated
with transporter/erector/launchers (TEL's), might be considered to be a mobile
system permissible after expiration of the Protocol but requiring that each TEL be
counted under the ceilings on numbers of ICBM launchers. The newly proposed
Racetrack system appears to satisfy the Soviet position on the requirements for a
permitted mobile system.
The Soviets might or might not respond to a U.S. deployment of an MVPS or
Racetrack system. It would be feasible, by the late 1980's or the 1990's, for the
Soviets, in the absence of SALT, to deploy more highly fractionated payloads with
up to about 20 to 30 RV's per SS-19-type missile, and up to about 30 to 40 RV's per
SS-18-type missile. These RV's would have to have smaller weight and thus yield,
and therefore would have to have improved accuracy to maintain the same single
shot kill capability. There would be severe technical problems involving accuracy
and reliability, and financial and availability of fissionable material considerations
could arise. But it is not certain that such considerations would preclude such a
Soviet response.
SALT II limitations cannot be helpful unless continued beyond 1985 in SALT III.
The currently agreed SALT II provisions include a maximum fractionation limit of
10 RV's per ICBM and 14 RV's per SLBM. The number of RV's in the overt threat
is therefore limited under SALT II but only until 1985. The earliest deployment of
the MX will be after 1985.
However, even if the Soviets developed and deployed highly accurate, high frac-
tionation RV's, and even if they covertly deployed additional missiles, an MVPS or
Racetrack system would exact a very high price for each U.S. missile destroyed. An
MVPS or Racetrack system would restore the stable pre-1978 situation in which an
attacker could not expect to destroy, in an initial attack, as many missiles as he
expended in that attack. The incremental cost of adding additional shelters and
thus aim points would be much less under the MVPS system than under the
Racetrack system.
Modernization of U.S strategic nuclear forces with emphasis on survivability and
endurance together with careful attention to the roles assigned to each part of the
force structure should greatly diminish the likelihood of any rational Soviet decision
to attack these forces or, directly or indirectly, to threaten such an attack. It would
also provide the best hope for survival should any such attack, intended or resulting
from an unintended chain of events, occur. In the longer run, it should also make
equitable and constructive arms control more feasible and more likely.
The Chairman. Mr. May, I wonder if we could have your re-
marks and then we will go to questions.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MAY, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,
LAWRENCE-LIVERMORE LABORATORY, LIVERMORE, CALIF.*
Mr. May. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will paraphrase and summarize those parts of my statement
which concern matters which the committee has heard quite a bit
about already and will try to dwell on parts which may be a little
newer.
The question is how to retain a deterrent force especially under
SALT and most particularly about the vulnerability of the ICBM
missiles. There is general agreement, I believe, that a deterrent
See p. 411 for Mr. May's prepared statement.
407
force, in order to do its job of deterrence, has to exist before the
crisis occurs and must be able both in fact and appearance to
survive an attack and be utilizable afterwards.
Right now, the part of the U.S. strategic forces which is alert and
survivable and reliable is only a fraction of the whole. It consists of
somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 nuclear weapons, with an ef-
fective yield which can be arrived at in various ways but the
equivalent effectiveness of the yield is something over 1,000 equiva-
lent megatons. These are approximate figures.
The U.S. ICBM force right now provides about 50 percent of this
alert, reliable, and survivable force. The rest is provided by bomb-
ers on alert status; that is, ready to take off within a few minutes,
and by submarines which are actually in operational zones.
We have other forces, as you know, which are not on alert and
which would therefore be quite vulnerable to surprise attack. I am
not counting them in this total.
The ICBM's not only provide about 50 percent of the alert and
survivable force but they are also qualitatively different from the
bombers and submarines, as has been repeatedly pointed out. Mr.
Lodal pointed it out. They have no need of warning, unlike bomb-
ers, and no need to penetrate enemy defenses; they have different
and better communication links than submarines and they must be
attacked with different weapons than either bombers or subma-
rines and at different times.
As has been repeatedly emphasized, the three elements together
are much harder to attack by the Soviet Union than any one or
two of them would be.
The forecast is that by the mid-1980's the U.S. ICBM force could
largely be destroyed by a Soviet attack. With it would go about 50
percent of our deterrent force, our alert and reliable and survivable
force, as well as the qualitative advantages which were noted
above.
The proportional cost to the Soviet forces would be far less and
the Soviet Union would therefore benefit in the military sense
from an attack on our forces. The value of this potential benefit in
day-to-day politics or in crises or in war is something that has been
debated at length in these hearings and elsewhere and I cannot
add very much to the debate except to say, having about 50 percent
of our bottom line deterrent forces subject to destruction by a first
strike is not a satisfactory outcome for all the years of investment
and technological development we have put in, and for all the
years of SALT negotiations.
It is possible of course to plan on launching the ICBM force on
warning of an attack before the attacking weapons actually ex-
plode. There would be very little time for the President to decide
whether to do that or not. Furthermore, no warning system is 100-
percent reliable.
It would be much preferable to devise a new system that could
replace the present Minuteman ICBM system and retain its major
advantages. Unfortunately that task has proven to be very diffi-
cult, largely because of the size and accuracy of the possible Soviet
attack.
408
There are only four ways to protect missiles, in a general sense,
whether on land or anywhere else. One can harden them. One can
defend them. One can keep them moving and one can hide them.
Hardening, given the anticipated Soviet accuracies and yields,
requires going so deep underground that the missiles could not be
launched after an attack for days or perhaps weeks. It is infeasible
from that point of view.
Active defense is currently under continuing study and research
and development, but no sufficiently reliable system has emerged
from these studies to warrant going beyond R. & D. in my opinion.
In addition, active defense is banned by the ABM Treaty as it now
stands.
The third alternative, to keep the missiles continually on the
move, whether on planes or trucks or some other mode of locomo-
tion, is extremely expensive and would have weaknesses of a secu-
rity, safety, and environmental nature. Moving them only after
receiving warning would lose the present advantage of ICBM's,
which is they do not require warning.
That leaves hiding; that is, some mode of deception. Deception in
one form or another has been the essential element in providing
survivability for the ICBM systems under consideration today.
It is not entirely satisfactory. It raises difficulties in connection
with SALT and with security maintenance. But so far, no one has
come up with anything else that better meets all the requirements
and constraints.
Deceptive land basing for ICBM's has a relatively long history of
studies reaching back to the 1960's, and most of the variations have
been looked at one time or another.
The latest version, the M-X racetrack concept, is a relatively
newcomer. It is more expensive and more complex in my judgment,
and less certain to operate than the other alternatives. Most impor-
tant, in my judgment, it would take a long time to deploy. It would
take too long to be in time to meet the Soviet threat to the
Minuteman.
It has these defects because even though it is a mobile system in
which deception must be maintained, it is being designed to follow
SALT verification precedents which require that the ICBM launch-
ers be counted at the site of deployment. This is the major reason
for its defects in my view.
I believe that approach to verification; namely, to count the
launchers at the site of deployment, which applied to fixed launch-
ers under SALT I and SALT II, does not provide the right model
for verification of mobile deceptive systems.
A quicker, cheaper, and more flexible way to go to preserve the
survivability of the ICBM force of the United States, or at least
half of it, which is all that is now contemplated, would be to
redeploy the present Minuteman missiles with some modification,
using the present bases and the public roadways and some 10,000
places, approximately, which could be shelters or garages, in which
the missiles could be hidden.
Such a deployment, if pursued with some urgency should shave
about 4 years and $15 billion from the proposed M-X racetrack
deployment. These two numbers, 4 years and $15 billion, are my
own estimates, based on the study you referred to in your introduc-
409
tion. I do not think the Defense Department will necessarily concur
with them.
I think such a deployment would be a relatively flexible way to
go. For instance, the number of hiding places could be expanded if
we needed a hedge in case the Soviet Union expanded their
number of reentry vehicles. The design and the spacing of the
hiding places or the shelters could be altered as we deployed the
system and got some experience.
I believe that the political and legal difficulties in acquiring the
additional land would be minimized if we deployed in States where
there already are Minuteman bases and people are used to them.
Whether the Minuteman is used or the M-X, if ICBM's are to be
deployed in a deceptive mode, I believe their number should not be
verified at the sites of their deployment. Maintaining deception is a
difficult business wherever you try to do it. It is very hard to be
certain that adequate security is maintained. That is true whether
you are talking about land-based missile systems, or submarines, or
anything else.
On top of that, attempting to introduce cooperative verification
measures at the site of deployment so that the number of ICBM
launchers can be verified there makes the maintenance of security
even more difficult and uncertain.
I have participated in attempts to do so over the past few years. I
do not believe they have led to a successful result. Not only is the
resulting system itself not satisfactory in my judgment, but there is
no guarantee that the Soviet Union would, if it wished to base its
ICBM's deceptively, follow our precedent, because it leads to what
seems to me to be a cumbersome, expensive, and possibly an inse-
cure system.
A better approach would be to verify the number of mobile,
deceptively based ICBM's in a way that is generally similar to the
way we verify the number of the other systems controlled by SALT
which are mobile and deceptively based; that is, bombers and sub-
marines. These numbers are verified in part by counting at or near
the production sites, and in part by collateral information which
cannot be discussed in open session.
If we merely redeploy Minuteman as I suggested, that kind of an
approach to verification should pose the Soviet Union no problem.
The Soviets know how many Minuteman ICBM's we have and they
know we have closed the production line. If they need any further
assurance, we can offer on-site inspection to make sure they have
that knowledge.
There is no conflict between meeting in a timely and effective
way the problem which the Soviet Union has itself caused us, or
will cause us, in making the ICBM's vulnerable and with the Soviet
Union maintaining an adequate knowledge of our forces if we
redeploy Minuteman.
If we decide to get M-X missiles instead of keeping Minuteman
missiles, or if, at some time in the future, the Soviet Union itself
decides to base its ICBM's deceptively, which they have little incen-
tive to do since we do not pose a first strike threat to them, then
we will need some SALT provision under which verification of the
numbers of these new missiles can be arranged.
410
To meet that contingency, the United States could propose that
the deceptive basing be allowed for ICBM's in the same way that it
is allowed for planes and submarines: Such weapon systems may be
deployed when and only when the number of units produced and
destroyed can be verified with adequate accuracy.
Adequate accuracy does not mean 100-percent accuracy but accu-
racy adequate for strategic purposes, which might mean 20 percent
as an example. j. u ^.i.
The party which is doing the verification would have to be the
one that is satisfied, so that either on-site inspection or maybe
some less intrusive cooperative method, as now used with subma-
rines, would be needed.
The Soviet Union may or may not accept this proposal. If they do
accept it, I think we would have better arms control in the future.
We would be limiting and verifying the number of missiles instead
of the number of launchers and we would be coming closer to
limiting and verifying the number of actual weapons.
If the Soviet Union does not accept this proposal, I think we
should proceed with rebasing ICBM's anyway, in the way that is
most effective and timely. We have a situation where 50 percent of
our deterrent force is at stake. We should put timely and effective
preservation of that force first and immediate progress at SALT
second, in my judgment. .„ ^ , i^,. -c -^ -
In the longer run the SALT process itself will be healthier if it is
not allowed to lead to an increased advantage of first strike forces
over deterrent forces. I think we would all lose faith in it if it does
that.
In addition, I believe that the Soviet Union would in fact accept
this approach to the ICBM rebasing problem eventually, after re-
fusing it probably for a while. The Soviet Union has on other
occasions accepted the U.S. approach where U.S. systems which we
considered vital to our security were at stake. For instance, they
have accepted our approach in the case of forward-based systems
and they have accepted our approach in the case of strategic cruise
missiles.
We, on the other hand, have accepted their approach where
systems which they considered vital were at stake, as in the case of
their heavy missiles and their Backfire bombers. I am not saying
whether this is good or bad, but the history has been that we have
gotten our way for those U.S. systems which we considered vital.
The Soviet Union would stand to lose nothing by accepting the
proposal outlined, except the chance to cost us time and money.
Their present programs would not be affected. They could continue
to emplace large missiles into silos, which is what they are doing
now.
Even if, at worse, the Soviet Union never accepted the proposal
outlined, we would be no worse off than we are now. We do not
know now how many ICBM's they have. We now rely on approxi-
mate intelligence estimates to plan survivability. None of this
would be changed by their refusing to abide by verification con-
straints which we would consider adequate on their future decep-
tive rebasing.
411
The only significant strategic change would be that we would be
able to pursue an effective course in dealing with the problem of
vulnerability of our own ICBM's.
The proposal that I have just made— to verify production and
destruction of mobile, deceptively based ICBM's instead of trying to
count launchers at the deployment site— could possibly be intro-
duced as a replacement for the protocol. The protocol, as it now
stands, does not make satisfactory provisions for survivable land-
based systems in my judgment. It merely delays testing and deploy-
ment of mobile systems. I think less vulnerable basing, such as
mobile, deceptive basing, should be encouraged rather than dis-
couraged by SALT.
If we rebase Minuteman, it would serve to maintain our deter-
rent forces in the mid-1980's and for some time beyond. It is far
from the last thing that needs to be done. All the existing strategic
systems will eventually wear out and, in addition, the technologies
for survival, verification, attack, for defense, and for warning are
all going to change. We should not lock ourselves into a system of
which major features are being dictated by the perceived need to
adhere to verification standards that were never designed to cope
with the present technological dilemmas.
The SALT process should instead evolve in such a way as to
permit the timely maintenance of assured and not too costly deter-
rent forces. The present SALT II Treaty seems adequate from this
point of view for the period during which it will be in force, except
that I believe it does need a change as outlined in order to deal
appropriately with the dangers to U.S. ICBM's which we see
coming and with the possibility of mobile systems.
That is my statement, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. May's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael M. May
The question I will address in this testimony is how to retain a deterrent force
under SALT. The most urgent part of that question is what to do about the
anticipated vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM missiles and that is what I will mainly
talk about, but the ICBM question cannot be resolved without considering the entire
deterrent force and some of its problems.
I believe there is general agreement that a deterrent force is supposed to deter
nuclear attack on the United States and its allies; such drastic aggression as might
not be settled without nuclear war; and nuclear coercion. The size and makeup of
the force that will do those jobs have long been subjects of debate, but it is clear
that the force must be in being before the crisis occurs and that it must be able in
fact and appearance to survive an attack and be utilizable afterwards.
Right now, the U.S. force that would survive and be utilizable after a full-scale
surprise Soviet attack on it, that is, the alert, survivable and reliable fraction of the
U.S. force consists of between 3,000 and 4,000 nuclear weapons of various yields.
Measures of the utility of the various yields can be arrived at in several ways,
depending on effectiveness of something over 1,000 equivalent megatons.
That is a lot of yield, even though it may be only one-fifth to one-tenth of the
Soviet first strike equivalent megatons. It is probably enough to destroy most but
not all of the known Soviet military force: air and naval bases, including subma-
rines in port and planes on the ground; major army installations; major supply and
communication centers; some but not all hard nuclear sites; the most essential war
industries. It is enough also to provide for a reserve of weapons that would not be
used at once, but that could destroy Soviet cities and economic capability, and would
serve to prevent our being left disarmed against Soviet reserves.
I believe the threat of prompt and assured military defeat rather than some
undefined and probably unusable threat of holocaust is the best deterrent. While
the alert, reliable, survivable force we have now does not guarantee that we can
promptly and assuredly cause the Soviet Union a military defeat, its use (assuming
48-260 0 - 79 Pt.i+ - 27
412
the worst, an attack on the United States) would make the further prosecution of
the war by the Soviet Union very difficult and would almost surely give us enough
time to prevent their terminating the war on their terms.
Right now, the U.S. ICBM force provides about 50 percent of this alert, reliable,
survivable force. The rest is provided by bombers on alert status— that is, ready to
take off within a few minutes— and submarines in operational zones. We have more
forces which are not on alert and which would be quite vulnerable to a surprise
Soviet attack. To the extent that we have indications of Soviet intent to attack— for
instance, through political tension, or evacuation, or increased alertness of their
strategic forces — we can put more of our bombers and submarines on alert, for a
time that is limited by crew and equipment availability.
The ICBM's not only provide about 50 percent of the alert survivable force, they
are also qualitatively different from the bombers and submarines. They have less
need of warning than bombers and no need to penetrate enemy defenses; they have
different and probably better communication links than submarines; they must be
attacked with different weapons than either bombers or submarines. As has been
repeatedly emphasized, the three elements together— ICBM's, bombers and subma-
rines—are more difficult to attack than any one or two of them, and are more
flexible in their response. ., • . ^■
The reason for the concern about ICBM's is the forecast that by the mid-eighties
the U.S. ICBM force could largely be destroyed by a Soviet attack. With it would go
about 50 percent of our alert, reliable, survivable force as well as the qualitative
advantages noted above, while the proportional cost to the Soviet forces would be
far less. The Soviet Union would therefore benefit in a military sense from an
attack on these forces. The value of this potential benefit in day to day politics, or
in crises, or in war, given the risks that attend an attack, can and has been debated
at length. I can add little to the debate, except to say that having about 50 percent
of our bottom line deterrent subject to destruction by a first strike is not a satisfac-
tory outcome for years of technological development, investment and SALT negotia-
tions.
It is possible, of course, to plan on launching the ICBM force on warning of an
attack, before the attacking weapons actually explode. There would be very little
time for the President to decide whether to do that. Furthermore, no warning
network is 100 percent reliable. It would be preferable to devise a new system that
could replace the present Minuteman ICBM system and retain its major advantages.
Unfortunately, that task has proven to be very difficult, largely because of the size
and accuracy of the possible Soviet attack.
There are only four ways to protect missiles, on land or anywhere else: to harden
them, to defend them, to keep them moving and to hide them. Hardening, given
anticipated Soviet accuracies and yields, requires going so deep underground that
the missiles could not be launched for days, perhaps weeks after an attack. Active
defense is under study but no sufficiently reliable system has emerged from the
studies to warrant going beyond R&D. In addition, active defense is banned by the
ABM Treaty as it now stands. Keeping the missiles continually on the move, on
planes or trucks for instance, is extremely expensive and has weaknesses of a
security, safety and environmental nature. Moving them only after receiving warn-
ing would lose the present advantage of ICBM's, that they do not require warning.
That leaves hiding, that is, some mode of deception. Deception in one form or
another is the essential element in providing survivability for the ICBM systems
being considered today. It is not entirely satisfactory. It raises difficulties in connec-
tion with SALT verification and with security maintenance. But so far no one has
come up with anything else that better meets all the requirements and constraints.
Deceptive land basing for ICBM has a relatively long history of studies, reaching
back to the 1960's. Most variations and most arguments have been considered
several times by several groups of people. The latest version, the so-called MX race
track concept, is a relative newcomer. It has been described to this Committee. It is
more expensive and more complex (and in my judgment, less certain to operate
properly than alternatives. Perhaps most important, it would take a long time to
deploy, too long to be in time to meet the Soviet threat to Minuteman. It has these
defects because, even though it is a mobile system in which deception must be
maintained, it is being designed to follow SALT verification precedents which re-
quire that the ICBM launchers be counted at the site of the deployment. I believe
that this approach to verification, which applied to fixed launchers under SALT I
and will apply to them under SALT II, does not provide the right model for
verification of deceptive mobile systems.
A quicker, cheaper and more flexible way to preserve the survivability of the U.S.
ICBM force (at least of half of it), in my opinion, would be to redeploy the present
Minuteman missiles, with some modification, using the present Minuteman bases
413
and public roadways and some 10,000 places (shelters, garages, and others) in which
the missiles could be hidden. Such deployment, if pursued with some urgency,
should shave about four years and 15 billion dollars from the proposed MX race
track deployment. It would also be a relatively flexible way to go. For instance, the
number of hiding places could be expanded if needed as a hedge against a greater
Soviet RV deployment than we are expecting. The design and spacing of the hiding
places could be altered as the system is designed and deployed and we learn more
about it, and more than one design could be tried out. Political and legal difficulties
connected with buying land and putting out environmental impact statements in
areas where minuteman is not now deployed might perhaps be largely avoided.
Whether Minuteman or MX is used as the missile, if ICBM's are to be deployed in
a deceptive mode, their number should not be verified at the sites of their deploy-
ment. Maintaining deception, whether on land or elsewhere, is always difficult and
one can never be 100 percent certain that adequate security has been provided.
Attempting to introduce cooperative verification measures so that the number of
ICBM launchers can be verified at or near the area of deceptive deployment makes
the maintenance of security even more difficult and uncertain. I have participated
in these attempts over the last two years and I do not believe they have led to a
successful result. Not only is the resulting system itself less than satisfactory, but
there is no guarantee that the Soviet Union would, if it wished to base its ICBM's
deceptively at some time in the future, follow a U.S. precedent that leads to a
cumbersome, expensive and possibly insecure system.
A better approach to verification, it seems to me, would be to verify the number
of mobile and deceptively based ICBM's in a way generally similar to what is used
to verify the number of the other mobile and deceptively based systems controlled
under SALT, namely, bombers and submarines. These numbers are verified in part
by counting at or near the production sites, together with collateral information.
If we merely redeploy Minuteman, as suggested above, such an approach to
verification would pose the Soviet Union no problem. The Soviets know how many
Minuteman ICBM's we have, to good enough accuracy for all strategic purposes, and
they also know that the Minuteman production line is closed. We could offer on-site
inspection to make the verification surer. Thus there is no conflict between our
meeting, in a timely and effective way, the problem which the Soviet Union has
caused us in making our ICBM's vulnerable, and the Soviet Union maintaining an
adequate knowledge of our forces such as may be needed for a continued and
successful SALT process.
If we decide to get MX missiles instead of keeping Minuteman missiles, or if at
some time in the future the Soviet Union decides to base its own ICBM's deceptively
(which they have little incentive to do since our forces do not pose a serious first
strike threat) we will need some SALT provision under which verification of the
numbers of these new missiles could be arranged. To meet that contingency, the
United States could propose that deceptive basing be allowed, for ICBM's as for
planes and submarines, when and only when the number of units produced (and
destroyed) can be verified with adequate accuracy. Adequate accuracy need not
mean 100 percent accuracy, for ICBM's, but accuracy adequate for strategic pur-
poses, say, for the sake of example, within 20 percent. The party doing the verifica-
tion would have to be satisfied, so that either on-site inspection or perhaps a less
intrusive cooperative method is likely to be needed.
If the soviet Union accepts this proposal, we would have better arms control. We
would be limiting and verifying missiles rather than launchers, which is to say, we
would be coming closer to limiting and verifying actual weapons.
If the Soviet Union does not accept, I think we should proceed with our rebasing
of ICBM's anyway. In a situation where 50 percent of our deterrent force is at stake,
we should put timely and effective preservation of that force first and immediate
progress at SALT second. In the longer run, the SALT process itself will be health-
ier if it is not allowed to lead to an increased advantage of first strike forces over
deterrent forces.
I believe, in addition, that the Soviet Union would eventually accept this ap-
proach to the ICBM rebasing problem. They have on other occassions accepted the
U.S. approach where U.S. Systems which we considered vital to our security were at
stake, for instance in the case of the forward based systems and the strategic cruise
missiles. We have accepted Soviet approaches where Soviet systems which they
considered vital were at stake, as in the case of heavy missiles and of Backfire
bombers. The Soviet Union stands to lose nothing by accepting the proposal outlines
above, except the chance to cost us time and money. Their present programs are not
affected. They could continue to emplace large missiles into silos under presently
agreed provisions, which is what they seem most interested in doing.
414
Even if the Soviets never accept the proposal outlined here we will be no worse
off than we are now. We do not know now how many ICBM s they have^ We rely on
approximate intelligence estimates to plan a survivable force. None of this would be
changed by their refusing to abide by verification constraints which we wou d
consider adequate on their future deceptive or mobile ICBM rebasing. The only
significant strategic change would be that we would be able to pursue an effective
course in dealing with the problem of vulnerability of our ICBM s ,. , . ,
The proposal to verify production and destruction of mobile and deceptive y based
ICBM's rather than attempt to count launchers of such ICBM s at the deployment
site could be introduced as a replacement for the Protocol The Protocol as it stands
now does not make satisfactory provision for survivable land based systems. It
merely delays testing and deployment of mobile systems, whereas less vulnerable
basing, of which deceptive basing is an instance, should be encouraged, not discour-
aged, by SALT. , , „ • ii. ■ j
Rebasing Minuteman would serve to maintain our deterrent forces in the mid-
eighties and for some time beyond. It is far from the last thing that needs to be
done, however, all existing strategic systems will wear out. In addition, the technol-
ogies for survival, for verification, for attack and defense, will continue to change
regardless of agreements. Such technologies are closely tied to civilian technologies
and cannot be frozen. • r x e ,u:„i, ^^^
Thus we should not lock ourselves into systems the major features of which are
dictated by the perceived need to adhere to verification standards that were never
designed to cope with the present technological and strategic dilemmas, ihe bALl
process should instead evolve in such a way as to permit the timely maintenance ot
assured and not too costly deterrent forces. The present SALT H Treaty seems
adequate from this point of view for the period during which it will be in force,
except that I believe it needs a change as outlined in order to deal appropriately
with the dangers to U.S. ICBM's which we see coming.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. May.
U.S. VULNERABILITY AND THE PROSPECT OF SOVIET STRIKE
With all of the discussion of the vulnerability of our Minuteman
system during the mid-1980's— whenever we have press witnesses,
including the military witnesses, we have had before us, they have
said that it was hard to conceive that the Russians would take the
risks involved in a nuclear strike because they could not know
what our response would be and it would be placing themselves in
the position of igniting their own funeral fire. But a knowledge of
this vulnerability and the theoretical possibility that they might
engage in such a strike would give them leverage in dealing with
the power politics of the world in ways advantageous to them.
We know now in Cuba that they have established a combat
brigade and they concealed it from us for some period of time.
They have done this well in advance of that period when we
foresee a vulnerability on the part of our land-based missiles.
They also provoked the Berlin crisis which was a very serious
one and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 which brought us to the
verge of nuclear war during periods when they were at a decided
disadvantage vis-a-vis the United States with respect to their stra-
tegic force.
I have never seen the historical connection or much evidence
that the one is necessarily related to the other.
Everybody concedes that a strike against the United States could
not be surgical and it would involve 10 to 20 million casualties and
deaths perhaps in the first explosions. Any country that would
launch such a strike would risk full scale retaliation which could
utterly incinerate it.
415
ADOPTING LAUNCH ON WARNING POLICY TO OFFSET VULNERABILITY
If there is this period, as I judge everyone agrees will come, in
the mid-1980's when our Minuteman will be at least theoretically
vulnerable, what would be wrong with announcing that during
that period the United States would adopt a launch upon warning
policy so that the Russians could not be assured that the missiles
would be there when they fired at them, with the kind of vast
attack that would be necessary to knock out over 1,000 of our
missiles?
Mr. May?
Mr. May. That is a difficult question as you know, sir.
The Chairman. It certainly would be an added deterrent.
Mr. May. Yes. The Soviet Union now does not know whether we
would launch missiles on warning or not. They do know we are
prepared to get the bombers off the ground on warning and they do
not know whether we would take the further step of launching the
missiles on warning. I guess I would think that is the best way to
leave it, so that they do not know and we will not commit ourselves
ahead of time.
I think, if we can do better, we should. If it becomes impossible
to do anything better than launch on warning, we would have
much more of a hair trigger type of response and I think we would
lose some assurance of deterrence.
The Chairman. Remember this is a period when we are going to
cure this. We are not going to be in that state indefinitely. There is
a period of 4 or 5 years when there is some Soviet advantage and
we worry about the possible vulnerability of this force. That is
going to be corrected. It is not going to last forever.
During that period we might simply say the United States holds
open the option of firing these missiles on warning just to make
certain the Russians are not under any misconceptions.
Mr. May. I think we have effectively made it clear that they
might well be fired on warning. If I recall, President Carter made
some general statement to the effect that no one should expect him
to just sit there with the missiles coming. I do not remember the
exact words. I think that delivers the idea effectively.
If you are addressing yourself, Mr. Chairman, to the suggestion
that we rebase Minuteman instead of building a brand new missile,
it is true that suggestion would fix the interim period, but eventu-
ally the rebasing with M-X would also fix that vulnerability.
I must confess to some doubt as to whether the M-X missile is
the right long term solution. It is a big missile. It is going to be
inherently harder to move and harder to hide than the Minute-
man. I am not sure, from a purely technical point of view whether
that is the way we should go.
I have the same problem with the presently proposed M-X
mobile scheme which is now being suggested, the racetrack scheme.
Again it strikes me as a very expensive system and one with very
limited flexibility. I do not quite see that we should lock ourselves
in that direction. Those are technical rather than strategic judg-
ments.
The Chairman. Mr. Nitze?
Mr. Nitze. I think Harold Brown has said that it would be
unwise to not leave the Russians in doubt as to what we might do
416
with respect to launch on warning. Maybe that is not too objection-
able a position to take.
I think there is all the difference in the world between that kind
of a posture where you leave the Russians in some doubt and when
the basis of your policy really is to launch on warning.
Certainly we have not done those things which would be consist-
ent with the policy of launch on warning. As far as I know we have
never exercised, even in simulated form, a launch on warning. I do
not believe we are properly equipped to do so.
I do not think we have gone through the necessary analyses as to
what targets we would attack if there were warning of such and
such number of missiles addressed to such and such number of
targets on our side.
The President will have a very short period of time in which to
make up his mind as to what to launch against what in response to
what kind of an indication of attack.
The Chairman. Do you not think we should do all of those things
and go through those disciplines and make those preparations?
Mr. NiTZE. I was just going to get to that point. If you really go
to a serious launch on warning policy and not just leaving the
Russians in doubt, then I think you should do all these things.
Then you ought to look at what the nature of the world is under
those circumstances. I believe that the world would be less secure.
I believe one of the things you need in the event of an attack is
the necessary sensors being in full operation. You have to know
what it is that is coming at you. Generally when one talks about
launching on warning one assumes knowing very promptly after
launch what has been launched against you. Those satellites that
give us that information are not wholly secure and certainly the
down links that give us the information and bring it to Washington
are highly insecure.
We would have to do all kinds of things in order to increase the
security of that system and I do not think you could ever make it
really secure.
Then you run into the question of what would we in fact wish to
do in the event of the destruction of the sensors and the communi-
cations from them? You talk about an initial attack resulting in
millions of casualties. An attack upon the sensors would not neces-
sarily result in any casualties.
What do you do under those circumstances? If you are dealing
from a position of clear and manifest second grade position vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union and you get into a situation of that type, it is
very difficult to figure out what it would be wise for the United
States to do.
I really do urge, Mr. Chairman, that we look seriously at this
question of maintaining an adequate deterrent and not try to do it
through mirrors such as launch on warning.
The Chairman. No one has quite made it clear to me how this
could be done without running a period of a few years even if we
were to accelerate the proposed construction of the M-X missile.
Mr. NiTZE. Mr. Chairman, please, if one were to take seriously
Mr. May's proposal, if one had taken that proposal seriously 2
years ago or 3 years ago when the proposal was initially made,
William Graham and I proposed the same thing at about the same
417
time, if that had been taken seriously 3 years ago, today we would
be in a position where we could be deploying at least 1,000 addi-
tional holes per year. That is what my computations indicate.
If we were to take it seriously today, within 2 years I think you
could begin the deployment of additional shelters in the Minute-
man fields.
The question at issue is whether one really takes this thing
seriously or not, whether one does take the time urgency seriously
and does something about it. If one does, there have been occasions
when we could do effective and timely things about it. There are
still today, things we could do which would enable us to deploy
additional shelters more or less pari passu with the increase in the
threat.
The Chairman. Thank you. My time is up.
Senator Javits?
SUBLIMIT ON MIRVED LAND-BASED ICBM's
Senator Javits. Mr. Lodal, one thing you said puzzled me. You
said "The sub-limit of 820 on MIRVed land-based ICBM's elimi-
nates the worst case threats against which force planners would
otherwise have to prepare."
I do not understand.
Mr. Lodal. I think it is quite possible for the Soviets to deploy
considerably more than 820 MIRVed land-based ICBM's by 1985. It
is my understanding quite a few of those who engage in the art of
projecting these sort of things projected more than that number.
When I was personally involved in these negotiations, there was
some more direct evidence that the Soviets planned more than 820,
in that at one point in time, they refused to agree to limits even
somewhat higher than 820.
The $33 to $34 billion cost you are looking at today for an M-X
system is predicated on the assumption that 820 is approximately
the size Soviet new MIRV threat we will face. If we face a threat
which is much bigger, then the costs get proportionately larger for
the type of systems necessary to counter the threat to land-based
forces.
SURVIVAL REQUIREMENT OVER 1,000 EQUIVALENT MEGATONS
Senator Javits. Does this tie in with Mr. May's conclusion that
even in the worst case theory, if you adopt SALT II, and you have
this limit and we would have a survival equivalent to something
over 1,000 equivalent megatons?
Does your thesis tie in with that? Do those two relate to each
other?
Mr. Lodal. I do not believe so.
Mr. May. I do not believe so. Senator Javits. I believe the thesis
you are referring to occurs on page 1. That is what we have right
now, sir. That is the present situation, with Minuteman not being
terribly vulnerable. It is not what we are going to have in a few
years. It is the present situation which we would like to maintain.
It is not the worst situation.
418
Senator Javits. As I understand it, we are not destroying any
missiles. Even if you are right, why would we not in 2 or 3 years
continue to have 1,000 equivalent megatons?
Mr. May. Because in 2 or 3 years the Soviet Union will have
enough accurate weapons to destroy practically all of our Minute-
man force should they attack us.
Senator Javits. Even if SALT II were approved?
Mr. May. Yes.
Senator Javits. That is your thesis?
Mr. May. I believe that is not questioned by anyone.
Senator Javits. Mr. Lodal, what do you say?
Mr. Lodal. I agree with Dr. May. I think they will have enough
forces, even with SALT II, to attack the Minuteman force in a few
years.
I would add one or two points where perhaps our degree of
emphasis differs somewhat, I am less concerned about the instabil-
ities inherent in the next 3 to 5 years, when the Soviets do have
this capability, but before we have an opportunity to deploy some
type of multiple protective shelter system which would take away
at least some of that capability. I am sure you have heard discus-
sion of the practical difficulties of mounting a large-scale pre-
emptive attack against our land based forces. Then vulnerability is
primarily theoretical, although it is a real vulnerability to which
we should respond. But it is not one which should cause us immedi-
ate alarm.
Should the Soviets launch a large-scale attack against all of our
Minuteman, they could reduce our 1,000 equivalent megatons to
perhaps half that number, but we would not be left without op-
tions. An American President has his bomber force, which has
highly accurate weapons on it and will have even more accurate
weapons as the cruise missiles are deployed. As my colleague Mr.
Nitze likes to point out, that bomber force has limited usability
because it can only stay in the air a certain amount of time if you
are in the middle of a nuclear war. But an American President
could respond with our bombers, using them to destroy virtually all
interesting Soviet military targets in a retaliatory strike.
The Soviets would face a situation where they could perhaps
attack U.S. military targets, but after the end of the first exchange
they would be without their military targets also. We would both
be left with only our submarine forces, where we are vastly superi-
or. Thus, they could reduce our equivalent megatonnage consider-
ably, but to do so they would end up after the attack in worse
shape than we. Therefore, they should have no incentive to mount
an attack in the first place.
Senator Javits. What do you say to that, Mr. May?
Mr. May. I would say it seems to me more prudent if we can
rebase Minuteman in such a way as to avoid this period where it
would be subject to attack.
One reason is, the other elements of the triad are not perfect.
Nothing is perfect. In particular if you look closely at bombers and
at submarines as well as ICBM's, there are problems. I think the
committee is well aware of them.
In the case of bombers you always have the question as to
whether they or the cruise missiles will penetrate Soviet defenses.
419
That has to remain an area of uncertainty. Will they in fact get
away from base? Will they get the warning? Will the communica-
tion systems be so disrupted that they will not? Will the communi-
cation system work to the submarines?
All these are areas of concern. They are areas on which the
Defense Department works daily to try to keep the situation from
getting worse, but there remains questions.
I think it would be prudent to avoid the additional very severe
question about the vulnerability of the Minuteman if possible. I
think it is possible without too much cost.
That is the main reason for thinking that we should go ahead
and rebase Minuteman. I might add, one of the major points that I
was trying to put across in my testimony was, whether we go to
the M-X or Minuteman, we should not hobble the system that we
deploy with SALT restrictions that really do not belong there. We
should go for the kind of verification agreements that would enable
us to field at reasonable cost and without too much complexity a
land-based mobile system, whether it uses Minuteman or M-X.
We ought to go for verification of production and destruction. We
should insist on that. That is the direction which I think favors the
deterrent forces over the first strike forces, independently of
whether we do something to fill in the near time gap or not.
CRUISE MISSILE NOT PROHIBITED BY PROTOCOL
Senator Javits. I think I understand your respective views on
this. Do you think that we could produce a cruise missile which is
not prohibited by the protocol for air-to-ground use? If we put on a
Manhattan project type effort, could we produce the air-launched
cruise missile much sooner than we now plan to? That seems to be
the added element which would give us a strike capability which
would be responsive to what the Soviets have in their ICBM force?
Mr. May. To answer your question directly, I don't know how
much we could speed up the cruise missile schedule. I couldn't
answer the question. I would be wary of putting all our bets on the
cruise missiles. They don't as you know, sir, increase the firepower
of the bomber. The bombs and the short-range missiles are simply
replaced with long-range missiles. Cruise missiles may increase the
survivability of the force, but not its firepower. They provide a
relatively slow response. They require that the bombers get warn-
ing to get off the ground; and they have to fly through the Soviet
defenses.
So, for all these reasons, they don't strike me as the answer for
later on. I think they are an adequate way to make the B-52
survive another decade maybe, but I don't see them as being much
more than that.
Senator Javits. My time is up, but with the Chair's permission,
we will get the others to comment.
Mr. NiTZE. I would like to make a few comments with respect to
the bomber force.
I think everybody who has worked on these problems would
agree that estimating the probable penetration to target of bomber
weapons is the most uncertain part of trying to wargame what
might happen in an exchange. There are so many parts to the air-
breathing system which you have to estimate. You have to esti-
420
mate the ability of the bombers to get off the ground. You have to
estimate the abiUty of the bombers to escape out far enough so that
they won't be vuln .^rable to the effects of a barrage. You have to
estimate the abihty of the bombers to get to the place where they
launch their cruise missiles.
Now, as to being able to estimate the vulnerability of the cruise
missiles to the various types of Soviet defenses, all of which we
don't really understand today; we don't know how many SA-lO's,
for instance, they are going to have deployed at a given tinie and
the degree to which we can know the location of those missiles.
Further than that, against hard targets, I believe everyone
agrees that the cruise missiles are vulnerable to terminal defenses
at the hard point. For instance, if you are defending silos, I believe
it is a relatively easy job to have defenses at the silo which could
shoot down the cruise missiles or at least deny them the high
accuracy which is estimated for them.
So that when people give you figures as to what the bombers can
do, these are generally what are called the best number and they
don't give you any indication as to the range of uncertainty which
is involved. The range of uncertainty in the effectiveness of our
bomber/cruise missile system is really very high, and one ought to
bear that in mind when one just says, you know, we are going to
have these bombers. Sure, we are going to have the bombers and
maybe they are going to work well, but maybe they are not going
to work very well. For instance, we don't understand all we should
understand about the degree to which the enormous Soviet radar
network is interconnected with their ground control intercepting
centers.
If it is really interconnected, then our bombers and our cruise
missiles might have a very hard time indeed penetrating the Soviet
Union.
Senator Javits. Mr. Lodal, would you care to make an observa-
tion?
Mr. Lodal. Yes; on the cruise missiles and the bombers: My
point concerned the situation we would face in the early 1980's.
While I agree in theory with the points Mr. Nitze makes, his points
do not apply in the early 1980's. During that time period, we will
have a secure bomber penetration capability, since the Soviets
won't have the type of defenses we referred to. Therefore, the
bombers could be used in the way I described.
Now, with respect to what Mr. May said, I think there is an
important question here, and that is the extent to which the SALT
Treaty does or does not stand in the way of deploying the type of
multiple-aim-point systems which we might wish to deploy. And,
quite frankly, with respect to SALT II and ICBM's, I think this is
the predominant technical issue that remains, it is the one place
where there perhaps is an interaction between the treaty and what
we might otherwise choose to do.
Among the three of us, I hear a lot more agreement than dis-
agreement. We are all saying we should keep and rebase the land-
based ICBM force, and we should deploy some type of multiple-aim-
point system in order to do that. Mr. May and I both commented
that we find problems with the large M-X missile. I suggested the
Trident D-5 missile as an alternative; he suggested the existing
421
Minuteman III as an interim alternative. Those are relatively
minor differences on technical points. But, on the question of
whether the SALT treaty gets in the way of our deployment pro-
grams, there may be some more important difference.
I fmd nothing in the SALT Treaty which gets in the way of doing
anything we might wish to do. To the extent that there is an
argument about that, it is an argument over whether we can
deploy multiple silos — additional so-called vertical shelters, which
look just like missile silos, deployed around the existing silos or in
some new place. The issue is whether such deployments are con-
sistent with the treaty.
But let me say that in my view, it is much in our country's
interest that the Soviet side not deploy such a system. If horizontal
shelters, which have some other advantages as well, happen to cost
an extra $1 billion a year over 10 years to deploy, but would permit
us to retain some confidence that the Soviets cannot and will not
deploy a multiple-silo system, I think that the $1 billion a year is a
price worth paying.
So, in my view, the treaty is beneficial to us in this area and not
harmful.
Senator Javits. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Helms?
Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SALT II — ARMS ESCALATION TREATY INSTEAD OF LIMITATION TREATY
The testimony of all three of you gentlemen has been most
helpful to me. I want to take it with me and study it carefully.
I am constantly struck by a persuasion that I have that we are
embarking on absolutely the wrong course. Is there any disagree-
ment among the three of you that this, in fact, is an arms escala-
tion treaty instead of a limitation treaty? Do you agree with that?
Mr. LoDAL. No.
Mr. NiTZE. I am not sure I would use those words. Instead, I
would say the treaty does not adequately limit the increase in
Soviet forces. In fact, I think the limits are much too high; and
certainly with respect to the Soviet Union permits them what I
believe to have been their initial program. I don't believe it inter-
feres in any basic way with their initial program.
Mr. LoDAL. It is my view that deployments on both sides are
likely to be less with the treaty than they would be without the
treaty, and that our own military problems are reduced by the
treaty, not increased by it. The size of the deployments we would
need to solve the military problems which are not solved by the
treaty are less than they would otherwise be.
Mr. May. Sir, I don't know; I can't come to a reasonable state-
ment regarding what would be the size of the deployment without
the treaty. If there had not been these negotiations, presumably
the whole political situation would be different, and I just don't
know what the eventual deployment on the two sides would be.
I tend to agree with Mr. Nitze, that probably the treaties didn't
make too much of a dent in the Soviet plans. The Soviet Union
tends to plan a long time in advance, and has a lot of inertia
regarding its plans. On the other hand, I think that the treaty on
422
other counts is compatible with our maintaining what we want to
maintain, that is, a deterrent second strike force adequate to deter
hostile action against us and our allies.
In the respect of mobile and land-based ICBM's, I believe the
treaty does not make adequate provisions. That is a weakness of
the treaty.
As to whether it is an escalation or a limitation treaty, that is
very hard for me to respond to.
Senator Helms. Well, all three of you gentlemen very eloquently
have talked about how we are not limited in doing this and not
limited in doing that in your statements, in your interpretation of
the treaty; and I certainly have no intention of being argumenta-
tive. I have just come to the inescapable conclusion, satisfactory to
me, that we have got to stop this insanity. I am talking about
killing 20 million here and 30 million there. Where are we in terms
of humanity? My own judgment certainly, as of this time, is that
the treaty ought to be rejected outright and the United States
ought to demand that the Soviet Union begin negotiations for a
true arms reduction treaty and go before the court of world opinion
and make clear this is the way we feel about it. But that is neither
here nor there in terms of the question I wanted to ask.
POSSIBILITY OF LASER SATELLITE INTERCEPTING AND DESTROYING
MISSILES
I suppose, Mr. Nitze, I would direct the first to you, and then to
the other two. I have done a bit of study of the possibility of a laser
satellite that would intercept and destroy missiles after launch. I
have no scientific expertise, but if this had a potential, it is certain-
ly interesting.
Do you think it has any potential?
Mr. May. You are asking me?
Mr. Nitze. I think Mr. May is better qualified.
Mr. May. Well, from what I have seen on the subject, present
lasers are too big to accomplish that task on present satellites.
However, these are not necessarily permanent restrictions.
Senator Helms. Let me see if I understand. The acoustics in here
are not all that good. You are saying it is too large for each
satellite and would require too many satellites?
Mr. May. Yes, sir; that is my understanding of the situation.
Senator Helms. But those obstacles might possibly be eliminated
by enough R. & D.?
Mr. May. Yes, sir; they might.
CRASH PROGRAM TO NULLIFY MISSILES AIMED AT US
Senator Helms. Does that lead you to any conclusion that per-
haps instead of our concentrating on weapons building, that maybe
we ought to go into a crash program of R. & D. to render null and
void missiles which might be aimed at us?
Mr. May. I think we ought to consider our program of R. & D.
and maybe expand it. I don't know in enough detail to have a
judgment on that, particularly on knocking down missiles. It is a
very tough job. However good we get at it, we are not going to be
able to guarantee that all of the missiles are going to be destroyed,
423
and we are going to want to retain some offensive arms which are
invulnerable and controllable after an attack.
In maybe a lighter vein, Senator, I don't know if this belongs
here, but I am reminded of the definition that was given by Am-
brose Bierce in the "Devil's Dictionary" of what the word "defense-
less" means. Mr. Bierce was a San Franciscan of about 100 years
ago. He defined the word "defenseless" as meaning "unable to
attack." I think there is a lot of depth to that and
Senator Helms. I don't disagree with that. I think that is right. I
just don't know which way is the best to turn. All I know is that I
fear that we are lulling the American people to sleep by repeatedly
describing this treaty as a limitations treaty; and I find that in my
own contacts with constituents and others that they have been led
to believe that this is going to take care of the problem. That is a
grievous mistake.
At the very minimal, I would hope that the people would under-
stand that this treaty is seriously, if not fatally, flawed; and I hope
that the Senate in these deliberations and in later ones will make
that point clear, and to whatever extent I can, I am going to do
that.
Well, time is running short. But I gather that you feel that an
appropriate amount of money is being spent on R. & D.?
Mr. May. I have not looked at the situation in detail. I think it
should receive quite a bit of money, but I am not familiar with
what the program is today, so I can't answer your question defi-
nitely.
Senator Helms. Well, if we can provide you with information,
and I would be able to provide whatever is available to me, I would
like to have you study that and drop me a note. I mean R. & D. in
terms of destroying missiles, because if we could get to the point
that neither side can realistically hope to get a missile through,
that would put an end to the nuclear arms race.
But I am concerned about where we are headed with this treaty.
Now, I don't think the Senate has a stronger national defense man
than me. I think my voting record will show that; but I think we
have reached the point now that when you talk about destroying
each nation two or three times, it is absurd.
Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. I thank you very
much.
The Chairman. Senator Hayakawa?
REDEPLOY MINUTEMAN MISSILES WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS
Senator Hayakawa. I have only one question. I will address it to
Dr. May.
In your statement you talk about:
A quicker, cheaper and more flexible way to preserve the survivability of the U.S.
ICBM force, at least of half of it, in my opinion, would be to redeploy the present
Minuteman missiles, with some modification, using the present Minuteman bases
and public roadways and some 10,000 places, shelters, garages and others, in which
the missiles could be hidden. Such deployment, if pursued with some urgency,
should shave about 4 years and $15 billion from the proposed M-X racetrack
deployment.
This seems very attractive to me, but is it not true this is not
possible under SALT II as now designed?
424
Mr. May. That is a matter of interpretation. The SALT II provi-
sions forbid additional fixed ICBM launchers. They do not forbid
except for the protocol, the possibility of nonheavy mobile missiles
and deceptive basing. j. J.^ .
The protocol forbids such deployment; and I would suggest that
we either turn down the protocol or allow it to lapse, depending on
what kind of schedule we want to be on. The protocol is indeed
incompatible with the kind of deployment which I have suggested.
Senator Hayakawa. What you are saying is, the Soviet interpre-
tation of the SALT Treaty would forbid us to do this?
Mr. May. I think both sides' interpretation of the protocol, sir,
would forbid our deployment of any mobile missile on land. I
believe that is correct.
I also think that is wrong, that is, I think that provision of the
protocol is not in our best interest.
Senator Hayakawa. When does the protocol expire?
Mr. May. In 1981.
Senator Hayakawa. Then what happens?
Mr. May. Then we can go ahead, I believe; but I think that it
would take a clear declaration of intent. I am not familiar with all
the negotiations history that has gone on in the last 3 years with
SALT. I would imagine if we plan to deploy Minuteman or any
other system in this deceptive mode, and to not permit verification
at the site of deployment, but, rather, go for verification at the
sites of production, I believe it would take a clear declaration from
the United States that this would be its policy, and then a steady,
long-term attempt to work it out with the Soviet Union.
I think that attempt would be successful. Maybe it would take a
while. It wouldn't be successful right away.
MULTIPLE VERTICAL SHELTERS ALLOWED BY PROTOCOL
Senator Hayakawa. I want to understand this. Mr. Nitze, in
your statement you state:
The Soviet side focused on the distinction between vertical structure deployments
and horizontal structures protecting mobile transporter/erector launchers. They
unambiguously stated that a vertical deployment mode would involve additional
fixed ICBM launchers which are prohibited by the treaty.
Are we referring to the same kind of thing?
Mr. Nitze. Yes. There is a difference of view between what Dr.
May has said and what I believe to be the facts. I believe that the
multiple vertical protective shelter system is not a mobile system. I
believe the distinction between a mobile system and a system in-
volving fixed launchers is that a mobile system has transporter/
erector launchers in which the transporter/erector launcher func-
tions are all integral to the same device. There is no other way of
making a clearcut distinction between what is a fixed launcher and
a mobile launcher.
I believe that is the way the Russians look at the problem. I
believe that is the way the President interprets the treaty.
Under that interpretation, the multiple vertical protective shel-
ter system would not be, would not satisfy, the criteria of being a
mobile system, and, therefore, the protocol would not bear upon it.
Now, frankly, I think that this is a very bad thing from the
standpoint of the interests of the United States. I agree entirely
425
with Dr. May, that the most advisable thing for us to do today
would be to deploy the Minuteman in a multiple vertical protective
shelter mode. But if the President's interpretation, and if the
Soviet interpretation, of the treaty is correct, the treaty prohibits
that.
Now, if that is correct, if one accepts the Russian and the Presi-
dent's interpretation of the treaty, then I think the best alternative
is the alternative that the executive branch has come up with, and
that is, the racetrack system. But I think one should be clear that
the racetrack system is much more expensive, will be less good,
won't work as well, is much more risky, than the multiple vertical
protective shelter system and will take much longer to deploy.
Further, the Russians do not agree that even the racetrack system
is compatible with the treaty.
I find it hard to imagine that one will use the racetrack system
for the Minuteman; therefore, it will depend upon the M-X.
I really doubt very much whether the M-X will meet its present
deployment schedule of 1986, and its full deployment schedule of
1989. On present plans and programs, I think we are in a very bad
situation with respect to the ICBM part of the Triad.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Nitze.
POSSIBILITY OF DECLARATION ALLOWING MULTIPLE VERTICLE
SHELTERS
Can we introduce to the treaty an amendment to make this
possible on our side, or can we make a unilateral declaration that
this is what we intend to do?
Mr. NiTZE. I think we could have done that, and maybe we still
could; but it would require, I think, a conviction on the part of the
executive branch that that is what they want to do for it really to
work.
Gen. Lou Allen proposed that we just tell the Russians that the
problem on the U.S. side is a risk created by the fact that the
Russians are in the process of deploying these very large, accurate
missiles, and in very large quantity, and that this is threatening
the survivability of our Minuteman; that, therefore, our security
requires we do something about it, and therefore that we intend to
deploy the multiple vertical protective shelter system, and that
we don't intend to have more than one missile per complex of
launchers.
And, just as the Soviet Union has told us, that we shouldn't
worry about their 3-X command-and-control silos — which, as far as
we can tell, can be readily converted to launch a missile — because
it wasn't their intent to put a missile in it, we similarly, could tell
the Russians it wasn't our intent to have more than one missile per
complex of multiple vertical shelters, and that, therefore, this is
what we propose to do.
But if we were to do that, it would require resolution on the part
of the executive branch, backed by the support of the Congress.
Frankly, that is what I think we ought to do. I thought General
Allen was correct; 2 years ago a number of us came out in support
of that position. But that was not persuasive to the President.
426
Unless the executive branch were to be behind it, it won't work.
If they are not behind it, then I think the racetrack system is the
best fallback position I know of.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you.
That is all my questions for now.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar?
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
NEW METHODS OF VERIFICATION IN SALT III
Gentlemen, I would like to continue in the same area that Sena-
tor Hayakawa was exploring and try to trace further the parlia-
mentary situation that we have here.
We have a treaty that is signed and, in essence, we are now in
the process of taking a look at what has occurred. And as you have
just pointed out, Mr. Nitze, before the situation described by Dr.
May could take place, it would call for a resolution by the Presi-
dent, by the administration, to do this, which is a difficult proposi-
tion for all of us at this point.
In other words, if we were exploring as a study committee what
the best options were for this country prior to somebody making a
decision, we are in one predicament, as the treaty has been signed,
and we are trying to decide as Senators whether to ratify it; or,
beyond that, whether to give advice to the President as to what he
needs to do.
Now, I suspect that almost all good ideas, and I believe this is a
very good one, have foundered on the point that is made by oppo-
nents to the ideas, that to adopt the idea would be to kill the
treaty; that is, to require significant renegotiation, to which the
Soviets might not prove to be amenable.
What I suppose I would like to gain from you gentlemen is some
personal opinion as to whether we are dealing with something here
that is in the realm of an idea that would have mutual advantage
to the point that even if we did go to renegotiation, there is at least
some probability that there is something here to talk about.
Now, I say that from the standpoint of having visited, with five
other Senators, Premier Kosygin a couple of weeks ago; and we
tried to present at least some common consent of things that we
believed were going to occur.
We also suggested things that might occur and which would
require, in that case, further negotiation. The prime minister indi-
cated, I think, the standard feeling that that would not be in the
realm of the possible. And yet we did find, I think, particularly in
the areas of discussion of verification, some feeling, not on his part
but on other Soviet officials, that in the SALT III picture changes
in verification might indeed be required, substantial changes
beyond that which they believed SALT II requires.
Now we come to the verification issue in this proposal by Dr.
May, and I think an intriguing one, that essentially, verification
might occur with regard to land-based missiles in a similar way
that it occurs with regard to aircraft and submarines. If this would
be of mutual advantage to both sides, if this is not to be conceived
as totally a cat-and-mouse game forever, in which we sort of hope
for the best in terms of verification, and that if verification really
is the stymie, what is the prospect? Would any of you offer an
427
opinion as to whether the Soviets would find it somewhat advanta-
geous or not advantageous at all? Should the advice of the Senate
be to the President to proceed toward filling the strategic gap that
almost all witnesses now believe we have in the intermediate
period between now and 1986 or 1989 by moving around our Min-
utemen?
Would you make a comment on any or all of that?
Mr. NiTZE. First of all, with respect to indications from some of
the Soviets that they might be interested in new methods of verifi-
cation in connection with SALT III, having been one of those who
was deceived by what they told us with respect to the bearing of
SALT I on SALT II, I wouldn't pay much attention to what they
say now about SALT III.
We had clear language in the Interim Agreement that nothing in
the Interim Agreement would prejudice the terms or scope of
SALT II; but the moment we started to negotiate SALT II their
position was, "The Interim Agreement was agreed at the highest
levels between the two countries and we can't possibly change it;
the provisions in the Interim Agreement must be carried forward
into SALT II."
So I would not give high credence to the suggestion that what
they say at one time is binding on them in any way with respect to
the next negotiating phase.
The second point, I am not sure that they would see it as really
being mutually beneficial to both sides. The situation of the Soviet
Union is quite different than ours. They have big land masses not
highly populated in which they can have a truly mobile system,
which they can hide by just digging trenchs someplace or another,
the way they do with the SS-20. We don't have uninhabited land
masses of the same volume; we have a much greater public inter-
face problem than they do.
So I think they would be reasonably happy if the protocol expires
and mobile systems are permitted. They would probably choose a
mobile system like the SS-20, but larger. They are not that much
concerned about verifying what we do.
I think they feel the verification problem is a unilateral problem
for us, not for them. They have lots of ways of finding out what we
are doing.
I think they are interested in diminishing, to the extent that
they can, the amount of information they have to give us on
verificational grounds, but otherwise I don't really think that they
are that much concerned about being able to verify what we do.
On a theoretical basis though, I do agree with what Dr. May has
said. I think his is potentially a better way of going at the problem.
If we were two equally responsible sides, going at it with similar
objectives, I would wholly agree that methods to carry out what he
is talking about could be developed. But if we put this off now until
SALT III, I don't think we ever will get it, because we would have
nailed down a different procedure in SALT II, and I just don't
think the Russians would give in on this.
So that now is the time I think the Senate has to make up its
mind whether it wishes to withhold consent unless certain changes
are made in the agreements. Unless the executive branch comes up
with a somewhat different formula from what they have come up
48-260 0-79 Pt.i+ - 28
428
with as yet, both with respect to amendments to the treaty and
with respect to support for adequate defense programs and budgets
in order to preserve an adequate deterrence for us.
Senator Lugar. Do either of the other of you have comments?
Mr. LoDAL. Senator, I would like to make several comments.
First, as I said earlier, I don't believe the situation is critical in
the next 3 or 4 year period. Our deterrent is not significantly
threatened in this period. The Soviets, to take advantage of this
theoretical vulnerability of Minuteman, would have to do some
terribly irrational things.
I do believe it is worth the money it costs us to fix this problem
and gain the additional security associated with eliminating it
altogether; but I don't think it calls for any hair-trigger responses
on our part. , , , • . u ^
Now that being said, on your specific point I don t believe that
the treaty prohibits us from deploying vertical shelters. If we want
to do it, we should simply assert that it is what we are going to do.
I haven't heard the administration say the treaty prohibits them,
and I have heard some officials say they believe the treaty does
permit the system. But I suspect that if one went forward and
asked the Soviets to clarify this explicitly, they might or might not
object, but at a minimum, they would insist that they have the
right to do the same thing.
In fact, the Soviets might well choose to deploy such a vertical
shelter system, which would cause us considerable trouble.
Finally, I think it is worth pointing out that if some approach
like the racetrack option can be worked out technically I admit it
does have problems as Dr. May has suggested, its only real disad-
vantage is one of cost, and the cost difference isn't that great. $1
billion a year over the life of the system is the official number, but
my own view is that the cost difference is more in the neighbor-
hood of one-half billion dollars a year for the racetrack-type
system. , . , .
What we are doing is for one-half billion dollars a year, which is
a relatively small amount is to eliminate both an issue of potential
political contention and the problems associated with our verifica-
tion of a similar Soviet system in the future.
MOBILE MINUTEMAN NOT IN VIOLATION OF TREATY
Senator Lugar. You are contending that we could move around
the Minuteman now, and that would not be a violation of the
treaty? Could we assert our right to do that?
Mr. LoDAL. I think that is right; so long as we came up with
some sort of a scheme that was verifiable along the lines of what
Dr. May has said, that we could do that.
We have said consistently to the Soviets that in our view the
launcher is not the silo itself, but rather it is the entire launch
mechanism— not just the shelter, regardless of whether the shelter
is horizontal or vertical.
Senator Lugar. But your point is that if they did the same thing,
we could not have much confidence in verification. You really need
to have the twin point of our asserting and doing it, but at the
same time working out a verification scheme in which both sides
notice, as they do with the submarines and the aircraft, what we
429
are doing? And Mr. Nitze's contention is that the Soviets would
have no desire to do that, and they feel that it is really a unilateral
problem of our own.
So your point is, we could proceed, but you think we would have
a disadvantage, because they would then have the right to proceed,
and would have really more going for them there?
Mr. LoDAL. Yes, sir; that is the point, very precisely stated.
ADVANTAGES OF RACETRACK SCHEME
I should add one last point. There are some technical advantages
of the racetrack scheme which should not be overlooked. You do
get a little bit for that extra money. In particular, you can move
the missiles around a little more rapidly. I don't find that particu-
larly helpful once the war is started, like some people have argued,
but it would be helpful in a crisis, to reduce further the biggest
worry I have about deceptively based systems, which is the possibil-
ity of some kind of compromise of their security. Being able to
move them around a little more rapidly in a crisis and sealing off
the areas permits one to be pretty well certain that the location of
the missiles has not been compromised. While somebody might be
able to get clandestine information over a long period of time, you
can keep the system secure for a few weeks at least. You can do
this to some extent with the vertical shelters, but it is easier with
the racetrack.
So you pay a little bit; but you get a little bit, and you eliminate
this thorny problem associated with the Soviets deploying the same
type of system.
Senator Lugar. Mr. May, do you have a comment?
Mr. May. Yes, I have a couple of comments.
What you are asking is, how do we get from here to there, and
that is a very tough question. I agree, of course, that when Minute-
man becomes vulnerable in its present silo, it isn't necessarily
going to be the end of the world; but it is half of our residual
deterrent force. That is an enormous chunk, and I do think we
should do something about it, not that I think the Soviets are
likely to attack us if we don't, but I believe that no one can foretell
the kind of political circumstances that would lead to crisis. And
this would be something that would seriously worsen the atmos-
phere in which crises take place.
PROBLEMS WITH THE RACETRACK SYSTEM
Now I have a very uneasy feeling that the M-X racetrack deploy-
ment will be something of an albatross. It is a huge thing and in
my judgment, a technological dead end. It is going to demand a lot
of attention and take up a lot of money that is badly needed for
many other strategic programs, like better command and control
and eventually better aircraft; and it may well not get done at the
end because of the technical difficulties associated with it.
I can't prove that; that is just a guess, a feeling I have.
I would like to do something more expeditious and flexible, and
that is why the suggestion about the Minuteman. As to how to do
that, I agree with Mr. Nitze, that the Soviets are not likely to
easily agree to production verification, but it is the sort of thing
430
which I think they will agree to if we argue hard enough, because
it doesn't directly interfere with things they have agreed to in their
5-year plan themselves. It simply means they can't deny us a
certain advantage.
As to what the Senate should do, I don't have any complete,
thorough recommendations.
I would like to suggest the following as partial recommendations.
It would be good to recommend that the protocol be allowed to
expire. It is an inadequate treatment of mobiles. Mr. Nitze is right,
it is not at all clear that what I am suggesting is a mobile. I have
been fairly general about what I am suggesting, because I think we
ought to look at several options, but the Senate might well make it
clear that the United States must reserve the right to maintain its
present minimum deterrent reliable forces after an attack under
SALT by any method that seems expeditious and timely, so long as,
in fact, the total number of missiles deployed is well known and
knowable to the Soviet Union.
So long as the issue is one of legalisms and not of substance, then
I think we would not violate the SALT spirit and should allow
ourselves to proceed.
Now, following these general declarations, there will be a lot of
work to be done, both technical to see how best to take advantage
of our options and, of course, negotiating to lay the groundwork for
eventual agreement concerning verification of mobiles. I am not
anticipating there would be prompt agreement, but I think there
would be eventual agreement.
PROCESS FOR DEPLOYING. MOBILE MINUTEMAN
Senator Lugar. Just give me an indication — I know this is prob-
ably rudimentary for those of you who have discussed this for
many years — but you mentioned we have 10,000 miles of roadways
and sheds. Specifically, how would you go about deploying Minute-
man up and down roadways? What sort of technical problems are
there? Would neighborhoods or cities or States agree to such a plan
or would everybody come into the fray, saying that this is an
environmental hazard to have around?
Mr. May. Sir, right now Minuteman is deployed in 1,000 such 3-
or 4-acre plots. Maybe you have seen them. The ones I have seen
were in the corner of wheatlands or pastures. They are very unob-
trusive; they are on country roads. In fact, you have to be right on
top of them with a helicopter or very close in a car to see them.
The idea would be to multiply this number by 10. The Govern-
ment purchases the land and places a Minuteman there. They are
quiescent systems; they don't have any emanations or anything
like that. I can't, and I don't think anybody else can, foresee how
much environmental fuss might be made. I think the real environ-
mental impact would be trivial. The Minuteman are now being
moved up and down the holes in North Dakota and elsewhere on
transporters. You would have somewhat more motion, but I think
the general public wouldn't mind it or be aware of it.
As to how much fuss would be made, I think that would all
depend on the resolve with which the system were pursued. If it
was clear this was indeed the most viable, cheapest way to go, and
431
it was safe, it seems to me there should not be a problem; but I am
really not an expert in that.
I might say the system, as I suggested, doesn't contemplate doing
anything very different from what is being done now. Minuteman
is now being moved on those roads, now placed in silos in the
corner of wheat and other fields, and the plowing goes right up to
the fences. You may have seen it. It is not much of an obstacle to
any of the life that goes on around it.
PUBLIC DEBATE ON M-X OR MOBILE MINUTEMAN
Senator Lugar. I have already overextended my time, but I just
want to intrude one final question. Has your proposal received
really serious consideration over the course of the last 2, 3, or 5
years? In other words, suddenly the M-X and the racetrack thing
have sprung upon us, really during the course of these hearings.
Now at some point, you know, the American public may very well
want to review the bidding as to how we got to that point; and
other people hearing your testimony for the first time may say,
"Well, all things considered, this seems like a much more attrac-
tive situation; it gives us security faster; it costs less money; it
doesn't involve the technical problems that may be there; and we
didn't like the idea of the M-X an3rway," some would say, "so why
not use what we have got?"
What I am wondering is, how full a public debate or even a
private debate has gone on with regard to this? And are we likely
to have another one in the future as discovery is made or your idea
has a revival and people get exercised about the M-X?
Mr. May. Well, sir, there are two issues: One is, do we rebase
Minuteman, and the other is, do we separate the verification from
the site of the deployment?
On the first issue, do we rebase Minuteman: There has been
considerable discussion of that defense and science circles for a
number of years. People are far from unanimous about what
should be done.
I believe you are scheduled to hear from Defense spokesmen
tomorrow, and they will probably give you good arguments as to
why we should not rebase Minuteman.
There are divided views on whether we should build M-X mis-
siles or not. I happen to think we don't need to now. We don't
know what missile to build, so we should wait.
But many people disagree with me within the Defense Depart-
rnent. I certainly can't say I did not get a hearing. People have
listened to me everytime I wanted to say something. They did not
necessarily do what I said, but —
Now, the other question regarding verification of production, I
really can't say how seriously that has been taken. It goes against
the SALT I precedent. It is more difficult and requires more coop-
eration. It is not an easy thing for the bureaucracy to do. It is not
an easy thing to propose to the Russians and get an agreement to,
because they presumably are not going to like it. It is a little more
intrusive from their point of view.
So I feel more work could be done on that.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
432
The Chairman. Gentlemen, I have just one final question, which
I will address to Mr. May and Mr. Lodal, because I know Mr.
Nitze's position and therefore need not ask him to reply again.
QUESTION OF RATIFICATION OR REJECTION
Would you tell me, Mr. May, since we are faced with not the
question of negotiating with the Soviet Union, which falls outside
our purview, but the question of whether or not we should ratify or
reject the treaty that has been presented to us, or ratify it subject
to certain understandings and reservations. What would be your
recommendation to us, limited as we are to those particular
choices?
Mr. May. My answer to that would be to take the third option
you mentioned. I would suggest ratification, ratification subject to
certain understandings, including, specifically, the one about the
protocol, and, generally speaking, an adequate treatment of a sur-
vivable land-based ICBM. And I might say I am also in great
sympathy with the suggestion made by Senator Nunn and others,
which, in essence, says that SALT doesn't solve our defense prob-
lem; it puts some limitations on some of these defense problems,
and we have to go ahead and maintain and increase our defenses.
So I would take the third suggestion you made, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And Mr. Lodal?
Mr. Lodal. Senator, my views are very similar to Dr. Mays.
I think that some of the clarifications suggested would be help-
ful, those that essentially go to the question of putting on the
record our interpretation of items which might otherwise be some-
what ambiguous, but about which the Administration has said that
there is no real argument, such as the protocol's duration, our
rights to deploy the type of multiple aim point system that has
been discussed here, and so forth.
But other than these unrelated clarifications, I would not suggest
recommitting the treaty or starting the process over. I think there
would be significant harm in doing that, and that the treaty de-
serves ratification.
The Chairman. We have Mr. Nitze's letter on this subject which,
together with his recommendation, will be inserted in the record.
[Mr. Nitze's letter appears in Part I, July 12, 1979 p. 529-530.]
The Chairman. I have no further questions. Have you. Senator?
Senator Lugar. No.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony, gentle-
men. ,
Let me announce for the purposes of the press that tomorrow s
hearing, the scheduled hearing on the M-X, or, rather, the ICBM
aspect of the SALT II Treaty, will be held in room 4221, the
committee's regular hearing room in the Dirksen Office Building,
beginning at 10 a.m.
There will be no further hearings on the SALT II Treaty for the
balance of the week. The hearings scheduled on the treaty for next
week will be announced at a later date.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to recon-
vene at 10 a.m., September 12, 1979.]
Appendix
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C., July 16, 1979.
Hon. Cyrus Vance,
Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr Secretary: Over the past several days the Committee has heard
conflicting testimony on whether the Soviet Union views the multiple protective
structure (MPS) basing mode for the MX missile as compatible with the bALl 11
agreements. In order to assist the Committee in its examination of this issue, would
you please provide the Committee the record of exchanges at all levels, including all
official public statements, between the United States and the Soviet Union wluch
pertain to the right of the United States to deploy an MPS type system. The
Committee would also appreciate a narrative which places these exchanges and
statements in the context of the negotiating process.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,
Frank Church, Chairman.
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C, August 2, 1979.
Hon. Frank Church,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing in response to your letter of July 16 regarding
Soviet views and the record of exchanges between the sides concerning the multiple
protective structure (MPS) basing mode for the MX missile, under the provisions of
the SALT II Treaty. ^ . ^^ „^„_-
This matter was raised by the Soviet Delegation in Geneva in the summer ot 19(8
when, referring to newspaper reports regarding a vertical MPS basing mode, they
stated that it appeared that such a deployment would violate both the ban on
construction of new fixed ICBM silo launchers and the ban on deliberate conceal-
ment measures. The United States Delegation replied that no decision had been
made regarding a basing mode but that whatever mode the United States adopted
would be one that violated neither of the provisions cited by the Soviets. They
further stated that the draft agreement expressly provided for the deployment, after
Protocol expiration, of an ICBM system in which missiles and their launches are
moved from point to point. The subject matter was not addressed again by the
Delegations. This issue was discussed on several occasions through diplomatic chan-
nels along the same lines.
Specifically the United States has made clear to the Soviets that the various
mobile ICBM systems we are considering, including ones in which the launch point
could itself be hardened, are permitted during the post-Protocol period. An early
and important statement of U.S. policy on this subject was made by Secretary of
Defense Brown in his speech before the National Convention of the American
Legion in New Orleans on August 22 of last year. (I enclose the relevant portion of
Finally, prior to the Vienna Summit, the United States publicly announced that it
intends to proceed with the MX system and described the various MPS basing
modes under consideration. At Vienna the Soviets complained about the introduc-
tion of a new powerful missile and questioned the verifiability of its deployment.
The President noted that the Soviets had already deployed missiles comparable in
power to the MX and he assured them that the basing mode would be verifiable.
Thereafter President Brezhnev signed the Treaty and the Protocol.
Further for your information, I would add the following points:
(433)
434
As noted, we do not accept the Soviet argument that the vertical MPS approach
would involve construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers, since the shelters in
a vertical MPS system are not ICBM launchers. These shelters would clearly be
incapable of launching an ICBM; rather they provide blast protection to the mobile
launchers themselves. Vertical MPS is a mobile system because the launchers,
which contain the equipment required to launch the missile, would be moved
together with the missile periodically from one shelter to another. This is the case
regardless of the type of shelter used or whether the shelters are vertical or
horizontal.
As to the claims the Soviets made about verification, we accept the requirement
that any mobile ICBM basing system must permit adequate verification of the
number of launchers deployed. In fact, it is in our interest to insist that this be the
case, given our high standards concerning verification and the possibility that the
Soviets might deploy a similar system themselves. The systems for MX basing that
we have considered, including vertical MPS, would be designed to meet this require-
ment.
As you know, the President decided in early June to enter full-scale engineering
development on the MX missile, thereby committing this country to maintaining a
survivable land-based ICBM leg of our strategic triad. This Administration will
shortly be making a decision on the precise nature of the basing mode for MX.
While the vertical shelter MPS approach has not been discarded, we are now giving
more active consideration to other approaches which involve other sheltering con-
cepts and appear to offer a number of other advantages, including improved confi-
dence in survivability, over the vertical MPS approach. In any case, our final
decision will not be influenced by Soviet objections.
In summary, SALT II clearly permits an adequately verifiable mobile ICBM
system. The concepts that we have considered seriously and the basing mode we will
soon select will meet that standard.
I hope this has been helpful in clarifying the MPS/SALT II issue.
Sincerely,
Cyrus Vance.
Enclosure: As stated.
A Balanced and Effective Defense
(Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, before the Annual National Convention of
the American Legion, New Orleans, August 22, 1978)
Any mobile ICBM basing system would, of course, have to be fully consistent with
all provisions, including verification provisions, of a strategic arms limitation agree-
ment. The United States will not deploy a mobile ICBM system that would not
permit adequate verification of the number of launchers deployed, and other provi-
sions of the agreement. You may be confident that we will insist that any Soviet
system meet the same verification standards.
The parts of the joint draft text of the SALT TWO agreements that have already
been agreed allow deployment of mobile ICBM systems of the types we are consider-
ing. The draft agreement explicitly permits deployment of mobile ICBM launchers
during its term, after the expiration of an interim protocol period which would end
well before mobile ICBM systems would be ready for deployment.
SALT II TREATY
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1979
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:16 a.m., in room
4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Stone, and Percy.
opening statement
The Chairman. This morning, the committee will continue its
consideration of the SALT II issues related to ICBM's.
Yesterday, the committee heard from public witnesses on these
issues. Today we will hear from two representatives of the adminis-
tration. Our witnesses are Dr. William Perry, Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering and Ambassador Ralph
Earle, Chief of the U.S. SALT delegation.
I understand that Ambassador Earle has a brief written state-
ment to present and that Dr. Perry has some remarks he would
like to make before we move to questions.
Let us proceed first with Ambassador Earle's statement and then
with Dr. Perry's.
STATEMENT OF HON. RALPH EARLE, II, CHAIRMAN OF THE
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
Ambassador Earle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
appear once again before this committee.
The U.S. M-X ICBM program is consistent with the SALT II
agreement signed by the President in Vienna on June 18. Indeed,
insuring this consistency was one of our goals in negotiating the
agreement with the Soviets.
Let me first review briefly with you the specific provisions in the
agreement which are most pertinent to the M-X ICBM.
In article II, paragraph 1, the ICBM launcher definition includes
mobile ICBM launchers. The second agreed statement to that para-
graph provides explicitly that mobile ICBM launchers shall be
counted in the aggregate after the termination of the protocol.
In article IV, paragraph 9, the ICBM "new types" limitation
permits each party to have one new type of light ICBM, thus
permitting the U.S. M-X ICBM.
In article IV, paragraph 11, the one new type of light ICBM for
each party is permitted to have up to 10 reentry vehicles. This will
accommodate the U.S. plans for M-X.
(435)
436
In article XV, paragraph 3, we have the provision which bans
deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of com-
pliance with the provisions of the treaty. The mobile basing mode
of the U.S. M-X ICBM is being designed so that it will not violate
the prohibition on deliberate concealment measures. M-X will be
adequately verifiable by national technical means.
.Article I of the protocol: The protocol ban on deploying mobile
ICBM launchers and on flight-testing ICBM's from such launchers
will expire the end of 1981, when the protocol terminates. In view
of the M-X schedule, these prohibitions will not affect the M-X
program. In addition, let me note that even during the period of
the protocol, the United States will be permitted to test a mobile
ICBM launcher short of flight-testing the missile from the launch-
er, and will be permitted to flight test M-X ICBM's from fixed
launchers.
As you know, last Friday the President announced his approval
of the mobile basing plans for the M-X missile, which Dr. Perry
will describe in greater detail. The United States has designed this
system, as I mentioned, so that it will be adequately verifiable
under the SALT II agreement.
In particular, the assembly of M-X missiles, launchers, and
transporters will be done in the open to the extent feasible.
Special transport techniques will be used to move each launcher
and missile to the deployment area. This unique system, together
with barriers between the deployment area and the assembly area,
will provide confidence that only one launcher is deployed on each
so-called loop road.
The loop roads will not be connected, so launchers cannot trans-
fer from one to another.
Finally, the shelters at each loop road can be uncovered periodi-
cally, and thus, the Soviets will be able to verify that there is only
one M-X launcher on each oval loop road.
It is important to note that paragraph 3 of article XV of the
treaty does not prohibit deliberate concealment in general, but
prohibits only deliberate concealment measures which impede ver-
ification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty. The treaty
does not require that the sides know exactly where every strategic
system is at every given moment. Rather, the treaty sets numerical
limits on strategic systems.
Verifying compliance with such numerical limits requires count-
ing the number of launchers deployed. This is already clear in the
case of SLBM launchers on submarines. The submarines spend
months at naval bases, which serve as verification choke points,
initially for fitting out and later between patrols and for overhaul-
ing. This permits the United States to count the number of Soviet
SLBM launchers with high confidence, and it permits the Soviets
to count the number of United States SLBM launchers with equal-
ly high confidence.
However, the submarines deliberately conceal themselves while
on patrol; but since this does not impede verification of compliance
with the agreement, it is permitted under SALT. The mobile basing
mode of the U.S. M-X ICBM system has been designed in an
analogous fashion and will be adequately verifiable under the
SALT II agreement.
437
Should the Soviets decide to deploy a mobile ICBM force in the
future, the United States will insist on the same high standard of
verifiability.
Now, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to the discussions which the
United States has had with the Soviets on this multiple protective
structure [MPS] basing mode for the M-X ICBM under the provi-
sions of the SALT II agreement.
This matter was raised by the Soviet Delegation in Geneva in the
summer of 1978 when, referring to newspaper reports regarding a
vertical MPS basing mode, they stated to us that it appeared that
such a deployment would violate both the ban on the construction
of new fixed ICBM silo launchers, provided for in article IV, and
the ban on deliberate concealment measures, to which I have al-
ready referred.
The U.S. Delegation replied that no decision had been made
regarding a basing mode, but that whatever mode the United
States adopted would be one that violated neither of the provisions
cited by the Soviets. We further stated that the draft agreement
expressly provided for the deployment, after protocol expiration, of
an ICBM system in which missiles and their launchers are moved
from point to point.
The subject matter was not addressed again by the delegations.
This issue was discussed on several occasions through diplomatic
channels along the same lines. In particular, the United States has
made clear to the Soviets that the various mobile ICBM systems we
have considered, including ones in which the launch point could
itself be hardened, are permitted during the post protocol period.
Prior to the Vienna Summit, the United States publicly an-
nounced that it intended to proceed with the M-X system and
described the various MPS basing modes under consideration. At
Vienna, the Soviets complained about the introduction of a new
powerful missile and questioned the verifiability of its deployment.
The President noted that the Soviets had already deployed missiles
comparable in power to the M-X and he assured them that the
basing mode would be verifiable. Thereafter, President Brezhnev
signed the treaty and the protocol.
Let me add the following.
The United States does not accept the Soviet argument, raised in
the context of vertical shelters, that the MPS approach would
involve construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers; the shel-
ters in an MPS system are not ICBM launchers. These shelters
could not launch an ICBM; rather, they provide blast protection to
the mobile launchers themselves.
On the other hand, the mobile launchers may launch a missile
whether or not they are in fact located in one of the shelters. MPS
is a mobile system because the launchers, which contain the equip-
ment required to launch the missile, would be moved together with
the missile periodically from one shelter to another.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
Dr. Perry, we would be pleased to hear from you at this point.
438
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, UNDER SECRETARY
FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE;> ACCOMPANIED BY SEYMOUR ZEIBERG, DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGI-
NEERING, AND WALTER SLOCOMBE, DIRECTOR, DOD SALT
TASK FORCE
Dr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do have a written statement which I would hke to submit for
the record. I would prefer not to read that written statement.
Instead, I will summarize some highlights from it.
The Chairman. The committee will be pleased to accept your
written statement and it will be inserted in the record at the
appropriate place. .
Dr. Perry. I am going to be discussing the mtroduction ot
the M-X system into our strategic deterrent forces.
The purpose of these forces, which is the deterrence of nuclear
war, is achieved by two related actions: first of all, by building the
strength of our strategic forces; second, by diplomatic initiatives to
achieve bilateral reduction in deployed forces. These related ac-
tions have led to both a SALT II Treaty and to the proposal to
deploy an M-X system. , , ^ . .i. o • ^
We do not know precisely what it is that would deter the boviet
Union from a nuclear war. We have 9,000 nuclear warheads in our
strategic forces. We believe this is more than enough to deter war,
and, in fact, we have built a substantial safety factor into those
forces.
The concern we have is not whether we have sufficient nuclear
power, but whether we can survive a surprise attack.
If the Soviet Union believes that it could destroy some substan-
tial percentage of these forces by a surprise attack, that would
eliminate the safety factor we have built into the forces and, in a
sense, weaken our deterrence. Therefore, the actions we are taking
to modernize our strategic forces emphasize improving the surviva-
bility of those forces so that they can withstand a surprise attack
and so that the Soviet Union could not believe that it could effec-
tively attack these forces.
A factor which gives us confidence in the survivability ot the
forces and therefore the strength of our deterrence is the diversity
of the forces— the fact that we have submarine-launched missiles,
bombers, and land-based ICBM's.
Each of those forces, in its own way, has susceptibility to a
particular type of attack. One of the great strengths of this diverse
system of forces is that the vulnerability of each force is occurring
at a different time in history. We can rectify the vulnerability,
then, in one force while the other two maintain the deterrence
during that period. .
Let me go very quickly through what we are doing now to
modernize the forces with the emphasis on the M-X program. With
your permission, I have some charts which will facilitate the dis-
cussion.
[The chart referred to follows:]
' See page 474 for Hon. Perry's prepared statement.
439
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Dr. Perry. In summary form, Mr. Chairman, this lists the three
components of our strategic forces: the ICBM's, the SLBM's, and
the bombers. Of these 9,000 warheads that we have, if we compare
them in net to those of the Soviet Union, we see that in the land-
based ICBM forces, the Soviet Union has about a 2-to-l advantage
in number of warheads deployed.
The Chairman. This is just a comparison of numbers and not a
comparison of size, is that right?
Dr. Perry. These are just numbers of warheads. In this simpli-
fied form it does not take into account qualitative characteristics or
survivability.
A simple comparison of numbers says there is about a 2-to-l
advantage in ICBM warhead for the Soviet Union. But the United
States has an advantage of about 4-to-l in submarine-launched
missiles warheads and about 8-to-l advantage in the number of
warheads or bombs in our bomber force.
In net, we assess that we have equivalence in our strategic
forces, averaged out over the entire set of strategic forces. So, the
issue which we are confronting is not the number of warheads in
our forces, but the ability to maintain their survivability.
We look, then, to each of these forces. In the case of the ICBM's,
the threat to their survivability will become severe in the early
1980's. Our response to that is to develop the M-X system which
provides mobile basing and therefore is able to resist the sort of
attack which might be launched against the Minuteman silos. I
will talk later in somewhat more detail about that M-X system.
Let me briefly point out the fact that our other two legs of the
Triad also have potential vulnerabilities.
In the case of the bombers, we believe that the new air defense
system being deployed by the Soviet Union will threaten the sur-
vivability of that force after the mid-1980's. This survivability prob-
lem is occurring about 5 years after the survivability problem of
the ICBM. Our solution is to deploy cruise missiles which will be
able to penetrate this new low altitude air defense system which is
now in the final stages of testing in the Soviet Union and will soon
begin deployment.
In effect, we believe the cruise missile will make that Soviet air-
defense system obsolete before it is deployed.
QUESTION OF B-52 LAUNCHING PLATFORM BECOMING OBSOLETE
The Chairman. Senator Percy, I invite you to ask any questions
at any time that you wish. Since there are only the two of us here
at the moment, we can indulge in that luxury.
Dr. Perry, what about the argument that we heard yesterday
that the B-52 is an airplane that is getting old, that it is going to
become an obsolete launching platform for these cruise missiles
and, therefore, that we cannot look to the future with any degree
of confidence as long as this aerial launching pad, so to speak, is
one that is wearing out?
Dr. Perry. That is a fair argument, Mr. Chairman. We assess
that the B-52 will indeed be wearing out— will be not useful as a
launcher of cruise missiles — by 1990 or the early 1990's, and, there-
fore, we will need a replacement for it as a cruise missile carrier by
this time.
441
The Chairman. Rather than as a bomber?
Dr. Perry. Rather than as a bomber. It will become ineffective as
a bomber by the mid-1980's — not because it is wearing out, but
because we will not have high confidence in its ability to penetrate
Soviet air defenses. The cruise missile will provide that for us, so
wearout and penetration capability there are two different issues.
WIDE BODIED COMMERCIAL JET AS ADEQUATE LAUNCHING AIRCRAFT
The Chairman. Does a regular wide bodied commercial jet or
commercial type jet, with which we are all familiar, constitute an
adequate aerial launching pad for cruise missiles, looking to the
future?
Dr. Perry. Not in my judgment, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We are going to have to have an expensive new
airplane because from the military designs they are about five
times as expensive as otherwise. What are we going to need in the
way of expensive aircraft in the future?
Dr. Perry. The fundamental requirement which the airplane
must have — which is different from that of transport airplanes — is
that it be hardened to a nuclear blast, so that it would not be
possible for the Soviet Union to conduct a barrage attack against
that airplane as it is departing its base. That is the fundamental
characteristic which would distinguish a cruise missile carrier,
whether we would design it from scratch or adapt a wide bodied
transport for that purpose. But I do not believe it is practical to
adapt a wide bodied transport to obtain that hardening.
The Chairman. I see. So, you will have to design a new aircraft?
Dr. Perry. Yes, we will.
We may be able to adapt other military designs for that purpose;
but I do not believe it will be practical to go back after the aircraft
is developed, to obtain the structural hardening which is necessary
in the airplanes that were designed for transport purpose.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Perry. The other features of a transport airplane might be
satisfactory, such as the speed and load capacity; but the resistance
to nuclear blast will be the singular deficiency.
I do want to reassert again that the B-52 will be adequate as a
cruise missile carrier, certainly until to the 1990 period, but not as
a penetrating bomber.
In the case of the submarine-launched ballistic missiles, we be-
lieve that they will remain invulnerable through the 1980's and the
earliest that the Soviets might be able to conceive of an attack
against our submarines at sea would be in the early 1990's, about
10 years from now. So, we have, separated by about 5-year inter-
vals, a threat to the survivability of each element these forces: one
coming in the early 1980's, one in the mid-1980's and one in the
early 1990's. This does give us an opportunity to phase our re-
sponses to these.
In the case of the bomber, the response is already underway. It is
deploying cruise missiles. They will begin to go into our forces in
about 2 years. We will achieve an initial operational capability in
1982. That action will anticipate the deployment of the improved
Soviet air defenses.
442
In the case of the submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the new
Trident missile will begin deployment later this year and the Tri-
dent submarine in about another year or so. Both of those are
anticipating increased Soviet threats to detectability of submarmes
at sea. So, we are satisfied that the actions we are taking in these
two legs of the Triad will maintain invulnerability against these
threats to their survivability.
SUBMARINE WARHEADS LESS ACCURATE AND MUCH SMALLER
The Chairman. Before we leave the submarines. Dr. Perry, the
critics of the treaty argue that though we have a numerical advan-
tage in the number of nuclear warheads that we carry aboard our
submarines, these warheads are less accurate and much smaller
than the warheads on the intercontinental ballistic missiles, the
Soviet missiles particularly, and that, therefore, the 4 to 1 ratio
which appears to be an American advantage is, in fact, an Ameri-
can disadvantage because the size of the submarine warhead being
so much less than the typical Russian warhead and the accuracy
being less, you have a decided Russian advantage in terms of the
nuclear power or the explosive power which they can place on
target as compared to what we can place on target.
Senator Percy. Dr. Perry, while you are answering that question,
would you supplement it with a statement on the whole question of
heavy missiles and throw-weight? Since your last testimony, oppo-
nents of the treaty have constantly pounded away at the fact that
the Soviets do have a right to 308 heavy throw-weight ICBM
launchers while the United States does not have that right.
Would you comment on how important, in your judgment, throw-
weight is as a measure of strategic force capability?
Dr. Perry. I would be happy to comment on that. Senator Percy,
but, with your permission, I will defer that to a few minutes later
in the discussion when I plan to explicitly address that issue.
Senator Percy Verv well.
Dr. Perry. Relative to the submarine question, Mr. Chairman, I
have a number of comments. ,
First of all, it is correct that the missiles on the SLBM s are both
smaller in yield and less in accuracy than those on our ICBM's.
However, the smallest warhead we have on a submarine is about
three times the size of the Hiroshima warhead. I wanted to put
that in some sort of perspective.
Second, the warhead going on the new Trident missile, the so-
called C-4 missile, will be about IVz times greater in yield than
that smaller SLBM warhead. So, they are smaller in yield than the
ICBM warheads; but they are still very substantial.
Third, to the extent that there are unique characteristics in the
ICBM force, which I believe there are, the moves that we are
taking in ICBM modernization— namely, the M-X— retain those
characteristics. It is not an issue that has anything to do with the
treaty, so far as I can see, unless the treaty were in some way to
prevent us from taking this action of preserving the ICBM leg of
the Triad. , j . u
The Chairman. I think that is a legitimate point that needs to be
constantly reiterated. The point is that whatever the comparative
advantages and disadvantages of the present nuclear balance be-
443
tween the two countries, whatever need we may have to develop
new weapon systems, to preserve that balance the systems we
desire to develop are not prohibited by the treaty. So, it is difficult
for me to make the linkage that opponents of the treaty make.
Unless one believes that we will all be lulled to sleep by ratifica-
tion of the treaty, it is hard for me to follow them to their conclu-
sion, even accepting their analysis of the throw-weight advantage
which the Soviet Union possesses in the size of the nuclear war-
heads.
I cannot see how we are impeded in any way by the ratification
of the SALT Treaty. In fact, it would seem to me that we are better
off with the treaty, whatever we must do in the development of
weapon systems, than we would be without the treaty.
Mr. Perry. It is quite correct that the treaty is not impeding
programs which we plan to undertake. It is also correct that in at
least one of our systems, namely, the M-X, the design of that
system is facilitated by limiting of Soviet ICBM MIRV's. I will talk
more about that later.
I would make one other comment about this Triad and compare
it with that of the Soviet Union.
VALUE OF THE TRIAD
In my judgment, the balance of forces that we have — we tend to
have a balanced capability in the ICBM, SLBM, and bomber
forces — is a far superior composition of forces than that of the
Soviet Union. They have concentrated their resources to the point
where about three-fourth's of their capability is in the ICBM force.
I would not want to exchange our balance for their great concen-
tration of ICBM's. I think the fallacy of the approach they are
taking will become clear. As M-X is developed, they will then be
confronted with the same type of ICBM vulnerability problem
which we have, although not to the same degree. But they have
three-fourths of their force invested in that ICBM's and they will
not be in a strong position to fall back on the high survivability
components of the force, the submarines and bombers, as we are
able to do.
I do suggest, though, that the Soviets are probably as dissatisfied
with that unbalanced Triad as we would be if we had it. I believe
we will see, over the period of the next 5 or 6 years, a very greatly
increased emphasis in Soviet submarine and bomber forces. We
will see them converging to the same sort of balanced triad which
we ourselves have selected.
PERCEPTION OF LACK OF EQUALITY
Senator Percy. Dr. Perry, is your judgment, why is there the
perception of our lack of equality? The perception of Soviet superi-
ority is sinking deeper into the American public consciousness as
the opponents of the treaty keep pounding away that we are now
in an inferior position. Why is it that we have not gotten the
message across to our people about the lack of vulnerability we
have in the various components of our Triad— specifically in bomb-
ers and submarines, and very soon in cruise missiles?
48-260 0-79 Pt . 4 - 29
444
We simply have not gotten this story across. Perception in the
world and the perception of the American public are very impor-
tant factors.
Dr. Perry. Since the purpose of these forces is to deter a war,
and since that depends at least on the Soviet Union's perception of
what the strength of our force is, this is an extremely important
issue.
I think the possible answer to that is twofold.
First of all, of all of the forces, ICBM's seem to have the greatest
symbolic value. They are a symbolic measure of military strength.
In ICBM's big is beautiful, so to speak.
Second, we have conducted a well publicized debate on the defi-
ciencies of our force in the last few years as we studied the vulner-
ability of the Minuteman and opened public debate on the SALT
Treaty. There is nc equivalent debate in the Soviet Union on the
deficiencies of their force.
If I were looking at their force as a Soviet military planner, I
would be very greatly concerned and I would be conducting a
debate to do something about the significant concentration of
ICBM's, which will be highly vulnerable, and on the very weak
force they have in submarine forces and bombers. I would be
campaigning to try to correct that weakness.
In the course of that campaign, I would be creating a public
perception of weakness.
Senator Percy. Somehow we have to get that story across be-
cause the rest of the world may become convinced by the oppo-
nents of the treaty that we are in a militarily inferior position and
that we are far more vulnerable than the Soviets are. Yet I per-
ceive us to be less vulnerable than the Soviet Union. I would not
want to keep my eggs in the same basket where the Soviets have
theirs.
But this story is not getting across. I wanted to ask you about it
so that it could be repeated.
Thank you.
HORIZONTAL SHELTERS AS STORAGE FACILITIES
The Chairman. Since I am going to have to leave in only a few
minutes. Dr. Perry, I wonder if you could answer two questions for
me which I think need to be addressed.
First of all, you have spoken of the M-X missile and its horizon-
tal shelter basing mode. There is a provision in the treaty that
storage facilities and launch sites are prohibited so that we avoid
the danger of having one missile fired from a silo and then another
missile inserted and fired and so on. I believe this is called some-
thing like "machinegun silos."
How do these horizontal shelters in this basing mode that is
being proposed become distinguished from storage facilities at
launch sites, which are prohibited by the SALT II Treaty?
I would address this question to either Dr. Perry or Ambassador
Earle.
Dr. Perry. I will give a very quick answer to that and then pass
it to Ambassador Earle.
They are not storage facilities. We do not store anything in them.
To facilitate verification of that we have provided for portholes in
445
the tops of the shelters which we will periodically remove to allow
inspection.
That is a simple answer to the question. Let me pass the ball at
this point to Ambassador Earle.
Ambassador Earle. I don't think I can add very much to that,
Mr. Chairman. When the provision to which you refer in para-
graph 5 of article IV was negotiated, I think it was clear on the
part of both sides that this is what a storage facility meant: it
meant a facility in which an excess missile remained for a period
of time. As I think Dr. Perry will develop, these are storage sites
only in the sense that one missile is available to the complex of 23
shelters and, therefore, I do not think would fall within the under-
standing between the sides as to what we had in mind when this
provision was agreed.
The Chairman. Do you think that is a distinction with which the
Russians will agree?
Ambassador Earle. Yes, I do. At no time have they raised this as
an issue with us. I think also the negotiating history of the storage
facilities was in the context of fixed ICBM launchers, which, of
course, this new M-X system is not.
The Chairman. Thank you.
characteristics of m-x missile
Dr. Perry. Let me go very quickly through the characteristics of
the M-X missile and then proceed to a description of the basing
system which will be employed.
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Dr. Perry. The missile, which weighs 190,000 pounds, is about
2V2 times the size and weight of the Minuteman missile. It is about
equal to the size of the SS-19, and it is about half the size of the
SS-18. It will have 10 warheads, compared with 3 on the Minute-
man and 6 on the SS-19, and 10 on the SS-18.
The accuracy figure is classified, but I can say that it will be
significantly better than that of Minuteman III.
Senator Percy. Did you say infinitely better? I thought Minute-
man III was pretty accurate.
Dr. Perry. I said significantly better.
Senator Percy. Oh, I see. I thought you used the word "infinite-
ly."
Dr. Perry. No. "Significantly."
Senator Percy. Thank you.
OBJECTION TO LEGALITY OF M-X
Senator Stone. Dr. Perry, has Defense Minister Ustinov of the
Soviet Union objected to the legality of the M-X missile, or has he
not?
Ambassador Earle, you may address this question, if you wish.
Ambassador Earle. Senator Stone, I would infer that the ques-
tion in part arises from a recent alleged quotation which appeared,
I believe, in the Wall Street Journal about a discussion Secretary
Brown and General Jones had with Minister Ustinov. I was not
present at that meeting. But my understanding is that he made
comments similar to the ones I described in my statement and that
their concern was expressed that a multiple basing mode could
violate either or both the provision regarding construction of addi-
tional ICBM launchers and the provision prohibiting on deliberate
concealment measures.
That expression by Mr. Ustinov at that meeting was a reiter-
ation of one that Minister Semenov had made previously and one
which President Brezhnev also made.
In all cases, the Soviets were assured that whatever basing mode
was adopted would be adequately verifiable by national technical
means and, as I noted earlier in your absence, subsequently Presi-
dent Brezhnev did sign the agreement, as agreed upon in Geneva.
Senator Stone. So, it is your position, then, that the Soviet
Union will not object to the racetrack mode which we have
adopted?
Ambassador Earle. Senator Stone, I do not know whether they
will object or not. I think it depends on the way it comes out. Based
on what Dr. Perry has been saying and will tell you, I think it will
be adequately verifiable and they may, indeed, not object to it. If
they raise questions regarding the veriflability of the system, we
are quite prepared to discuss those questions with them in the
Standing Consultative Commission.
STATEMENT OF NONOBJECTION BY SOVIETS
Senator Stone. Wouldn't you think it would be reassuring to the
Senate in connection with the ratification procedure that you
obtain their approval, or at least their statement of nonobjection?
Otherwise, you are going to be faced with an amendment.
448
Ambassador Earle. Senator Stone, you can speak better than I
can as to what would reassure the Senate. In my view, it would be
highly inappropriate to ask the Soviets for permission to deploy a
system which we believe would be adequately verifiable.
Senator Stone. The administration has been taking that line
during the entire debate on SALT, that you do not think it is
appropriate for us to ask their permission. You have been told,
though, by members of this committee repeatedly that we do not
like the kind of ambiguity which substitutes ambiguity at the
moment for objection later on. It is not a question of permission; it
is a question of their nonobjection. It is not a question of asking
them "Please may I". It is a question of getting out on the table
whether or not they are going to object, so that we know. It makes
the difference between an understanding and a reservation, or a
reservation and an amendment.
That is important to the administration and not just to the
Senate.
Ambassador Earle. Senator Stone, I would simply comment that
if I were in the opposite position and the Soviets asked us if we
would acquiesce in a program which was merely on the drawing
board, I would not acquiesce.
Senator Stone. But we are about to be asked for billions of
dollars to fund a system which we want to be sure is not, on its
face, objectionable to our treaty partners. This is supposed to be a
treaty.
Ambassador Earle. And I think. Senator Stone, that the provi-
sions of the treaty are quite clear that the compliance
Senator Stone. Then you can assure us that it is not objection-
able and that we can go ahead and will not have this problem later
on.
Ambassador Earle. I can assure you that it is permissible.
Senator Stone. That's fine.
WHAT constitutes A MOBILE MISSILE
Let me ask this question. What does constitute a mobile launcher
when there is no SALT II agreed definition of a mobile launcher?
Ambassador Earle. Senator, I agree that there is no specific
definition of a mobile launcher. That is because of the variety of
type of mobility that could be used with respect to launchers. I
think that the words themselves, and the negotiating record with
the Soviets indicate that a mobile launcher is a launcher which can
move, in contradistinction to the so-called fixed silo launchers. In
other words, any launcher of an ICBM which is not fixed is, by
definition, mobile. I am quite comfortable with the lack of precision
there.
INCREASED CAPABILITY OF SOVIET ICBM's
Senator Stone. With regard to their response to our mobile
launcher or their own initiatives, it has been said frequently and
recently on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere, and is it not
possible, that an entirely new Soviet ICBM which did not violate
the "new types" definition could increase: (1) their accuracy; (2)
their reliability; (3) their range capability; (4) their warhead yield;
(5) their ABM defense penetration capability; (6) their targeting
449
capability; and (7) their capability of command and control subsys-
tems?
Finally, in this question, could not any of these factors, or all,
significantly increase their military capability and, hence, the util-
ity of their ICBM?
I ask those questions of both of you.
Dr. Perry. The answer is certainly. The answer is self-evident
from the question. All of those are desirable features of the ICBM.
They are permitted and they can increase their capability.
We, of course, are permitted to make similar improvements.
"the ss-19 loophole"
The Chairman. Dr. Perry, there is a report in the Evans and
Novak column which is entitled "The SS-19 Loophole." I will read
a portion of it and wish to get your response, but disregard the
hyperbole and just address the argument.
A reading of the fine print in the SALT II Treaty after it went to the Senate has
revealed, to the horror of supporters of the arms control pact, an uncanny repetition
of the worst U.S. blooper in the 1972 SALT I Treaty.
The 1972 mistake, not discovered until long after ratification, failed to pin down
specific limits on the size of a replacement for the SS-11 intercontinental ballistic
missile. Now, in a new negotiating blooper discovered as the Senate ratification
debate begins, SALT II does not clearly define the size of Moscow's mainstay SS-19
ICBM, which it sets as the limit on the size of any new missiles.
That history should be so sadly replayed is explicable only by this fact: The
Russians simply refused to agree on a specific definition of the size of the SS-19.
This adds new evidence that U.S. negotiators, under orders from Washington for an
agreement at almost any cost, bowed to the iron will of their Soviet counterparts."
What is your response to the argument that this treaty, by
failing to exactly define the SS-19, has failed to establish a reliable
limit on the size of the new missile that the Russians would be
permitted to develop under the terms of the treaty?
Dr. Perry. I would make just two brief comments on that and
then would see what Ambassador Earle cares to say.
First of all, the revelation in the column is not really a revela-
tion or a surprise to anybody who has been working with the
treaty, nor is it to the horror of the people who are working on the
treaty.
Second, the issue of verification of changes in weight is such that
in my judgment it is, in fact, easier and more reliable to verify
changes or increments of weight, such as a 5-percent or 10-percent
increase, than it is to verify absolute numbers. So, I do not see how
that issue complicates our verification problem one way or the
other since, indeed, what we would be doing in our verification is
comparing a new system with the SS-19 and determining what, if
any, increase there was. This we can do more reliably and more
accurately than we can the assessment of absolute weights.
Ambassador Earle. Senator Church, let me add this. I think in
the light of what Dr. Perry said about verification that the treaty
itself is quite clear. Each side is permitted one new type of ICBM.
It must be light. It is agreed formally in the document that the SS-
19 is the heaviest in terms of launch-weight and throw-weight of
any existing light ICBM. Ergo, here, not even the 5-percent provi-
sion applies. Any ICBM with a throw-weight or launch-weight
greater than that of the SS-19 is prohibited and, given what Dr.
450
Perry said about the verification of changes of weight, there is not
any question or any basis for the article to which you referred.
The Chairman. What if the Russians were to say that we were
mistaken about the size and throw- weight of the SS-19? Since they
have not agreed to our definition of the dimensions and the capa-
biUties of that particular missile, our argument that some new
missile exceeds it would be unacceptable to them.
In other words, they have not agreed as to the size, the weight,
throw-weight, and capability of the SS-19; is that correct?
Ambassador Earle. That is correct.
The Chairman. Don't we have here a possibility for argument in
the future?
Senator Stone. The Senator's question is very cogent. They have
not agreed to the upper limit of the SS-19, so how can we maintain
that anything higher than the SS-19 is not light?
Ambassador Earle. They have agreed that the throw-weight and
launch-weight of the SS-19 are the ceilings for the light ICBM's.
Senator Stone. But they have not yet said what they are?
Ambassador Earle. They have not.
Senator Stone. How will we know what they are?
Ambassador Earle. The problem would exist even if they said
what they are. If we say that the throw-weights of a new missile
exceeds the throw-weight of the SS-19 or if we say that the throw-
weight of that new missile exceeds x-thousand kilograms, the prob-
lem is exacty the same except, as Dr. Perry said, it is easier to
verify that it is heavier than the existing SS-19 than that it is
heavier than a fixed number.
You have the problem. I agree with that.
Senator Stone. Don't we need both?
Ambassador Earle. I don't think that the number would help at
all.
Senator Stone. It doesn't help at all?
Ambassador Earle. No; for the reasons that Dr. Perry stated.
Dr. Perry. I would like to make one other point and come at this
from a different direction.
Suppose it is the motivation of the Soviets to make that change
or some of the other changes to which Senator Stone referred
earlier, I expect to see those product improvements to which Sena-
tor Stone referred earlier as a matter of course, particularly the
guidance improvements. But, to a very great extent, adding more
weight or adding those other features does not really change the
nature of the threat to the United States. The present SS-18 and
SS-19 already are capable of providing all of the threat the Soviets
need to the Minuteman system. Adding to that threat does not
change the nature of the problem.
If we deploy an M-X system and if they want to try to over-
whelm that system, those features will not affect the vulnerability
of M-X. Only additional reentry vehicles will do that.
So, the principal point of verification to which we have to ad-
dress ourselves, I believe, is action which could lead to significant
increases in the number of reentry vehicles. This is what could
cause us a problem in the M-X system.
Let me get to Senator Percy's question.
451
Again, it is difficult to address this problem in an unclassified
manner, but I have attempted to do that by comparing the capa-
bilities of four different missiles: the Minuteman III; the SS-19; the
M-X; and the SS-18.
[The chart referred to follows:]
452
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453
Dr. Perry. There is a whole spectrum of targets against which
these missiles might be used. I have taken the two ends of the
spectrum: A very hard target — and you might think of a silo as
being representative of that — and a very soft target which would
be an economic or an industrial target.
I have taken off the scale of these two graphs, but it is still
representative of the actual results when the calculations were
made. This shows that the number of soft targets which could be
successfully attacked by Minuteman III, SS-19, M-X, and SS-18 is
basically a function of only the number of reentry vehicles on those
missiles, going from 3 to 6 to 10.
Senator Stone. How many reentry vehicles will the Russians
have in 1986, compared to us for all systems?
Dr. Perry. May I defer an answer to that for just a minute.
Senator? I will come back to that.
In the case of the hard-target capability, it is a function not only
of the number of warheads, but also of the accuracy and the yield.
Here we see that the M-X, when it becomes operational in 1986,
will have greater capability than the SS-19 now or at that time. It
will have greater capability than the SS-18 presently has, and
slightly less or about as equivalent capability of what we project
for the SS-18 at that time. This is on a missile-by-missile basis.
Now I will address your question. Senator Stone.
ICBM reentry vehicles RUSSIANS WILL HAVE BY 1986
Senator Stone. How many heavy warhead, reentry vehicles, will
they have in 1986? How many will we have under the treaty?
Dr. Perry. In ICBM's?
Senator Stone. All right, yes. The missiles limited by the treaty.
Under the missiles limited by the treaty, how many heavy reentry
vehicles will they have and how many will we have? How many
light ones will they have and how many will we have, as limited by
the treaty?
Dr. Perry. At the end of the treaty, we would expect there to be
about an equal number of warheads on each side.
Going into categories of warheads, we will expect the same ratio
of advantage in ICBM's that they presently have over us and the
same relative advantage we presently have in SLBM's and bomb-
ers.
Sentor Stone. In other words, they will have more heavy reentry
vehicles than we will and we will have more light reentry vehicles
than they will. Is that it?
Dr. Perry. Senator Stone, light or heavy they have the same
capability on target. Ours are heavy enough.
Senator Stone. I will get to the capability in a minute. Please
answer my question.
Dr. Perry. Ours are heavy enough. They will have
Senator Stone. You have not answered my question. Dr. Perry.
Are they going to have more than we have of heavies?
Dr. Perry. Certainly. They will have approximately 6,000 ICBM
RV's at that time.
Senator Stone. How many will we have?
Dr. Perry. We will have the same as we have now, about 2,000.
454
Senator Stone. They will have 6,000 heavy reentry vehicles and
we will have 2,000 heavy reentry vehicles.
Dr. Perry. A little more than 2,000; yes.
Senator Stone. Let's now talk about light ones. How many will
they have and how many will we have?
This is all under the treaty and assuming 100 percent verification
and compliance on both sides.
Dr. Perry. We will have about a 2-to-l advantage in light
reentry vehicles in the SLBM field by the end of the treaty.
Senator Stone. The problem, of course, is
Dr. Perry. Senator Stone, there is a third part of the question,
which is the bombers and the cruise missiles.
Senator Stone. That's right. Please tell us about that.
Dr. Perry. We will have upward of 3,000 cruise missile warheads
at that time and we expect they will have none.
Senator Stone. They will have no cruise missiles?
But they already have cruise missiles.
Dr. Perry. Strategic cruise missiles that come under this treaty.
Senator Stone. Don't they have supersonic cruise missiles oper-
ational today?
Dr. Perry. They have tactical supersonic cruise missiles today,
that is correct. They do not have stategic cruise missiles and we do
no^ expect them to have those by the end of the treaty.
Senator Stone. We will have how many strategic cruise missiles?
Dr. Perry. By the end of the treaty, the number is about 3,000. I
can get you the specific figure.
Senator Stone. This is strategic cruise missiles with ranges
longer than 600 kilometers.
Dr. Perry. The range is on the order of 3,000 kilometers. The
accuracy is far better than any ICBM on either side.
LSubsequent information was supplied for the record]
Production Rate of ALCM's
[Supplied by DOD]
At the presently planned rate of production (40/month), we will have 8,400
ALCM's produced by early 1989. Should we increase the production rate to 60/
month in late 1982, we would produce 3,000 ALCM's by mid-1986.
PARITY OBTAINED THROUGH CRUISE MISSILES
Senator Stone. Do you feel that it is the cruise missiles that
make up the difference between their heavy reentry vehicles and
our heavies? Is that where we are getting our parity?
Dr. Perry. I think that during the period between now and the
M-X deployment, the cruise missile represents an offsetting fea-
ture. I would not want to rest on that position.
Senator Stone. But where do we get our parity since they have
so many more heavy reentry vehicles than we do? It is on the order
of 3 to 1. Where do we get even?
Dr. Perry. We get our parity by the ability of these various
systems to attack targets which are in our target inventory— both
soft targets and hard targets. W3 will have more cruise missiles in
the inventory at the end of 1986 than we have hard targets in our
target list. The cruise missile is quite capable of attacking any of
455
those hard targets, including silos, with a higher probability of kill,
in fact, higher than an ICBM.
Senator Percy. Dr. Perry, I have a few other questions.
I want to give you a chance to respond to opponents of the M-X.
But if there is anything further that you would like to present to
us, I would like to hear it. We have been interrupting you quite a
bit, and I have questions following your presentation.
Dr. Perry. Why don't I go quickly through the rest of my presen-
tation, then.
Senator Stone. Before you do, Dr. Perry, let me finish up my
group of questions.
CASE OF SOVIET HARD TARGETS
Is it not the case that the Soviet hard targets are far harder than
ours, more numerous and more widely scattered?
Dr. Perry. The hardest Soviet hard target can be attacked with a
probability of kill of about 99 percent for the cruise missile. This is
the hardest target which they have.
To answer your question directly, yes.
Senator Stone. You then believe that they cannot intercept
those long-range cruise missiles with look-down, see-down, or other
capabilities by the time we have these large numbers ready?
Dr. Perry. You bet I believe that. I would be glad to have a
detailed and lengthy discussion with you on that.
Senator Percy. I am happy you believe it. You think that is
where we get our comparability — with the cruise missiles.
Dr. Perry. The whole strategic force balance is a dynamic affair
which changes from year to year. During the window between the
vulnerability of the Minuteman and the emergence of the M-X, the
cruise missile will make the difference. It will begin deployment at
about the same time that the Minuteman becomes vulnerable.
Senator Stone. Provided we do not extend the Protocol restric-
tion in any way, shape, or form?
Dr. Perry. Correct.
[The following information was subsequently supplied for the
record.]
Protocol Limitations on GLCM's and ALCM's
[Supplied by DOD]
The Protocol limitations affect the ground-launched and sea-launched cruise mis-
siles, but not the air-launched cruise missile.
Senator Stone. I'm glad you made that point.
Dr. Perry. We are leaning on the other two legs of this three-
legged stool during that period.
Senator Stone. We are leaning on the sea-launched system
during that period?
Dr. Perry. On the sea-launched systems and on the cruise mis-
siles.
Senator Stone. All right. Thank you.
EXTREMELY LOW FREQUENCY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR SLBM
Senator Percy, I am sorry to delay letting him get to the rest of
his survey, but since he mentioned sea-launched ballistic missiles, I
456
would like to refer both witnesses to a hearing of the Subcommit-
tee on Research and Development of the Armed Services Commit-
tee of June 8, 1978. I will read you what Senator Mclntyre said and
what Secretary Brown answered. Then I will ask you to bring us
up to date.
Senator McIntyre. Mr. Secretary, for 10 years our subcommittee has been a
supporter of the Department's efforts to develop an extremely low frequency [ELF]
communication system which would enable both our strategic and attack subma-
rines to operate day to day at greater, more survivable depths. Is there any element
of the SALT negotiations which might produce a constraint on our development of
this technology?
Secretary Brown. No. The principal constraint on the development and deploy-
ment of an extemely low frequency communications system, Mr. Chairman, is the
U.S. Congress.
Gentlemen, since that time the U.S. Congress both authorized
and appropriated funds for that system, and I understand that the
Defense Department has recommended doing it. Why is it since we
are going to be relying on our sea-launched systems during this
window of vulnerability, that the administration has held it up?
Dr. Perry. The recommendation which I have personally made
on this question and which I believe is the recommendation the
Secretary is making to the President, is that the country does need
and will need an ELF system. The time of that need will be the
late 1980's, and not the early 1980's. The timing does not go with
the vulnerability of the Minuteman issue; it goes to the time at
which the Soviets may have developed a submarine detection capa-
bility. The purpose of the ELF system is to allow our submarines to
run deep, to minimize their chances of detection.
Senator Stone. You don't think the Soviets have developed that
detection capability?
Dr. Perry. I am confident that the Soviets do not today and will
not in the next 5 to 10 years, have a capability to detect our
submarines at sea of sufficient operational credibility to be a threat
to that force. But I cannot project that more than about 10 years
into the future.
I think it is very important in the future that we have that
system operational.
Senator Stone. What if you are wrong and the Soviets have that
capability or are about to get it in the very near future? Would we
then not need to have the capability to get our subs deeper for
their communications so that we do not have the problem?
Dr. Perry. Yes.
Senator Stone. So, if you are wrong, wf really do need to be
moving on it, and both the administration, up to now, and the
Congress have agreed to do it, yet we are not doing it. Why aren't
we doing it?
Dr. Perry. Senator Stone, as I said, the issue in my mind is one
of timing. If I thought there were any significant doubts about my
assessment of the Soviet ASW capability— not whether they could
eventually have it, but whether they could have it in the next 5
years — I would be recommending an urgent and accelerated pro-
gram to do that.
Senator Stone [presiding]. Well, I am recommending it.
Senator Percy.
457
Senator Percy. Dr. Perry, did you wish to finish your presenta-
tion before I ask you further questions?
Dr. Perry. Thank you.
What I have now is primarily descriptive information about the
basing system. Once I go through this, you may want to ask some
questions about how that system works.
NO PROTOCOL LIMITATIONS ON ALCm's
Ambassador Earle. Senator Stone, if I might interrupt Dr.
Perry, I would like to correct what appears to have been a miscon-
ception in your questions regarding the extension of the protocol in
the context of discussing air-launched cruise missiles.
There is nothing in the protocol which limits air-launched cruise
missiles. If the protocol were extended, which I do not anticipate it
will be, there would be no impact whatsoever on our air-launched
cruise missile program for development and deployment.
Senator Percy. And we understood fully that there will be no
extension of that.
DESCRIPTION OF M-X BASING SYSTEM
Dr. Perry. The basing system about which you have read in the
newspapers and may have received some early information on I
will describe as quickly and as briefly as I can.
The concept is to put that missile, of which you have already
seen a picture, on a large transporter erector launcher, which will
be based in a horizontal shelter.
[The chart referred to follows:]
^■/9^^f^'•^t^''%3i^^i^^'■'^■'
458
Dr. Perry. This is an artist's concept of what that might look
like. Let me show you a more accurate picture of what the trans-
porter erector launcher will be.
[The chart referred to follows:]
FIGURE 3
TRANSPORTER-ERECTOR-LAUNCHER
CONCEPT
SHOCK ISOLATION
SYSTEM
SHOCK ISOLATION
SYSTEM
24:00 X 49
TIRES (TYP)
EMD D74F DC TRACTION
MOTOR
CHARACTERISTICS
WEIGHT (KLB)
(WITH MISSILE) 670
LENGTH (FT) 180
HEIGHT (FT) 13.5
WIDTH (FT) 13.0
TIRE TREAD WIDTH (INCH) 156
NO AXLES/TIRES 6/24
MAX. TIRE PRESSURE (PSD 40
WHEEL BASE (ft) 145
MOTIVE POWER (HP) 3250
Dr. Perry. This is a large vehicle which may be likened to a
locomotive. It is about the same weight as a locomotive. It will
carry the missile and the launching equipment in the middle. The
difference between this and a locomotive is it will operate on
rubber wheels or tires instead of on a track.
Let me give you a few numbers.
This one weighs about 700,000 pounds with a missile on it.
[The chart referred to follows:]
459
FIGURE 2
HORIZONTAL SHELTER CONCEPT
SALT
VERIFICATION
OPENINGS
Dr. Perry. This is a picture of a horizontal shelter into which it
is placed. I have depicted here four portholes. We envision that
periodically or on challenge we would remove these portholes to
allow the Soviet Union satellite to inspect the shelter to verify that
there were no missiles located in it.
[The chart referred to follows:]
48-260 0-79 Pt . 4
30
460
FIGURE 1
LOOP ROAD FOR 1 MISSILE WITH
23 SHELTERS
SHELTER
FINAL
ASSEMBLY
AREA
_ 7000 FT.
(APPROX.;
SPECIAL RAILWAY
FROM DESIGNATED ASSEMBLY AREA
Dr. Perry. That is necessary because 1 missile will have as its
base 23 separate shelters, and we will move the missile periodically
from shelter to shelter to maintain confusion about the location of
the missile.
Senator Percy. What is the distance between the two?
Dr. Perry. The spacing between shelters if 6,000 to 7,000 feet. It
is a little greater than 1 mile.
Senator Percy. From extreme point to extreme point, what is the
greatest distance?
Dr. Perry. It is about 10 miles. That will vary quite a bit,
depending on the topography of where it goes.
SS-18 CAPABILITY TO DAMAGE M-X
Senator Percy. If an SS-18 landed right in the center, what
circumference of damage would it have? How large an area would
it cover?
Dr. Perry. It would cover about four of the holes.
Let me make a differentiation. The SS-18 is available in a single,
large blockbuster, and it is also available in what Senator Stone
was calling the heavy RV, but I want to differentiate between
these because it would not be a heavy RV in Soviet parlance. They
have a 10-RV version and a single RV version. The single RV
version could take out about four of these at once. But then they
could only get one RV per SS-18.
461
The 10-RV version would require 1 RV per shelter. In other
words, if they tried to space an RV between two shelters, they
would end up getting neither one of them. Of course, that was the
factor which determined the spacing of the shelters.
We have spaced them not for the size of the present Soviet RV's,
but for a size of about twice that large, on the theory that they
might, by improving warhead efficiency, over the next 5 or 6 years
get an even higher yield RV in their 10-RV system than they now
have.
Senator Percy. Of the 23 shelters, a single RV SS-18 put right in
the center would take out 4 shelters. Two simultaneous launches of
SS-18's, one in the center of the left-hand segment and one in the
center of the right-hand segment, would take out about how many
shelters?
Dr. Perry. For a 10-RV SS-18, each one of its RV's would take
out one shelter, if it hit it. It has to have sufficient accuracy to hit
it, which we believe they do have.
So, one SS-18 RV equals one shelter.
If, as I said, they elected to use their single RV, the big block-
buster, and put one on either end, then they would get the four on
this end and the four on that end [indicating].
Senator Percy. So, it would be 8 out of 23 with a single SS-18
warhead?
Dr. Perry. Yes, 8 out of 23 for 2 SS-18's.
Senator Percy. It is a shell game.
Dr. Perry. It is more effective for them to use their 10-RV
system because then with 2 SS-18's, they could get 20 of these 23
shelters.
PAUL NITZE's criticism OF COST OF M-X
Senator Percy. Could we talk about Paul Nitze's criticism of the
M-X. He said that it would cost $7 billion to $8 billion just to make
it verifiable.
Dr. Perry. That is not correct.
Senator Percy. It is not.
What do you estimate the cost to be?
Dr. Perry. What Paul was doing was comparing the cost of a
vertical shelter MPS system with this system. The difference be-
tween those two in cost is about $7 billion.
The difference in performance or the difference in characteristics
between the two, howevei-, is that this system has a totally differ-
ent survivability mode than the vertical shelter system. That is the
main driving factor in considering this system as opposed to the
vertical shelter system. I will discuss this in a minute.
The features of this system which are unique to making it verifi-
able—such as these large portholes on top— cost something less
than $1 billion. It is between $0.5 billion and $1 billion.
Senator Percy. So, he is saying $7 billion to $8 billion. You are
saying it is less than $1 billion?
Dr. Perry. No. I am saying that the $7 billion figure is correct;
but I am attributing slightly under $1 billion of that uniquely to
verification. The other $6 billion is to make this system have a
dash capability. This is to allow it to move quickly from one shelter
to another shelter.
The reason we want that feature is the following.
462
The system achieves its survivability by maintaining the uncer-
tainty as to where it is located. Let me describe how that happens
first and then see if I can go directly to your questions.
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463
M-X RAPID REDEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY
Dr. Perry. As we move it from one shelter to another shelter, we
have it covered up with this large quonset hut on wheels, so to
speak.
Senator Percy. Would you mind showing the chart very quickly
to the audience so that they can have at least a quick perception of
what you have. It will make this a little more understandable to
them.
Dr. Perry. Certainly.
I said that I would describe this [indicating] as a large quonset
hut on wheels. It is intended as a visibility shield, to cover the
transporter erector launcher.
Senator Percy. Thank you.
Dr. Perry. As the transporter erector launcher moves from one
shelter to another, it is covered by this vehicle. At one of the
shelters it deposits its missile, but it continues then to traverse all
of the shelters. So, an observer of this deployment would not be
able to tell in which shelter it was located.
If this deployment system were successful, then that is all we
would need to do.
As we studied this system, our ingenious technical people raised
all sorts of questions as to how the Soviet Union may be able to
devise ways of breaking into the security of the system.
We do not believe they can do it. But we did not want to be
locked into a system which, if we discovered they could do it, would
leave us simply trapped in our silos and unable to respond. So, we
insisted that the system be capable of rapid redeployment. That,
then, required us to put the missile on its launcher, the transporter
erector launcher, at all times, whereas in the other systems of
deployment the missile was separated from the launcher when it
was put in the silos and it took up to 1 day to redeploy it.
With this system, if we have any reason to believe that the
security has been compromised — for example, if we observed an
ICBM attack heading in this direction — we could rapidly move it
out of one shelter to any other shelter in this system in less time
than it takes an ICBM to reach the United States. So, this is an
additional survivability feature. This is what we are paying the
extra $6 billion for.
Senator Percy. This might be an appropriate point for you to
comment on survivability. Again, Paul Nitze has categorically
stated that the racetrack mode will be less survivable and more
expensive than a vertical shelter deployment.
Would you comment on that?
Dr. Perry. I have to categorically agree with the statement
about its being more expensive. It is about $7 billion more expen-
sive.
COST OF M-X shelters VERSUS SOVIET WARHEADS
Senator Stone. In that regard, is it less expensive to add one of
these shelters, as it is to add an RV in the new system?
Dr. Perry. The answer is no. If we take our shelters and our
RV's and try to make a cost comparison, the shelters are somewhat
cheaper.
464
Senator Stone. Not our shelters and our RV's, but our shelters
versus their RV's.
Dr. Perry. The problem is that we don't know what their RV's
cost. That is my problem in answering your question.
If you take the difference between ours, where we see an advan-
tage of about 25 percent for shelters versus reentry vehicle we
might believe that that is an adequate safety factor to say that in
the case of the Soviets, it is about equivalent — about a wash—with
probably some advantage to the shelters over the reentry vehicles.
I would make one other comment about that, though.
The race between shelters and reentry vehicles, which I think we
should take every effort to keep from happening, is a race in which
where we are building a system that is more and more survivable
while they are putting a greater and greater investment in reentry
vehicles that go into fixed silos which are highly vulnerable to
attack from ours. If you imagine that they are putting these
reentry vehicles into a mobile deployment system then the advan-
tage goes very much to our shelters.
FAILURES IN DEVELOPMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES
Senator Stone. I would like to ask about cruise missiles if I
could, since you have put a great weight — in fact, the whole admin-
istration has put a great weight on closing the gap and reducing
the window of vulnerability by the use of cruise missiles.
The New York Times reported last Sunday a crash of a test
flight cruise missile and summarized several other failures of test-
ing. Have these failures postponed the period in which we can both
contract and get deployed sufficient numbers of these missiles?
What has it done to the timetable?
Dr. Perry. The answer is no, it has not affected the timetable.
Senator Stone. Would you submit to the committee, on a classi-
fied basis if necessary, some information about the failures?
Dr. Perry. Yes, sir, I will.
But I can give you a summary statement on an unclassified
basis.
[The information referred to is classified and is in comittee files.]
Senator Stone. Fine.
Dr. Perry. The successes on the cruise missile tests we have had
to date have been about 30 out of about 40 tests. I will get you the
actual numbers. As missile test programs go, this has been quite a
successful one.
There have been some failures which the New York Times re-
ported. There will be more failures in the system before our testing
is done.
But, looking at the overall test program, we have a good feeling
about its success. The projection of initial operational capability in
late 1982 we still believe is good.
TRIAD WILL favor SOVIETS BY 1986
Senator Stone. Let me ask about the allegations made by oppo-
nents of our strength versus their strength under the treaty in
regard specifically to our Triad and their Triad. It is asserted by
opponents of the treaty that in 1986, either two or all three legs of
465
the Triad will be in the favor of the Soviets, as opposed to us. What
is your answer to that?
Dr. Perry. I do not agree with that.
As I mentioned, the Soviets will have a distinct advantage in the
ICBM leg. We should not gloss over that.
Senator Stone. That is their 6,000 to our 2,000.
What about airborne?
Dr. Perry. Senator, it is not only 6,000 to 2,000. The quantitative
characteristics are 6,000 to 2,000. Their accuracy and yield will be
either comparable to or greater than ours.
Senator Stone. The accuracy is greater?
Dr. Perry. Either comparable to or greater. In 1986, we antici-
pate that the Soviet ICBM will have comparable accuracy to our
Minuteman — not our M-X, but our Minuteman,
ADVANTAGE IN AIRBORNE LEG OF TRIAD
Senator Stone. What about airborne, their Backfire numbers
versus our B-52 numbers? Our B-52's are fixed. They are going to
be producing Backfires, according to the Brezhnev limitation, at 30
per year. In 1986, who will have more, and is the relative strength
of the airborne then in our favor or in their favor?
Dr. Perry. Senator Stone, in my judgment, we will have an
enormous advantage in the airborne leg of our Triad in 1986,
primarily because of the introduction of cruise missiles as a
weapon in that system. It is not a question of comparing the
airplanes. It is a question of comparing the ability to deliver weap-
ons on target.
Senator Stone. Then you assume they will not catch up with us
on airborne cruise missiles?
Dr. Perry. I assert that by the end of 1986 it is not within their
capability to field an air-launched cruise missile on their strategic
bombers anywhere near or comparable to the one we have or in
anything like the numbers we will have.
Senator Stone. How. many Backfires will they have and how
many B-52's will we have?
Dr. Perry. I can get the Backfire number for you simply by
taking the number they have now and adding 30 per year.
Senator Stone. Let's do that. What is it?
Dr. Perry. Let me see— between now and then — I don't have it
in my head.
Mr. Zeiberg. It is about 200 now.
Dr. Perry. So, I would therefore estimate that it would be be-
tween 300 and 400 by 1986.
Senator Stone. How many B-52's will we have operational by
then?
Dr. Perry. We will have B-52G's and B-52H's, which are the
ones we really ought to count. We will have something on the
order of 250. We will also have FB-lll's, in a number of something
over 60, I believe, deployed in the strategic forces. Then we will
have a host of other airplanes, such as B-52D's and our F- Ill's in
Europe, which we do not consider part of our strategic forces, but
which do have the capability of delivering nuclear weapons to the
Soviet Union.
466
Senator Stone. But other than the cruise missile aspect, which,
of course, is quite important and may be decisive, the numbers are
that they will have more than we will have of those carriers at
that time. Is that right?
Dr. Perry. You are making the equation of
Senator Stone. I am granting the cruise missile situation be-
cause I think what an airplane carries is more important than how
many wings it has.
Dr. Perry. If you include the Backfire
Senator Stone. I believe I said that wrong. It needs at least two
wings. [General laughter.]
Dr. Perry. If you include the Backfire, then I have to wonder
about how many other U.S. airplanes need to be included besides
the B-52G's and B-52H's.
Even if you assume that some of those Backfires are going to be
used intercontinentally, it is quite clear that a substantial number
of them are going to be used for naval attack and for what we
might call theater nuclear forces.
Senator Stone. Also ours, if you are including FB-lll's.
Dr. Perry. That is why I say if we limit it to B-52G's and B-
52H's, and to FB-lll's, which is where I got the 300-odd number,
those are the only ones dedicated to strategic forces. The F-lll's
and the other light bombers in our forces forward based systems I
did not include in that calculation because they are going to be
used for other purposes. I think a substantial number of Backfires
will be used for other purposes, too. No matter what you think
about its intercontinental capability, it is a formidable antishipping
weapon. It is clear that the Soviets intend to use at least some of
them for that purpose.
NUMBER OF SOVIET SLBM's BY 1986
Senator Stone. Finally, about the sea-based systems, how many
submarines will they likely have compared to what we will likely
have carrying strategic missiles or intermediate-range ballistic nu-
clear missiles in 1986?
Dr. Perry. I will have to get you those numbers. Senator Stone. I
don't carry them in my head.
Senator Stone. Just a ballpark figure.
Dr. Perry. They will have more submarines than we have. They
will have more missiles than we have. They will have about a
factor of two disadvantage in the number of warheads that can be
delivered.
Senator Stone. We will have twice as many warheads in our sea-
based systems?
Dr. Perry. Yes.
Senator Stone. Even though they will have more vehicles?
Dr. Perry. Yes; this is because they have been much slower than
we in developing SLBM MIRV's. It is because of a technical differ-
ence, I believe. Senator Stone. They have not had the solid fuel
capability to introduce the modern SLBM's into their force to date,
and they have not had the same MIRV capability in the submarine
force. I believe they will overcome that disadvantage after 1986.
Senator Stone. You are placing the main distinction in these last
two legs of the Triad as to airborne because of the preponderance
467
of our cruise missile edge and as to seaborne because we have more
warheads in our system than they have, even though they have
more vehicles, right?
Dr. Perry. Right.
Senator Stone. But you are saying that they may overcome that
warhead number in sea-based systems by 1986?
Dr. Perry. No; let me be more precise. It is not by 1986. I am
saying that I don't think we should stand pat on that and that is
why we are moving with the M-X. I don't believe they will stand
pat either in that they will be improving both their bomber forces
and cruise missile forces — pardon me, and their submarine forces. I
do not expect to see that significant improvement happening until
the late 1980's, though. That is not contemporary with the date
about which we were talking.
Senator Stone. Suppose at the end of the 1986 treaty period we
have not yet reached a SALT III with a reduced number or some
kind of cap number in it, what happens if the Soviets do not
remain at 10 RV's per missile at the end of the treaty? Let's say
they go to 30 warheads on an SS-18 after 1985. What does that do
to the M-X system before it is fully operational and deployed?
Dr. Perry. If they really do that in an attempt to overwhelm the
system, that puts us into the shelter-versus-RV race to which you
referred. The main feature that the treaty will have gotten us
then, in that case, is about a 5-year breathing spell. So, by the time
that race started, we would be in production and in deployment of
our missiles and our shelters.
Senator Stone. You surely cannot be referring to the treaty
period as a breathing spell when it is our window of vulnerability,
isn't that right? We were getting our breathing spell in 1986.
Dr. Perry. Relative to the M-X system, it is a breathing spell
because it is not possible for us to have those missiles or those
shelters in production before about 1984. So, we have a 5-year
period in which, no matter how much we want to be building these
new missiles and shelters, we do not have the capability of doing
so.
larger m-x deployment by building more shelters
Senator Stone. Could we get a substantially larger M-X deploy-
ment by building shelters at the rate of 2,000 per year?
Dr. Perry. Yes. If we started in 1984 or 1985, for example, we
could have 10,000 of them deployed by the date that we are now
quoting for full operational capability — 1989.
Senator Stone. But your overall feeling is that other than the
heavy missile RV's and the heavy missile comparisons, the Triad is
in our favor as to at least two legs and not in their favor as to at
least two legs?
Dr. Perry. That is correct.
Senator Stone. Thank you.
Senator Percy. Thank you.
nitze comment that m-x is less survivable/more expensive
Dr. Perry, when Paul Nitze had categorically stated that the
M-X is less survivable and more expensive, as I related in my last
question, you agreed with him that it is more expensive. Would you
468
please expand and comment on his statement that it is less surviv-
able.
Dr. Perry. I think it is unquestionable that this is not so. I have
no question at all in my mind that this system is more survivable
than the vertical shelter MPS system. That is precisely why we
have designed it. That is why we were willing to pay the extra
expense to get it.
Both of them have, as their principal mode of survivability the
hiding of missiles in a large number of shelters. From that point of
view, they are essentially identical in survivability.
The difference between the two systems is that this system in
addition has a dash capability. So, if you have any reason to believe
that the uncertainty of missile location has been compromised, you
still can have a last minute dash to save the systeni.
I do not envision a scenario in which all of this ever happens.
The importance is that we want to convince the Soviet war plan
that trying to coordinate and launch an attack against this system
is really impossible. If he could become convinced that he had an
espionage system or an exotic sensor system which located the
missiles in the shelters, he still could not become convinced that he
could successfully attack the system because he has to recognize
that even if he knows where the missile is when he launches his
ICBM's, he does not know where it will be when the ICBM's arrive
on target.
This has to throw such an element of uncertainty into his plan-
ning that I think it makes it completely unreasonable to believe he
would ever try to attack the system. This is why I say that this
system is more survivable. What I really mean to say is that it
creates an unacceptable uncertainty in the mind of anybody trying
to attack it— uncertainty caused by this additional complication of'
mobility.
ARGUMENTS OF SALT OPPONENTS ON M-X AND CRUISE MISSILE
PROGRAMS
Senator Percy. Would you respond to the arguments of a couple
of other opponents to our M-X system and cruise missile program.
SPEEDING UP M-X AND CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM
We have heard from several opponents of the treaty that
the M-X and cruise missile program could be speeded up by as
much as 18 months to 2 years and that speeding up these pro-
grams, particularly the M-X, would mean a shorter period of time
in which our land-based missiles would be vulnerable to attack.
The opponents charge that the real reason we do not speed up
these programs is that they will never be built.
Could either of these programs be speeded up? If we cut through
all the redtape, what would be the earliest that we could deploy
ALCM's and the M-X. Second, how would you respond to the
charge that these programs will be held hostage to SALT III?
Dr. Perry. That is the largest slice of baloney that I have ever
seen in one sandwich.
Senator Stone. Not salami, but baloney?
Dr. Perry. Very well, take your pick.
469
Senator Stone. The difference is important.
Dr. Perry. Let me first describe the cruise missile program. We
are farther along in it and I can describe more concretely what is
going on.
We are now, as Senator Stone mentioned, conducting the compet-
itive flyoff tests in that system. We have two different contractors
and we are paying an extra several hundred million dollars to have
two contractors proceeding in parallel to have maximum assurance
that one of them will have a successful program.
In addition to that, we have more of what we call concurrency in
that program than any other program in which we are engaging.
By concurrency I mean that while we are doing the development
phase, we are also doing production. While we are doing the test-
ing, we have production going on as well. If there is any legitimate
criticism as to how we are handling that program, it is that we
have too great a degree of concurrency. Both of these contractors
already have started building the production facility and already
have started producing the missiles. Clearly, that effort is going to
be more or less wasted so far as the loser is concerned.
I cite this example to point out the very high degree of concur-
rency that we have in the cruise missile program. It is a program
which, when I came into this job in early 1977, really did not exist.
The long-range, air-launched cruise missile program was only a
technology program at that time. We have been moving it on the
fastest possible course for operational capability. Any objective ex-
amination of the record will sustain that fact.
In the case of the M-X, it is conceivable that we could accelerate
the initial operational capability date by about a year under the
following set of circumstances.
First of all, we would have to presume a much heavier transfu-
sion of early year funding. Second, we would have to assume great
er overall funding because of the inefficiency of that particular
compression. Third, we would have to assume that we could solve
the various land withdrawal and environmental problems on about
a year faster timescale than we now imagine it can be done. In my
opinion, that would probably take legislation to waive certain of
the environmental requirements, which legislative action we do not
feel necessary, nor do we plan to ask for it. We believe that it is
important that this system meet objective environmental con-
straints. We may ask for support in minimizing the time involved
with procedural aspects of this. But we intend to see that this
system should meet all legitimate environmental considerations
placed on it.
So, it would take some sort of special action on the part of the
Congress, I think, to waive some of those requirements in order to
get an earlier availability date than 1986.
Senator Percy. But you do not now intend to ask for that extra
authority?
Dr. Perry. We may ask for some authority to streamline proce-
dures. We do not intend to ask for a waiver of any substantial
environmental considerations.
Senator Percy. If you did pick up a year, you would still be
within the provisions of the protocol, so far as deployment?
470
Dr. Perry. There is nothing we can do technically or program-
matically to violate the protocol, no matter how hard we try.
MAKE MINUTEMAN MOBILE RATHER THAN BUILD M-X —
BUILD ABM DEFENSES AROUND MINUTEMAN
Senator Percy. Yesterday, we heard a witness, Dr. May, who
argued that the United States should make the Minuteman mobile
rather than build the M-X. We have heard others argue that we
should build ABM defenses around Minuteman missiles and seek
an exception to this purpose to the ABM Treaty rather than build
the M-X. I would give you an opportunity to comment on those
criticisms made yesterday.
Dr. Perry. Thank you. I would be happy to do that.
Let me take the second issue first.
First of all, the ABM system would clearly be a violation of the
ABM Treaty which we have. But second, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, we do not know how to build an ABM system in which we
could have any confidence that it could protect our Minuteman
sites against a determined ICBM attack.
The cost and the time to develop and deploy that system, even if
we thought we could do it — certainly the schedule is on the same
order as the M-X schedule would be. But to put that ABM in
better context, I would say that we can design a system which can
defeat the presently deployed Soviet ICBM's. This is simply because
they have not put penetration aids for ABM's in that systern be-
cause they do not envision that they are going to have ABM's to
operate against.
But we know how to develop and deploy penetration aids which
would defeat such an ABM system, and it would be rash in the
extreme to believe that the Soviets could not do that.
So, when people are advocating an ABM system for defending
Minuteman, I believe they are imagining that the sophistication of
the Soviet ICBM threat remains constant, which is a naive assump-
tion.
Now, the other question concerns the mobile Minuteman. We
have looked quite extensively at using Minuteman either as an
interim system or as an alternative system to M-X. It is hard to
give a simple answer to that question because there are three
fundamentally different ways in which it might be deployed. One
proposal has been that we proceed to build an M-X basing system
such as I have described to you today, but instead of putting the
M-X missile in it, we put Minuteman missiles in it. I think there is
some belief that this would be a great saving of time and money.
The simplest answer to that is that it would save very little
money and maybe no time at all— or at most maybe a year or so of
time.
The pacing item in the operational date of this system is in the
base, not in the missile.
Of the $33 billion which has been estimated as the cost of M-X,
something on the order of $24 billion is associated with the base
and support facilities, not with the missile itself
My final comment is this. We simply cannot take the Minute-
man as it is and do that. It would require modification. It would
471
require further tests. It is not designed for a horizontal transport
mode of operation. So, it would require some modifications.
Finally, when this system has all reached its final operational
capability, about 1988 or 1989, what we would have deployed in
this $24 billion base is a 20-year-old missile. The first thing we
would have to do is take all the old chemicals out of that missile
and replace them with new chemicals because they would be worn
out. I think that is a poor proposal.
I really feel more strongly about it than that last phrase, but
that is all I will say for the record.
Another version that is being considered is the mobile Minute-
man, where you take the missile and you put it on the transporter
erector launcher. Then you save all of the costs of this enormously
expensive basing system. You can say we already have a basing
system which is the U.S. Interstate Highway System. So now you
will have this system which will roam up and down the interstate
highways. That system has a high degree of survivability because
we have an enormous area in the country for it to get lost in.
There is no doubt in my mind that that system has good survivabil-
ity. But I have never really been able to bring myself to propose
that system. It envisions not only driving around on interstate
highways with three nuclear warheads per missile, but those mis-
siles are connected to about 60,000 pounds of TNT equivalent,
which is a simple way of describing the chemical fuel in that
missile. I really think that is an irresponsible proposal and I would
not make it.
testing/deploying mobile minuteman system during protocol
Senator Percy. Well, with the uproar that we have gotten in
Illinois over nuclear waste alone, I would not suggest that you use
our interstate highways.
Could the mobile Minuteman system be tested or deployed before
the protocol expired?
Senator Stone. Don't use the Whitehurst Freeway, whatever you
do. [General laughter.]
Dr. Perry. It is pretty close, but the answer really is no. We
think it would take us about 3 or 4 years on the simple version, the
road mobile system, to get it deployed. You might envision a test
happening about halfway through that period. The answer is that
the protocol would not be a substantial constraint to us, if that is
truly what the country wanted to do.
Senator Percy. Senator Stone, I have just two more questions.
One relates to another criticism of Paul Nitze and another relates
to a previous question which you asked. May I just finish up with
those before I yield the floor?
Senator Stone. Go right ahead, Senator Percy.
Senator Percy. Thank you.
criticism of treaty for limiting launchers rather than
missiles
Yesterday, Paul Nitze criticized the treaty for limiting launchers
rather than missiles. He said the Soviets could hide ICBM's in
472
warehouses with retractable roofs and could fire them in a strate-
gic exchange.
Would you comment on the validity of this criticism.
Dr. Perry. That criticism has the seeds of its own defeat imbed-
ded in it. If you really believe that the Soviets could hide missiles
in warehouses and launch them and that we would have no way of
detecting or verifying that, then why in the world would we want a
treaty that counts missiles? You have aleady stated that you have
no way of verifying them, so why
Senator Stone. Well, you might count production rates and
stocking rates as opposed to launch sites.
Dr. Perry. But if you believed you could do that, then the
problem with counting launchers tends to go away.
There is one other point I want to make.
Some people have said— and I think it is worth illuminating this
issue— that yes, but you could have only the prescribed number of
launchers and then you could have a number of missiles waiting in
the wings to go into those launchers on a reload capability. Aside
from the provisions in the treaty which make that difficult by
limiting storage sites around missile areas, there is another factor,
particularly with the Soviet liquid fuel missile. Reloading a silo
takes some time and you can argue whether it is 2, 4, or 8 hours. It
is not a simple or easy task. During that time, the complex is
totally soft. The hardness of the silo does not protect the crew or
the missile while it is in this loading and fueling process.
We have pointed out that our submarine launched missiles have
no hard target capability. You would never use them to attack a
silo. But if you envision a reload being used against you, they could
certainly make very unattractive the job of reloading this silo. The
multikiloton warhead going off within 1,000 or 2,000 feet of it
would certainly destroy everything in the vicinity, not counting the
silo. So I think the reload capability is handled adequately by our
SLBM force.
ONSITE INSPECTIONS OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES
Senator Percy. On the same point, Paul Nitze undoubtedly
would like to count missiles with onsite inspection of the produc-
tion facilities. This is another criticism of his. Would you care to
comment on it? I presume that we tried to get that and it has been
turned down.
Dr. Perry. Speaking for the U.S. development program, we
would have no objection to there being an onsite inspection of our
missiles. But if Paul Nitze can go over and negotiate that clause
into the treaty, I think that would be just great.
Senator Percy. So, it is just a matter of their simply rejecting it?
Dr. Perry. Ambassador Earle apparently was not able to negoti-
ate that.
Ralph, what can you say about that?
Ambassador Earle. Senator Percy, we did not try to negotiate it.
Onsite inspection has inherent difficulties. Reliance on spot checks
in this case in my view does not lead you to total reliance on what
you derive from them.
473
Unless we had resident inspectors at every known production
facility, it would be of little value. When you get into that area,
what about the unknown production facilities?
I do not find it a feasible approach. We did not propose it. I don't
think the Soviets would accept it. But I really do not think it would
be of that great a benefit to us.
MESSAGE TO SOVIETS ON MPS QUESTION
Senator Percy. Ambassador Earle, my last question is to you and
it relates back to your conversations with Senator Stone on this
subject.
I know that sometimes the State Department feels that ambigu-
ity is a good thing. We felt that way originally on Resolution 242 of
the United Nations.
I think I stand together with Senator Stone in believing that in
this case one of our jobs in the Senate is to try to look at any place
that can be ambiguous and to try to clarify it.
We just do not want mistaken Soviet perceptions about what
they think we can and cannot do. It is not a matter of going to
them for permission. Rather, it is making perfectly clear to them
right from the outset our position and that we intend to go forward
with something and do it in as public a way as we can and private-
ly as well.
In your own statement you mentioned a problem. You said that
the United States does not accept the Soviet arguments raised in
the context of vertical shelters that the MPS approach would in-
volve construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers. The shelters
in an MPS system are not ICBM launchers.
We have a difference of opinion there with the Soviets. Have we
in that particular case told them clearly how we feel about this? If
so, when did we do that and what was their response?
Ambassador Earle. Senator Percy, what we said was that any
MPS system which we developed would be verifiable and it would
not violate the prohibition on the construction of new fixed ICBM
silo launchers. There was silence on their part thereafter. As I
mentioned, Mr. Brezhnev did sign the agreement.
Now that statement was made to them in Geneva; it was made
through diplomatic channels; and it was also made to them by the
President.
Senator Percy. Thank you very much.
I would like to say that we very much appreciate both of you
coming back. We felt that to complete the record several appear-
ances would be necessary in order to give you a chance to respond
to the critics. I think this helps clarify the record.
In the event that we have overlooked some of the criticisms that
we subsequently feel are valid enough to warrant questioning, Mr.
Chairman, I would ask that the record be kept open so that any of
the committee members can submit further questions that would
clarify criticisms that have been made. In this way, before we
complete the record, our witnesses will have an opportunity to
respond to those criticisms.
Senator Stone. There will be additional questions which we will
ask be submitted for the record, so without objection, it is so
ordered.
474
Thank you, Senator Percy.
I have one or two final questions, and one relates to Cuba, Dr.
Perry.
ADDITIONAL ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE FACILITIES IN CUBA
The Cienfuegos Naval Base construction involves the possibility
of antisubmarine warfare against us. In connection with my ques-
tioning of you regarding their antisubmarine warfare technology,
you assured us that they are several years away at least, and even
later than 1986, from any really substantial capability in that
regard. Therefore, can you assure us that there is no technical
antisubmarine warfare additions being made by the Soviets in
Cuba?
Dr. Perry. Senator Stone, I am not a good source on what the
Soviets are or are not doing in Cuba.
Senator Stone. Well, if they don't have it at all, how can they be
doing it in Cuba — right?
Dr. Perry. I would comment that I do know what their technol-
ogy and operational capability in this field is and it would not
change my judgment on it if I learned that they had deployed some
of that capability in Cuba.
I am not saying that that is a good thing or something that we
should condone. But I am saying that it would not change my
judgment on their ability to localize our SLBM's at sea.
Senator Stone. Thank you.
Thank you. Ambassador Earle and Dr. Perry, for a very helpful
and enlightening session. We appreciate it.
Dr. Perry. Thank you. Senator Stone.
Ambassador Earle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Dr. Perry's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. William J. Perry
Mr. Chariman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to testify before you
today on MX and our planned program of Strategic Force Modernization.
The testimony is divided into three parts. First is an overview of our Strategic
Force Modernization Program. Next, the major portion of my testimony will address
the MX program — missile and survivable basing system — which the President has
recently approved. Finally, I will review the impact of our planned modernization
program on arms control.
strategic force modernization
The primary objective of our strategic forces is to deter nuclear war. The present
TRIAD of strategic forces has been successful in achieving this objective since the
1960's. This TRIAD of forces includes:
(1) ICBM's— more than 1,000 Minuteman and Titan II launch vehicles with a total
of more than 2,000 warheads;
(2) SLBM's — more than 600 Polaris and Poseidon launch vehicles with nearly
5,000 total warheads; and
(3) Heavy Bombers — more than 300 B-52's with a total of more than 2,000 war-
heads.
In aggregate we have more than 9,000 warheads, comprising a powerful deterrent
force. Given the size and strength of this force, some have questioned the need for
modernization. While it is true that the present balance is adequate in terms of our
objectives of deterrence and equivalence, we face challenges for the future that we
cannot ignore. Indeed, while the strategic balance through 1985 will continue to be
adequate, it will be less favorable to us in the early 1980's than it is now. That is
true with or without a SALT II agreement.
The first challenge is the obsolescence of our own strategic forces. We need to
modernize, improve, and in some cases replace these strategic forces in order to
475
maintain a responsive and reliable deterrent, and we will need to do so regardless of
the status of SALT.
The second challenge we face is the growing vulnerability of our ICBM force. By
the early 1980's the Soviets will have the combination of guidance accuracy and
warhead numbers that will give their ICBM's the theoretical capability to destroy
most of our Minuteman force in a preemptive attack. Fortunately, the future
vulnerability of the Minuteman force does not imply the concurrent vulnerability of
the United States. We can afford some temporary degradation in the ICBM force
because our overall strategic capability will remain strong. The other two legs of the
strategic Triad are not now threatened in the same way as our ICBM's. But we have
decided to build up the leg of the Triad that is temporarily weak so that should
other parts of our strategic forces become more vulnerable at some later time, our
overall strategic deterrent will not be eroded.
A third challenge is the possibility of longer term threats to our bombers and
rnissile-carrying submarines. Under some circumstances Soviet SLBM's could pose a
significant counterforce threat to our bombers, by barrage attack on our present
SAC bases. There is also the potential of our bombers being destroyed with an ICBM
barrage attack. The larger number of ICBM RV's (relative to SLBM RV's) could
compensate for the longer time available for bomber escape, so that even though the
bombers get off the ground, they may not escape the area that is barraged. Our air-
breathing force will also have to deal with the growing Soviet air defense threat
posed by look down — shoot down interceptors and advanced surface-to-air missiles
currently under development. Well into the 1980's our bombers will be able to
penetrate Soviet defenses — and our ALCM's indefinitely.
Fortunately, we are also quite confident that, through the 1980's — which is about
as far as we can confidently predict — our SLBM's cannot be located by Soviet anti-
submarine warfare forces sufficiently well for an ICBM barrage attack to be effec-
tive against them. But we are not so sure what ASW capabilities the Soviets may
develop and deploy in the 1990's, so we cannot simply assume that our SLBM force
will remain invulnerable indefinitely.
To meet these challenges, we have been working to find ways to restore the
survivability of ICBM's, to maintain our SLBM survivability into future decades,
and to strengthen the survivability of our air-breathing forces. We have programs in
the works to do all of these things.
The most difficult issue to resolve has been the survivability of the land-based leg
of the Triad; as I said earlier, this is the single most serious strategic problem we
face at the present time.
We have sought a solution to this problem that will satisfy our military require-
ments and be consistent with our efforts and to have verifiable strategic arms
limitations. Because it is relevant to SALT II and important to the future viability
of our strategic forces, I would like to describe the MX and its basing system in
some detail.
M-X
In June the President approved full scale development of the MX missile. MX is
the largest new missile permitted under SALT II. It will be 71 feet in length and 92
inches in diameter, weighing 190,000 lbs. With a throw-weight of 7,900 pounds, the
MX can be loaded with 10 Mk-12A reentry vehicles. Assuming that SALT II
constrains ICBM's to no more than 10 reentry vehicles, the MX will have a military
capability equivalent to the SS-18, the largest Soviet ICBM.
Last week the President approved the mobile basing system for MX. This basing
method evolved from previous designs of both the underground trench and surface
horizontal shelters. The concept combines the most desirable features of these two
approaches. Derived from the trench concept are system confinement and the asso-
ciated benefits to verification; an integral transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) which
makes it unambiguously dec./ that shelters are not launchers; and rapid force
reposturing or dash on tactical warning. Derived from the horizontal shelter con-
cepts are lower cost designs; reduced environmental impact; improved options for
preservation of TEL location uncertainty; and, greater public acceptance in the
states where the system will likely be deployed.
Each TEL is confined to operate on a loop type road network with shelters located
on spurs as depicted in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows a sketch of the shelter concept. The
shelters are hardened and have openable roofs for verification.
Figure 3 shows a sketch of the TEL concept and lists some of its characteristics.
The complete TEL is parked in a shelter in the normal, peacetime operating mode.
The missile can be launched from the TEL on the road— the shelter is not required
for launch. When launching the missile from inside the shelters, the TEL mecha-
nism pushes up through the shelter roof so there will be no problem of debris from
a nearby nuclear burst blocking the door.
UR_9R n n
476
There are about 4600 shelters deployed on 200 road loops. Each loop has 23
shelters, with only one TEL which carries one missile. Adjacent loops are not
connected by roads capable of supporting TELs, and TELs cannot be moved from
one loop to another without being disassembled and passed through the normal
support process. The TELs are too heavy (about 700,000 pounds) and too cumber-
some (about 180 feet long, 13 feet high and 13 feet wide) to operate off-road; they
would sink into the surface, be trapped by small terrain variations, or tip over.
Therefore, each TEL is confined to operate only within its 23 shelter loop; this aids
verification.
The preferred deployment area is a series of valleys in the western desert area.
About 100 valleys appear usable based on topologic and geologic considerations. The
valleys are not very large and on the average only a few loops will be in a single
valley. This natural clustering feature adds another level of confinement to the
system by impeding transfer of equipment throughout the deployment area except
through well defined, observable entry and exit points.
Further enhancement of system verifiability is built in by the operations and flow
indicated in Figure 4. The missile, its canister and communications modules are
assembled in the designated assembly area (DAA) in facilities that are open to the
extent possible (e.g., openable-roof facilities). The assembly process is designed to
take a significant time (about one week) and only one missile is in work at any time.
The missile, its launch-related equipment and TEL subassemblies are shipped at a
slow pace to the designated deployment area (DDA) on a special railroad. A spur of
the special track connects each valley to the mainline and there is a major barrier
which must be removed before the flatcar can enter the valley. The barrier is
designed to require a considerable time period to disassemble, keeping the overall
process slow.
Once in the valley the flatcar delivers the equipment to a final assembly area
(FA A), but first has to pass through another barrier station. This second barrier is
of the same type as the first one, increasing confidence that the TEL could not move
undetected among the road loops.
The TEL is put together in final, workable form in the FAA and is then mated
with the missile and launch-related equipment. This step ensures that the TEL
cannot exist in its final operational form anywhere but as its deployment site in the
DDA. Verification is thereby enhanced. After assembly, the TEL is driven into the
road loop.
Survivability
Survivability of the system is based on two independent elements: preservation of
location uncertainty and a high degree of mobility.
Location uncertainty is maintained by periodically moving the TEL from one
shelter to another and by making it impossible for remote observers to determine
whether what is being moved is indeed the TEL. Since the movement of the TEL
from shelter-to-shelter occurs on surface roads out in the open, a visibility shield is
used to cover it. This shield, illustrated in Figure 5, is provided by a special vehicle
which can move alone, or straddle and move in unison with the TEL when the TEL
is moved. After the TEL is relocated in a new shelter, the shield vehicle visits all
the shelters and replicates the procedures associated with TEL entry into a shelter.
Thus, the identification of the shelter into which the TEL was inserted is denied.
Under normal conditions, the missile would be moved to another shelter in its
cluster when maintenance is required, or at least once every few months if no
maintenance was needed. The crew schedule for movements would be established so
that no crew would know where more than a very few missiles were located. The
many observables associated with movement of a 700,000 pound TEL and a 190,000
pound missile need to be simulated or masked in the overall process. In-shelter and
in-transit signatures (e.g., electromagnetic, acoustic and thermal emissions) will be
simulated by a combination of countermeasures placed in the shelter and carried by
the vehicle.
Denial of the opportunity to measure many of the system's observables is accom-
plished by a combination of exclusion from the immediate vicinity of the shelter (as
is currently the case with the Minuteman silo sites) and by sweeping the area to
detect sensors or agent operations. Seismic effects, however, are long-range and
might be measurable by remote sensors. If this proves to be a real concern, the
seismic effects can be simulated by carrying mass simulators in the shield vehicle
whenever it is moving without a TEL. The need for mass simulators is not yet
firmly established, but we plan to retain the option to include mass simulators
should the need be established. Actual deployment of mass simulators would add
$1.4B (in FY 80$) to the cost.
Survivability of the system is provided by this basing arrangement is in three
different modes of operation. First, the system can be repostured in a short time;
477
using normal practices a few hours is achievable. This operating practice might be
useful if some concern about location uncertainty develops, or if an international
crisis appears to be developing. Second, if the location uncertainty becomes in grave
doubt then the system, or a portion of it, could be placed in constant motion; if
tactical warning indicates an attack, the TELs could then drive into the nearest
shelters. Third, as an alternative to constant motion, the TELs could be poised to
dash on tactical warning to reposture some designated percentage of the force
during the flight time of attacking ICBMs (it is not feasible to do this during close-in
SLBM flight times, although dash to a few of the nearest neighboring shelters is
possible here). The dash on warning mode sizes the TEL's locomotion capability and
allows any one of the shelters on the loop to be reached in the 30 minute ICBM
flight time.
We have analyzed the MX system in response to a variety of Soviet counterforce
threats. The threats considered ranged from a moderate Soviet buildup constrained
by SALT II to a high Soviet buildup assuming SALT II never goes into effect. In
each case the number of MX missiles and shelters were adjusted so that when the
Soviets had expended all of their ICBM RV's in one-on-one attacks on MX shelters
(after first attacking Minuteman), we still have some ICBMs surviving. This ap-
proach takes away any Soviet incentive to attack our ICBM force using their ICBM
force, since they degrade their relative position by undertaking such an attack.
For example, if they launch their entire ICBM force against ours they would be
left, after the attack, with their SLBM and bomber forces facing our superior SLBM
and bomber forces plus the remaining US ICBMs that have survived the attack.
Should they choose to hold some ICBMs in reserve, they will still lose (although a
smaller amount) relative to their position before the attack.
In response to a moderate Soviet buildup constrained by SALT II, we estimate
that the MX program would require 200 missiles and 4,600 shelters at a cost of $33
billion in constant FY 80 dollars. In reaction to a high Soviet buildup assuming
SALT II never goes into effect, the MX program would require 400 missiles and
13,500 shelters at a cost of $59 billion in constant FY 80 dollars.
Even for this most very severe threat excursion, the MX system can be expanded
to meet the threat even if it had to take the entire ICBM threat by itself. In fact, it
is inconceivable that we would not also attempt to deter such an enormous (and
enormously costly) Soviet buildup — if it seemed to be materializing — by augmenting
other legs of the triad. For example, we could increase our deployment of cruise
missiles and C-4 SLBM's.
We would not have significant programmatic difficulty in expanding MX to meet
these advanced threats. We can build shelters, for example, at a rate of 2000 per
year, or even higher under emergency conditions.
In MX system configurations, missiles and shelters can be traded off within wide
limits without major changes in cost or survivability. Thus, our response to a
breakout could emphasize either missiles or shelters, depending on available produc-
tion resources and policy considerations.
Verification
Verification of the system is accomplished on the basis of several general charac-
teristics which have been noted earlier. These include:
(1) A designated assembly area (DAA) used for the equipment, with operations
conducted as openly as is feasible to aid observations by National Technical Means
(NTM).
(2) Special transport techniques used to move the equipment from DAA to the
designated deployment area (DDA). The uniqueness of these transport techniques
aids in identification and monitorability.
(3) A final assembly area, used at the entry of the DDA where the TEL assembly
is completed and the missile is mated with the TEL. The TEL, therefore, only exists
in the DDA.
(4) Barriers between the DAA and the DDA. They require a significant time to
disassemble in order to permit transit of equipment.
(5) Clustering of road loops in small groups in the valleys comprising the DDA.
This makes transfer between groups impossible.
(6) No interconnection between road loops which would allow TEL transfer. Thus
TELs cannot be transferred from loop-to-loop.
Openable roofs on the shelters permit viewing via NTM. The shelters would be
opened periodically, (e.g., at major maintenance periods), and a specified number of
openings would occur each year. Provisions for "on-demand" openings would also be
made in order to handle ambiguous cases. The shelter roofs are opened by removing,
by crane, a number of plugs built into the roof, as indicated in Figure 2.
We have made comprehensive assessments of the verifiability of the system. The
results may be summarized as follows:
478
The Soviets can verify the proposed U.S. system.
Soviet concern over US cheating should be ineligible due to the availability of
collateral information.
If employed by the Soviets, a system designed along the lines of MX would be
verifiable by the United States. We could monitor with high confidence the number
of MX-type launchers the Soviets deployed in designated areas and would have high
confidence that no such launchers deployed elsewhere.
Environmental and public issues
The MX basing system involves "point security" practices. This means that only
the land in the immediate vicinity of each of the shelters is withdrawn from public
use. The area is about 2.5 acres per shelter— essentially the same as current Min-
uteman sites. Thus only about 25 square miles would be withdrawn from public use,
including land for the assembly areas.
Every effort will be made to make MX energy self-sufficient. Each MX shelter
may require 5-10 kw of power in steady-state operation, which results in several
tens of megawatts of total power requirement. It appears feasible to power MX in
peacetime by photo-voltaic solar systems emplaced at the shelters, along with some
geothermal plants or windmills. This would avoid energy problems and also provide
a pathfinder program for large scale production of commercially useful photovoltaic
systems. The size of the solar units would be in the range of interest for individual
homes.
Costs
The total DoD system costs for the current baseline concept are estimated in FY
80 dollars at $33 billion for acquisition and $440 million for annual operations and
support. The costs include RDT&E for mass simulators in the shield vehicle and
shelters. Actual deployment of the mass simulators would add about $1.4 billion to
the acquisition costs and about $10 million to the annual operations and support
costs.
The cost estimates have been carefully prepared, but with any complex system
projected 10 years into the future there is bound to be uncertainty. "Improvements"
will be resisted unless an overriding need can be demonstrated. However, there are
some features which probably will ultimately be added to the system (e.g., mass
simulators). Implementation of these improvements will be deferred until their need
actually arises, though low-cost provision will be made for them. Costs will also be
influenced should the Soviets increase their ICBM threat beyond our estimates,
especially in the absence or termination of SALT II. In that case we would expand
the MX system in response and that would, of course, increase the cost (but by less
than the Soviet threat augmentation would cost them).
Incremental costs to expand the system are roughly $2.6 million per shelter
against a proliferated Soviet missile threat and $2.0 million per shelter against a
Soviet threat based on fractionation of the current missile inventory. These costs
are slightly less than our acquisition cost per RV. While we do not know what
Soviet RV costs are, we have no reason to believe them to be substantially different
from our own. Thus there would be no advantage to the Soviets in pursuing an RV
vs shelter race, considering that they would be investing in RVs based in vulnerable
silos and obtaining no cost advantage in the process.
This is an expensive system like all other major strategic systems we have built.
In FY 80 dollars the Minuteman ICBM program cost $40B, the B-52 program cost
$54B (not including the supporting tanker force and ALCM), and the TRIDENT
program will cost about $39B (assuming 25 submarines and 600 C-4 misiles). Annual
operating costs of MX will be comparable to Minuteman, and about one-third those
of the SLBM force or bomber force.
IMPACT OF STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ON SALT
I have described for you today the strategic force modernization programs which
the Administration has planned for the years ahead. These efforts have become an
important issue in the debate over SALT II. In my view this is an entirely proper
extension of the SALT debate. The value of SALT II cannot be determined in
isolation; the treaty must be judged in terms of its effect on U.S.-Soviet relations
and on the overall defense posture of the United States.
As Secretary Brown has said repeatedly, SALT II by itself is not sufficient to
ensure the strategic balance between the United States and Soviet Union. But it
does permit us to take the steps necessary to maintain the strategic balance and it
makes that task easier by putting important limitations on Soviet strategic forces.
With or without SALT we will need to modernize our strategic forces, during the
lifetime of SALT II we will continue deployment of the Trident submarines and
479
missile, we will begin to deploy ALCMs which will dramatically improve the capa-
bility of our bomber forces, and we will move toward IOC of MX in a survivable and
verifiable basing mode. These programs are necessary because SALT will not solve
all of our strategic problems, but SALT II will make the resolution of those prob-
lems easier than would be the case without an agreement.
The need for greater defense efforts has led some to ask whether SALT is really
worth the effort, whether in fact it is arms control at all. My own view is that SALT
II will make a valid and significant contribution to US national security if it is
combined with a vigorous program of strategic force improvements.
It is important to understand that strategic arms control and force modernization
are not inconsistent undertakings. They are complementary ways of maintaining a
stable nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. By modern-
ization and improving our strategic forces we can ensure that we are capable of
meeting our defense objectives despite the continued Soviet buildup. By negotiating
an equitable and verfiable SALT agreement we can constrain Soviet forces and limit
the threat to which we must respond.
We must also understand that arms control cannot substitute for strategic force
modernization. We need to pursue both courses of action, and this Administration is
committed to doing so.
Arms control and Force modernization are mutually supportive:
Arms control helps modernization: by limiting the Soviet threat, and by adding
predictability to the Soviet force buildup we are able to respond more prudently and
more efficiently in designing our own forces. Specific example: the SALT II limit on
RVs per missile will make MX more survivable and less expensive.
Modernization helps arms control: by keeping our forces strong, secure, and
survivable, we can negotiate with greater confidence. This will also provide our
adversaries with a greater incentive to negotiate.
The June decision on the MX missile was criticized by some on grounds that it
would give the United States a destabilizing first-strike capability, suggesting that
we instead rely on smaller missiles such as Minuteman. This issue, of course, is not
affected by the decision on the basing mode. The MX missile will be capable of
attacking Soviet silos in the late 1980's. In sufficient numbers it could give us
effectively the same capability against silos that the Soviets will have in the early
1980's. In the mid 1980's the ALCM will provide us with a capability (although not
prompt) of the same sort, and SLBMs at some future date will probably achieve a
counter-silo accuracy.
But in none of those cases, for ourselves or for the Soviets, will this amount to a
disarming first-strike capability, since the very formidable at-sea SLBM forces of
both countries (and the bomber/cruise missile force) will not be affected by an
attack on silos. The primary advantage to the United States of having the same
counter-silo capability as the Soviets, besides the obvious perception reasons, is that
by giving the Soviets the same problem that they gave us, we motivate them to go
to smaller, mobile survivable ICBM's as did we. Smaller missiles are less threaten-
ing to the United States, and stability will actually be enhanced if both sides move
to survivable and verifiable ICBM basing.
In summary, MX is consistent with our arms control objectives for the following
reasons:
(1) It r^^tores confidence in the one vulnerable leg of Triad,
(2) It reduces the need to consider LUA as a policy option,
(3) It discourages the Soviets from preemptive attack (and encourages them to
move to smaller, less threatening mobile ICBM's or to SLBM's).
480
FIGURE 4
DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT
HIGHWAY
SPECIAL
RAILROAD
(E.G. 4 RAIL TRACK)
PUBLIC RAILROAD
Senator Stone. This session is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the committee adjourned, to recon-
vene subject to call of the Chair.]
[Additional questions and answers follow:]
Ambassador Earle's and Dr. Perry's Responses to Additional Questions
Submitted for the Record
Question 1. Did the United States allow a significant loophole in the SALT II
Treaty by not obtaining Soviet agreement to the numerical magnitudes of the
launch- weight and throw-weight of the SS-19 (the largest light ICBM which sets the
standard for the dividing line between light and heavy ballistic missiles)? Won't the
Soviets be able to exploit this loophole by making their "new type" ICBM somewhat
larger than the SS-19's such that the United States will not be able to challenge
because it will not know precisely the magnitude of the limit?
Answer. The absence of Soviet data on the launch-weight and throw-weight of the
Soviet SS-19 will not interfere with our ability to determine whether the Soviets
are complying with the agreement or to challenge a suspected violation. A Soviet
statement on data could not substitute for our own estimates of SS-19 launch-
weight and throw-weight.
Under the terms of the SALT II Treaty, the Soviets are barred from any increase
in the launch-weight or throw-weight of the SS-19, because they have agreed that
the SS-19 defines the upper limit for "light" ICBM's. Our intelligence can detect a
change in these factors more easily and with greater precision than it can measure
their exact size. The requirement that any follow-on to the existing SS-19 not
exceed the current launch-weight and throw-weight of the SS-19 is monitored by
comparing our intelligence on the new missile with our extensive intelligence data
on the SS-19. Our own monitoring capability will allow us to determine whether
there are any significant increases in the size of the SS-19 and whether there is any
significant discrepancy between the SS-19 and any new Soviet "light" missile.
In short, there is no loophole. We have a firm basis for challenging Soviet efforts
to evade the limits on new or modified ICBM's, and we have clear guidelines for our
own design of the M-X ICBM.
Question 2. Couldn't an entirely new ICBM which didn't violate the "new types"
definition have increased (1) accuracy, (2) reliability, (3) range capability, (4) war-
head yield, (5) ABM defense penetration capability, (6) targeting capability and (7)
capability of command and control subsystems? Couldn't any of these factors signifi-
cantly increase the military capability and, hence, utility of the ICBM?
481
Answer. An existing ICBM could be improved in the course of modernization in
these categories, to the extent that those improvements could be made without
violation of the SALT II Treaty limits on modifying existing ICBM systems. These
require that any modifications have to be made within the constraints of limiting
the length, the largest diameter, the throw-weight, and the launch-weight of the
ICBM to changes of between plus or minus 5 percent; and not changing the number
of stages or type of stage propellant. Thus, even with improvement in the seven
categories you mentioned, "an entirely new missile" would have to be one where
throw-weight, number of warheads, dimensions, and type of propellants were essen-
tially the same as before. (In some categories, notably yield, the throw-weight limit
would inhibit improvements.) Improving any of these factors would increase to some
degree the absolute capability of the ICBM but would not cause us significant
concern militarily. However, taking into account the capabilities of existing Soviet
ICBM's, even very large improvement in these areas would not affect our deterrent
capability or the strategic balance. This is because the newest Soviet ICBM's al-
ready have sufficient accuracy, yield, reliability, range, command-and-control, etc.,
to attack any target, hard or soft. Therefore, further improvements in these param-
eters would be of marginal significance.
What is important with regard to further improvements in accuracy and yield-to-
weight ratio would be the deployment of more, smaller RV's on Soviet ICBM's while
retaining good hard target capability. The provisions of the Treaty (new types
limitations, fractionation limits, and MIRVed ICBM launcher limitations) will con-
strain the number of Soviet ICBM RV's which can threaten U.S. ICBM's in the
future. Combined with the limits on smaller RV's, they will effectively prevent such
exploitation of improved accuracy and yield.
Question 3. In the selected M-X horizontal shelter basing mode, do the shelters
constitute storage facilities at launch sites which are prohibited by SALT II? What
was the original intent of the sides in agreeing to this prohibition? What is the
meaning of the terms "storage facilities" and "launch sites '?
Answer. Subparagraph 5(b) of Article IV of the Treaty prohibits either side from
providing storage facilities for or storing ICBM's in excess of normal deployment
requirements at launch sites of ICBM launchers. The associated Agreed Statement
defines the term "normal deployment requirements" as the deployment of one
missile at each ICBM launcher. The sides did not define the other terms formally in
the Treaty, but their meaning was made clear in the negotiating record. An ICBM
"launch site" refers to the area adjacent to and surrounding an ICBM launcher.
"Storage facilities" refer to some protective structure, either above or below ground,
in which missiles would be stored and from which they would have ready access to
the ICBM launcher. The intent of the sides in this provision was to prohibit either
side from deploying near ICBM launchers excess missiles which could be used for
rapid reload and refire of the ICBM launchers.
The horizontal shelters in the U.S. MPS (multiple protective structure) basing
mode for the M-X ICBM will not be storage facilities for excess missiles pursuant to
subparagraph 5(b) of Article IV. They will never be used for storing missiles, but
only for housing a missile on its launcher. The MPS system is being designed so
that the Soviets can verify that there is only one M-X launcher carrying its one
M-X missile in each designated deployment area with its associated 23 horizontal
shelters. They will be able to verify that there are no excess ICBM's and no storage
facilities for excess ICBM's. Thus, the U.S. MPS system will be consistent with the
SALT II agreement.
Question 4- In their testimony, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated concern with the
inclusion in SALT II of conventionally armed cruise missiles. As you know, NATO
counts heavily on air-delivered conventional munitions to counter Soviet armored
strength. When was the decision made by the United States to agree to the Russian
insistence that conventionally armed cruise missiles also be included?
Answer. Since we had no programs for long-range, conventionally-armed, air-
launched cruise missiles, and in view of verification concerns, we indicated to the
Soviets in late 1978 that, in the context of satisfactory resolution of other issues, we
would agree that the limits in the Treaty on ALCM's and in the Protocol on
GLCM's and SLCM's would apply to both conventional and nuclear weapon-delivery
vehicles. We made clear that such a definition of GLCM and SLCM in the Protocol
set no precedent for future limits, if any, on such weapon systems. After prolonged
negotiation on the issue, the sides agreed shortly before the Summit to a separate
definition of GLCM and SLCM in the Protocol covering both conventional and
nuclear weapon-delivery systems. This separate definition underscores the U.S. no-
precedent position, as made clear in the negotiating record.
Question 5. Was a detailed study undertaken and presented to the Secretary of
Defense and the President on the utility for NATO of conventionally-armed cruise
482
missiles for penetrating dense Warsaw Pact air defense? If such a study was done,
when was it completed?
Answer. Although no formal study was undertaken and presented to the Presi-
dent on the utility for NATO of conventionally armed cruise missiles for penetrat-
ing dense Warsaw Pact air defenses, there have been a number of staff and contrac-
tor studies which explored this and other issues related to conventionally-armed
cruise missiles. The Secretary of Defense was informed of staff assessments of the
utility, feasibility and potential availability of conventional cruise missiles. Based
upon this work the results of these assessments were used in analyses of the issues
for the Special Coordination Committee (SCO and the President. For example,
during 1978, in the context of the SCC deliberations on the SALT cruise missile
definition, the Secretary received staff summary papers on conventional applica-
tions of cruise missiles. A draft version of one such paper. Conventional Applica-
tions of Cruise Missiles, was provided to the SFRC by ACDA on July 26, 1979.
Question 6. There was a recent report that the State Department had objected to
a joint USAF/West German low-cost, lightweight (about 100 lbs.) miniature drone
program (with a 20-lbs. conventional warhead) to be used against Warsaw Pact air
defense radars on the grounds that such a drone would violate SALT IL Was this
report accurate?
Answer. Since the system to be developed by the United States and FRG is an
unmanned guided mini-drone, the issue regarding whether this joint program would
violate the SALT II protocol was addressed by the DoD as a key issue is whether the
grogram should be approved. The DoD review, which included review by the DoD
ALT II representative, concluded there would be no conflict between the program
and SALT II. We therefore recommended to the Department of State and the Office
of Management and the Budget that we approve the program and provided them
our assessment regarding SALT II. After careful review, especially on this point,
State and 0MB concurred in the proposed joint program.
Question 7. In Secretary Brown's posture statements for both fiscal year 1979 and
fiscal year 1980, the prospect of fifth generation Soviet ICBM's was presented. In his
fiscal year 1979 statement he said:
"In addition, the Soviets have a fifth generation of ICBM's in development,
estimated to consist of four missiles. Flight testing of one or two of these missiles
could begin at any time, with the others following by the early 1980's."
What are your current expectations? How does the "new type" rule in the Treaty
really affect this prospect? Has the testing of fifth generation been delayed or
already begun?
What additional constraints to make the "new type" rule more effective did the
United States propose during the negotiations but which were not included in the
final agreement?
Answer. Much as Secretary Brown indicated in his posture statement for fiscal
year 1980, current projections by the Intelligence Community are that the Soviets
probably have under development at least four new or modified types of ICBM's.
Flight-testing of these systems could begin within the next year or so. However,
modifications currently being tested may incorporate some of the improvements
intended for the projected fifth generation systems. In any event, given existing
"Treaty constraints, it is expected that any additional improvements to these systems
will meet the Treaty criteria for existing type modernization. The effect will be that,
to the extent these programs continue— as they may— they will be restricted to
modification of existing types that do not significantly increase the threat to the
United States. (See previous answer.)
Furthermore, in view of the early Soviet insistence on a single exemption to the
new types rule contained in the Treaty, it is expected that one of the projected
systems will have substantially different characteristics and quality as a new type
of ICBM in terms of Treaty provisions. However, the Soviets will not be permitted
both to replace the MIRVed SS-17 (4 RV's) or SS-19 (6 RV's) ICBM's with a 10-RV
light ICBM and to replace their non-MIRVed SS-11 ICBM with a non-MIRVed light
ICBM that differs substantially from the SS-U.
The United States first advocated a ban on new types and on modifications to
existing types of ICBM's in its Comprehensive Proposal of March 1977. The new
types issue became the subject of detailed negotiations in Geneva, beginning in the
fall of 1977, when the United States initially proposed that a new type be considered
as any ICBM which had a propulsion system, guidance system, reentry vehicles,
penetration aids, and/or post boost vehicle (PBV) of a type different from such
components on existing ICBM's. In April 1978, a new United States proposal was
tabled which reflected a shift of focus away from attempts to control ICBM accuracy
improvements by means of a freeze on changes in guidance system hardware. Under
this proposal, which formed the basis for the new types definition as it finally
483
evolved, a new type was defined as an ICBM different from existing types (those
flight-tested as of April 15, 1978), in one or more of the following respects:
(a) the number of stages, the length, the largest diameter, the launch-weight, or
the throw-weight, of the missile;
(b) the initial weight, the type of propellant (i'.e., liquid or solid), or the total
impulse, of any of its stages;
(c) the initial weight, the type of propellant (i.e., liquid or solid), or the total
impulse, of the post-boost vehicle (PBV).
"Different" with respect to length, diameter, launch-weight, throw-weight, initial
weight, and total impulse, was defined as any change (plus or minus) in excess of
five percent. This value was chosen both to be adequately verifiable and to allow for
possible minor design or production changes necessary for the maintenance of the
effectiveness of existing types of ICBM's, while preventing significant modifications
in the components subject to constraint.
The United States introduced another proposal designed to make the fractiona-
tion limits — the limits on the number of RV's on ICBM's of existing types — more
effective. It proposed — and the Soviets agreed — that the weight of individual reentry
vehicles on existing types of ICBM's with multiple reentry vehicles be no lighter
than those already flight-tested on that type of ICBM as of May 1, 1979. Limitations
were also agreed on the minimum weight of RV's on existing types of ICBM's with
single reentry vehicles. These provisions are intended to inhibit a Party from
quickly deploying, at a later date, more reentry vehicles than the number to which
existing types of ICBM's are limited by the fractionation limits.
Additionally, the United States proposed that the weight of each reentry vehicle
on the one permitted new type of ICBM be greater than four percent of the missile
throw-weight. We eventually dropped this proposal in the context of agreement on
other issues. However, the United States made an informal statement that, if a side
tested RV's on the permitted new type of ICBM, for which the total weight of 10
such RV's was less than 40 percent of the throw-weight, it would raise serious
questions whether the new system was really designed to be one in which the
payload would not exceed 10 RV's. The United States further stated that if such a
problem arose in the future, it would be an issue for discussion and resolution in the
Standing Consultative Commission. The Soviets made no comment with regard to
this statement.
Question 8. Does the chart presented on relative United States and Soviet hard
target kill capability reflect the differences in the target structure of the United
States and the Soviet Union in terms of numbers and hardness of military targets?
Are hard targets more numerous and harder in the Soviet case? If so, how is this
reflected in the charts?
Answer. Let me start by noting that the purpose of the chart is to compare the
military capabilities of single, individual missiles of various types against, first, hard
targets, and second, soft targets. The chart does not, therefore, attempt to reflect the
difference in numbers of United States and Soviet missiles, nor does it reflect
relative hardness of United States and Soviet targets. For the purpose of this chart,
a hard target, whether United States or Soviet, was defined as having overpressure
hardness of at least 2,000 psi.
The Soviet silos and command and control facilities are typically harder than ours
and there are more of them. Rather than building super-hard silos, which will not
be able to withstand the better ICBM accuracies both sides are achieving, we have
taken with M-X the more effective route of combining hardness with mobility and
location uncertainty. We also derive our strength and survivability from a more
balanced triad of survivable strategic forces rather than an unbalanced dependence
on ICBM's.
Question .9. Please provide the Committee with a cost-effectiveness comparison of
the selected horizontal shelter ("racetrack") M-X basing concept and the previously
studied vertical shelter basing concept. The comparison should be done using the
same basic constraints, requirements, threats and scenarios.
Also please provide a specific comparison of the hardness and spacing of the
horizontal and vertical shelter concepts.
Was a less demanding Soviet threat assumed in appraising the horizontal shelter
concept than was used in appraising the vertical shelter concept?
Answer. As implied in the question, any meaningful cost comparison of two
design concepts must use the same basic constraints, requirements, threats, and
scenarios. Applying this groundrule, the horizontal shelter plus dash version will
cost approximately $7 billion more than the vertical shelter concept. Roughly $6
billion of this increase is to acquire the shuffle and dash on warning features that
add significantly to the survivability and, hence, deterrence, of the selected design.
These mobility features are a hedge against possible Soviet attempts to identify and
484
target only those shelters containing missiles. The remaining one billion dollars is
attributable to SALT related features, such as openable ports in the roof of each
shelter. We believe this expenditure is clearly cost effective. If we failed to offer a
system having verifiability satisfactory to the Soviets and thereby undermined
SALT, we could then need to spend many more billions to maintain the strategic
balance.
A number of different combinations of hardness and spacing have been used in
various papers in the past three years as preliminary design work has progressed,
theoretical analyses have been completed and field tests of preliminary designs have
been conducted. No final decisions on design or spacing were ever made for vertical
shelters, and they would not have been made until after two or three more years of
design and testing. The criteria for hardness for the horizontal shelter system will
be the same as they would have been for vertical shelters. Since it is more expensive
to harden a horizontal then a vertical shelter to the same level, cost optimization
leads to a somewhat larger spacing for the horizontal shelters, but the survivability
of the system will be the same.
Question 10. In a letter dated August 2, 1979, to the Committee Chairman,
Secretary Vance described Soviet views and the record of exchanges between the
two sides concerning the MPS basing mode under the provisions of the SALT II
Treaty. The Secretary referred to the matter being raised by the Soviet Delegation
in Geneva in the summer of 1978. He described this exchange in some detail. He
then mentioned but did not describe the issue having been raised in diplomatic
channels on several occasions.
Paul Nitze has indicated that the United States made at least two important
demarches to the Soviets on this issue which seem not to have been described by the
Secretary. Would you please describe in more detail all exchanges the United States
had with the Soviets on this issue.
Answer. As Secretary Vance stated in his letter of August 2 to the Committee
Chairman, this subject was raised in the Soviet Delegation in Geneva in the
summer of 1978. Referring to newspaper reports regarding a vertical MPS basing
mode, they stated that it appeared that such a deployment would violate both the
ban on construction of new fixed ICBM silo launchers and the ban on deliberate
concealment measures. The United States Delegation replied that no decision had
been made regarding a basing mode but that whatever mode the United States
adopted would be one that violated neither of the provisions cited by the Soviets.
They further stated that the draft agreement expressly provided for the deploy-
ment, after Protocol expiration, of an ICBM system in which missiles and their
launchers are moved from point to point.
In addition, as Secretary Vance also mentioned in his letter of August 2, the
subject was discussed on several occasions in diplomatic channels other than be-
tween the Delegations. In particular, the United States approached the Soviet
Union at the Ambassadorial level in Washington and Moscow, also in the summer
of 1978. In these discussions, the United States made clear to the Soviets that the
various mobile ICBM systems that we are considering, including ones in which the
launch point could itself be hardened, are permitted during the post-Protocol period.
The Soviets stated that construction of additional ICBM launch silos would be
inconsistent with the SALT agreement, and questioned how the number deployed
could be verified.
An early and important statement of U.S. policy on this subject was also made by
Secretary of Defense Brown in his speech before the National Convention of the
American Legion in New Orleans on August 22 of last year.
Finally, prior to the Vienna Summit, the United States publicly announced that it
intends to proceed with the M-X system and described the various MPS basing
modes under consideration. At Vienna the Soviets complained about the introduc-
tion of a new powerful missile and questioned the verifiability of its deployment.
The President noted that the Soviets had already deployed missiles comparable in
power to the M-X and he assured them that the basing mode would be verifiable.
Thereafter President Brezhnev signed the Treaty and the Protocol.
Question 11. Could you provide the Committee with the statements made by the
Soviets in the SALT II negotiations about the capabilities of the Backfire (such as
that President Ford notes in his memoirs was presented to him by President
Brezhnev)? Would you also provide the analysis of those statements in light of
United States estimates of the Backfire's capabilities?
Answer. During the more than six years of the SALT II negotiations there were a
number of exchanges between the Soviets and the United States regarding the
capabilities of the Backfire bomber. Members of the Soviet Delegation have infor-
mally stated that Backfire has a 4,000 km radius for a mission flown entirely at
high altitudes and subsonic speeds. An early Soviet-proposed version of the Backfire
485
statement contained a reference to a Backfire radius of action of 2,200 km. (The
Soviets indicated that this included some supersonic flight.) The United States
opposed inclusion of this number because we did not wish to endorse the 2,200 km
combat radius figure, and the Soviets removed it.
Although there is some disagreement within the intelligence community on the
maximum range of the Backfire, there is general agreement that it has enough
range to reach the United States under certain conditions. Such estimates are,
however, sensitive to assumptions regarding payload and flight profile. The range
capabilities for Backfire stated by the Soviets during the course of SALT II negotia-
tions may not be inconsistent with our own estimates of Backfire's capabilities,
depending on the assumptions that are made. This spread of numbers illustrates the
flexibility of aircraft to trade speed, altitude and payload for range.
APPENDIX
Comparison of the Russian and English Texts of the SALT II Treaty
In connection with its examination of the SALT II Treaty and related documents,
the Foreign Relations Committee examined the Russian text of the Treaty, the
Protocol, the Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, the Memorandum of
Understanding and the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines to ascer-
tain whether there were significant differences between the Russian and English
versions of the documents.
Using a typescript of the Russian texts (64 pages in all) provided by the Depart-
ment of State, the Committee consulted expert linguists and legal scholars in the
Congressional Research Service and the Law Library of the Library of Congress and
retained Professor Leon Lipson of Yale Law School, an authority on Soviet law, as a
special consultant to examine and compare the Russian and English texts. Their
research revealed seven points of possible discrepancy on which the Committee
sought and obtained further clarification from the Department of State.
To provide interested members of the public with the background research on this
subject, the following documents are printed below:
Letter of Senators Church and Javits of July 23, 1979 to Secretary Vance, enclos-
ing a memorandum of questions on the two texts;
Reply of the Department of State of August 17, 1979 with comment by the
Division of Language Services.
July 23, 1979.
Hon. Cyrus Vance,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary: As part of its consideration of the SALT II Treaty and
related documents, the Committee on Foreign Relations has made a thorough study
of the Russian text of the documents to determine their compatibility with the
English text submitted by the President to the Senate for ratification.
In general, the Committee has found no alarming discrepancies between the two
texts. Nevertheless, seven specific questions have been raised about seeming discrep-
ancies of varying, generally minor degrees of significance. Inasmuch as the Depart-
ment's Division of Language Services, in a memorandum of June 14, found the two
texts "to have the same meaning in all substantive respects," the Committee would
appreciate clarification of the seven points it has noted.
They are set out in detail in the accompanying memorandum. Please supply the
Committee with responses to these points in similar detail at your earliest conven-
ience, but if possible before the planned Congressional recess beginning on August 3.
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.
Sincerely,
Frank Church,
Chairman.
Jacob K. Javits,
Ranking Member.
Enclosure.
Memorandum of Questions Concerning the Russian and English Texts of
the Salt II Treaty
This memorandum raises a number of questions, presented in order of impor-
tance, about apparent discrepancies between the Russian and English texts of the
SALT II treaty. Any eventual decision on the seriousness of any of these discrepan-
cies will be up to the Committee on Foreign Relations, but to make that decision, it
would be appropriate to get explanatory comments from the Department of State
and those who negotiated the agreement.
(487)
488
Following, with Russian words rendered in the Latin alphabet, are detailed pres-
entations of the various questions:
1. "Zablagovremenno" to mean "well in advance" —
In Article XVI of the Treaty, paragraph 1, line 2, the English text reads
(emphasis added):
"Each Party undertakes, before conducting each planned ICBM launch, to notify
the other Party well in advance on a case-by-case basis that such a launch will
occur, except for single ICBM launches from test ranges or from ICBM launcher
deployment areas, which are not planned to extend beyond its national territory."
In two other cases — both connected with plans to notify of flight-testing or deploy-
ment of cruise missiles — the English text also uses "well in advance" to modify the
concept of notification. One use occurs in the Fifth Common TJnderstanding to
Paragraph 8 of Article II of the Treaty (dealing with ALCMs "capable of a range in
excess of 600 kilometers"). The other occurs in the Fifth Common Understanding to
Paragraph 3 of Article II of the Protocol (dealing with longer-range GLCMs and
SLCMs).
In all three cases, the English phrase "well in advance" is rendered in the
Russian text by the word, "zablagovremenno." Although the Oxford Russian-English
Dictionary (1972) renders the Russian word as "in good time; well in advance," both
a Soviet dictionary (the 1965 Soviet Encyclopaedia Publishing House edition, super-
vised by A. I. Smirnitsky) and a Western one (the 1944 E. P. Button, MuUer edition)
give the meaning as "in good time, in advance."
More importantly as a matter of precedent, "zablagovremenno" was used in the
Russian text of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War
Outbreak, signed on September 30, 1971 (22 U.S.T. 1590) when the English text read
simply "in advance."
Unless there have been clarifying statements between the parties making more
precise the number of days or hours of the agreed prior notification of ICBM tests or
ALCM, GLCM and SLCM testing or deployment, there is considerable imprecision
even in the English rendition. The question is whether or not the English "well in
advance" is more precise and restrictive than the Russian "zablagovremenno" and,
if so, whether the difference is a signficant one.
2. The use of negative conjunctions to connect three verbs (develop, test, deploy) —
In Article IV, Paragraph 5(c) and Paragraph 7 of the Treaty, the Parties undertake,
respectively, "not to develop, test or deploy" rapid ICBM-launcher reload systems or
missiles heavier than those they now have deployed. In those two instances, after
the word "undertake" (Russian "obyazuetsya"), the three verbs are written as
follows (emphasis added):
ne cozdavat', ne ispiytij^vat' i ne razvyortiyvat' and rendered in English: "not to
develop, test or deploy."
In another passage — the Common Understanding to Paragraph 8 of Article IV of
the Treaty — the English text (emphasis added) reads:
"During the term of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not
produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the type . . . known ... as the SS-16."
The Russian rendition, in this instance, uses a different conjunction ("i" — "and")
to link the three verbs after the negative statement ("will not" — "ne budyet").
Arguably, in Russian, the obligation as stated is only not to take all three of the
actions (production, testing and deployment) rather than to forego each and all of
them, as in the undertaking on "systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers and on
heavy missiles. " There is also, in the grammatical construction, an obvious differ-
ence between undertaking not to do three things and stating that one will not do
them. Most authorities on Russian usage consulted on this question see little differ-
ence in the "will not" context, between the use of "i" — "and" and the three negative
conjunctions. They do suggest that even after "ne budyet" it would be possible, if
stiff, to use the "ne . . . ne . . . ne" construction of Article IV itself.
In any event, the translation does present a measure of ambiguity, and it is
proper, at least, to ask for its clarification, especially as it would have been possible
in the Common Understanding to achieve a parallel formulation by having the
USSR "undertake" not to produce, test or deploy, in the same fashion as in Article
IV itself.
3. The Russian "kazhdaya" to mean "either";
In Article XVII, dealing with the Standing Consultative Commission, the Treaty
states that "the Parties will . . .
"(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers
necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;" . . .
(emphasis added)
In the Russian text of this section, the word "either" is rendered as "kazhdaya,"
an adjective used elsewhere throughout the Treaty and accompanying documents to
489
mean "each", its common Russian meaning. The result of this apparent discrepancy
in the two texts is that it is not clear what obligation is assumed. In English it does
seem clear that a request from either party should result in a voluntary response
from the other; in Russian, that connection seems somewhat obscured. The fact that
the provision of information is to be on a voluntary basis in any event may well
render this point insignificant but it is still worth asking why the negotiators did
not have the Russian text read "lyubaya" ("either") instead of "kazhdaya" in this
instance.
4. The Russian rendering of "update" — In the Memorandum of Understanding
exchanged by the SALT delegation heads, the Parties agreed on the U.S. and USSR
data base on strategic offensive arms as of November 1, 1978 and agreed to "update
the above agreed data" when SALT II enters into force. In the Russian text, the
words "will update" are given as "proizvedut utochnyenie," literally, "to produce
clarifications or revisions," "to revise." In a sense the Russian is more precise than
the English in this instance, but neither really spells out the nature of the commit-
ment in great detail. Perhaps there is no need to do so, as it is clear that what is
intended is an exchange of information in which numbers that were accurate in
November 1978, are to be revised to be accurate on the date the treaty goes into
force. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to ask for clarification of this translation.
5. The translation of "as appropriate" — In Article XVII, Paragraph 2 (fi and (g)
and in the Second Agreed Statement to Article II, Paragraph 3 of the Treaty — all
provisions dealing with activities in the Standing Consultative Commission relating,
respectively, to consideration of improving the treaty by amendment, of further
limiting strategic offensive arms, and consulting on revision of the agreed list of
definitions of planes as heavy bombers — the English phrase "as appropriate" is
given in Russian as "po mere neobkhodimosti." The connotation of the English
words would seem to be broader, to carry more of a sense of discretion and desirabil-
ity, than the Russian, which usually is restrictive and implies necessity or need.
In practice the decision of whether or not it is "appropriate" for the Parties to get
into discussions on amending this Treaty or further limiting the arms race will
depend entirely on political considerations and not on treaty language. In the case
of a disagreement over whether or not a plane should be considered a heavy
bomber, however, it is conceivable that one Party could treat the question as a
matter "appropriate" for consultations, while the other Party held that consulta-
tions on the subject were not "needed."
It is not easy to conceive of a better Russian translation than the one used for "as
appropriate, ' but it is nevertheless appropriate to raise the question with the State
Department on this point, as it should have been possible — even if a different
Russian construction were required — to come closer in Russian to the connotation of
desirability or possibility of the English "as appropriate".
6. Inconsistent repetition of the word "further"— In the preambular sections of
both the Treaty and the Protocol reference is made to the desirability of the Parties'
taking "measures for" (Treaty) or concluding "early agreement on" "the further
limitation and further reduction of strategic arms." While the English text uses the
word "further" twice in both instances, the Russian text uses the translation "dal'-
nyeishemu" only once in the Treaty preamble and "dal'nyeishem" twice in the
Protocol preamble.
The inconsistency is minor to the point of insignificance, except as it may reflect
on the care taken in coordinating the English and Russian texts generally. It is
therefore worth noting.
7. The Russian translation of the English "develop"— In Article IV, Paragraph 5
(c) and Paragraph 7, the Parties undertake not "to develop, test or deploy" rapid
reload systems for ICBM launchers or heavier missiles than those now deployed.
(See Point 2, above). In both instances the word "develop" is given in Russian as
"cozdavat' ", a verb more usually translated as "invent". In more conventional
usage, the idea of development would be rendered in Russian through the verb
"razviyvaf ". It seems probable in the context of the Treaty that "cozdavat' " has a
mechanistic and perhaps a special military usage in Russian, different from its
standard sense of "invent" or "create". An alternative Russian verb that might
have come closer to the English "develop" in this sense would have been "razraba-
tljrvat
The point is one on which State Department authorities can perhaps provide an
added assurance.
490
Department of State,
Washington, D.C., August 17, 1979.
Hon. Frank Church,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of July
23, 1979 requesting a clarification of seven specific questions concerning the Russian
text of the SALT II Treaty.
The Language Services Division of the Department of State has reviewed the
matters raised in your Memorandum of Questions, and their comments are
enclosed.
If you or your colleagues have further questions on this matter, they may be
addressed to the Language Services Division at 632-1528.
Sincerely,
J. Brian Atwood,
Assistant Secretary of State
for Congressional Relations.
Enclosure.
Comment by the Language Services Division, Department of State, on the
Seven Points Raised in the Memorandum of Questions Concerning the Rus-
sian AND English Texts of the SALT II Treaty
1. The best translation of the Russian word "zablagovremenno" is "in good time"
(and all the dictionaries cited in the memorandum give this as the first translation).
The U.S. side preferred to use the term "well in advance" which it considered
essentially the same. Both terms are a matter of subjective judgment. The meaning
of both "well in advance" and "in good time" would depend on the type of limitation
involved. In this case, the objective on both sides was that there be a reasonable
interval of time between the notification and the actual activity. It will be the task
of the Standing Consultative Commission to define more precisely what constitutes
sufficiently timely notification in each case.
2. The Common Understanding to paragraph 8 of Article IV is an elaboration of
the text of the Article, and words different from those of the Article but meaning
the same thing ("will" as opposed to "undertake") were used in the part of the text
which is of concern here. This applies equally to both the English and Russian texts.
If it stood alone, the Russian construction "ne budet proizvodit', ispj^yvat' i
razvertyvat' " might be ambiguous, but since the basic obligation is stated unequivo-
cally in the text of the Article itself, there can likewise be no ambiguity in the text
of the Common Understanding on this point.
3. It is true that "kazhdaya" means "each" rather than "either". However, since
the response referred to in Article XVII is to be voluntary, it was not considered a
substantive discrepancy. Moreover, the wording of this paragraph is taken directly
from the ABM Treaty, Article XIII, par. 1(b), which has been in force for seven
years, without any problem arising in this regard.
4. There is no better Russian translation of "update" than the one given, and
since it does provide for the intended exchange of new or "revised" information, the
meaning of both texts was considered to be identical.
5. It is correct, as the memorandum states, that it is difficult to come up with a
better translation of "as appropriate" than the wording used in the Russian text.
The U.S. side insisted on the expression "as appropriate". The translation thereof
was the subject of lengthy discussions, but neither side was able to come up with
anything better than "po mere neobkhodimosti". Since both "as appropriate" and
"po mere neobkhodimosti" are a matter of subjective judgment, the difference, if
any, between them was not considered substantive. Moreover, the wording of these
paragraphs is taken directly from Article XIII, pars. 1 (f) and (g) of the ABM Treaty,
which, as previously pointed out, has been in force for seven years.
6. The second "further" was added in the English version to provide emphasis.
Even without the second "further", the first would apply to "reduction" as it does to
"limitation". The same applies in Russian, so that the absence of the second "dal'
neyshemu" in the Treaty preamble does not signify any substantive discrepancy.
7. The English word "develop" can have both the meaning of "create" (e.g. "to
develop a new type of fuel") and to "improve something already existing" (e.g. "to
develop one's capabilities"). In the present context, "develop" is used in its first
sense, conveyed in Russian by "sozdavaf ", and not in its second, more restrictive
meaning, which would be conveyed by "razrabatiyvaf " (the same construction is
found in Article IX, par. 1 of the Treaty). The wording is the same as that in Article
V par. 1 of the ABM Treaty.
491
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson's Responses To Additional Questions for the
Record of July 16, 1979, Part 2
Question 1. What is your response to the charges that the Treaty as it now stands
establishes the conditions which threaten our security for the years to come?
Answer. In my reply to this as well as to the following questions I want to
emphasize the point I made in my statement to the Committee on July 16, 1979,
that is, that having retired from the Foreign Service and resigned as Chief of our
SALT Delegation on February 29, 1977, I can in no way speak for or on behalf of the
present Administration. For the same reason I have no information not generally
available to the public on the negotiations subsequent to that date, the consider-
ations that led this Administration to adopt or not to adopt certain positions, or the
programs and planning for our strategic forces. Thus, except for those matters that
occurred during the period I was Chief of our Delegation, the following answers are
only an expression of my personal opinion.
With respect to the foregoing question my answer is that the charge is nonsense.
To the best of my knowledge the Treaty in no way constrains any programs or plans
for our strategic forces that are in contemplation for the duration of the Treaty,
while it does place meaningful constraints on the numbers of Soviet strategic
systems and their qualitative characteristics. If we choose not to exercise the rights
that we have under the Treaty that is our choice rather than the consequence of the
Treaty.
Question 2. Can the Soviets indeed deploy several new types of ICBMs under the
Treaty, as some have charged, or must all new ICBMs (except one) be limited to
modifications of existing types?
Answer. I am not familiar with the basis on which the charge is made, nor am I
familiar with the negotiations that led to this provision in the Treaty. However,
reading the plain language of paragraph 9 of Article IV of the Treaty it seems clear
to me that each side is permitted to deploy only one new type of ICBM through the
life of the Treaty and that modifications of existing types of missiles are limited to
not more than a five percent change either up or down in the length, the largest
diameter, the launch weight, or the throw weight of the type of missile being
modified. Any change beyond five percent in any of those dimensions would in itself
classify the missile as a new type and hence subject to the limitation of not more
than one new type during the life of the Treaty.
Question 3. What is the negotiating history in Geneva — or to the extent you know,
at the other levels — with regard to forward-based systems during the period immedi-
ately preceeding Vladivostok? In particular, did the Soviets indicate they would
drop their FBS position in response to US arguments that more numerous Soviet
systems would have to be counted? Did the Soviets ever threaten to revive the FBS
issue?
Answer. As I said in my oral testimony before the Committee on July 16, 1979
(page 32) I know of no basis whatsoever for the conclusion that prior to Vladivostok
the Soviets had indicated that they were prepared to concede on the position they
had theretofore maintained on forward based systems. In fact, if anything, at
Geneva they repeated their position even more often and more insistently. In doing
so the only "concession" that I can recall them offering was that instead of immedi-
ately withdrawing all of our "forward based systems" and liquidating the bases we
would be given a reasonable period of time to do so in an orderly manner.
After Vladivostok the Soviet Delegation insistently tried to reintroduce the for-
ward based system issue into the text of the Treaty by various formulae which
would commit the United States to negotiate a resolution or liquidation of the
question within a limited period of time in SALT III. My Soviet colleague often said
to me that I should not interpret their conceding on the issue at Vladivostok as
meaning that they had forgotten it.
Question k- Doesn't the fact that the Treaty expressly permits encryption serious-
ly inhibit our ability to verify the new types limits?
Answer. In my own view the mention of encryption in the second Common
Understanding under paragraph 3, Article XV of the Treaty in no way adds to or
subtracts from the broad obligation under paragraph three "not to use deliberate
concealment megisures which impede verification by national technical means. . .".
The test is simply whether anything, including encryption, is a deliberate conceal-
ment measure which impedes verification. Nothing is prohibited under that article,
including encryption, unless it is a deliberate concealment measure that impedes
verification. Thus the specific mention of encryption in the Common Understanding
under that paragraph for purposes of clarification, does not "permit" any encryp-
tion that either party would otherwise be "permitted" if it was not a deliberate
concealment measure which impedes verification.
Question 5. Does the USSR have the right to decide what telemetry to encrypt?
492
Answer. I do not see how the mention of encryption in the second Common
Understanding to paragraph 3, Article XV gives the USSR any more "right to
decide" what telemetry to encrypt than it has to decide what it will do with respect
to any other obligation under the Treaty. We have monitored telemetry from Soviet
missile tests for years and I have confidence that our technicians in this field know
what is pertinent to verification and what is not. If the Soviets encrypt telemetry
that we consider pertinent to verification it seems clear under the language of the
Treaty that we are just as entitled to raise or challenge any questionable activity in
this field in the Standing Consultative Commission or elsewhere, as we are any
other activity pertinent to the Soviet obligations under the Treaty.
Question 6. Some have charged that SALT legalizes the position the Soviets will
soon achieve strategic superiority. What is your response to that?
Answer. I have difficulty in following the logic of this and similar arguments as a
reason for not ratifying the Treaty. Whatever views one may have with regard to
the wisdom or desirability of the restraints placed on the Soviet Union under the
Treaty, in the absence of a SALT Treaty there would be no restraints and therefore
nothing that the Soviet Union did could be considered as "illegal".
As I said in my statement on July 16, 1979 to the Committee, the ideal would be
an agreement so comprehensive, so perfectly balanced, and so well anticipating the
future that we would never again have to concern ourselves with the problem. The
present agreement obviously does not meet that test. However, as I then said I feel
it is a constructive and useful step forward and therefore I favor its ratification.
Question 7. Is the United States contemplating building conventionally armed
cruise missiles which would have to be counted as nuclear weapons and, therefore,
are effectively prohibited?
Answer. I do not feel qualified to discuss U.S. plans for deploying cruise missiles.
However, I note that deployment of cruise missiles is covered only by the Protocol to
the Treaty which remains in force only through December 31, 1981. If my under-
standing is correct that we have no plans for deploying any cruise missiles prior to
that date I do not see that the question is pertinent either to the present Treaty or
its Protocol.
Question 8. Do you agree that a tougher U.S. line would have ijroduced a better
result on Backfire or MLBMs? That reopening the talks now would do so?
Answer. My answer to both questions is no.
For years official statements by the Secretary of Defense and Chairmen of the
JCS, even after the Backfire emerged as an issue, indicated that Soviets had about
150 heavy bombers. In agreeing to the 2,400 aggregate at Vladivostok the Soviets
could assume that we would not seek to charge more than that number of heavy
bombers against the aggregate. Thus subsequently to agree to include the Backfire
in the aggregate would have required the Soviets to destroy a corresponding number
of ICBMs and/or SLBMs additional to those they had planned when agreeing to the
2,400 figure. I did not then nor do I now think that they are prepared to do this.
Thus I was pleased to see the constraints on the Backfire that the present Adminis-
tration was able to negotiate. Although not as substantial as inclusion of the
Backfire in the aggregate, I feel that they are meaningful.
With respect to MLBMs, assuming they have the importance which some attach
to them, even though it has never been proposed that we deploy such systems, the
Treaty does freeze the number of launchers for such missiles, bans their deployment
in a mobile mode and imposes fractionation limits lower than it was estimated the
Soviets were capable of achieving. It seems to me these are meaningful constraints
and I have no reason to feel that no matter how "tough" our negotiators, additional
constraints could have been negotiated at this time. Nor do I feel that reopening
negotiations on this Treaty without offering substantial concessions on our part
would achieve such a result. If we continue to attach the same importance to these
missiles it is, of course, open to us to seek to achieve further constraints in negotia-
tions for a subsequent agreement.
Additional Comments Submitted for the Record by General Rowny
On page 585 of part 1 of The SALT II hearings, Senator Sarbanes asked General
Rowny the following question and received the following answer: ^^
"Senator Sarbanes. General Rowny, do you think that SALT I was* good idea?
"General Rowny. Yes, sir. I think that taking the initiative for the interim
agreement was a good idea."
General Rowny subsequently submitted the following clarification: "However, I
would have had my assurances in hand before supporting it."
On page 586, Senator Sarbanes asked the following question and received the
following reply from General Rowny:
493
"Senator Sarbanes. None of these assurances were precluded by SALT I. We
could have done them if we had chosen to do them. Is that correct?"
"General Rowny. I think that is correct."
General Rowny subsequently submitted the following clarification:
"* * * except that promises are forgotten and besides, asking for more weapons
did not seem to many as being in step with the spirit of SALT."
494
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS RECEIVED FOR THE RECORD
Statements of Dr. Wes Schwemmer Cady, Association International Relations
Representative; Katherine Eaton, Chairman, Association Legislative Pro-
gram Committee; and Dr. J. David Edwards, Assistant Director for Interna-
tional Relations, on behalf of the American Association of University
Women, Washington, D.C.
Since 1922 the American Association of University Women (AAUW) has included
in its legislative programs provisions for the control and limitation of armaments.
Numerous Association study programs have examined arms control as an integral
part of an enlightened foreign policy and as a means to achieve meaningful national
security. In recent years AAUW has enthusiastically supported the creation of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the ratification of the SALT I Treaty, and
significant United States participation in the United Nations' Special Session on
Disarmament. Strongly in accord with the aim of the SALT Process, AAUW mem-
bers have carefully analyzed the provisions of the pending SALT II Treaty Proposal
and find them sound, desirable, and supportable.
Petitioning as an aggregate of approximately 190,000 members, the AAUW urges
the unconditional ratification of the SALT II Treaty. We believe ratification is
necessary for the following reasons:
One: SALT II will enhance U.S. national security and global security by reducing
the risk of thermonuclear war through the establishment of quantitative and quali-
tative ceilings on the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.
Two: SALT II will maintain national security by allowing, within the quantitative
and qualitative ceilings, ample arms for deterrence through the respective retali-
atory capabilities.
Three: SALT II will slow expensive and inflationary arms competition between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. By setting limits on strategic nuclear weapons, it will
prevent a new escalation in this phase of the already exorbitant arms race.
Four: SALT II will inhibit further proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons and,
within the content of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, will provide substantial
evidence that the United States is serious in its intent to achieve effective arms
control measures and, ultimately, a cessation of the nuclear arms race.
Five: SALT II will strengthen detente by providing a climate of stability in East-
West relations and will also strengthen regional collective security systems by
addressing the concerns of our NATO allies who strongly support the treaty.
Six: While SALT II is based on the mutual interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
in avoiding thermonuclear genocide, it is not based on misplaced trust. The mainte-
nance of a strategic balance and a safeguard against treaty violation is ensured
through various national technical verification processes.
Seven: SALT II, in addition to being a sound instrument to enhance national
security, bears desirable moral, social, and economic impact. For example, a reduc-
tion in arms expenditures, if truly effected, allows a reallocation of funds for
peaceful domestic and international development, thus augmenting global and na-
tional security through concomitant reduction of economic problems and the inter-
national tensions such problems produce.
Eight: Finally, SALT II is necessary because its Joint Statement of Principles lays
the groundwork and establishes the objectives for SALT III and a continuing process
of arms reduction.
THE SECURITY ISSUE
Full scale thermonuclear warfare between the superpowers is unconscionable.
Estimates of the number of deaths and the degree of destruction created by a major
nuclear exchange vary so much that they are confusing at best. At worst, they are
of such magnitude that they create an aura of unreality and disbelief. We can be
certain, however, that a full nuclear exchange will leave tens of millions of U.S. and
Soviet citizens dead and hundreds of millions dying. Vast expanses of radioactive
terrain will be uninhabitable for hundreds of years. The major responsibility of a
SALT II treaty is to reduce the risk of such human extermination. SALT II will
decrease the risk of nuclear war by ensured maintenance of the balance of strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles at a level where neither side would gain from striking first
because of the destructive retaliatory capability. Without SALT II we will face the
certain instability of an unrestrained and expensive nuclear arms race which will
not in the future, any more than in the past, improve our military security. Without
SALT II the unrestrained arms race will certainly increase fears and distrust on
both sides and among our respective allies. The fear and insecurity, coupled with
495
increased weaponry, multiply the possibility of war by miscalculation. Greater
security through reduced arsenals also reduces the possibility of genocide by tragic
accident. A reduction in the nuclear arms industry will similarly reduce the risk of
a tragic domestic accident in production, transportation, or storage.
By providing equal aggregate limits on launchers, heavy bombers and long-range
air to surface ballistic missiles, ceilings on throw-weight and launch-weight, and
qualitative restrictions on testing and deployment, SALT II creates stability and
predictability in the strategic balance. By placing a ceiling of 2,250 on strategic
delivery vehicles and limits on numbers of warheads, this treaty balances the apples
of more accurate and numerous U.S. MIRVs against the oranges of larger Soviet
warheads and heavier Soviet missiles.
The U.S. Triad defense strategy of land-based, sea-based, and bomber-launched
missiles is not undermined by SALT II. In fact, SALT II allows the U.S. to make
changes, within the limits imposed, to counter any allowable Soviet changes. Under
the provisions of this agreement, moreover, the U.S.S.R. must dismantle 200 to 250
strategic systems. Within the context of predictability/stability provided by SALT
II, U.S. military options remain open. According to Leslie H. Gelb, Director of the
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, "the agreement allows the United States to go
forward with every single strategic nuclear program now on our drawing board."
SALT II is arms control as well as a step in the process of arms limitation. The
Protocol provides for some additional temporary limitations through 1981, but it
does not seriously inhibit the development of cruise missiles, the M-X land-based
missile, the Soviet Backfire bomber or intermediate range ballistic missiles. These
remain to be addressed in SALT III. In this regard, we must agree with the critics of
this agreement who charged that SALT II does not go far enough. Perhaps SALT II
is the best we can achieve at this point. It is progress and we (and the world) will be
better with it than without it. Since genuine security will only come with the
elimination of the possibility of nuclear annihilation, AAUW urges that SALT II be
ratified as a step toward such ultimate security and that the negotiations for SALT
III begin in earnest as soon as possible.
VERIFICATION
A strong argument for SALT II is that it is in the best national security interests
of the U.S. and of the Soviet Union to limit the risk of nuclear war. Verification of
the treaty ensures that both nations will honor those interests by making it difficult
for either side to cheat. It is our opinion that the Soviets will violate SALT II only if
they can gain a significant military advantage from such violation. The U.S. intelli-
gence community and our "national technical means" of verification are sophisticat-
ed enough to ascertain whether the U.S.S.R. is violating the treaty on such massive
and extensive scale as to attempt to gain some advantage in the strategic balance. It
is not in the national interest by either signatory to violate the treaty and thereby
to risk repudiation by the other side. Simply put, a renewed arms race is in no
nation's best interest.
The Standing Consultative Commission established under the provisions of SALT
I has a successful record of resolving questions of compliance, matters of interpreta-
tion and procedures for implementation. The continuance of the SCC plus U.S.
national technical means of verification will allow us to identify and resolve any
questions of violation or, if necessary, to revoke the treaty long before there is
significant threat to our security. Additionally, the Soviet Union, were it to attempt
to gain advantage, would have to consider the negative political effects worldwide
from being caught cheating.
The verification and consultative procedures have proved viable under SALT I.
Verification "by any national technical means" is even stronger under the terms of
SALT II. That U.S. security will not depend on "trust" of the U.S.S.R. increases the
attractiveness of the SALT II treaty proposal.
GLOBAL RELATIONS
The ratification of SALT II should not be linked to detente and/or matters of
political and military competition for allies. Nonetheless, the practicalities of SALT
II will reduce tensions and set the parameters of the most dangerous dimensions of
U.S.-Soviet competition. As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and other experts
have noted, SALT is the foundation of an enduring political relationship with the
U.S.S.R. based on a reduction of tensions and areas of competition. This does not
mean competition will not continue; on the contrary, our political, economic and
social systems make competition inevitable. It does mean, however, that we can
compete without bringing about our mutual destruction. Further, rejection of SALT
496
II will occasion a chill in U.S.-Soviet relations and might end the SALT Process — a
turn of events which the world cannot afford.
Rejection of SALT II will seriously damage U.S. leadership and prestige in the
Third World and with our allies. Third World states have been vocal in reminding
us of the commitment to arms control and to the nuclear arms reduction entailed in
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. They recently rebuked us at the United Na-
tions' Special Session on Disarmament for our slow progress and recalled that their
pledge to abstain from developing nuclear weapons is tied to U.S.-Soviet reductions
in nuclear armaments. A failure with SALT II will reenforce their fears, heighten
the arms race in the Third World, encourage states like Pakistan and Brazil to
develop their own nuclear weapons, and retard progress on other arms control
measures such as a comprehensive test ban treaty, restriction of arms sales, preven-
tion of satellite warfare and a mutual reduction of forces in Europe.
U.S. leadership will suffer not only in the developing nations, but our status with
our NATO allies will suffer from a failure of SALT II. The treaty does not adversely
affect our cooperation with our NATO allies. In fact, it can be cogently argued that
SALT II enhances our position by allowing us to focus on strengthening allied
conventional and tactical nuclear forces by placing no bans on weapons systems in
Europe and no bans on sophisticated technology transfer, and— significantly— by
providing stability in East- West relations. In addition to endorsing SALT II formal-
ly, our allies have expressed concern that rejection of SALT II will open a new
phase in the Cold War which would serve neither their interests or ours.
SALT 11 AS A women's ISSUE
SALT II is an issue that carries considerable importance and concern for the
women of the U.S. and of the world. It is important morally because it is an issue
that threatens world peace and the very existence of humanity. Historically women
have been in the front ranks of issues of peace and humanitarian concerns. More-
over, we do understand the jargon and technical nature of the arms control debate.
A vital part of the National Plan of Action drafted in 1977 by women from all parts
of the United States— representing all segments of the female population— asks that
the President and Congress intensify efforts to negotiate disarmament and to reduce
military expenditures. As women we have traditionally been the primary nurturers
and educators of the young. As women we are distressed that the generations we
have reared may be doomed and annihilated by thermonuclear warfare. We are
distressed that our government spends 60 times more to equip one soldier than to
educate one child.
For women SALT II is an economic issue as well as a moral issue. As producers
and consumers — as wage-earners, shoppers, taxpayers, investors, and money-manag-
ers— women are acutely aware of the cost of the arms race. The United States has
spent about 2 trillion dollars on the military since World War II to be less secure
now than we were then. The current global arms race costs 400 billion dollars a
year, one billion dollars a day, or one million dollars a minute. Compared to the
amount spent on health or education, the imbalance is staggering.
Women understand and suffer from inflation and unemployment and we are
disconcerted because military expenditures are largely economically nonproductive.
They enormously intensify inflation. Such spending creates few jobs since the arms
industry is technology- and hardware-intensive. Such spending results in few usable
goods or services. Military spending deprives society of raw materials and human
energies which are desperately needed in the domestic economy and especially
needed for Third World development. No matter how we analyze it, increasing
military expenditures do mean sacrificial trade-offs in human needs.
SALT II must be ratified. Its failure will mean an increase in U.S. military
spending of $30 billion to $60 billion over the next decade. SALT's failure will mean
a 50 percent to 60 percent increase in our current defense expenditures for nuclear
strategic forces. We are not content that even with SALT II our expenditures on
nuclear forces will increase by 20 percent to 40 percent; we deplore that the political
trade-off for SALT II could be increased non-strategic military spending. Even the
wealthiest nation in the world must make economic choices. The people of the
United States have always been our greatest resource. Within a tightening budget
we cannot afford to give human problems — poverty, health care, inadequate school
ing and housing, and unemployment — less attention because we are unwilling to
grapple with the problem of fruitless military expenditures. By reducing the nuclear
arms race, SALT II is at least a beginning.
497
SALT AS A PROCESS
AAUW urges ratification of SALT II. As a second step in an arms control process
SALT II is vital and lends hope for an improved future. The United States is now,
and always has been, a strong nation because of our people, our national character,
our adaptability, and our worldview. Our commitment, through the Joint Statement
of Principles, to SALT III indicates that we are serious about arms reductions and
about preventing nuclear war. SALT II is, admittedly, limited in its achieved agree-
ments. It is what can be accomplished through the SALT PROCESS that is vital.
We must not relinquish our leadership or our national commitment to a safe and
peaceful world by failure to ratify SALT II.
Statement of Raymond Nathan, Director, Washington Ethical Action
Office, American Ethical Union, Washington, D.C.
The American Ethical Union is the national religious federation of ethical hu-
manist societies. At its recent annual assembly, it adopted the following resolution:
Whereas an uncontrolled nuclear arms race may end in nuclear holocaust, and
Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty II for six years, and
Whereas SALT II levels off the strategic arms race by numerical and qualitative
restrictions, with sound verification arrangements, and
Whereas SALT II lays the groundwork for more meaningful restrictions in a
SALT III Treaty: Therefore be it
Resolved, That the American Ethical Union urges the United States Senate to:
1. Vote for ratification of SALT II, as a necessary step to continue the arms
control process, and
2. Work for a freeze on further testing, deployment and production of nuclear
weapons and systems, to stop the arms race at the present level.
We regard the limitation, and eventual elimination, of nuclear armaments as
essential not only to a better life, but to sheer survival. As concerned laymen, we
have followed closely the long drawn out efforts to achieve such limitation, and
believe it is high time to take the small step forward that SALT II represents.
When both the United States and the Soviet Union have the nuclear weapons to
destroy each other many times over, the idea that the modest limitations proposed
in SALT II could give either side an advantage that would pose a threat to the other
becomes meaningless. However patriotically motivated, attempts to rewrite the
treaty in the Senate serve no constructive purpose. Instead, they may trigger a
vastly accelerated arms race which, by heightening the threat of nuclear war, could
reduce our military security while dealing a severe blow to our already shaky
economy.
We urge ratification of SALT II as submitted, with a sense-of-the Senate resolu-
tion that work should proceed immediately on a SALT III treaty to bring about
more substantial limitations of nuclear arms.
Statement of Walter Hoffmann, Chairman, Campaign for U.N. Reform,
Wayne, N.J.
suggested outline of resolution on salt protocol verification problem
With respect to the SALT II Protocol limiting the deployment of cruise missiles
and mobile launchers of ICBM's, and with respect to the agreed Statement of Joint
Principles for SALT III, it is the sense of the Senate of the United States that a
SALT III extension of the constraints of the Protocol may be even more difficult to
verify by national technical means alone than the subject matter of the SALT II
treaty, and
Therefore, the Senate urges the President of the United States, prior to signing a
SALT III treaty which might extend the constraints of the Protocol, to attempt to
negotiate a treaty establishing an Internatjipnal Arms Control Verification Agency
with on-site inspection authority, so that such an agency may be available in the
future to supplement U.S. national technical means of verification and thereby help
insure the adequate verifiability of a SALT III agreement and any other future
arms accords.
Revised May 29, 1979.
498
Memorandum in Support of Resolution Urging the President To Negotiate for
THE Establishment of an International Arms Control Verification Agency
WITH On-site Inspection Authority Prior To Signing SALT III
SUMMARY of ARGUMENT
One: The SALT I and SALT II agreements can be verified to a large extent by
satellite reconnaissance and other national technical means.
Two: The SALT II Protocol, however, which prohibits for a short period of time
the deployment of long range ground and sea launched cruise missiles and the
deployment of mobile launchers of ICBM's, is extremely difficult to verify by satel-
lite reconnaissance or by other national technical means.
Three: While the SALT II Protocol can be defended, and should be ratified, on the
ground that it is for a limited period of time during which neither side will be ready
to deploy such weapons, it is contemplated that, immediately after the ratification
of SALT II, negotiations will be undertaken for SALT III which may involve the
extension of the restrictions in the Protocol.
Four: The Senate of the United States should make clear to the Administration
now, during the SALT II debate, that the verification problems inherent in the
Protocol must be solved before the temporary restrictions in the Protocol are ex-
tended in a SALT III agreement.
Five: The most effective way of resolving the verification problems inherent in a
SALT III extension of the Protocol constraints is to supplement national technical
means of verification with some kind of on-site inspection authority.
Six: Rather than bilateral inspection of Soviet installations by the U.S. and of
U.S. installations by the Soviets, it may be more feasible politically and more
acceptable from a national security standpoint, to develop on-site inspection capabil-
ity through the establishment of a neutral International Arms Control Verification
Agency.
Seven: An International Arms Control Verification Agency with on-site inspection
authority would supplement, but not replace, U.S. national technical means of
verifying SALT III. It would also help insure the adequate verifiability of a Compre-
hensive Test Ban Treaty and other possible future arms accords.
Why AN Extension of the Protocol Would Present More Difficult
Verification Problems Than Subject Matter of SALT I and SALT II
Satellite reconnaissance and other national technical means of verification were
able to monitor agreements imposing limits on ABM systems because ABM systems
require extremely powerful supporting radar, which can be detected through appro-
priately equipped satellites.
Limits on land-based ICBM launchers, such as those contained in SALT I and II,
can be monitored by satellites because such monitoring merely requires relatively
simple silo counting operations with some dimensional analysis. Moreover, hardened
silos take around two years to complete and require extensive support facilities,
both factors simplifying verification through national technical means.
The construction of new submarines is readily subject to satellite observation and
therefore agreements on limiting the total number of submarine launchers can be
verified. National technical means may also prove acceptable to monitor limits on
the number of strategic bombers in the same way.
MIRV numerical limitations, which are contained in SALT II, present another
kind'^bf verification problem. Satellite reconnaissance cannot determine the type of
warheads a particular missile carries. The way to overcome this is to provide, as
SALT II does, that any system which is tested with multiple warheads will be
assumed to be equipped with that number of warheads if it is deployed.
SALT II also provides that bombers which carry air launched cruise missiles
having a range in excess of 360 miles should be counted as heavy bombers in
computing strategic nuclear delivery systems. To aid verification, it is reported that
both sides have agreed that aircraft carrying cruise missiles will be distinguishable
from other aircraft. Even if this verification device were not adhered to, it might
conceivably be possible to" determine by national technical means that a particular
bomber is carrying cruise missiles, but it is extremely difficult to determine how
many of such missiles it is carrying, and whether the range of such missiles is below
or in excess of 360 miles.
The SALT II Protocol presents even more difficut verification problems. It will
ban through 1981 the deployment of all ground and sea-launched cruise missiles
that have a range in excess of 1500 miles. The Protocol will also ban through 1981
the deployment of mobile launchers of ICBM's sometimes referred to as the MX.
499
The existence of cruise missiles, as distinguished from bombers, is not easily
observable by satellite. Because cruise missiles travel so close to the ground, border
listening posts often cannot be relied upon for crucial information. When you add to
these problems specific range limitations, as the agreement does, permitting the
deployment of ground and sea launched cruise missiles with a range of less than
1500 miles, but prohibiting the deployment of such missiles with a range in excess
of 1500 miles, precise verification by national technical means alone, becomes a
practical impossibility.
Limits on the deployment of the multiple launch point ICBM (sometimes called
the "MX") present another difficult verification problem. Whether the tunnel
method is employed or mobile launchers riding on standard railroad tracks, it is
very difficult for satellite reconnaissance to supply the type of verification that is
needed to locate all mobile launchers at any given time.
Why the Senate Should Advise the President That the Verification Problems
Inherent in the Protocol Must Be Resolved Before the Protocol Restric-
tions Are Extended by SALT III
The SALT I Interim Agreement permitted the Soviet Union to have 1,615 ICBM's,
740 SLBM's and 62 modern ballistic missile submarines, as compared to only 1,052
ICBM's, 710 SLBM's, and 44 modern ballistic missile submarines for the United
States. Although significant U.S. advantages in heavy bombers, missile accuracy,
and MIRV's compensated for the disparity in launcher numbers, many Senators
were unhappy with the unequal numbers. 'Therefore the Senate attached an amend-
ment introduced by Senator Henry Jackson requiring the President to negotiate a
future SAL'T agreement which "would not limit the United States to levels of
intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet
Union." As a result of the Jackson amendment, SALT II provides for exact equality
on permitted levels of MIRV systems (1,320 each), as well as aggregate strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles (2,400 each).
Many Senators today are uneasy about the verifiability of certain parts of the
SALT II package— particularly the prohibitions regarding the deployment of MX
and ground and sea launched cruise missiles contained in the Protocol. In response,
the Administration points out that the SALT II Protocol is only for a very short
period of time and that during that period the technology of both the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. is such that neither will be ready to deploy the ground or sea launched
cruise missile or the MX, anyway. The Administration argues that we can continue
the development of these new weapons during the Protocol period, but the Protocol
banning their deployment for a brief period of time can and should be ratified. We
agree with the Administration and urge the Senate to ratify both the SALT II
Treaty and the Protocol.
It is contemplated, however, that as soon as SALT II and the Protocol are ratified,
negotiations will be initiated for SALT III, and that SALT III may extend the
restrictions in the Protocol on the deployment of the cruise and MX missiles. The
Administration will submit to the Senate as part of the SALT II package, an agreed
Statement of Joint Principles for SALT III. While there is general language in the
statement on cooperative measures for verification, there is no specific reference as
to how the verification problems inherent in long term constraints on the cruise and
MX missiles are to be solved.
During the debate on ratification of SALT II and the Protocol, it is respectfully
submitted that the Senate should pass a resolution urging the Administration to
resolve the verification problems inherent in the Protocol prohibitions before the
President signs a SALT III Treaty extending the restrictions on the deployment of
cruise and MX missiles or limiting other weapon systems which are difficult to
verify by national technical means alone. If the Senate can make certain that the
Protocol constraints in SALT III will not be extended without more adequate
verification, then we hope that those Senators who are now uneasy about the
verification question will support the Protocol as a temporary stop-gap in the SALT
process.
In any event, it is essential that the Senate not only make known its uneasiness
about verification, but more importantly, suggest a constructive solution to the
verification problem.
Why an International Verification Agency With Onsite Inspection Authority
Is THE Most Feasible Solution for Those Situations Where National Techni-
cal Means Alone Will Not Suffice
When satellite reconnaissance, border listening posts, intelligence networks, and
other national technical means are not sufficient by themselves to verify an arms
1+8-260 0-79 Pt.i+ - 32
500
control Eigreement, it is necessary to evolve some kind of on-site inspection authori-
ty. Then, if the United States should receive information which leads it to believe
that the Soviets are violating an agreement prohibiting the deployment of new
weapons, it can have the site of the suspected violation inspected. Even this may not
be foolproof, but it would add a very important supplemental deterrent to intention-
al violations. On-site inspections would be particularly useful in checking factories
suspected of manufacturing new weapons, in checking sites where new weapons are
suspected of being tested, in checking weapons stockpiles, and in checking sites
where constrained weapons are suspected of being deployed. If the element of
surprise can be added, the value of on-site inspections would increase proportionate-
ly. Greater frequency of on-site inspections would also increase the effectiveness of
their violation deterrence.
It is difficult to imagine, however, that the Soviet Union would agree to permit
U.S. inspectors to visit Soviet installations to verify compliance. It is equally diffi-
cult to imagine that the United States would allow Soviet agents to go snooping
around our missile sites. There is both a political problem and a national security
problem in permitting bilateral on-site inspections. Probably neither we nor the
Soviets would allow it.
Furthermore, if bilateral inspection were agreed upon, who would be the final
judge of whether cheating had occurred? If the Soviets filed a complaint, would not
they be prone to find that cheating had occurred even if in fact it had not? At the
very minimum, the participation of neutral observers would be necessary to give
credibility to the findings of an inspection team.
For all of these reasons, the best hope of getting some kind of meaningful on-site
inspection authority for major weapons systems is through the creation of a neutral
international arms control verification agency. Admittedly, the establishment of
such an agency would be difficult, but it is the best hope we have of achieving on-
site inspection capability to supplement U.S. national technical means of verifica-
tion.
The American people would more easily permit international representatives
from neutral countries, such as Sweden and Switzerland, to inspect U.S. military
installations to verify U.S. compliance with SALT III. At the same time, our
national security would clearly be enhanced by international inspection of Soviet
installations to assure Soviet compliance. We are also confident that an appropriate
international system of security checks can be devised for the selection of neutral
international inspectors that will guarantee the protection of each nation's security.
Whether we can sell the Soviets on the idea of neutral international inspection is
not known, but we must try. Otherwise, further agreements in the SALT process
will become more and more difficult to verify by national technical means alone.
This in turn will cause a complete breakdown in SALT progress.
An additional advantage of an international verification agency is that it would
increase the participation of other nations in the arms control process. This would
serve to focus greater international attention on disarmament issues and might
serve to accelerate the arms control process in other countries in addition to the two
superpowers.
An International Arms Control Verification Agency with on-site inspection au-
thority could also provide significant verification assistance if a Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is negotiated. National technical means are adequate to
monitor above ground nuclear tests and even some underground tests of a certain
magnitude. But they are not adequate to monitor all underground tests. While
remote control "black boxes" could be an important verification aid in underground
nuclear test detection, they would occasionally need to be supplemented by some
form of on-site inspection.
SALT III will undoubtedly involve more than an extension of the protocol con-
straints on the MX and cruise missiles. It may involve prohibitions or limitations on
the development or manufacture of laser beams, killer satellites, and other equally
deadly technological advances. In verifying such agreements, the existence of inter-
national on-site capability to visit selected manufacturing plants could be signifi-
cant.
If other negotiated agreements in SALT III or SALT IV resulted in actual arms
reductions, such as the reduction of nuclear weapons themselves, the danger of
relying solely on national technical means for verification would increase substan-
tially. An International Verification Agency with on-site inspection authority would
be a crucial verification supplement in such agreements.
501
How AN International Verification Agency With Onsite Inspection
Authority Would Work
The verification process of the International Atomic Energy Agency offers one
possible model of how an International Arms Control Verification Agency might
work. The IAEA, which came into existence in 1957, establishes and administers
safeguards to insure that fissionable and other atomic materials made available by
or through the Agency to non-nuclear powers are not used by those nations for
military purposes. This is done by inspecting nuclear research projects in the
territories of member states. The IAEA is governed by a General Conference where
each nation has one vote, a 23-member Board of Governors, and a Secretariat
headed by a Director General who has a four year term. No nation has a veto,
although certain questions require a two-thirds vote for passage.
Another possible model is the International Disarmament Organization proposed
by President John F. Kennedy in 1962. Under the 1962 U.S. proposal, the Interna-
tional Disarmament Organization would have been governed by an Administrator
responsible to a Control Council consisting of the major signatory powers as perma-
nent members, together with certain other parties to a multi-lateral treaty that
would be elected on a rotating basis by a General Conference of all members. The
Kennedy I.D.O. would have had the task of verifying, at agreed depots or other
locations, the destruction of armaments during three stages, or where appropriate,
the conversion of armaments to peaceful purposes. A proposal for an International
Disarmament Organization similar to the Kennedy proposal was made by the Neth-
erlands Government to the 1978 U.N. Special Session on Disarmament.
Regardless of the structure, it would be essential for the Administrator or Direc-
tor General of an International Verification Agency to be absolutely impartial and
to have a fairly large degree of independence. It would also be essential for the
inspectors to have a background that would insure strict impartiality, and the
training and experience that could provide a high degree of technical competence.
Perhaps such inspectors could be trained by the United States and the Soviet
Union.
The inspectors would need unrestricted access to all areas of the Soviet Union and
the United States, as well as other nuclear powers. On-site inspections would be
ordered by the Agency's Administrator in two ways: either as a part of a routine
surprise check-up, or as the result of a complaint lodged with the Administrator by
one of the signatory nations.
An International Verification Agency might also be given satellite reconnaissance
capability. France did propose the creation of an International Satellite Agency at
the 1978 Special UN Session on Disarmament. Since U.S. technical means of verifi-
cation already embrace the most advanced satellite reconnaissance technology,
there would be no technical advantage for the U.S. in such international capability.
There might, however, be a political advantage for the United States. If cheating
which is denied by the accused nation is discovered by U.S. national technical
means, confirmation by the International Verification Agency of such cheating
could bring world public opinion to bear heavily on that nation.
The most important addition to the verification process that an International
Verification Agency could provide, however, is the ability to conduct on-site inspec-
tions to supplement national technical means and to determine by such inspections
whether cheating has occurred. It should be emphasized that the International
Verification Agency would never replace U.S. national technical means. It would
only supplement such means through on-site inspections.
Conclusion
The Campaign for UN Reform supports Senate ratification of SALT II and the
SALT II Protocol. In addition, for all of the reasons stated, the Campaign respectful-
ly urges the Senate of the United States to adopt a resolution urging the President,
prior to the signing of a SALT III agreement, to negotiate a treaty establishing an
International Arms Control Verification Agency with on-site inspection authority,
so that such an agency will be available in the future to supplement U.S. national
technical means of verification and thereby help insure the adequate verifiability of
SALT III and any other future arms accords.
502
Communications Workers of America,
(Affiliated with AFL-CIO),
Washington, D.C., August 1, 1979.
Hon. Frank Church,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Senator Church: Rank-and-file delegates to the 41st Annual Convention of
the Communications Workers, gathering in Detroit from every part of the nation,
strongly endorsed the SALT II Treaty as a pragmatic diplomatic instrument, which,
if approved and put into force, would be in the best interest of the United States.
This recent action by the delegates followed the issuance, earlier, of a CWA
Executive Board Statement which cited key points in the Treaty and urged ratifica-
tion by the Senate after presentation for advice and consent by President Carter.
A copy of the statement approved by the CWA Convention is enclosed.
As you consider this most important matter, I urge you to take into consideration
the views of our CWA members who reflect in large part the thinking of their
neighbors and fellow citizens in communities throughout the country.
Sincerely,
Glenn E. Watts,
President.
Enclosure.
Excerpt From Statement on Foreign Policy
SALT II
After more than six years of bargaining, the United States and the Soviet Union
have signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, known as SALT II, in Vienna
where President Carter met Premier Brezhnev for their first summit conference.
The prolonged meetings between the two superpowers, a process that began with
SALT I more than a dozen years ago, has been called "the most important negotia-
tions of the post- World War II era."
But whether the agreement is to become law depends upon ratification by the
United States Senate, and the impending debate could be the most difficult foreign
policy debate in Congress since the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles in 1920.
SALT II does not put an end to the arms race, but the treaty does provide for
stability, predictability and equality through 1985 in the strategic relationship be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union.
From a military standpoint, a principal virtue of SALT is that it provides a base
line for judging what the Soviets are up to. It establishes rules for what they can
build and also for what they can't.
If the treaty is ratified, the Soviets and we will be bound to limit the total
number of strategic launch vehicles (missiles and bombers) to 2,400 at first and then
to 2,250 by the end of 1981.
SALT II, however, does not deny the United States the right to proceed with
developing and deploying the new (MX) land missile nor does the treaty prevent the
United States from making this new superweapon mobile in order to decrease its
vulnerability to Soviet attack. President Carter has, indeed, decided to advance to
the full-scale development stage of this 190,000 pound missile which is capable of
carrying 10 warheads of 335 kilotons each. The MX missile would supplement the
1,0()0 Minuteman and 54 Titan ICBMs reposing in underground silos. About 200 MX
missiles which could be deliberately hidden from Soviet spy satellites, could be built
and deployed by 1986.
Moreover, the treaty forbids interference with our ability to verify Soviet missile
developments by satellite surveillance as well as by electronic ground station moni-
toring.
Despite the loss of monitoring stations in Iran, the United States retains the
capacity to verify Soviet compliance with SALT II.
By ratifying the SALT Treaty, the United States Senate would by no means be
ignoring the fact that there remain fundamental differences between the economic,
social and political structure of the United States and that of the Soviet Union. Nor
would approval of the pact sweep away the compelling reality of the basic adversary
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Communications Workers of America continues to view the Soviet Union as
an imperialist totalitarian state which violates the human rights of its citizens and
is a threat not only to the multi-party democracies of the West, but also to the
nations of the "third-world."
503
In summary, we believe the SALT Treaty reflects a pragmatic diplomatic instru-
ment, which, if approved and put into force, would be in the best interest of the
United States. It is not a panacea for the International arms race or for the ongoing
conflict between the political theories of Thomas Jefferson and V. I. Lenin. Within
its stated limits, however, it is a rational document, which deserves support.
Statement of Edward F. Snyder, Executive Secretary of the Friends
Committee on National Legislation, Washington, D.C.
There is widespread support among Quakers for far-reaching steps toward world
disarmament. There is, however, less agreement among Friends on the proposed
SALT II Treaty because some Friends feel that it provides little or no progress
towards disarmament and should therefore be opposed or at least ignored.
Our own Friends Ck)mmittee on National Legislation urges final Senate ratifica-
tion— after strenuous efforts are made through related agreements, understandings,
declarations, or interpretations to halt new missile and warhead production and to
reduce rapidly the launcher and warhead ceilings in a follow-on agreement to be
concluded long before the SALT II expiration at the end of 1985 and preferably
before the expiration of the Protocol on December 31, 1981.
Our support for the SALT II Treaty is based on its value as a political document
which affirms detente with the Soviet Union. It chooses accommodation over unre-
mitting hostility. It can open the way for significant weapons reduction in later
negotiation on SALT and related issues.
SALT II's ratification would also affirm a national consensus that more real
national security can be found in mutual attempts to reverse the arms race than in
an uncontrolled race to devise and build ever more dangerous weapons of mass
destruction.
Unlike some other witnesses before this Committee, we do not find SALT II's
military limits particularly impressive or commendable. Indeed, this treaty appears
to confirm the upward thrust of the arms race by giving the military establishments
of the Soviet Union and the United States most of what they might reasonably hope
to obtain in terms of weaponry in the next five years. We are amazed to find in this
"arms control" agreement an unbelievably high ceiling on warheads which would
permit a combined United States and Soviet increase of about 7500 warheads, as
well as the authorization of a new ICBM system (which might be made mobile after
1981) and the opening of a whole new arms race escalation through cruise missiles.
We find highly disturbing the collateral demands being made which would link
SALT II ratification to increases in military spending. In Salt I seven years ago
accompanying military increases were rationalized as necessary to obtain bargain-
ing chips. Those increases purchased mainly an accelerated arms race and greater
insecurity. Current calls for additional military spending increases appear to be
crass quid pro quos for Senatorial votes, unrelated even to Pentagon requirements.
The concept of "essential equivalence" in bald terms says that if the Soviet Union is
foolish enough to spend its desperately needed resources for arms which increase its
stockpiles of weapons, the United States should do likewise whether or not this
increases United States security or is viewed by the Defense Department as neces-
sary.
This is not the leadership for peace which our nation should be exerting in the
world. It is following the herd over the cliff to disaster.
While SALT II's ratification will not take us very far down the road to real arms
limitation and disarmament, its rejection by the Senate would be highly unfortu-
nate. If the Senate does not ratify SALT II, it seems probable that:
U.S. and Soviet military spending will rise even more rapidly than now planned.
Efforts to negotiate SALT III reductions will be blighted, as will negotiations on a
comprehensive test ban, mutual reduction of forces in Europe, and arms sales
limits.
Hard-line advocates in the U.S.S.R. will be strengthened in the struggle for
leadership in a post-Brezhnev period. Their ascendancy would strengthen their
counterparts in the United States.
"Near nuclear" powers, frustrated by the failure of nuclear powers to make
progress on arms limitation as promised in Article VI of the 1968 Non-Proliferation
Treaty, may decide to develop their own nuclear weapons, thus hastening further
proliferation and danger.
proposed changes in salt II treaty
Senate consideration is one of the few opportunities during the marathon SALT
process when the public and its representatives in the Senate can insert their own
504
views. At all other times the military establishments of the United States and the
Soviet Union are either in control of the agenda or at least able to exercise veto
power. This is therefore a precious moment which should not pass without maxi-
mum effort to demonstrate that the public wants arms control agreements that
reduce rather than increase arms.
We therefore urge your favorable consideration of amendments such as the one
proposed by Senator Hatfield to mandate a freeze on further expansion of strategic
offensive arms. If the Senate of the United States would send the SALT II Treaty
back to the negotiators to attempt to write in such a freeze it would have a stunning
and positive impact around the world. This would be a momentous declaration by
you as representatives of the United States public that the nuclear arms race must
be reversed now rather than continuing into the indefinite future.
If the Hatfield amendment is not approved, we support a declaration such as
Senator McGovern proposes for negotiations in SALT III for a freeze and an annual
reduction thereafter of ten percent.
We strongly urge your support for these approaches. We hope this prestigious
Committee is as able as the small boy to point out that the Emperor has no
clothes — that more nuclear arms buy more insecurity rather than security, that war
preparations usually are followed by wars and not peace treaties, and that arms
control treaties should reduce arms rather than authorize increases in arms.
ACCELERATING THE SALT PROCESS
It should be clear that if the arms race worsens as much between SALT II and
SALT III as it did between SALT I and SALT II, the costs and risks will be nearly
unbearable. Some way must be found to accelerate the SALT process. Now the
negotiating process is continually subverted by simultaneous arms building. Often
negotiators' efforts are overrun by development or deployment of new weapons
systems.
To advance true arms limitation efforts, we urge this Committee to give greatly
increased emphasis to the collateral events surrounding the negotiating process.
Specifically, we suggest that an early SALT III agreement making substantial
reductions in nuclear arms is much more likely to be achieved if there is a U.S.
moratorium on testing and production of the weapons under negotiation than if
there is a crash program under way to produce them.
While those who place their faith in arms may find some risks in such a moratori-
um, we suggest that those risks are far less than the risks now being run in an ever
accelerating arms race.
We also hope this Committee will review in the near future the roles that various
moratoriums on testing or arms development have played in reaching arms agree-
ments. While much controversy attended the occasions when the United States and
the Soviet Union suspended nuclear tests in the period 1958 to 1963, we believe it is
beyond doubt that such moratoriums helped to create the political climate in which
the partial test ban treaty finally became a reality in 1963.
We hope your Committee will hold hearings on the question of how the SALT
process may be speeded. And in those hearings we urge your consideration of the
concept of reciprocal initiatives, of which Prof. Charles E. Osgood of the University
of Illinois is a chief exponent.
A policy of "essential equivalence" in provocative weapons systems can lead to
moral and fiscal bankruptcy. A policy of essential equivalence in peaceful policies,
where each side takes steps away fron confrontation and toward tension-reducing
measures, could substitute a peace race for the arms race.
The world's peoples desperately need leadership away from the brink of nuclear
destruction. You members of this Committee and your colleagues in the Senate have
an opportunity unparalleled in history to turn this nation and the world toward
peace rather than being swept along toward disaster.
Our prayer is that you have the vision and courage to make the right decisions
for peace and the ability to translate them into effective policy.
Statement of Stephen E. Seadler, President, Ideological Defense Center,
New York, N.Y.
I. introduction
1. In his message to the United States Senate on January 22nd, 1917, President
Wilson declared, "The question of armaments, whether on land or on sea, is the
most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future for-
tunes of mankind."
505
2. Standing before the Inaugural crowds on January 19th, 1961, President Ken-
nedy declared, "So let us begin anew . . . Let both sides, for the first time, formu-
late serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms — and bring
the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all
nations."
3. In his Inaugural Address on January 20th, 1977, President Carter declared,
"T^e world is still engaged in a massive armaments race designed to insure continu-
ing equivalent strength among potential adversaries. We pledge perserverance and
wisdom in our efforts to limit the world's armaments to those necessary for each
nation's own domestic safety. We will move this year a step toward our ultimate
goal— the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth. We urge all other
people to join us, for success can mean life instead of death."
4. In the spirit and sixty years of those intentions the world has seen a plethora of
peace-security, non-armament, arms reduction, and arms control instruments such
as the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), League Commission on Armies
Draft Treaty (1925), Pact of Locarno (1925), Washington Naval Conference Agree-
ment (1927), Geneva and London Naval Conference Agreement (1927, 1930), Geneva
Protocol (1928), Kellog-Briand Pact (1928), Charter of the United Nations and its
Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945), Antarctic Treaty (1961), Limited
Test Ban Treaty (1963), Outer Space Treaty (1967), Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970),
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (1971), 'Accidents
Measures' Agreement (1971), Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1972), Biological Weap-
ons Convention (1972), ABM Treaty (1972), SALT I (Interim Agreement) (1972), ABM
Protocol (1974), Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement (1973), Threshold Test Ban
and Protocol (1973), Treaty and Protocol on Underground Peaceful Nuclear Explo-
sions (1976), and Environmental Modification Ban (1977).
5. Yet, despite those imperative and paramount intentions and despite those
hopeful instruments, a Second World War ravaged the planet, and a monumental
world-wide arms race now hurtles us toward the inevitable and historic outcome of
all arms races. If that certainly can be made more certain it has now so become, for
arms control itself has become an instrument of the arms race — legitimating it,
institutionalizing it, guiding it, optimizing it, and integrating itself with it.
6. Now we are engaged in the design and consideration of yet another instrument,
SAL*! II. This testimony on that projected Treaty is being presented to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations during the concluding month of its hearings— the
month that marks the 40th anniversary of the start of World War II.
II. PRINCIPLES
1. It is therefore fitting to begin by noting that that war's fundamental lesson still
has not been learned — a lesson fundamental to the very definition of war, to the
failures of the aforementioned intentions and instruments, and to the inevitable
failure of arms control as traditionally and presently conceived.
2. Not only has this lesson not been learned, but there exists a strong cultural
bias against even considering it, for it involves consideration of ideologies. This bias
has resulted in dealing with ideologies by simply pronouncing them insignificant,
irrelevant, passe, defunct or dead. Manifestation of this bias range from popular
thought-blocking shibboleths such as 'Actions speak louder than words,' to the
extremely serious flaw in US classical Military Intelligence Doctrine of concentrat-
ing on adversary capabilities to the neglect of intentions. The consequences have
been most tragic.
3. On the other hand, our culture includes profound implicit recognitions of the
significance of ideas and hence of ideologies. These include the very concept of
democracy and the foundations of this Republic, which evolved from the pre-revolu-
tionary ferment of ideas to the ultimate Jeffersonian 'market place of ideas' —
implying that ideas affect behavior, including votes and polity — exampled by these
hearings themselves.
4. Our concern here is with an utterly different domain of ideas: state ideologies
of aggression; more especially, their core ideologies of violence and license (Core
IVLs). The contemporary form of this problem began with Bismarck, extended
through the Hohenzollerns, and proliferated into the new strains of Marxism-
Leninism, Tanakaism, [1] Fascism and Nazism. Consequences have been The Second
Reich, World War I, The Third Reich, World War II, the Gulag Archipelago, the
present arms race, and impending World War III.
5. Despite those realities, the traditional concept of war encompasses only the
condition of armed conflict, and threat to the peace only the immediacy thereof.
Clarification of the concept of war and the fact that we have been in World War III
for some time is provided by the following passage from Hobbes' "Leviathan":
506
For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell only, or the act of fighting; but in a
tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and
there the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre, as it is in
the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a
Showre or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So
the nature of Warre, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposi-
tion thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other
time is PEACE.
The inclination and disposition to war are crystallized in its ideological foundations,
which rationalize, legitimate, motivate, unify, guide and impassion 'the Will to
contend by Battell.'
6. It is not possible in brief testimony to develop the foregoing, nor to present the
essentials of the new field of ideologies (i' de o 16' gics), which formulates the
problem and solutions to it. For this background the Committee is referred to the
first 25 pages of the paper "Ideologic Essentials of Public Administration," [2] copies
of which are submitted with this testimony for its convenience. With this under-
standing, we now proceed to applications to the predicament of SALT II.
III. APPLICATIONS
1. An indication of the aforementioned fundamental lesson of World War II is
given by William L. Shirer in "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich." [3]
* * * had the foreign statesman of the world perused it /Mein Kampf/
carefully while there still was time, both Germany and the world might have
been saved from catastrophe . . . /but/ his opponents inside and outside Ger-
many were too busy, or too stupid, to take much notice of it until it was too
late . . .
2. A general cue for learning and applying that lesson is given by the following
from a House Committee on Foreign Affairs report: [4]
Our reluctance to face the facts concerning Soviet policy, when they have
done their best to make its nature explicit, is parallel to our earlier reluctance
to recognize the nature of Nazi ambitions when they lay plain in the text of
Hitler's book. This reflects our disbelief in the capacity of dogmatists, especially
if they take their dogma for a science, to think in theoretical terms and to
believe in their own theories.
3. Focus within that cue is provided by the following admonitions of Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn: [5]
The most important aspect of detente today is that there is no ideological
detente . . . And detente? There is no detente . . . One can't raise the question
of detente without ideological detente.
4. Specificity within that focus is provided by the following slogans from among
those provided by the Central Committee of the CPSU for May Day 1979: [6]
Hail to Marxism-Leninism — the mighty ideological weapon . . .
Under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, under leadership of the Communist
Party — forward to the victory of communism!
For the significance of that weapon and banner, which we occasionally reference
but rarely if ever understand, see the section 'Communist Ideology' in [2], pages
168-174.
5. Next, we must apply in foreign relations the understanding of threat that
obtains in domestic relations. When threatened with violence you are not obliged to
wait for the act; you can deal with the threat itself. All state codes provide impris-
onment for assault, which is commonly understood to be the threat of injury by
force under such circumstances as create well-founded fear of imminent peril,
coupled with apparent present ability to execute attempt if not prevented. Battery
in assault and battery is carrying out the threat. Furthermore, state codes provide
for the arrest and imprisonment of any person who has threatened to commit any
offense punishable by law, and also provide long sentences for advising, encourag-
ing, advocating or inciting murder. Contrastingly, nations have been recognizing
and dealing only with extreme assault (posed armies) and actual breaches of the
peace (battery), rather than recognizing and dealing with the threat — which is
manifest in the combination of an aggressive violent ideology and significant arma-
ments.
6. We now see that ideological arms control (lAC) must be incorporated into the
arms control concept and process, that lAC is a condition precedent to, the sine qua
non of, meaningful physical arms control, and that the illusion that physical arms
control alone can be effective has been nourished by the delusion that intentions
can be contained by limitations on capabilities.
507
7. Fortunately, the means for implementing lAC are already at hand. They
consist of certain interlocking language in existing US-USSR arms control treaties
and the UN Charter, chronologically as follows.
1. UN Charter. Chapter VII, Action With Respect To Threats To The Peace,
Breaches Of The Peace, And Acts of Aggression. Article 39: The Security
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security.
2. Outer Space Treaty. Preamble. . . . Taking account of United Nations
General Assembly resolution 110(11) of 3 November 1947, which condemned
propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression, and considering that the aforemen-
tioned resolution is applicable to outer space, . . .
3. Non-Proliferation Treaty.
1. Preamble. . . . Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force. . .
2. Article VI. . . . Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
treaty on general and complete disarmament. . .
4. SALT I (Interim Agreement). Preamble. . . . Mindful of their obligations
under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons. . .
5. Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. Article II. The Parties agree,
in accordance with Article I and to realize the objective stated in that Article,
to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use
of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and
against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international
peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be gtiided by these consid-
erations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the
field of international relations.
6. SALT II.
1. Preamble. /Language identical to that in SALT I (Means No. 4)/
2. Statement of Principles. . . . The Parties will also consider further joint
measures, as appropriate, to strengthen international peace and security
and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.
7. International Law. In addition to the foregoing legal Means, further, funda-
mental, legal Means exist by virtue of the fact that those Means: (1) constitute
established provisions in international law; (2) repeatedly distinguish between
'threat' and execution of threat; and (3) can draw on the concept of 'threat'
conveyed in para. III. 5, above, inasmuch as: (i) that concept is a general princi-
ple of law recognized by civilized nations, and (ii) the Statute of the Internation-
al Court of Justice lists as one of the major sources of international law 'the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.'
8. Precedent. The foregoing Means are so well established that for application
they need only the elucidation and integration provided herein. However, a
clear precedent already exists in UN General Assembly Resolution 3379(XXX),
which took note of a Declaration adopted at the Conference of Ministers for
Foreign Affairs at Lima in August 1975 that 'condemned zionism as a threat to
world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and
imperialist ideology.' As much as we may abhor its substance as invalid, mali-
cious mischief, we must recognize the Resolution's significance £is a major,
prototypical, international, formal ideological defense (of the peace) measure.
That significance is enormously enhanced by the fact that the USSR and the
Soviet bloc strongly supported the Resolution. For more on this see [2], pages
178-179.
9. Ideological Defense (ID). The term 'ideological defense,' above, derives from
the phrase in the UNESCO Charter; 'Since wars begin in the minds of men it is
in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.' Since the
relevant operative content in the minds of men are ideologies, the defenses of
peace must be ideological. This, too, provides Means.
8.0 The spirit and letter of the Means set forth in para. III.7, above, provide
sufficient foundations for introducing lAC into the SALT process. In broad terms
this involves undertaking ideological negotiations (ideonegotiations) that deal with
both edges of the Marxist-Leninist 'mighty ideological weapon,' especially as honed
by its Core. To summarize the section on 'Communist Ideology' in [2], the first, or
508
Violence, edge of the sword scientifically legitimates and espouses violence; the
second, or License, edge 'scientifically' legitimates and espouses a super-ethic that
frees comrades from 'ethical encumbrances.' The License edge includes the extreme-
ly important corollary of legitimating and espousing duplicity, which explains much
in contemporary history. It constitutes a continuous 'fingers crossed behind the
back' vitiation of all agreements and treaties with the USSR, which 'honors,'
stretches or abrogates their terms on a day-to-day basis, depending on Soviet assess-
ments of each term's congruence with Soviet strategic goals and needs and tactical
opportunities as events transpire. These considerations require that ideonegotiations
deal with both edges as follows.
8.1 Violence Edge. Ideonegotiations must: (1) Seek adequate recission or modifica-
tion of those aspects of Marxism-Leninism that constitute threats to the peace,
threats of force, propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression; and (2) Serve as joint
measures to strengthen international peace and security and reduce the risk and
outbreak of nuclear war, as formal evidence that they will be guided by these
considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the
field of international relations, and as effective measures essential to cessation of
the arms race.
8.2 License Edge. Ideonegotiations must seek adequate recision or modification of
those aspects of Marxism-Leninism that free the USSR from 'ethical encumbrances'
and undermine the integrity of agreements and treaties. Bases for these negotia-
tions are provided by the same Means as for the Violence Edge negotiations — plus
Means provided by terms calling for negotiations in good faith, as in SALT I and II
references to Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by references to the Pur-
poses and Principles of the United Nations in the Outer Space and Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaties, and by the good faith obligations of the U.N. Charter.
8.3 Whether ideonegotiations should be undertaken via amendment, annex or
other provision integral with SALT II, or by measures outside of but complementary
to it, will not be entered into in this testimony.
9.0 Recent testimony seeking to enhance the SALT process by monitoring and
assessing Soviet conduct as a criterion for continuation of the process is notable in
that it would convert the SALT process from a series of tenuously related episodes
into a system, and merits consideration here.
9.1 Despite its system merit, that enhancement is fundamentally flawed in that:
(1) Conduct has already occurred and may have seriously inimical consequences; (2)
It provides no fundamental means for affecting conduct, only hopes for its rectitude
in the future under pressure of threatened withdrawal from SALT, which threat
carries little if any credibility; (3) It is fraught with possibilities for evasion, equivo-
cation, subterfuge, camouflage and confoundation; and (4) It provides only Go/NoGo
decision outcomes.
9.2 In system terminology, it constitutes a reactive, feedback system, which is
inadequate for the purpose. What is needed is an anticipatory, feedforward system —
wherein we deal with the ideology that drives and guides the policies that deter-
mine the conduct, and then monitor and assess both ideology and conduct. This
constitutes an organic approach, which is essential when dealing with societal
systems, expecially when the stakes are so high.
9.3 Behavioral pressure is applied continuously or repeatedly by the ideonegotia-
tions themselves — and by our intimating our inclination, should they fail, to turn
from such cooperative proceedings to full-scale adversary proceedings via a wide
range of ideological defense measures (some of which are outlined in [2]) — the one
countermeasure the USSR most dreads.
IV. CONCLUSION
1. The need for introduction of Ideological Arms Control in arms control in
general and the SALT process in particular is clear and urgent. That need will
become underscored by the difficulties it will face. Such difficulties can be anticipat-
ed by the fact that the USSR has repeatedly and vehemently excluded Ideological
Detente from Detente. That exclusion alone evidences the hoUowness of "Detente"
as we continuously misunderstand it, which in turn underscores the urgency of lAC.
2. When that exclusion is combined with an understanding of what Ideological
Detente would mean, with what Marxism-Leninism means, with the relentless
Soviet arms build up and world-wide strategic and tactical operations, including its
utilization of arms control as an element of those operations, and with the history of
arms control and other peace and security instruments as conventionally conceived
and executed, our vision becomes clear. We then perceive the inevitable disaster of
vanquishment or thermonuclear war that will befall us unless we undertake to
509
introduce and establish the ideological dimension in world affairs, beginning now,
with SALT II.
3. More especially, we will have begun to extend universally that Novus Ordo
Seclorum envisioned in our Great Seal, wherein Mankind will have learned to
recognize and disdain the dogmatic fallacies of tyrannical malevolence, and to value
more noble and glorious purposes.
NOTES
1. The term "Tanakaism" denotes the Japanese Imperial Ideology of World Con-
quest (both terms are coined) as exemplified in the Memorial presented to the
Emperor of Japan by Baron Tanaka in 1927.
2. Seadler, S E. "Ideologic Essentials of Public Administration," in "Management
Handbook For Public Administrators," John W. Sutherland, Editor (New York: Van
Nostrand Reinhold, 1978).
3. Shirer, William L. "The Rise And Fall Of The Third Reich" (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1960), Chapter 4, "The Mind of Hitler and the Roots of the Third
Reich." Also recommended: Sklar, Dusty. "Gods & Beasts/The Nazis & The Occult"
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1977).
4. "The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism." House Committee on For-
eign Relations, Subcommittee No. 5, National and International Movements, 80th
Congress, 2d Session, House Document No. 619 (Washington: USGPO, 1948).
5. During the extraordinary interview on the BBC, March 10, 1976.
6. "Current Digest of the Soviet Press." Vol. XXXI No. 15 (May 9, 1979), p. 11.
Statement of Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton, President, Pax Christi USA,
Chicago, III.
Mr. Chairman: I am Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton, President of Pax Christi USA
and Auxiliary Bishop of the Archdiocese of Detroit. I am happy to present this
testimony on SALT II on behalf of Pax Christi USA and of many people who are
deeply concerned about the morality of our world's weapons systems, which, instead
of safeguarding our future, threaten its very existence.
Before I proceed to Pax Christi's position on SALT II, I should like to offer two
preliminary considerations which will help you understand the context of Pax
Christi USA's position on SALT II. The first is that while the global arms race is
very much a strategic, political, and economic concern, we believe that the arms
race at heart represents a profound spiritual crisis for our times. We act as though
we have lost faith in our destiny and no longer believe that we can solve problems
in a nonviolent manner which is most truly expressive of human dignity.
We ought, rather, to take courage from instances of nonviolence in political
conflict. For example, during and immediately after World War II, a major interna-
tional conflict between Great Britain and India was resolved without recourse to
arms, thanks to the leadership of Gandhi in politicizing nonviolence. In the same
decade, the atomic bomb was used against a civilian population, setting us on a
tragic path towards nuclear holocaust. Recent history thus lays before us two
models of conflict resolution, demanding that we make a choice. The SALT II treaty
is an acid test of our fundamental option. If we approve a treaty which allows an
escalation of nuclear arms, we demonstrate a cynicism, or worse, a despair about
the human potential for security through nonviolence. If, on the other hand, we
insist that the treaty provide for an immediate limit of nuclear arms, we affirm that
the bedrock or our defense policy is our faith in the strength that comes from trust
in God and in human goodness.
The assumption that global peace can be achieved only through massive weapons
buildups is not only a delusion, it is a psychological and spiritual sickness. Thus the
real issue is whether we shall accept the challenge of humanity in our international
debates and conflicts, or whether we shall continue to act as creatures who deny the
lordship of God over our entire universe. We realize that a humanistic and religious
perspective is not often considered in weapons debates, but unless we bring that
perspective to the debate we shall be lost in an uncharted sea without guidelines of
any sort.
My second consideration deals with the place of morality in conducting political
and foreign policy. Often we hear the argument that we can act only in our own
"enlightened self interest" in fashioning foreign policy. This attitude extends to the
debate on the arms race and SALT II with the consequence that wider moral
questions are dismissed or ignored in our discussion. What passes for "enlightened
self interest" may cloak a self defeating shortsighted policy divorced from ethical
considerations. In this time of unprecedented challenge forced upon us by escalating
510
arms development, genuine enlightened self interest demands that we locate our
political debate within such fundamental questions as these: Do we have the right
to plan the near total destruction of the human species? If it is wrong to attack
civilian populations is it not also wrong to make the weapons to execute such an
attack? Is it morally permissible to endorse or even accept a policy based on
Mutually Assured Destruction when we clearly have superior nonviolent alterna-
tives to manage conflicts between adversary powers?
These questions should carry much more weight in our arms development discus-
sions. For too long we have discussed morality as if it were simply an individual
question. It is time to bring the full force of moral concern to such issues as SALT
II, for without any significant moral debate we shall be left with a purely political
debate which will only end in the escalation of the arms race with its consequent
denial of fundamental human rights: the right to life, the right to survival, and the
right to live in freedom from fear of the nuclear threat which daily grows stronger.
PAX CHRISTI AND SALT II
I shall now proceed to Pax Christi's position on SALT II. Pax Christi USA is part
of the International Catholic Movement for Peace which has its headquarters in
Belgium and branches in Europe, Australia, and North America. Pax Christi was
founded to seek reconciliation between French and Germans after World War II,
and has since become very strongly involved in disarmament issues. The five pro-
gram priorities of Pax Christi USA are: Disarmament, A Just World Order, The
Primacy of Conscience, Education for Peace, and Alternatives to Violence. Regard-
ing our disarmament priority, we hold the following position: "Pax Christi USA
seeks to foster both nuclear and general disarmament. It believes that the construc-
tion and possession of nuclear weapons represents a profound immorality in the
contemporary world. Pax Christi USA seeks to reorient the priorities of our nation-
al government away from heavy arms spending and trading to policies which have
as their chief concern the truly human survival of all people. Far from weakening
the United States, disarmament will strengthen it and help it become a more
constructive leader among nations."
There are two fundamental reasons why we cannot support SALT II in its present
form: first, the increase in strategic weapons and weapons systems permitted by
SALT II along with corresponding escalation in research and development of weap-
ons systems, both of which are sanctioned by the morally intolerable doctrine of
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD); and second, our commitment to the teachings
of the Roman Catholic Church on the arms race and the preparation and use of
nuclear weapons.
Regarding our first reason, we are deeply disappointed that a treaty which has
the title of "limitation" of arms is in reality a treaty which specifically permits
escalation in arms. While we in Pax Christi call for disarmament, we are prepared
to support any truly effective limitation in arms as a meaningful step to security.
The minor limitations in SALT II are greatly outweighed by the major escalation in
strategic weapons permitted by the treaty. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
officials ask us to wait for SALT III for any real limitation or disarmament meas-
ures. Should not the entire SALT process, not just its third phase, produce some
measure of limitation? To this point the "arms control" provided by SALT I and
SALT II has actually increased the deadly supply of strategic weapons on our globe.
Marek Thee of Oslo's International Peace Research Institute has observed that the
bilateral United States/Soviet accords have "not halted the arms race, but rather
impelled its course."
The basis of our decision not to support SALT II in its present form lies in our
commitment to the peace message of Jesus and to Catholic principles and teachings
which call for an end to the arms race itself. These are, in briefest summary, the
following:
1. The Catholic Church has publicly condemned the use of indiscriminate weap-
ons.—At the Second Vatican Council convened by Pope John XXIII, the assembled
bishops of the world spoke in the document, "The Church in the Modern World," of
the "horror and perversity" of the use of scientific weapons in war which compelled
them to "undertake an evaluation of war with an entirely new attitude." This new
attitude was most clearly expressed in their condemnation of total war: "Any act of
war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas
along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits
unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation." (The Church in thi Modern World,
art. 80).
While we realize that SALT II does not propose the use of nuclear weapons and is
supposed to serve as an important psychological barrier against their use, we cannot
511
ignore the fact that even to make one more nuclear weapon enhances the chance of
its use, a use we cannot morally sanction.
2. The Catholic Chruch has spoken out against the philosophy of deterrence and
Mutually Assured Destruction which are the basis of SALT //.—At Vatican II the
Catholic bishops of the world observed that "this accumulation of arms, which
increases each year, also serves in a way heretofore unknown, as a deterrent to
possible enemy attack." (The Church in the Modern World, art. 81) The bishops did
not, however, endorse the philosophy behind deterrence and noted instead that it is
"not a safe way to preserve a steady peace. Nor is the so-called balance resulting
from this race a sure and authentic peace. Rather than being eliminated thereby,
the causes of war threaten to grow gradually stronger." (Ibid.) Later, in the context
of the discussion on deterrence the bishops declared: "Therefore, it must be said
again: the arms race is an utterly treacherous trap for humanity, and one which
injures the poor to an intolerable degree. It is much to be feared that if this race
persists, it will eventually spawn all the lethal ruin whose path it is now making
ready." (Ibid.)
In 1976 the Holy See was even more outspoken in its testimony to the United
Nations on disarmament. Concerning deterrence, it declared, "The severity of the
diagnosis is thus clear. In the eyes of the Church the present situation of would-be
security is to be condemned. " (emphasis in the original)
Perhaps there is nothing which is more telling evidence of the insanity and
immorality of our age than the policy of "Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). For
self-professed civilized nations to use the phrase, much less make it the cornerstone
of their foreign policies testifies to the utmost callousness regarding the sanctity
and dignity of human life. This MAD doctrine which undergirds the policy of
deterrence and which is endorsed by SALT II has been explicitly condemned by the
Catholic Church. In their 1976 pastoral letter, To Live in Christ Jesus, the Catholic
bishops of the United States stated: "As possessors of a vast arsenal, we must also
be aware that not only is it wrong to attack civilian populations but it is also wrong
to threaten to attack them as part of a strategy of deterrence."
Finally, the Catholic Church oppposes the arms race which is permitted by SALT
II. In testimony to the United Nations in 1976, the Holy See declared that the arms
race "is to be condemned unreservedly" and explained: "The obvious contradiction
between the waste involved in the overproduction of military devices and the extent
of unsatisfied vital needs * * * is in itself an act of aggression against those who are
the victims of it. It is an act of aggression which amounts to a crime, for even when
they are not used, by their cost alone armaments kill the poor by causing them to
starve. " (The Holy See and Disarmament 1.2)
The implication is clear. Not only is it immoral to use nuclear weapons, or to
threaten their use as a deterrent; it is also immoral and a "crime" even to make
them, for their very existence is already killing peope. SALT II does not substantial-
ly reduce our existing stockpile of those criminal weapons; instead, it allows their
increase. Pax Christi USA cannot support this escalation.
We see in this escalation a "machine gone mad", a technology which does not
serve and liberate humankind, but enslaves it. (The Holy See and Disarmament 1.5)
Pope John Paul II has pointed out that "the exploitation of the earth * * * for
military purposes, and the uncontrolled development of technology outside the
framework of a long range authentic humanistic plan often bring with them a
threat to man's natural environment, alienate him in his relations with nature, and
remove him from nature." (Encyclical Redemptor Hominis art. 15) In this context he
raises the question whether humankind is "developing and progressing or * * *
regressing and being degraded in [its] humanity." (Ibid.)
What, you may ask, are our concrete proposals on SALT II since we do not
support this treaty in its present form? While the treaty as it is does not merit our
support, there is an important amendment to this treaty which we can wholeheart-
edly support. This is the amendment introduced by Senator Hatfield, which would
mandate a moratorium on any strategic offensive arms already developed. This
amendment would add to the SALT II treaty the following, at the end of Article IX:
"3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this treaty, each party agrees not to
deploy, on or after the date of entry into force of this treaty, any number of
strategic offensive arms in excess of the number of strategic offensive arms deployed
by such party on the date of signature of this treaty, and each party agrees not to
develop, test, or deploy strategic offensive arms of a type not deployed by such party
on the date of signature of this treaty."
We believe that such an amendment will provide the effective arms limitation
dimension to SALT II which is now lacking. SALT II will then be far better
deserving of its name and will insure some significant measure of limitation which
is both morally and strategically sound. While the present dimensions of the United
512
States and Soviet arsenals are indeed frightening, the future weapons already being
developed will almost surely lead us to the very calamity we are trying to avoid. In
addition, while the Soviets have made it clear they would not accept any further
arms escalation amendments to SALT II, it is our hope that they may be willing to
renegotiate this treaty if, in fact, a significant limitation measure is added by this
Senate. The Senate's endorsement of the Hatfield amendment will be a living
testimony to the moral conscience of this esteemed body and evidence to the world
that moral and human considerations bear on arms policy decisions made by the
United States.
The present occasion of the SALT II debate is indeed a crisis in the sense of a
turning point; it is an unprecedented opportunity for the development of a new
attitude, a new vision, a new consciousness on which the future of our race depends.
Millions of our fellow Americans have sound intuitions that our security is threat-
ened rather than enhanced by policies based on Mutually Assured Destruction. The
emerging consciousness of the possibilities and the imperative of arms limitation is
still feeble and unformed. Pax Christi pledges itself to spare no effort in our
commitment to foster this emerging consciousness which repudiates nuclear war as
well as preparation for it. We will match our commitment to arms limitation and
disarmament with an equal commitment to the constructive works of social justice
which are the indispensable foundation of peace.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present this testimony of Pax
Christi USA on SALT II to this body. Please be sure of our prayers for you as you
debate this treaty. Your deliberations may well determine the survival not only of
this nation but of the entire world. In a very real sense, this is a test of the power of
the spirit and all that is noble in humankind; it is a test to determine whether it is
yet possible to control the destructive force of these weapons and the unspeakable
evils they threaten to unleash.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Statement of Dr. Alan Geyer, Representing the Council of Bishops and the
Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church, Washington,
D.C.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: My name is Alan Geyer. It is my
privilege today to testify on behalf of the Council of Bishops of the United Methodist
Church and also on behalf of our denomination's Board of Church and Society. I am
not myself, a bishop, I regret to say, although some of my best friends are bishops. I
am a political scientist whose main teaching and research have been in internation-
al relations, with a special interest in arms control and disarmament. I am also an
ordained minister, which many folks imagine is incompatible with being a political
scientist or a political anything. My present position is Executive Director of the
Churches' Center for Theology and Public Policy, an ecumenical study center here
in Washington. I wish to state clearly that I am not speaking today for that Center
but only for my own denomination.
Last April, the Council of Bishops adopted "A Resolution on SALT II and Commit-
ment to Disarmament" which urged approval of the SALT II Treaty. That resolu-
tion also expressed determination "that the American people and their government
must not fail to make positive decisions for disarmament in the days just ahead."
The text of the resolution is attached to this testimony and I shall make continuing
reference to it in my remarks today.
Several weeks ago I heard a private complaint from one of our government's key
officials in SALT affairs. He said, with great vexation, that the churches have
waited much too long to get into the action on nuclear arms issues — and that even
now they bring mostly a dilettantism to the really hard choices.
I could not argue with him— except to say .that there is a new seriousness about
disarmament on the part of many church leaders and local congregations, as many
members of the Senate and the House are beginning to discover in their constituen-
cies. The survival of the human race is, at last, becoming a theological issue. In fact,
it is hard to think of a more fundamentally theological issue.
If the nuclear arms race really does raise serious theological questions, it should
point us toward mysteries which we cannot pretend fully to understand. And, truth
to tell, we do not understand very much about the human consequences of nuclear
technology, or about the dynamics of political power in a nuclear age, or about the
limits of human rationality in coping with nuclear crisis.
Our national security debates in these late 1970s have once again become preoccu-
pied with strategic scenarios of nuclear war. The SALT II hearings themselves have
too often been turned into a platform for promoting the further development of
offensive nuclear weapons and military budget increases. These hearings and the
513
general public require a more adequate framework of political vision and humane
policy if the SALT process is to be an effective instrument of peacemaking.
Our religious communities are clearly summoned to lift up some alternative
scenarios: some new scripts for the strategies of peace. Scenarios in which both our
real security and our very survival are more surely promised than they are by the
fatuous assumption that we'd be better off with still more and bigger and better
nuclear weapons than the 32,000 already in the U.S. arsenal. Scenarios in which our
leaders muster the wit and the will to draw us away, at last, from these grisly
apprehensions of total terror which make mental health and normal living impossi-
ble for us all. Scenarios which appeal to "the better angels of our nature."
Deep beneath the military mathematics of the SALT debate are some searing
questions of moral wisdom.
What, if anything, would we not do to 260 million Soviet people, or to our own
people and institutions, or to all Earth's peoples, for the sake of promoting our
military technology and our perceptions of our own prestige? Do we have enough
vision of our creaturehood in God's good Creation, or of the humanity even of our
enemies, or of the things that really make for peace and security— any redeeming
vision which may yet spare us all from the Great and Final Firestorm?
The political setting in this country for discussing these questions right novy is
hardly auspicious. We are heavily burdened with political cynicism, wounded pride.
Cold War hallucinations, loss of common purpose, and manipulation of all of the
above by lushly funded propaganda from mean-spirited interests.
I wish to raise four broadly political questions which should be basic to the SALT
II debate. Each of these is morally loaded precisely because it is political, and not
simply technical.
Questions
(1) What moral claims, if any, do the Soviet government and people have against
us — and what do we do about them?
(2) What are the moral claims of non-nuclear- weapon states against both the
Soviet Union and the United States— and what do we do about them?
(3) What view of the meaning of our own security do we bring to arms limitation
issues?
(4) Can we make a national decision on SALT II without further corrupting the
integrity of our domestic politics?
Answers
(1) You do not have to overlook the repressive habits of Russian governments, or
the opportunism of Soviet foreign policy, or their Avis complex about catching up
with the U.S. in strategic weapons to ask whether the SALT debate isn't plagued
with very crude images of the Russians as our enemies. One such crudity is to
ignore obvious Soviet motives in avoiding a war even more devastating than World
War II and in reducing the terrible economic burdens of the arms race. Another
crudity is to attribute irresistible force to Soviet penetration of such societies as
Afghanistan and Ethopia — thus failing to see how bogged down the Soviets now are
in coping with national and religious forces in those societies. Still another crudity
is the unwillingness to recognize how many concessions the Soviets have actually
made on SALT and other disarmament questions.
After all, in SALT I, they did agree to exclude U.S. bombers and NATO forward-
based systems from the accords.
In SALT II, they agreed to come down from the 1974 Vladivostok launcher limit,
which means scrapping 250 of their own launchers capable of devastating all our
major urban areas. They changed their positions to accommodate demands on
sharing a common data base; permitting one new land-based missile system; defin-
ing the size of "new" missiles; limiting land-based missiles to 10 warheads; permit-
ting the U.S. to deploy long-range cruise missiles from our bombers, then permitting
an "average" limit of 28 cruise missiles per bomber after proposing a limit of only
20; stipulating that the Backfire will not be upgraded into a long-range bomber nor
will its production rate increase.
One of our senior U.S. negotiators has reported that "all the major moves" on
concessions have come from the Soviet side. While some Americans complain of
appeasing the Russians, we may well suspect that there is honest perplexity in
Moscow as to what more they must do to appease the Americans.
In short, our antipathies to many aspects of Soviet politics and policy must not
blind us to the very human seriousness of Soviet leaders about avoiding nuclear
war — a seriousness which transcends all ideologies and cultures.
(2) The moral claims of many other nations — in fact, of all nations — are at stake
in the SALT process.
514
There is no greater sense of inequity in the world today than that felt by nations
which have renounced nuclear weapons for themselves and, under U.S. and Soviet
pressure joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. But they joined only because
of a clear promise by the superpowers, written into that treaty, that there would be
an end to all nuclear testing and steady progress in reducing nuclear arsenals. Next
year's second Review Conference on that treaty could witness the collapse of effec-
tive international cooperation in halting the spread of nuclear weapons if it con-
venes with neither a SALT agreement nor a comprehensive test ban.
Mr. Chairman, I attended the First Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation
Treaty in Geneva in May 1975 and I served as head of this country's non-govern-
mental observers there. That conference, just six months after President Ford met
Chairman Brezhnev in Vladivostok, heard repeated assurances that a SALT II
accord was just ahead. Those assurances were offered in the face of understandable
protests from non-nuclear-weapon states that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was
increasingly an intolerable instrument of invidious discrimination.
Now, more than four years later, can we really suppose that a refusal to ratify
SALT II on the eve of the Second NPT Review Conference will promote the safety
or security of this nation? Is there any more likely circumstance of nuclear war
than the threat or use of nuclear weapons by any of a dozen other states which
already possess, or could soon possess, them in a world of uncontrolled proliferation?
It is primarily because of this perverse linkage between the vertical spiral of
strategic arms and the horizontal spread of nuclear arms that the United J^ations
General Assembly last fall voted 127-1 (only Albania voting No) to urge the earliest
possible conclusion of the SALT II accords. That doesn't mean universal enthusiasm
for SALT itself: it does mean that the non-fulfillment of SALT II is almost univer-
sally viewed as the greatest obstacle to progress on all the othe;^ issues on the
world's disarmament agenda.
(3) Perhaps our most basic ethical concern in national security policy is not a
conflict between principles and politics: it is the question as to how we conceive
political reality.
Do we really believe, for instance, that more and bigger nuclear weapons have a
redeeming effect on our insecurities, or that "strategic superiority" is still a politi-
cally meaningful term in nuclear policy? A much more useful perspective has been
suggested by Henry Kissinger in an uncharacteristic moment of modesty and per-
plexity (which was one of his wiser moments) when he blurted out: "What, in the
name of God, is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it politically,
militarily, operationally at these levels of numbers?* What do you do with it?"
The ultimate contradiction of the nuclear age is that the more we have committed
our substance to the idols of defense and deterrence, the more defenseless we have
become. Our insecurity has been compounded by every new escalation of military
technology. Not only have our national boundaries become indefensible against
nuclear attack: offensive technology increasingly threatens to outrun the technology
of arms control itself. As ingenious and even redundant as our present verification
systems may be, they can be overtaken by still more exotic offensive weapons if we
do not develop more peaceable political relationships and reverse the dynarnics of
the arms race. There is no technical escape from the requirements of reconciliation.
Not only has our defenselessness been compounded militarily: non-military
threats to our security — resource exhaustion, ecocatastrophes, inflation and massive
poverty and human degradation— all are severely aggravated by the arms race.
As our power to destroy has grown, our power to conserve and to create has
shrunk.
SALT II can be a step toward greater security if, as the Council of Bishops has
said, the US and USSR proceed "immediately after the approval of SALT II to
negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear weapons in SALT III and succeeding
agreements."
If, however, this treaty's "disturbingly limited" provisions are used to push on
with still more devastating weapons and with thousands of additional nuclear
warheads, we cannot believe that our national security will really be served. The
Council of Bishops declared themselves "persuaded of the hard truth declared by
the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament that nuclear weapons consti-
tute 'much more of a threat than a protection' for the future of humanity."
(4) Our domestic political integrity is very much on trial in the SALT II decision.
One of the sorriest episodes in our political history was a whole series of extrava-
gant pay-offs for SALT I. The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency was dismissed, along with his top aides. The Agency's budget was sharply
cut. Both research and public affairs functions were guttered. And the SALT II
negotiations have, from the beginning, been burdened with promises of new weap-
515
ons systems made at the time of SALT I: full-scale MIRV deployment, cruise
missiles, Trident submarines.
The consideration of SALT II on its merits has, I personally believe, been made
much more difficult by a series of decisions about weapons, budget, and personnel,
as well as by official and unofficial rhetoric about Soviet policy.
I regret very much having to report my own impression that the prospects for
public support of SALT II were badly damaged by the Administration's own anti-
Soviet talk during the spring and summer of 1978. In fact, there was more than
alarmist talk. There was the first public cruise missile test. There was stepped up
planning for MX mobile missile development. There was a revival of evacuation
planning for civil defense. There was a highly publicized mock anti-Soviet maneuver
in Texas, attended by the President. In the early fall, a general was named to
succeed Paul Warnke at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. All of these
happenings tended to reinforce public hostility toward the Soviet Union— yet all of
them were rationalized as efforts to consolidate support for SALT II.
Even before SALT II was signed in Vienna and before these hearings began, the
White House had decided that the MX mobile missile had become a domestic
political necessity if SALT II were to be ratified. The tragedy of this most costly and
ominous development is that it could have been avoided politically if the public had
been engaged on the merits of SALT II during 1978.
The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in May and June of 1978
offered a timely opportunity to engage the public on the issues of nuclear arms
control and disarmament. In fact, the mobilization of public opinion was clearly the
prime purpose of the Special Session. But the President declined even to attend, the
United States offered no significant policy initiatives, and the Special Session
became a non-event for the American public. Yet these decisions, too, were rationa-
lized as political necessities for the sake of SALT II.
Whatever political games may be played in support of SALT II, we must also be
candid about the degree to which treaty opponents have cheapened the debate by
.the hard selling of raw fantasies, not only about the Soviet Union but also about
American groups committed to arms limitation. One of the silliest canards is being
spread by the American Security Council's Coalition for Peace Through Strength:
the claim that there is a $100 million pro-disarmament lobby led by the National
Council of Churches and the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy. Those
of us who have tried for years, without success, to get the National Council to fund
at least one modestly-paid staff person on disarmament issues — and who are famil-
iar with the subsistence style of the latter Coalition — have reason to wonder wheth-
er the inadequacy of the American Security Council's political research may help to
explain the vain imaginings of their strategic analysis.
If there is any set of issues which ought to lift the level of political debate in this
country to the highest levels of honesty and integrity — and a clear-eyed view of the
common good — it is these issues of national security and human survival.
Now I must conclude this review of the moral ambiguities of SALT II. I wish to
share with this Committee the fruit of a U.S.-Soviet disarmament consultation in
Geneva last spring, in which I was privileged to participate, along with governmen-
tal and church leaders from both countries. A major product of that consultation
was the very first joint U.S.-Soviet theological statement on any policy issue, a
statement which has since been warmly endorsed by both the Council of Bishops of
the United Methodist Church and the Governing Board of the National Council of
Churches. The benediction of that statement was written mostly by a Russian
Christian and ends with a familiar and terribly appropriate text from Exodus:
"Finally, our sisters and brothers, we call to your attention the authoritative
predictions that nuclear war by the 1990's is an increasing probability. In that
decade of high risks we will be approaching the end of our millenium. Even now,
only twenty years separate us from the moment when we will be called upon to
mark prayerfully the bi-millenary anniversary of the coming to the world of our
Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ, the Prince of Peace. How shall we meet that day!?
In what state shall we present our planet to the Creator? Shall it be a blooming
garden or a lifeless, burnt out, devastated land!?
"Thus the Lord has set before us again life and death, blessing and cur^!
Therefore choose life that you and your descendants may live!"
A Resolution on SALT II and Commitment to Disarmament
(Adopted by the Council of Bishops, UMC, Spring 1979)
Convinced that Christians have no higher calling than to be peacemakers who
teach nations to renounce the ways of war and to transform tools of death int.o tools
of life;
1+8-260 0-79 Pt.U - 33
516
Confronted by multiplying evidence that the nuclear arms race is out of control
and the prospects of nuclear war in our generation are mounting;
Disturbed by the resurgence of Cold War hostility and alarmism among some of
our people;
Persuaded of the hard truth declared by the United Nations Special Session on
Disarmament that nuclear weapons constitute "much more of a threat than a
protection" for the future of humanity;
Determined that the American people and their government must not fail to
make positive decisions for disarmament in the days just ahead;
We, the Council of Bishops of the United Methodist Church, urge the approval of
the SALT 11 Treaty. While we regret that the treaty is a disturbingly limited step
toward the reversal of the arms race, we believe that it will provide a more
equitable and effective framework for negotiating significant disarmament agree-
ments between the superpowers.
We call upon the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to
demonstrate their good faith by proceeding immediately after the approval of SALT
II to negotiate substantial reductions in nuclear weapons in SALT III and succeed-
ing agreements.
We affirm the crucial importance of meaningful SALT accords in fulfilling U.S.
and Soviet pledges to those nations which have renounced nuclear weapons under
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in halting the spread of nuclear weapons.
We believe that SALT II has become a necessary step toward other disarmament
agreements such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban, mutual force reductions in
Europe, and curbing the arms trade.
We believe, further, that the development of more peaceable relationships in
economic, technical and cultural field— -not only for the superpowers but for all
nations — is critically dependent upon progress toward nuclear disarmament.
We are deeply grateful for the March 27-29 Geneva Disarmament Consultation of
church representatives from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and their joint appeal to
"choose life in spite of the spreading power of death." Confessing a common faith in
"Christ, the All Powerful, the Conqueror of Death," that appeal sets before us a
vision of the year 2000 in which our planet may be either "a blooming garden or a
lifeless, burnt out, devastated land".
We commend Americans for SALT and the Religious Committee on SALT as
appropriate channels for Christian witness.
Finally, we pledge ourselves and we summon all our pastors and people to a new
and steadfast commitment to the works of disarmament and peace. Such a commit-
ment requires our constant prayer, our faithful study our courageous advocacy, and
our effective political action.
Endorsed by the Executive Committee of the Board of Church and Society of the United
Methodist Church.
Statement of Col. Phelps Jones, USA (Ret.) Director, National Security and
Foreign Affairs, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Washing-
ton, D.C.
Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished committee: My name is Colonel
Phelps Jones, USA (Ret.). It is my privilege and honor to serve the L85 million
members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States as their Director of
National Security and Foreign Affairs.
I appreciate this opportunity to furnish this important panel with the views of the
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States with respect to SALT II.
Our recorded opposition to this document of transcendant substantive and symbol-
ic importance did not arise in any "knee jerk" fashion. V.F.W. representatives have
met with President Carter, Dr. Brzezinski, Mr. Warnke and General Seignious, as
well as with responsible opponents of SALT II, inside and outside of government.
As you may be aware, mandated positions of the V.F.W. are arrived at democrat-
ically at our annual National Conventions.
Our 79th National Convention was held in Dallas, Texas, in August, 1978. Nation-
al Security Resolution Number 434, "Strategic (SALT) Negotiations with the
USSR," passed without dissent.
This resolution is appended to this statement as Enclosure Number 1 and will be,
with your Chairman's permission, made a permanent part of the hearings.
As to the treaty proper, certain basic questions need to be considered.
Treaty proponents, often with considerable emotion, assert as self-evident truth
that SALT II advances the national security policy of the United States.
To this assertion, I can only reply that after a conscientious 29-month search, I
have yet to locate an unambiguous statement by the President or the Secretary of
517
State which, in concrete, dispassionate terms, sets forth: (a) Where we think we are
in the world; (b) where we hope to get to; and, (c) how we propose to get there. I
have been obliged to fall back on a 17-month old set of remarks delivered by Mr.
Anthony Lake, of the State Department's Policy Planning Office, in San Francisco
on March 14, 1978, which included the following, somewhat elastic, paragraph:
"Our approach, therefore, is to make constant, pragmatic, case-by-case decisions,
seeking the most constructive balance among our interests and adjusting our tactics
as circumstances change."
In short, not knowing where we're going, we react.
While this approach does not make for wise policy, I suggest that Mr. Lake's
words are an accurate depiction, probably unwitting, of the absence of any central
strategic conception, sense or direction in our overall security policy.
SALT n, then, can be fairly viewed as being, to this Administration, an end in
itself.
For the Soviets, on the other hand, the treaty is but a useful component of a
wider, and geo-politically thrusting, foreign policy.
My point here is a simple one. To treaty proponents who assert that SALT II
supports U.S. national security policy, the sad rejoinder must be:
What national security policy?
SALT II, through the period of the protocol and the treaty proper, sets agreed
limits on only one component of military power: central, offensive, strategic sys-
tems. At Enclosure Number 2, attached hereto, are these various limits and sub-
limits.
Not considered are central defensive systems, active and passive civil defense
measures, conventional force levels and, most telling, any restraints on aggressive
foreign policy thrusts designed to upset global balance; i.e., the issue of "linkage
which will not, nor should not, go away.
"These omissions from SALT II pose a dilemma for SALT-sellers. On the one hand,
treaty proponents urge us repeatedly not to "hang too much on the SALT tree."
SALT II is, in General David Jones' words, "a modest but useful step." (In the
V.F.W., we believe that SALT II is a "modest" treaty that has much to be "modest"
about. The testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before this distinguished Commit-
tee was more of a collective dental extraction than a combined chorus of support.
General Rowny's considered non-concurrence is on the record.)
On the other hand, the President and his leading "SALT-sellers" have either
stated (as has President Carter) or implied (as has the Administration-supported
house organ "Americans For SALT") that to oppose SALT II would cause Ameri-
cans to be viewed throughout the world as "war mongers." Our reaction to this
"war mongering" charge is to recall that in March, 1977, Secretary Vance travelled
to Moscow with the then new Administration's preferred "SALT 11" package — a
treaty involving deep, important and mutual reductions.
Secretary Vance was turned down cold by the Soviet Union.
No one, here or abroad, charged the Soviets with being "war mongers" for this
abrupt and unexplained rejection. And, incidentally, this cold turn-down occurred
two and one half years ago. SALT II then, is the product of the Carter Administra-
tion. It is then not, as the "SALT-sellers" would have use believe, the product of
seven years of negotiations covering three Administrations. Since March, 1977, we
have been negotiating with ourselves — and, we in the V.F.W. suspect America has
lost.
Mr. Chairman, I urge, on behalf of the V.F.W. , that the Senate vote up or down
on SALT II and not, as was the case with the May, 1972 SALT I Accord, merely add
"reservations" and "unilateral declarations" that will have no enduring meaning.
The Wall Street Journal, in a brilliant editorial, "Off the Reservation," tracks
carefully the sad fate of the U.S. Senate-approved "unilateral declarations" ad-
dressed to the May, 1972 SALT I Treaty.
The last three paragraphs of this perceptive editorial make an enduring point.
These paragraphs follow:
"If the Senate foregoes cosmetics and spells out its concerns in clear amendments
to the treaty, it will at least force some clarification of the issue. Our suspicion is
that the Soviets are likely to find the treaty, even with amendments, so much in
their interest they will come back to the negotiating table. But it is of course quite
possible that, as Foreign Minister Gromyko threatened (in plain English) in a
Moscow press conference, that they will kill the negotiations.
"This might be a good thing. At least we will know where we stand. At least we
will be out from under the process that, for example, led President Carter to delay
our cruise missile program unilaterally while the talks were in progress. If Soviet
rejection of equalizing amendments proves that they will not negotiate limits on
their buildup, we could at least set about offsetting their drive in the cheapest and
518
most effective way we can, unencumbered by treaty constraints that force us into
cumbersome and expensive systems like the proposed MX missile shuffled around in
a 20 mile trench.
"The worst choice the Senate could make would be to do nothing while pretending
to do something. Its members need to suppress their first instinct, and face up
manfully to the fundamental decision before them. When tempted to straddle, they
ought to look at the history of unilateral declarations. If the Senate votes a list of
reservations, it will only have compiled a handy catalog of what the Soviets will do
to us during the life of the treaty."
As to the issue of whether we should "trust" the Soviets, once again, in our view.
President Carter's advisors miss the point.
The Soviets can be "trusted" to act as the 1979 inheritors of the Marxist-Leninist
tradition. They seek the fruits of conquest preferably without fighting.
The more relevant issue is whether or not we can "trust" this Administration—
heavily staffed as it is with symbol-manipulators and America-lasters.
It is a harsh judgment, but the V.F.W. believes it to be true: We "trust" the
Soviets to pursue their national and ideological goals more persistently and purpose-
fully than we "trust" this Administration to conserve, protect and decently advance
our 203-year democratic experience.
A lengthening litany of anti-defense decisions taken by the Administration leaves
one little hope that the MX will finally be deployed to offset ICBM vulnerability in
the 1980's.
Mr. Chairman, the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States recommends
that either:
(a) SALT II be returned to the Executive Branch without the Senate's consent and
with the Senate's admonition to re-negotiate, in due course, a true, mutual, verifi-
able and deep mutual arms control treaty.
(If the Soviets are not interested in such an approach, they are not, as we suspect,
interested in arms control in any non-symbolic way.)
Or,
(b) The Senate add precise and unambiguous amendments (not "reservations or
"unilateral declarations") covering such areas as: (1) on site verification, (2) the
"Backfire" bomber, (3) the heavy ICBMs permitted the Soviet Union (308 SS-18's)
which are denied us, and (4) Soviet geo-strategic adventurism conducted under the
umbrella of "detente."
Truly, Mr. Chairman, an enduring peace is the heart felt goal of the V.F.W. Our
members and their sons have fought in our last four wars. Others conceived of— or
dissented from— these conflicts. We need no urging to fight for peace. We do and we
will.
But an America, locked into strategic inferiority and narcotized by an inherently
unequal treaty, does not enhance a stable peace.
SALT II, as written, is a self-inflicted slide backwards towards a strategically
vulnerable, hence politically isolated, America whose policies will become increas-
ingly irrelevant to allies, fence-sitters, and communist totalitarians alike.
Our national experience deserves better. We remain, in Lincoln's words, the "last
best hope on earth. "
SALT II is a painfully structured strategic "apology" where none is needed.
As written, we urge its resounding defeat.
Enclosure No. 1
Resolution No. 434
Strategic (SALT) Negotiations with the USSR
Adopted by the 79th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the
United States held in Dallas, Texas, August 18-25, 1978.
Whereas, with respect to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of May 1972:
(a) neither side is permitted to deploy a nationwide ABM defense or a base for
such a defense;
(b) each side is permitted to deploy a limited defense of one area. In each defense
area, out to a 150 km radius, each side is permitted up to 100 ABM launchers and
interceptors and a limited radar base for these interceptors;
(c) neither side is permitted to give ABM capability to non-ABM systems; e.g., air
defense systems;
(d) verification will be by national means. The parties have agreed not to interfere
with these means; and
(e) the treaty will be of unlimited duration. Withdrawal is permitted for supreme
interest; and
519
Whereas, with respect to the Interim Offensive Agreement of May 1972:
(a) each side is permitted to keep any fixed land-based ICBM launchers currently
operational or under construction. No new fixed land-based ICBM launchers may be
built;
(b) the Soviets may complete the 313 modern large ballistic missile launchers; e.g.,
for SS-9 class missiles, currently operational and under construction. No new ones
may be built;
(c) neither side may convert to modern large ballistic missile launchers or any
other ICBM launchers;
(d) each side may keep any SLBM launchers operational or under construction;
also, newer SLBM launchers may be built as replacements for older SLBM launch-
ers or for older heavy ICBM launchers;
(e) verification will be by national means. The parties have agreed not to interfere
with these means;
(f) the duration of the Agreement is five years. Withdrawal is permitted for
supreme interests. The parties have agreed in the ABM Treaty to continue active
negotiations for limitations on strategic arms; and
Whereas, it is crucial to note that since 1972, the year of SALT I, the Soviets
have:
Deployed four (4) new ICBM's, SS-16, SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19;
Built and deployed over 100 supersonic, inter-continental "BACKFIRE" bombers;
Deployed the DELTA I and DELTA II missile-launching submarines. A DELTA
III is undergoing sea trials;
Improved the targeting and accuracy of their ICBM force;
Developed and tested a satellite killer; and,
Exceeded the U.S. effort in research, development, test, and evaluation, weapons
procurement and other defensive investments every year since 1969. During 1977,
their effort was 75 percent larger than ours; now, therefore be it
Resolved, by the 79th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the
United States, That:
(a) continued U.S. adherence to the May 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Agree-
ment occur only if the most thorough-going verification techniques reveal that the
Soviets are complying;
(b) no effort or expense be spared to verify Soviet compliance with this agreement
and any other agreement this year or next;
(c) the American public be fully and frankly kept informed of the dynamic and
shifting U.S.-Soviet balance so that if the U.S., by living up to agreements, is faced
with being the "second strongest" nation in the world, domestic public opinion will
support U.S. withdrawal from these Agreements and massive re-arming;
(d) the U.S. fully fund and deploy the Trident submarine and restore and fund the
B-1 Bomber, and permit test firing of our land-based ICBMs;
(e) no effort or expense be spared in the critically important research and develop-
ment of offensive and defensive strategic weapons technology; and
(f) current negotiations with the Soviet Union, aimed at changing the nature of
the May 1972 "Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons" and the November 1974
accords into a permanent treaty (as with ABMs), accept the philosophy that the U.S.
not agree to any formulation that would freeze the United States at a lower number
of offensive launchers than the USSR, in short, apply the President's formula
following the abortive Vance mission to Moscow in March 1977, i.e., we continue to
"hang tough".
Enclosure No. 2
the present arsenals
United States Soviet Union
573 Bombers (3 set for cruise missiles) 156 Bombers
1,054 ICBM's (550 with MIRV's) 1,398 ICBM's (608 with MIRV's)
656 SLBM's (496 with MIRV's) 950 SLBM's (144 with MIRV's)
Total: 2,283 Total: 2,504
HOW THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET ARSENALS OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS ARE
AFFECTED
Ceiling on strategic weapons until the end of 1981: The Soviet Union has six
months after the treaty goes into effect to destroy 104 missile launchers or bombers.
The U.S. has no plans to increase arsenal up to 2,400 limit.
520
Ceiling from January 1, 1982 to the Treaty's expiration date, December 31, 1985:
Of the 573 U.S. bombers, about 220 are in storage. The U.S. expects to destroy
stored planes to get under the ceiling.
HOW THE TREATY RESTRICTS COMPOSITION OF ARSENALS
No more than 820 of the 1,200 may be multiple-warhead ICBM's. No more than
1,200 of the 1,320 may be multiple-warhead ICBM's and SLBM's. No more than
1,320 of the 2,250 may be multiple-warhead ICBM's and SLBM's and bombers with
cruise missiles. Of the 2,250 weapons systems allowed, at least 930 must be single-
warhead missiles and bombers.
Statement of the Women's National Democratic Club, Political Action
Committee, Washington, D.C.
policy position on salt ii treaty
The Political Action Committee of the Woman's National Democratic Club has
studied the provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Arms (SALT II)
and has heard presentations by both proponents and opponents of the Treaty. As a
result, the Committee has decided to support the Treaty and the continuing negotia-
tions on arms limitation that would follow.
By establishing essential parity in the strategic forces of the two opposing sides,
SALT II enhances the stability of the strategic balance and reduces the possibility of
nuclear war.
The Treaty imposes equal aggregate ceilings on the numbers of launchers of
nuclear warheads which each side may deploy, as well as subceilings on specific
types of launchers. In addition, the Treaty imposes limitations on the number of
warheads which can be placed on a single missile and restricts the deployment of
new types of missile systems to one for each side. For the first time, significant
restrictions are agreed on qualitative improvements, thus curbing the sophisticated
technology which drives the arms competition.
Compliance with the Treaty is based on national technical means of verification
rather than on the good intentions of either side. The Committee accepts the
assurance given by the President and the Secretary of Defense that the U.S.
intelligence capabilities are sufficient to monitor Soviet strategic forces so that no
violation of the Treaty that would alter the strategic balance could take place
without being detected. Over and above that assurance, the Committee believes that
it is in the overriding interest of both nations to preserve the integrity of the Treaty
just as it had been in their mutual interest to negotiate and sign the Treaty.
The Committee understands that the terms of the Treaty permit the United
States to maintain a strong defense force and supports the Administration's stated
intention to maintain such a force. This course is essential for deterring against
nuclear attack and against aggressive moves in the global arena by the Soviet
Union which would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and its
allies. At the same time, the Committee opposes the acquisition by the U.S. of
weapons systems for the sole purpose of gaining political support for ratification of
the Treaty.
Accordingly, the Political Action Committee endorses the SALT II Treaty and
urges prompt ratification of it by the Senate without amendments which would
jeopardize the agreement which has been painstakingly negotiated over a period of
seven years.
Statement of Lester H. Ahlswede, Representing Citizen-Taxpayers, Silver
Spring, Md.
introduction
As a spokesman for what I am sure is a considerable segment of the American
public which believes that other behavior besides armament spending is urgently
needed in foreign relations, I respectfully submit this statement of testimony to the
Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate in relation to the SALT II
treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
I offer this testimony because, on the basis of news reports, there has been none
given to date from the standpoint of the interests and concerns of the public. All
testimony offered so far has been presented by people who generally have personal
or position prejudices which impugn their presumed expertness. I do not claim that
521
the viewpoints and conclusions presented here represent those of all the people, but
they do represent the concerns of a great many.
My qualifications are these: I am a university graduate, now 64 years old, who
has spent a career in newspaper work, government information, public relations
and in recent years as a writer. In the course of my work I have been in most of the
50 states and have had jobs in the midwest, New York City and Washington, D.C. In
most of these years I have been a student of human nature and behavior concerned
with the lack of understanding of human judgment and integrity and interested in
finding the keys to them. I am the author of a book about integrity which I expect
to be published soon. I am not a crank or a publicity seeker but someone genuinely
concerned about mankind who believes much greater emphasis is needed on other
than physical force in all human affairs.
THE POSITION
By itself, the SALT II treaty allows so much armament production that it is a
phoney symbol of peace and a cruel joke which only perpetuates fear, distrust and
arms spending. Especially if its approval must be accompanied by increased arms
expenditures, it is a mockery of credulity and a scrap of nonsense.
THE VIEWPOINT
Many of us citizen-taxpayers of the United States are growing increasingly tired
of the tremendous appropriations for military spending which is inherently wasteful
both with what is actually obtained and in terms of excessive over-abundance of
military hardware. What we want is international diplomacy which alleviates fears
and distrust accompanied by substantial reductions in armament appropriations.
We want all of our leaders in the legislative as well as executive branches of
government to be working to achieve these ends.
Most of us of the people are not nearly as frightened by a so-called threat of
communist military invasion as some individuals proclaim and think we are. On the
contrary, we objectively see that no nation in the world, including the United States
and the U.S.S.R., can afford to risk starting an atomic holocaust which would
devastate it as well as its enemeis. We see nuclear weaponry more as a deterrent
than as a danger. Furthermore, we believe, on the basis of frequently published
reports, that the United States already has a msissive overkill power in its atomic
arsenal which more than adequately protects our interests. We, therefore, see past
and present — and proposed — armament spending programs as extravagant and ex-
cessively wasteful.
We do not want or believe we need a so-called arms limitation treaty with the
U.S.S.R. which, instead of honestly limiting armaments, perpetuates for years to
come a continuum of suspicion, antagonisms and heavy spending for unneeded
military power — all of which breeds conflict, not compatibility.
Far more important than arms in relations between the United States and the
U.S.S.R. is the contest of political and economic behavior, which too often has been
atrocious on both sides and about which far too little is done to achieve correction
and improvement. In this contest, abuses of the so-called "free enterprise" system,
which is not to be confused with democracy, in both national and international
spheres are more relevant than quantities of missiles or powers of warheads, and
insidious activities of the U.S.S.R. also are importantly relevant. Unfair and un-
founded charges on either side are equally reprehensible. The existence of the
different systems of the two countries and their competitiveness in the world scene,
however, must be accepted as facts of life. All of this needs much more attention
than is now given, and a treaty on political-economic behavior would be far more
valuable than the sham SALT II treaty. This, furthermore, may require corrections
and changes in the internal affairs and functioning of the two nations, which, then,
also merits the attention of the leaders of each.
Beyond this, we believe that inordinate fear of the U.S.S.R. has long been falsely
propagated by a powerful clique within the United States with which the industrial-
military complex is related or associated. This group greatly benefits from such fear
propagation. While the original concept of Marxism projects world-wide develop-
ment, this far from automatically implies that the U.S.S.R. or any other communist
nation plans to impose communism by military force on the United States or even
elsewhere in the world. It needs to be seen objectively that the behavior of the
U.S.S.R. with nations on its western borders has been primarily nationalistic, as a
defensive measure, and not political, although political influence has followed in the
wake of nationalism.
We must credit others besides the Russians with reading "Das Kapital" and
believing in its concepts. This is especially applicable to people in countries where
522
oppression, autocracy, deprivation and injustice have prevailed. It is in the presence
of such evils that communism breeds, and it is the existence of such evils that we
should fear more than the danger of communist military takeovers. We even need
to be concerned about such evils within our borders.
Another factor about which we need to be cognizant in our relations with the
U.S.S.R. is that it will obviously seek military agreements which allow for its
relationship with China. Because it faces a vast border with China and uncertain
Chinese intentions, it cannot afford as much limitation of arms as the United States
can. A truly meaningful arms limitation treaty between only the United States and
the U.S.S.R., therefore, is not possible; yet we are unnecessarily affected by this
circumstance.
Since this situation illustrates the fact that effective disarmament in the world is
a broad international matter, the role of the United Nations must also be consid-
ered. The U.N. has lost favor and impact in recent years because of defects in its
procedures, including the basis for votes in the General Assembly, the single veto
power in the Security Council and other flaws. If it were an effective international
body, it could do much to reduce fears, tensions and armaments in the world. Action
needs to be taken, initiated by leading powers, to revise the charter of the United
Nations so that it can become a more viable force in the developing and maintain-
ing of world peace.
THE SITUATION
Specifically in relation to the SALT II treaty, conditions and factors beyond those
already considered are as follows:
1. Relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. can currently be de-
scribed as reasonably stable and are certainly greatly improved over the Cold War
period following World War II. There is no substantial basis for fear of a U.S.S.R.
attack on the United States or its European allies, and cause for such fear is less
now that it has been in previous years. Nor is there serious reason to believe the
U.S.S.R. will have a desire to attack the United States in the forseeable future.
Launching a major war by any nation in this nuclear age is pure folly.
2. The United States already has more than enough destructive power to devas-
tate the U.S.S.R. should it attack and can maintain such power with far less
armament spending than is currently allocated.
3. Neither the Department of Defense nor the CIA can be relied upon to offer
more than technical advice on a SALT II treaty and are not qualified to advise on
broader policy issues. Spokesmen associated with the industrial complex benefitting
from military spending also are not qualified to be objective. All will be disposed to
overplay the fear theme because it serves their appropriation, stature or profit
interests. The State Department has appeared to be barren of original, constructive,
affirmative ideas for years and, therefore, its spokesmen cannot be expected to offer
much of substance or consequence.
4. Testimony of Mr. Kissinger must be judged both on the basis of his perform-
ance as Secretary of State and as a Presidential advisor, plus his current position as
a representative of a political party out of power. Nor does he now address himself
to continuing or future needs. When he supports greater military spending, the
reasons for such support should be questioned.
5. The apathy with which the public responded to the signing of the SALT II
treaty should be a good indication of how the public feels about it. Obviously, the
people of the United States do not consider it of much consequence.
6. That the Carter administration wants the treaty approved cannot be viewed as
of major importance. Its interests are colored by political wishes; and in view of the
general ineptness of the administration, there is no reason to bestow credit to it for
any great achievement in arranging the treaty.
7. As a document of mechanics about numbers of weapons, the treaty, as a whole,
in inconsequential. If it does nothing more than limit a few armaments, it may be
doing a disservice rather than a service to the peoples of the United States, the
U.S.S.R. and the world by encouraging a continuation of the present arms race and
the present accompanying fears and tensions.
8. Because there will be objection to reduced arms spending on grounds of eco-
nomic effect in areas of arms production, let it be added that at least some of the
savings can be used for relocation of displaced workers but more importantly, funds
can be allocated to development of new energies, subsidizing of consumer purchases
of solar energy systems, necessary welfare programs and other such projects. Some
savings also could be used to reduce the inordinate national debt and its huge
interest cost.
523
CONCLUSION
The United States Senate should reject the SALT II treaty as predominantly an
exercise in futility which perpetuates excessive armament production and its accom-
panying evils.
As an alternative, the Senate should adopt a resolution referring the treaty back
to a joint United States-U.S.S.R. Study Committee composed of broad representation
from the societies of both nations, with instructions to create an agreement which
will reduce fears and tensions as well as armaments.
In addition, the Senate should adopt a resolution to encourage creation of an
international United Nations Charter Review Committee with instructions to revise
the charter in such ways, including revising the basis for Assembly voting rights, so
that the United Nations can become a more viable institution for the initiating of
effective international disarmament treaties.
Benjamin M. Becker,
Highland Park, III, July 19, 1979.
Hon. Frank Church,
U.S. Senator, Idaho, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Office
Building, Washington, D.C.
Dear Senator Church: As a concerned American, I take the liberty of writing to
you and the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with respect to
its current consideration of SALT II.
In April 1971, prior to adoption of SALT I on May 29, 1972, my article "The Myth
of Arms Control and Disarmament" appeared in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists (April 1971— Volume XXVII Number 4, copy enclosed). The major points made
there were that strategic arms control agreements are a myth and deceptive; that
the key to nuclear arms control and ultimately meaningful disarmament was to
work toward eliminating the mutual fears of the United States and the Soviet
Union of one another, and that such fears could possibly be alleviated over a period
of time by voluntary and reciprocal acts of nuclear arms control of the two super-
powers. SALT I has not arrested the nuclear arms race, and one of the few and
uncontested aspects of SALT II is that neither will it arrest the nuclear arms race.
I briefly note some observations for consideration by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
1. Americans do not trust the Russians and the Russians do not trust the Ameri-
cans. That mutual distrust has prevailed with ebb and flow since the day when the
United States recognized the Soviet Union during the days of Franklin Roosevelt.
Despite the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT I agreement, technical and cultural
exchanges and growing trade, this mutual distrust persists.
2. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have some reasonable basis for
their respective mistrust of one another, the United States with its bases surround-
ing the Soviet Union and nuclear submarines within attacking range of Russia and
the Soviet Union with its continuing quest for nuclear superiority (and perhaps
already achieved), its unrelenting encouragement of revolution throughout the
world and indirect aggression through its surrogate nations.
3. From the beginning, SALT has been nothing but a m5rth. During the entire
period from 1972 (SALT I) there has been a continuing development, deployment
and increase of nuclear arms, notwithstanding that SALT I was and SALT II is
being hailed as a step toward nuclear arms control.
4. Apart from worsening economic conditions, the current debate on SALT II is
sparking more divisiveness among Americans and encouraging disenchantment with
government. Americans are asking: How can their elected officials and experts
differ so sharply on an issue involving the very fate of civilization?
5. The failure of the Senate to approve SALT II will not be as tragic as contended
by its advocates. It is not the end-all of American relations with the Soviet Union.
Before approving SALT II we must be certain that it makes some meaningful
contribution to slowing the nuclear arms race. SALT I has not accomplished that
objective. There is no valid reason now to suppose that that will be done with SALT
II.
6. A major objection to SALT II asserted by opponents is that compliance by the
Russians is unverifiable. State Secretary Cyrus Vance and Defense Secretary Harold
Brown argue that violations of SALT II by the Soviet Union can be monitored, but
for some regison these assertions by the U.S. defense establishment are not convinc-
ing. Americans are asked to support SALT II without the confidence that there will
be compliance by the Soviet Union. Their record on compliance with SALT I is
replete with known violations.
524
7. In the final analysis, at no time in international history has any kind of arms
limitation agreement prevented, let alone restrained, war between the parties to
such agreements. Alleged violations of such agreements are not enforceable under
our sovereign-nation-international system. There is no international force, nor can
one be conceived, and by no means the United Nations, which can enforce interna-
tional arms control agreements. So to identify SALT as an agreement is a deceptive
misnomer. It is not an agreement. SALT is not enforceable. So all we have is an
understanding or a series of understandings which can be violated by either party
at will and at any time. So why mislead the American people that we have an
ageement? To call SALT an "agreement" does not make it so.
No nation has ever exercised restraint in going to war by reason of non-aggression
treaties or arms control agreements. Neither did the existence of the League of
Nations nor the United Nations Organization to which member nations are pledged
to maintain the peace prevent a series of small and large wars. So, why deceive the
American people that SALT will bring peace or strategic arms control.
8. A meaningful discussion of SALT II, and for that matter the whole subject of
strategic arms control, involves knowledge and understanding of highly technologi-
cal information, some of which, to be sure, is under high security secrecy. It is just
impossible for the average American and voter to be familiar with the technical
aspects of the SALT discussions. This may be even the case with some of the
Senators who are asked to vote on SALT II. Yet, the U.S. Senate is asked to ratify a
treaty where the basic technological considerations are subject to considerable con-
flict of opinion among the experts on both sides of the issue. No one has brought
into question the loyalty and patriotism of experts on each side — the President,
Vance, Brown, Warnke, Nitze, Rowny, Helms, Hart or Gam and many others. Yet,
they differ sharply on the facts and interpretation of SALT. How are the people
expected to be able to make some respectable judgment on the issue?
9. Proponents argue that SALT II for the first time places an upper limit on
certain nuclear arms. Opponents say this is not so. Proponents argue that SALT II
will "establish", "limit", "compel", "impose" certain things and at the same time
argue that SALT II is not a substitute for a strong defense, such as equipping our
strategic bomber force with long-range cruise missiles, placing the new longer-range
Trident I missile in our existing missile carrying submarines, etc. Both the propo-
nents and opponents agree that SALT II does not arrest the continuing race for
bigger and better nuclear arms. There is no restriction on continuing technological
research and development in nuclear arms by either party. Then why have SALT
II? Gen. Edward Rowny, who for six years represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff at
the SALT II negotiations, testified that SALT II "does not meet minimally accept-
able standards" for United States security and that "agreeing to a bad agreement is
worse than no agreement at all."
10. There is the claim by proponents of SALT II that the failure of the Senate to
approve the SALT II treaty or adding amendments would diminish the Soviet
Union's confidence that the President speaks for the nation, and that amendments
requiring renegotiation will lead to corresponding demands by the Soviet Union.
The Russians well know the American democratic processes in the adoption of
treaties. It is presumptuous for Brezhnev or Gromyko to warn that we better not
propose any amendments to the SALT II agreement. Let there be full and complete
consideration by the United States Senate, and if the consensus is that in the
interests of the United States there should be amendments, so be it. This should
constitute another excellent example of how democracy works. It will demonstrate
that while the President may speak for the nation what he says or does is subject to
the will of the people as expressed through their representatives. If the Russiaas
demand additional concessions in exchange for any proposed amendments, let us
cross that bridge when we reach it. If the Soviet sponsored amendments are reason-
able we can agree to them. If such amendments are contrary to the interests of U.S.
security, we might as well get it all on the table and know it now, and act
accordingly. Let us keep in mind that the Soviet leaders want SALT as much as we
do.
IL Finally, there is an absence of war and the existence of peace only when it is
in the interests of potential antagonists to abstain from war. With the penultimate
disastrous effects of nuclear warfare, the United States and the Soviet Union have
remained at peace. With the nuclear deterrence possessed by both superpowers,
restraint has been exercised out of fear. If it is fear which is the basis of concern by
the United States and the Soviet Union, does it not make sense, as suggested in my
article, to minimize, and hopefully eliminate, the causes of fear of one another?
Does it not make sense for the United States to explore what it is that the Russians
fear about the United States? Step by step we voluntarily and reciprocally take the
first small steps to alleviate such fears, starting with the removal of a base here and
525
there and initiating self-imposed limitations on specific nuclear weapons, stopping
there and awaiting reciprocal voluntary steps which in response would hopefully be
taken by the Soviet Union. Some will say that this is whistling in the dark, the
Soviets will never respond voluntarily. It is submitted that they are as likely to
respond as they would be with a SALT agreement, no more, no less. With claimed
verification capability by both superpowers and substantial equivalence in existing
nuclear power capability of destroying one another many times over, there is no
greater risk in the voluntary-reciprocal proposal than in unenforceable so-called
strategic arms limitations agreements.
The early lineup of proponents and opponents of SALT II long before negotiations
were completed and the President and Brezhnev signed the agreement gave the
appearance of an upcoming battle. Experts, political leaders lined up their forces
and the American people were showered with public relations presentations on each
side of SALT II. On the issue of survival from a possible nuclear conflict, there can
be no victors. It is clear from the public discussion thus far that the danger of
nuclear conflict is not diminished with or without SALT. Let's not divide the nation
more than it is divided by endless debate on SALT II.
I would appreciate if this presentation can be made part of the proceedings of
your Committee. I would welcome the opportunity to appear before your Committee
to present and discuss my views personally.
Statement of Roger A. Singerling, Hackettstown, N.J.
DOCENDO DISCIMUS
I was a U.S. Nav>' survival instructor for two and one-half years during the war
in Vietnam. U.S. Navy pilots and aircrewmen were serving in Southeast Asia and it
was mandatory that they be adequately prepared to survive if they were shot down.
They would also have to be prepared to evade the enemy; resist the enemy; escape
from the enemy. The records show that training received was highly beneficial to
U.S. Navy personnel who did become actual prisoners of war. They did survive
captivity and were returned home safely. Some of them are still on active duty;
some of them are now civilians and we are no longer at war with North Vietnam.
The SERE schools served their purpose.
The SERE schools did serve a purpose during the Vietnam era but I believe the
lessons learned are as applicable today as they were during the sixties and early
seventies and should not be ignored. We as a free nation must still be concerned,
deeply concerned about our survival — our survival as a world leader. Perhaps the
following insights will provide assistance in making a final determination regarding
ratification of the SALT II treaty as it was originally written.
Point
Freedom! Try to imagine what it would be like without it. As I sit at my
typewriter writing this I don't have to fear a knock on my door. I'm a citizen of the
United States of America, free to write and speak as I chose. I have peace of mind
because I know that what I write might help to make my country a better one,
whether or not my government agrees or disagrees with what I have to say.
Needless to say, I value my freedom very highly. But that was not always the case.
In August, 1965, I suddenly found myself adorned in a black uniform and being
referred to as Comrade Ivan, interrogater. I was being ordered by the U.S. Navy to
withhold freedom from my fellow navymen in a pseudo Communist prisoner of war
camp.
My initial reaction was: "What am I doing here? Why am I required to do this?
I've been trained by the U.S. Navy to be a hospital corpsman; trained to assist in
curing aches and pains — not inflict them." But as the training officer explained to
me upon reporting for duty: "The job you will be doing is an important one and it
will require a personality change — you are going to be the enemy. "
Change my personality. Become the enemy. As I gained on the job experience I
did manage to become more and more like them. I learned to be cruel and sadistic
like them. I learned how to quote passages from American newspapers to be used
for propaganda purposes. I became very adept at quoting anti-war statements from
the Holy Bible when appropriate or also if appropriate, ripping pages from it.
Occasionally I would set the Stars and Stripes afire; I learned to ignore the stench
of burning nylon. I learned how to instill fear in my fellow man through intimida-
tion and degradation. I did become like the enemy but I also became a better
American — I would never again take freedom for granted.
I had been in close physical and psychological contact with more than fifty
students a week, every other week, for two and one-half years; twenty-five hundred
526
Americans from varied backgrounds who repeatedly sacrificed their own comfort
and well being voluntarily without having a real gun held to their heads. They did
so because they believed in their country and what it was attempting to do for
them; they had learned about freedom too. Perhaps that was why there were not a
few tears being shed when we; students and instructors alike; stood together as we
saluted the flag at the end of the training program while the national anthem
played over the public address system where Communist propaganda had blared
from only moments before.
Point
Throughout these hearings it has been my observation that almost all testimony
and debate has focused consistently on the quantity, capabilities and individual
strengths of various weapons systems. As I interpret it, the consensus has been: that
due to the recent increases in Soviet military strength and due to the projection of
their future potential increases we in turn must match them weapon for weapon at
the very least. The theory being: that if the Soviets are able to go beyond parity
with us they might risk branching out due to an extra ounce of courage. This
consensus is probably a realistic one, however, what disturbs me is that the question
of our national unity has been barely touched upon. The Soviets appear to be
unified — unified through fear but unified none the less.
The Soviet Union reminds me of the typical bully on the block who is fully aware
of his motives. He knows from experience that if he just waits long enough, eventu-
ally someone weaker than he will come along to be taken advantage of.
Are we presently, perhaps, reacting like the weak, immature youngster, who,
thinking he might be confronted by the bully when he steps out into the street
takes a loaded shotgun from his father's gun cabinet before leaving his house? Is
our loaded shotgun going to be the M-X?
Just for a moment, consider the absurdity of the M-X taken out of context.
Consider the Dr. Strangelove atmosphere that hovers over it. Consider the ridicu-
lous labyrinth of roadways and tunnels. Consider the cost. The M-X is our saviour?
Technology is the ultimate weapon? If any member of this committee sincerely
believes that hypothesis then it seems to be democracy as we now know it is
endangered and peace as we expect it will not be forthcoming.
It is understandable that we should be concerned with the maze of nuclear
weapons now planted in the earth by both we and the Soviet Union, but I don't
believe either of us will ever be tempted to use them against each other — it's
inconceivable.
It's inconceivable because the United States being a Christian nation would never
initiate a first strike. It's inconceivable because the Soviet Union being the bully
that it is would never initiate a first strike due to their fear of a retaliatory one.
I sincerely feel we should be concerned about Soviet military strength, but the
emphasis must be centered on their conventional forces, not their nuclear arsenal. I
am inclined to believe they would launch a first strike somewhere in the world but
it would be a conventional strike not a nuclear one.
I believe we should begin in earnest to establish a firm foreign policy based on a
renewal of national unity. National unity should be our watch words for the
eighties because our degree of strength will be determined, can only be determined
by our degree of national unity.
Statement of Joseph E. Tracey, Jr., Wheaton, Md.
I am 72 years of age. I was born and raised on Capitol Hill, eight blocks from the
Capitol in Southeast Washington, D.C. I graduated from Georgetown Law School
with a LL.B and Doctors of Jurisprudence degrees. I retired in 1970 from the
Internal Revenue Service as an Estate and Gift Tax Attorney.
I served with the 29th Division in World War II in the Invasion of Normandy. I
received the Infantry Combat Badge, Arrow Head for the Normandy Invasion,
Presidential Citation Badge and the Bronze Star Medal for Valor and Meritorious
Services. I am a disabled veteran.
I submit my observations and opinions as an ordinary citizen with no technical
background or armed with statistics. I base my reasoning on intense listenings and
reading of the conflicting comments and testimony of "experts", I have also listened
and solicited opinions from my friends, neighbors, barber-shop talk, all from ordi-
nary citizens like myself who are and will be effected by the outcome of the treaty.
The premises that I think the committee should start out with is:
1. No one trusts the Russians.
2. No one suggests lowering our guard or weakening our military strength.
527
3. We all believe in the famous motto of one of our original colonies, "Don't Tread
on Me".
I sincerely think that the SALT II agreements should be ratified, because it is a
continuation of sincere efforts to reduce arms, it is not a "peace treaty". We do not
need months of testimony to know that the Russians will cheat. If they decide to go
to war a piece of paper will not stop them. What the signing of the treaty will do, is
keep the jaw-boning going, similar to the Middle East. As long as we talk and
communicate, the chance of war is postponed and hopefully a new generation of
Russians will see the folly of a holocaust or economic disaster.
If we do not ratify the SALT II, what do we have, isn't it status quo? Will not
ratifying bring peace with Russia? Will Russia disarm, will Russia stop infiltrating
wherever opportunity presents itself. To hear General Haig and Mr. Kissinger
testify to a Disarmament Agreement, stating that they agree to its ratification, only
on one condition, that we increase our defense spending, amazes me. Do you think
for one minute that the Russians will agree to this. Would you? A disarmament
treaty with the condition that we increase our arms is contradictory and ridiculous.
The State Department and experts on both sides worked on this agreement for
years with the full knowledge of prominent Senators. Kissinger, Haig, Ford and on
and on. Then suddenly when it is culminated, they suddenly discover that they have
reservations. This looks to me as if our leaders and representatives can't make a
decision or do not know what the score is. The American public would be utterly
confused if they didn't have the common sense that they possess. They know that
the only way to walk is to crawl first. They all say, "What can we lose by ratifying."
What do we lose by not ratifying. Answer these questions. We do not need months
of technical, confusing testimony.
My friends continually question the arms race. Congress and experts seem to be
obsessed with the idea that spending billions on defense will automatically give us
security. The only thing it is sure to do is to make the arms manufacturers rich,
more generals, more admirals, more experts, huge printing bills.
Military security must be based on economics, strength, patriotism and love of
country. The morale of our citizenry is not helped by the utter confusion amongst
our leaders on whether to ratify or not to ratify. What is the big concern about
Russia allowing us to observe. Would that keep her from cheating. If we caught her
cheating, what are we going to do about it? Protest certainly, and get a promise not
to do it again.
Ratify the treaty. Stop wasting money on defense. Dollars do not guarantee
security, wise spending, planning, employment and a restoring of confidence in our
people, for our leaders will give us changes. We can proceed with SALT III, IV, and
on and on with the hope that both sides will see the folly of ridiculous waste on
defense and spend the people's money on both sides, for economic stability and
mankinds stability. Stop playing politics and use the common sense that our Su-
preme Being endowed in us. Lets all remember John Kennedy, "It is not what your
country can do for you, but what you can do for your county.' Let Russia remember
our Motto. "Don't Tread on Me."
I did not use the 2500 words alloted to me because any more comments would be
excess verbage. I sincerely think that if we do not ratify we will have lost our last
opportunity of getting Russia to cooperate with us even to a limited degree. I cannot
imagine Russia or any other responsible government agreeing to go back to a treaty
table after being insulted by the dumping of an agreement that took years of
debate, compromising and good faith on both sides.
Let's ratify with hope and eternal vigilance and get on with getting our beloved
country strong again. Let's have more jobs, more military parades, waving of the
flag, integrity in our leaders. A strong patriotic America is a strong military
America. Let the free world see our determination to grab at any peace effort.
Ratification of SALT II is a good beginning. Let us not panic everytime Russia
builds a canoe by building two billion dollar aircraft carriers, which can be blown
out of the sea in five seconds.
o
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